(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "International law documents : Conference on the Limitation of Armament with notes and index, 1921"



O si i '■„.'■.!■ /..■ v.; / ) : Vk.y iirvJjFlLA. 




NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 
DOCUMENTS 



CONFERENCE ON THE 
LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT 

WITH NOTES 
AND INDEX 



1921 




WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1923 



ADDITIONAL COPIES 

OF THIS PUBLICATION MAY BE PROCURED FROM 

THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 

AT 

75 CENTS PER COPY 



PURCHASER AGREES NOT TO RESELLER DISTRIBUTEJTHIS 
COPY FOR PROFIT.— PUB. RES. 57, APPROVED MAY 11, 1922 



PREFACE. 



The joint resolution terminating the state of war between the 
United States and Austria and the United States and Germany 
was not signed till July 2, 1921. 

This joint resolution was embodied in treaties of peace signed 
August 24 and 25, 1921, respectively. During the early part of 
the year 1921 the discussion upon international law at the Naval 
War College gave attention to relations based upon the technical 
state of war then existing. 

The problems of the Conference on Limitation of Armaments, 
to which President Harding invited Great Britain, France, Italy, 
and Japan, on August 11, 1921, were also discussed. This Con- 
ference met on November 12, 1921, and adjourned on February 6, 
1922. 

It seems desirable that the results of the Conference on Limita- 
tion of Armament, so far as they relate most directly to the Navy, 
should be easily available to naval officers. Accordingly, the Pro- 
posal of the United States for Limitation of Naval Armament, the 
Minutes of the Committee on Limitation of Armament, and the 
Treaties and Resolutions of the Conference, with some additional 
material, is here brought together. 

The discussions upon international law at the Naval War Col- 
lege have been conducted by George Grafton Wilson, LL. D., pro- 
fessor of international law in Harvard University, and one of the 
legal advisers at the Conference on Limitation of Armament. 

This volume of the Naval War College Publications has been 
delayed in order that the work of the Conference on Limitation 
of Armament might be presented. 

C. S. Williams, 
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, 
President Naval War College, Newport, R. I. 
Novembee 20, 1922. 

in 



CONTENTS. 



Page. 

President's invitation to Powers to attend the Conference-- 1 

Proposal of the United States, Nov. 12, 1921 7 

Committee on Limitation of Armament : 

First meeting, Nov. 15, 1921 15 

Second meeting, Nov. 23, 1921 17 

Third meeting, Dec. 12, 1921 29 

Fourth meeting, Dec. 22, 1921, 11 a. m 31 

Fifth meeting, Dec. 22, 1921, 3 p. m - 47 

Sixth meeting, Dec. 23, 1921 63 

Seventh meeting, Dec. 24, 1921, 11 a. m__ 79 

Eighth meeting, Dec. 24, 1921, 3 p. m 94 

Ninth meeting, Dec. 28, 1921, 11 a. m 100 

Tenth meeting, Dec. 28, 1921, 3.30 p. m 112 

Eleventh meeting, Dec. 29, 1921, 11 a. m 120 

Twelfth meeting, Dec. 29, 1921, 3.30 p. m 133 

Thirteenth meeting, Dec. 30, 1921, 11 a. m 144 

Fourteenth meeting, Dec. 30, 1921, 3 p. m__ 157 

Fifteenth meeting, Jan. 5, 1922, 3.30 p. m 165 

Sixteenth meeting, Jan. 6, 1922, 11 a. m 181 

Seventeenth meeting, Jan. 7, 1922, 11 a. m 197 

Eighteenth meeting, Jan. 9, 1922, 11 a. m 221. 

Nineteenth meeting, Jan. 27, 1922, 4.15 p. m 235 

Twentieth meeting, Jan. 31, 1922, 3.30 p. m 237 

Twenty-first meeting, Feb. 3, 1922, 5.40 p. m 253 

Report of the American delegation 257 

I. Limitation of armament 257 

II. Pacific and Far Eastern questions 285 

Treaties and resolutions 291 

Treaties 291 

(1) A treaty between the United States of Amer- 

ica, the British Empire, France, Italy, and 

Japan, limiting naval armament 29.1 

(2) A treaty between the same Powers, in relation 

to the use of submarines and noxious gases 

in warfare 327 

(3) A treaty between the United States of Amer- 

ica, the British Empire, France, and Japan, 
signed Dec. 13, 1921, relating to their insular 

possessions and insular dominions in the 

Pacific Ocean 334 

v 



vi Contents: 

Treaties and resolutions — Continued. 

Treaties — Continued. Page. 

(4) Declaration accompanying the above Four- 

Power Treaty 339 

(5) A treaty between the same Four Powers, sup- 

plementary to the above, signed Feb. 6, 1922_ 340 

(6) A treaty between all Nine Powers relating to 

principles and policies to be followed in mat- 
ters concerning China 340 

(7) A treaty between the Nine Powers relating to 

Chinese customs tariff 342 

Resolutions 362 

No. 1. Resolution for a Commission of Jurists to 

consider amendment of Laws of War 362 

No. 2. Resolution limiting jurisdiction of Com- 
mission of Jurists provided in Resolution 
No. 1 363 

No. 3. Resolution regarding the sale of ships be- 
fore the ratification of the treaty limit- 
ing naval armament 364 

No. 4. Resolution regarding a Board of Reference 

for Far Eastern Questions 364 

No. 5. Resolution regarding Extraterritoriality in 

China 365 

No. 6. Resolution regarding Foreign Postal Agen- 
cies in China 369 

No. 7. Resolution regarding Armed Forces in 

China 370 

No. 8. Resolution regarding Radio Stations in 

China and accompanying Declarations 372 

No. 9. Resolution regarding unification of rail- 
ways in China and accompanying Decla- 
ration by China 375 

No. 10. Resolution regarding the reduction of Chi- 
nese Military Forces , 377 

No. 11. Resolution regarding existing commitments 

of China or with respect to China 378 

No. 12. Resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern 
Railway, approved by all the Powers, in- 
cluding China 381 

No. 13. Resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern 
Railway, approved by all the Powers, 

other than China 381 

Index 383 



PRELIMINARY NOTE. 



On July 8, 1921, the State Department of the United States 
inquired informally of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan 
whether they would participate in a conference on limitation of 
armament. The reply was favorable. Closely related to limita- 
tion of armament were the problems of the Pacific and Far East. 
These matters were also included in the agenda, and for the Pa- 
cific and Far Eastern questions the participation of Belgium, 
China, the Netherlands, and Portugal was also invited. 

The Conference met in Washington November 12, 1921, and ad- 
journed February 6, 1922. Seven plenary sessions were held. The 
Committee on Limitation of Armaments held 21 meetings. The 
Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions held 31 meet- 
ings. In addition to the above there were many meetings of 
special and sub committees. 

Seven treaties were signed and 13 resolutions were adopted. 
The French text of the treaties and resolutions has been printed 
on pages opposite the English texts. 

Full reports of the Conference on Limitation of Armament 
appeared in Senate Document No. 126, Sixty-seventh Congress, 
second session, 935 pages. The text of this Document No. 126 
is reproduced in the following pages so far as it concerns the 
limitation of naval armament. The text relating particularly to 
other matters is omitted. The paging of this volume does not co- 
incide with that of Senate Document No. 126, but the following is 
approximately the parallel paging: 



Invitation 

Agenda 

Proposal 

Committee meetings 

Report of delegation 

Treaties and resolutions 
Index 



Naval War College. 


Senate Document. 


1-3 


17-19. 


5. 


789. 


7-14 ,\ . 


56-63. 


15-256 


237-439. 


257-290. . : 


792-818; 863-868. 


291-382 


869-910. 


383-392 : 


911-935. 



After this Naval War College volume was in type the Govern- 
ment published a report of the conference with English and 
French texts upon opposite pages. The title of that report is 
Conference on Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 
12, 1921-February 6, 1922, and that report contains 1,757 pages. 
That volume does not contain the report of the American delega- 
tion to the President. 

vir 



CONFERENCE ON LIMITATION OF 
ARMAMENT. 

PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO POWERS. 

TEXT OF THE FORMAL INVITATION OF THE PRESIDENT, SENT BY THE 
SECRETARY OF STATE, AUGUST 11, 1921, TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF 
GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY, AND JAPAN, TO PARTICIPATE IN A 
CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT. 

The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his 
suggestion that there should be a Conference on the subject of 
Limitation of Armament, in connection with whMi Pacific and Far 
Eastern questions should also be discussed. 

Productive labor is staggering under an economic burden too 
heavy to be borne unless the present vast public expenditures are 
greatly reduced. It is idle to look for stability, or the assurance 
of social justice, or the security of peace, while wasteful and un- 
productive outlays deprive effort of its just reward and defeat 
the reasonable expectation of progress. The enormous disburse- 
ments in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the 
greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national 
prosperity ; and avoidable or extravagant expense of this nature 
is not only without economic justification but is a constant 
menace to the peace of the world rather than an assurance of 
its preservation. Yet there would seem to be no ground to expect 
the halting of these increasing outlays unless the Powers most 
largely concerned find a satisfactory basis for an agreement to 
effect their limitation. The time is believed to be opportune for 
these Powers to approach this subject directly and in conference ; 
and while, in the discussion of limitation of armament, the ques- 
tion of naval armament may naturally have first place, it has 
been thought best not to exclude questions pertaining to other 
armament to the end that all practicable measures of relief may 
have appropriate consideration. It may also be found advisable 
to formulate proposals by which in the interest of humanity 
the use of new agencies of warfare may be suitably controlled. 

It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance 
of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, 
and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless 
this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove causes 
of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to 

1 



2 president's invitation. 

principles and their application. It is the earnest wish of this 
Government that, through an interchange of views with the 
facilities afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a 
solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, of unquestioned 
importance at this ' time ; that is, such common understandings 
with respect to matters which have been and are of international 
concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship among our 
peoples. 

It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define 
the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far 
East, but rather to leave this to be the subject of suggestions to 
be exchanged before the meeting of the Conference, in the ex- 
pectation that the spirit of friendship and a cordial appreciation 
of the importance of the elimination of sources of controversy will 
govern the final decision. 

Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been made, 
and in the light of the gracious indication of its acceptance, the 
President invites the Government of the French Republic to par- 
ticipate in a Conference on the subject of Limitation of Armament 
in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will 
also be discussed, to be held in Washington on the 11th day of 
November, 1921. 

TEXT OF THE FORMAL INVITATION OF THE PRESIDENT, SENT BY THE 
SECRETARY OF STATE, AUGUST 11, 1921, TO THE GOVERNMENT OF 
CHINA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSION OF PACIFIC AND FAR 
EASTERN QUESTIONS, IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONFERENCE ON 
THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT. 

The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his 
suggestion that there should be a Conference on the subject of 
Limitation of Armament, in connection with which Pacific and 
Far Eastern questions should also be discussed. 

It is quite clear that there can be no final assurance of the 
peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the 
prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this 
desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove causes of 
misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to prin- 
ciples and their application. It is the earnest wish of this Gov- 
ernment that, through an interchange of views with the facilities 
afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a solution of 
Pacific and Far Eastern problems, of unquestioned importance 
at this time; that is, such common understandings with respect 
to matters which have been and are of international concern as 
may serve to promote enduring friendship among our peoples. 

It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define 
the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far 



PACIFIC AND FAR EAST. 6 

East, but rather to leave this to be the subject of suggestions to 
be exchanged before the meeting of the Conference, in the ex- 
pectation that the spirit of friendship and a cordial appreciation 
of the importance of the elimination of sources of controversy 
will govern the final decision. 

Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been made, 
and in the light of the gracious indication of its acceptance, the 
President invites the Government of the Republic of China to 
participate in the discussion of Pacific and- Far Eastern ques- 
tions, in connection with the Conference on the subject of Limi- 
tation of Armament, to be held in Washington on the 11th day 
of November, 1921. 

TEXT OF THE FORMAL INVITATION OF THE PRESIDENT, SENT BY THE 
SECRETARY OF STATE, OCTOBER 4, 1921, TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF 
BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND PORTUGAL, TO PARTICIPATE IN 
THE DISCUSSION OF PACIFIC AND FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS IN CON- 
NECTION WITH THE CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMA- 
MENT. 

Acting under telegraphic instructions from my Government I 
have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the invitation of 
the President of the United States to the Governments of France, 
Great Britain, Italy, and Japan to send representatives to a Con- 
ference to be held in the City of Washington on November 11, 
1921, on the subject of Limitation of Armament, in connection 
with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be dis- 
cussed, has been graciously accepted. The Government of China 
has also been pleased to accept the President's invitation to par- 
ticipate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions. 

It is the earnest wish of this Government that with the facili- 
ties afforded by a Conference it may be possible to find a solution 
of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, by a practical effort to reach 
such common understandings with respect to matters which have 
been and are of international concern as may serve to promote 
enduring friendship among our peoples. 

In view of the interest of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portu- 
gal in the Far East the President desires to invite Your Excel- 
lency's Government to participate in the discussion of Pacific and 
Far Eastern questions at the Conference, and I have the honor 
to enclose herewith the tentative suggestions as to the agenda 
of the Conference, relating to Pacific and Far Eastern questions, 
proposed by the Government of the United States. 



AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE. 

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT. 

1. Limitation of naval armament, under which shall be dis- 
cussed — 

(a) Basis of limitation. 
(6) Extent, 
(c) Fulfillment. 

2. Rules for control of new agencies of warfare. 

3. Limitation of land armament. 

PACIFIC AND FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS. 

3. Questions relating to China. 

(1) Principles to be applied. 

(2) Application. 

Subjects: (a) Territorial integrity. 

(&) Administrative integrity. 

(c) Open door — equality of commercial 
and industrial opportunity. 

{d) Concessions, monopolies, or preferen- 
tial economic privileges. 

(e) Development of railways, including 

plans relating to Chinese Eastern 
Railway. 

(f) Preferential railroad rates. 

(g) Status of existing commitments. 

2. Siberia (similar headings). 

3. Mandated islands (unless questions earlier settled). 
Electrical communications in the Pacific. 

5 



THE PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOR A LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMA- 
MENT. 



PRESENTED WITH THE ADDRESS OF CHARLES E. HUGHES, 
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICAN 
DELEGATE. 

The United States proposes the following plan for a limitation 
of the naval armament of the conferring nations. The United 
States believes that this plan safely guards the interests of all 
concerned. 

In working out this proposal the United States has been guided 
by four general principles : 

(A) The elimination of all capital shipbuilding programs, either 
actual or projected. 

(B) Further reduction through the scrapping of certain of the 
older ships. 

(C) That regard should be had to the existing naval strength 
of the conferring powers. 

(D) The use of capital ship tonnage as the measurement of 
strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary 
combatant craft prescribed. 

Capital Ships, 
united states. 

1. The United States to scrap all new capital ships now under 
construction and on their way to completion. This includes 6 
battle cruisers and 7 battleships on the ways and building and 2 
battleships launched. 

Note. — Paragraph 1 involves a reduction of 15 new capital 
ships under construction, with a total tonnage when completed 
of 618,000 tons. Total amount of money already spent on 15 
capital ships, $332,000,000. 

2. The United States to scrap all battleships up to, but not in- 
cluding, the Delaware and North Dakota. 

Note. — The number of old battleships scrapped under para- 
graph 2 is 15 ; their total tonnage is 227,740 tons. The grand 
total of capital ships to be scrapped is 30, aggregating 845,740 
tons. 

7 



b CAPITAL SHIPS. 

GREAT BRITAIN. 

3. Great Britain to stop further construction of the 4 new 

Hoods. / 

Note. — Paragraph 3 involves a reduction of 4 new capital 
ships not yet laid down, but upon which money has been spent, 
with a total tonnage when completed of 172,000 tons. 

4. In addition to the 4 Hoods, Great Britain to scrap her pre- 

dreadnaughts, second-line battleships, and first-line battleships up 

to but not including the 'King George V class. 

Note. — Paragraph 4 involves the disposition of 19 capital 
ships (certain of which have already been scrapped) with a ton- 
nage reduction of 411,375 tons. The grand total of ships 
scrapped under this agreement will be 583,375 tons. 

JAPAN. 

5. Japan to abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, 

viz., the Kii. Owari, No. 7, No. 8, battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 

8, battle cruisers. 

Note. — Paragraph 5 does not involve the stopping of" con- 
struction on any ship upon which construction has begun. 

6. Japan to scrap 3 battleships : the Mutsu launched, the Tosa 
and Kaga building ; and 4 battle cruisers : the Amagi and Akagi 
building, and the Atago and Takao not yet laid down but for 
which certain material has been assembled. 

Note. — Paragraph 6 involves a reduction of 7 new capital 
ships under construction, with a total tonnage when completed 
of 289,100 tons. 

7. Japan to scrap all predreadnaughts and capital ships of the 

second line. This to include the scrapping of all ships up to but 

not including the Settsu. 

Note. — Paragraph 7 involves the scrapping of 10 older ships 
with^a total tonnage of 159,828 tons. The grand total reduc- 
tion^^ tonnage on vessels existing, laid down, or for which 
material has been assembled is 448,928 tons. 

FRANCE AND ITALY. 

8. In view of certain extraordinary conditions due to the World 
War affecting the existing strengths of the navies of France and 
Italy, the United States does not consider necessary the discussion 
at this stage of the proceedings of the tonnage allowance of these 
nations, but proposes it be reserved for the later consideration of 
the Conference. 

OTHER NEW CONSTRUCTION. 

9. No other new capital ships shall be constructed during the 
period of this agreement except replacement tonnage as pro- 
vided hereinafter. 



REPLACEMENTS. 



9 



10. If the terms of this proposal are agreed to, then the United 
States, Great Britain, and Japan agree that their navies, three 
months after the making of this agreement, shall consist of the 
following capital ships: 

List of capital ships. 



United States. 


Great Britain. 


Japan. 


Maryland- 


Royal Sovereign. 


Nagato. 


California. 


Royal Oak. 


Hiuga. 


Tennessee. 


Resolution. 


Ise. 


Idaho. 


Ramillies. 


Yamashiro. 


Mississippi . 


Revenge. 


Fu-So. 


New Mexico . 


Queen Elizabeth. 


Settsu. 


Arizona. 


Warspite. 


Kirishima. 


Pennsylvania. 


Valiant. 


Haruna. 


Oklahoma. 


Barham. 


Hi-Yei. 


Nevada. 


Malaya. 


Kongo. 


Texas. 


Benbow. 




New York. 


Emperor of India. 




Arkansas. 


Iron Duke. 




Wyoming. 


Marlborough. 




Utah. 


Erin. 




Florida. 


King George V. 


' 


North Dakota. 


Centurion. 




Delaware. . 


Ajax. 

Hood. 

Renown. 

Repulse. 

Tiger. 




Total 18 


22 


10 


Total tonnage 500, 650 


604, 450 


299, 700 







DISPOSITION OF OLD AND NEW CONSTRUCTION. 

11. Capital ships shall be disposed of in accordance with 
methods to be agreed upon. 

REPLACEMENTS. 



12. (a) The tonnage basis for capital ship replacement under 
this proposal to be as follows : 

United States 500,000 tons 

Great Britain 500,000 tons. 

Japan 300, 000 tons. 

(&) Capital ships 20 years from date of completion may be re- 
placed by new capital ship construction, but the keels of such 
new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to 
replace is 17 years of age from date of completion; provided, 
however, that the first replacement tonnage shull not be laid 
down until 10 years from the date of the signing of this agree- 
ment. 

(c) The scrapping of capital ships replaced by new construc- 
tion shall be undertaken not later than the date of completion 

25882—23 2 



10 AUXILIARY CRAFT. 

of the new construction and shall be completed within three 
months of the date of completion of new construction ; or if the 
date of completion of new construction be delayed, then within 
four years of the laying of the keels of such new construction. 

(d) No capital ships shall be laid down during the term of 
this agreement whose tonnage displacement exceeds 35,000 tons. 

(e) The same rules for determining tonnage of capital ships 
shall apply to the ships of each of the Powers party to this agree- 
ment. 

(f) Each of the Powers party to this agreement agrees to in- 
form promptly all of the other Powers party to this agreement 
concerning : 

(1) The names of the capital ship's to be replaced by new 

construction ; 

(2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage; 

(3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage; 

(4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid 

down ; » 

(5) The actual date of completion of each new ship; 

(6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced. 

(g) No fabricated parts of capital ships, including parts of 
hulls, engines, and ordnance, shall be constructed previous to the 
date of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of such 
parts will be furnished all Powers party to this agreement. 

(h) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of capital 
ships they may be replaced by new capital ship construction in 
conformity with the foregoing rules. 

Auxiliary Combatant Craft. 

13. In treating this subject auxiliary combatant craft have been 
divided into three classes : 

(a) Auxiliary surface combatant craft. 

(&) Submarines. 

(c) Airplane carriers and aircraft 

(a) AUXILIARY SURFACE COMBATANT CRAFT. 

14. The term auxiliary surface combatant craft includes cruis- 
ers (exclusive of battle cruisers), flotilla leaders, destroyers, and 
all other surface types except those specifically exempted in the 
following paragraph. 

15. Existing monitors, unarmored surface craft, as specified in 
paragraph 16, under 3,000 tons, fuel ships, supply ships, tenders, 
repair ships, tugs, mine sweepers, and vessels readily convertible 
from merchant vessels are exempt from the terms of this agree- 
ment. 



NEW CONSTRUCTION. 11 

16. No new auxiliary combatant craft may be built exempt from 
this agreement regarding limitation of naval armaments that ex- 
ceed 3,000 tons displacement and 15 knots speed and carry more 
than four 5-inch guns. 

17. It is proposed that the total tonnage of cruisers, flotilla 

leaders, and destroyers allowed each Power shall be as follows : 

For the United States 450, 000 tons. 

For Great Britain 450,000 tons. 

For Japan 270, 000 tons. 

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose 
total tonnage in auxiliary surface combatant craft on November 
11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to 
scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time 
the total tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft for each nation 
shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated. 

Limitation of new construction. 

18. (a) All auxiliary surface combatant craft whose keels have 
been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to com- 
pletion. 

(b) No new construction in auxiliary surface combatant craft 
except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter shall be laid 
down during the period of this agreement ; provided, however, 
that such nations as have not reached the auxiliary surface com- 
batant craft tonnage allowances hereinbefore stated may con- 
struct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance. 

Scrapping of old construction. 

19. Auxiliary surface combatant craft shall be scrapped in ac- 
cordance with methods to be agreed upon. 

(&) SUBMARINES. 

20. It is proposed that the total tonnage of submarines allowed 
each Power shall be as follows : 

For the United States , , 90, 000 tons. 

For Great Britain 90, 000 tons. 

For Japan 54,000 tons. 

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement 
whose total tonnage in submarines on November 11, 1921, exceeds 
the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess 
tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total ton- 
nage of submarines for each nation shall be reduced to the pre- 
scribed allowance as herein stated. 

Limitation of new construction. 

21. (a) All submarines whose keels have been laid down by 
November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion. 



12 AIRCRAFT. 

(b) No new submarine tonnage except replacement tonnage as 
provided hereinafter shall be laid down during the period of this 
agreement ; provided, however, that such nations as have not 
reached the submarine tonnage allowance hereinbefore stated may 
construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance. 

Scrapping of old construction. 

22. Submarines shall be scrapped in accordance with methods 
to be agreed upon. 

(C) AIRPLANE CARRIERS AND AIRCRAFT. 
AIRPLANE CARRIERS. 

23. It is proposed that the total tonnage of airplane carriers 
allowed each Power shall be as follows : 

United States 80,000 tons. 

Great Britain 80,000 tons. 

Japan 1 48, 000 tons. 

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose 
total tonnage in airplane carriers on November 11, 1921, exceeds 
the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess 
tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total ton- 
nage of airplane carriers for each nation shall be reduced to the 
prescribed allowance as herein stated. 

Limitation of new construction. 

24. (a) All airplane carriers whose keels have been laid down 
by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion. 

(&) No new airplane carrier tonnage except replacement ton- 
nage as provided herein shall be laid down during the period of 
this agreement ; provided, however, that such nations as have 
not reached the airplane carrier tonnage hereinbefore stated may 
construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance. 

Scrapping of old construction. 

25. Airplane carriers shall be scrapped in accordance with 
methods to be agreed upon. 

Auxiliary Combatant Craft, 
replacements. 

26. (a) Cruisers 17 years of age from date of completion may 
be replaced by new construction. The keels for* such new con- 
struction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to 
replace is 15 years of age from date of completion. 



REPLACEMENTS. 13 

(&) Destroyers and flotilla leaders 12 years of age from* date of 
completion may be replaced by new construction. The keels of 
such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is 
intended to replace is 11 years of age from date of completion. 

(c) Submarines 12 years of age from date of completion may be 
replaced by new submarine construction, but the keels of such 
new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which the 
new tonnage is to replace is 11 years of age from date of com- 
pletion. 

(d) Airplane carriers 20 years of age from date of completion 
may be replaced by new airplane carrier construction, but the 
keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage 
which it is to replace is 17 years of age from date of completion. 

(e) No surface vessel carrying guns of caliber greater than 8 
inches shall be laid down as replacement tonnage for auxiliary 
combatant surface craft. 

(f) The same rules for determining tonnage of auxiliary com- 
batant craft shall apply to the ships of each of the Powers party 
to this agreement. 

(g) The scrapping of ships replaced by new construction shall 
be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new 
construction and shall be completed within three months of the 
date of completion of the new construction, or if the completion 
of new tonnage is delayed, then within 4 years of the laying of 
the keels of such new construction. 

(h) Each of the Powers party to this agreement agrees to in- 
form all of the other Powers party to this agreement concerning: 

(1) The names or numbers of the ships to be replaced by 

new construction; 

(2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage; 

(3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage; 

(4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid 

down ; 

(5) The actual date of completion of each new ship; 

(6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced, 
(i) No fabricated parts of auxiliary combatant craft, including 

parts of hulls, engines, and ordnance, will be constructed previous 
to the date of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of 
such parts will be furnished all Powers party to this agreement. 
(j) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of ships of this 
class they may be replaced by new construction in conformity 
with the foregoing rules. 

Aieceaft. 

27. The limitation of naval aircraft is not proposed. 

Note. — Owing to the fact that naval aircraft may be readily 
adapted from special types of commercial aircraft, it is not 
considered practicable to prescribe limits for naval aircraft. 



14 TRANSFERS. 

General Restriction on Transfer of Combatant Vessels of 

All Classes. 

28. The Powers party to this agreement bind themselves not 
to dispose of combatant vessels of any class in such a manner that 
they later may become combatant vessels in another navy. They 
bind themselves further not to acquire combatant vessels from 
any foreign source. 

29. No capital ship tonnage nor auxiliary combatant craft ton- 
nage for foreign account shall be constructed within the jurisdic- 
tion of any one of the Powers party to this agreement during the 
term of this agreement. 

Merchant Marine. 

30. As the importance of the merchant marine is in inverse ratio 
to the size of naval armaments, regulations must be provided to 
govern its conversion features for war purposes. 



MINUTES OF COMMITTEE ON 
LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT. 



FIRST MEETING— TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1921, 4 P. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood. Accompanied by Mr. J. Butler Wright. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Mr. Pearce (for Australia), Sir 
John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Ac- 
companied by Sir Maurice Hankey. 

France. — Mr. Briand, Mr. Sarraut. Accompanied by Mr. Mas- 
sigli. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi Ricci, Senator Al- 
bertini. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Baron Shide- 
hara. Accompanied by Capt. Yamanshi, Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general. 

Interpreter, Mr. Camerlynck. 

1. The first meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Arma- 
ment met in the Hall of the Americas at the Pan American Build- 
ing at 4 p. m., Tuesday, November 15, 1921. 

2. There were present for the United States, Mr. Hughes, Sen- 
ator Lodge, Mr. Root, and Senator Underwood ; for the British 
Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Sir Robert 
Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John 
Salmond (for New Zealand), and Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for 
France, Mr. Briand and Mr. Sarraut (MM. Viviani and Jusserand 
being absent) ; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi Ricci, 
and Senator Albertini ; for Japan, Admiral Baron Kato, Prince 
Tokugawa, and Baron Shidehara. The secretary general and Mr. 
Camerlynck, as interpreter, were also present. 

SECEETARIES. 

3. It was resolved that all secretaries and experts should tem- 
porarily withdraw, with the exception of one secretary for each 
delegation. Accordingly the following secretaries remained: 
Messrs. Wright, for the United States ; Hankey, for the British 
Empire ; Massigli, for France ; Marquis Visconti-Venosta, for 
Italy; and Capt. Yamanashi, for Japan (accompanied by Mr. 
Ichihashi, interpreter for Admiral Baron Kato). 

15 



16 COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION. 

SECEETAEY TO THE COMMITTEE. 

4. The secretary general of the conference was appointed secre- 
tary to the committee with the understanding that he would be 
allowed one assistant. 

EECOED OF PEOCEEDINGS. 

5. It was agreed that no verbatim stenographic report of the 
proceedings of the committee should be kept, but that each secre- 
tary of a delegation should coordinate with the secretary general 
for the compilation of a collective and mutually satisfactory 
proces verbal. 

METHODS OF PEOCEDTJEE FOE DEALING WITH AMEEICAN DELEGATION'S 

PEOPOSALS. 

6. The committee then proceeded to the discussion of the 
method to be followed in conducting the study of the proposals 
advanced by the American delegation with respect to naval dis- 
armament and the other suggestions advanced during the discus- 
sion of the subject at the second plenary meeting of the confer- 
ence. The suggestion of the chairman, Mr. Hughes, was adopted 
that the reference of questions to expert subcommittees should 
be only for the purpose of supplying information, settling ques- 
tions of fact, and obtaining their advice and recommendation, the 
committee in no way thereby delegating its authority or binding 
itself to adopt such reports or advice. 

TECHNICAL SUBCOMMITTEE CONSTITUTED. 

7. The committee further agreed that (1) there be constituted an 
expert subcommittee consisting of one technical expert designated 
by each delegation, who should enjoy the right at meetings of the 
subcommittee of the advice and services of such other technical 
advisers as each member of the subcommittee might desire, and 
(2) that one technical adviser for each delegation, in addition to 
the secretary of such delegation, should be present at each meet- 
ing of the committee with respect to limitation of naval arma- 
ment. 

The following naval advisers were nominated and appointed: 
Col. Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, for the 
United States; Admiral of the Fleet Beatty, for the British Em- 
pire ; Admiral de Bon, for France ; Admiral Acton, for Italy ; Ad- 
miral Baron Kato, for Japan ; with full power of substitution 
and revocation in each case. At the suggestion of Mr. Balfour, 
Col. Roosevelt was appointed chairman of this technical subcom- 
mittee. The committee determined that the technical subcom- 



PUBLICITY. 17 

mittee should convene at once to consider the proposals advanced 
by the American delegation with respect to naval disarmament 
and the other suggestions advanced during the discussion of the 
subject at the second plenary meeting of the. conference, the sub- 
committee to report as soon as possible to the committee consid- 
ering the questions upon which it might find itself in agreement. 

FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEE. 

8. The chairman expressed the desire that any member of the 
committee who might consider that a meeting of the committee 
would be opportune should communicate immediately with him. 

PUBLICITY OF WORK OF SUBCOMMITTEE. 

9. The committee, in supporting the suggestion of Mr. Briand 
that the expert subcommittee should submit at the earliest pos- 
sible moment their recommendations on questions on which 
agreement could easily be reached, resolved that the expert sub- 
committee should be notified that it is the instrument of the 
committee alone and that publicity with regard to any of the 
subjects under discussion should therefore be given solely through 
the medium of the committee. 

The committee then adjourned subject to the call of the chair. 



SECOND MEETING— WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 11 A. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root. Ac* 
companied by Mr. Butler Wright. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), 
Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). 
Accompanied by Sir Maurice P. Hankey, Gen. Lord Cavan. 

France. — Mr. Briand, Mr. Viviani, Mr. Jusserand. Accom- 
panied by Mr. Massigli. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Alber- 
tini. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa. Accompanied 
by Maj. Gen. Tanaka, Mr. Saburi, Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general. Accompanied by Mr. W. P. Cresson. 

Interpreter, Mr. Camerlynck. 

The Committee on the Limitation of Armaments held its second 
meeting in the Columbus Room, Pan American Union Building, at 
11 a. m., Wednesday, November 23, 1921. 



18 MR. BRIAN'S SPEECH. 

There were present : For the United States, Mr. Hughes, Sen- 
ator Lodge, Mr. Root, accompanied by Mr. Butler Wright ; for 
the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes 
Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Aus 
tralia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (foi 
India), accompanied by Sir Maurice P. Hankey, Gen. Lord Cavan ; 
for France, Mr. Briand, Mr. Viviani, Mr. Jusserand, accompanied 
by Mr. Massigli ; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi- 
Ricci, Senator Albertini, accompanied by Marquis Visconti- 
Venosta, Count Pagliano ; for Japan, Admiral Baron Kato, Prince 
Tokugawa, accompanied by Maj. Gen. Tanaka, Mr. Saburi, Mr. 
Ichihashi. 

The secretary general, accompanied by Mr. Cresson, was pres- 
ent. Mr. Camerlynck (interpreter) was also present. 

The chairman, Mr. Hughes, announced that he had been in- 
formed by the Japanese Ambassador that the Japanese Govern- 
ment had ' appointed Mr. Masanao Hanihara a plenipotentiary 
delegate. 

The chairman then said that the committee had been convened 
to see what could be done with certain questions not yet taken 
up. The naval subcommittee was not yet ready to report, so he 
supposed the committee might take up such other questions as the 
members desired. 

Mr. Briand asked for the floor in order to express his keen 
regret at being forced to give up his collaboration in the work 
of the conference, as that day was the last one that he was spend- 
ing in Washington. He considered it one of the greatest honors 
of his political life to have been able to participate, even for a 
time, in the proceedings of the conference, which had followed the 
noble, generous, and courageous initiative taken by the American 
Government. He wished to say once more something which he 
had been unable to express at the last plenary session with all 
the emotion which he felt : How deep was his gratitude to his 
colleagues for the words spoken by them and addressed to France. 
It was certain that the exchange of friendly declarations which 
had taken place before the whole world had enabled Europe to 
take a great step forward on the road to peace ; this had, in fact, 
brought about a moral situation without the existence of which 
it would have been hard, indeed, to reach a positive result. No 
longer would anyone be able to say that the armaments of France 
masked offensive intentions. Speaking frankly, it had been prac- 
tically a necessity for France that these words should be uttered ; 
she had been so sharply attacked ; she had been credited with so 
many hidden motives that, in foreign lands, some had ventured 
to doubt her real purposes. On the morrow — and this was one 
of the reasons for which Mr. Briand had to return to Paris — the 



MR. hughes' reply. 19 

French Government and the French Parliament would take up 
the consideration of the military problem as it presented itself 
after the war and the victory ; they would take it up with a de- 
sire to make the greatest possible progress in the realm of the 
reduction of military burdens. The duration of military service 
would very probably be reduced by one-half. Thanks to the words 
spoken at Washington, these decisions would be reached in a 
serene atmosphere. 

Mr. Briand wished to add that he departed without anxiety, 
since he left his mandate in the hands of Mr. Viviani, who, during 
his previous trips to America, had created for himself universal 
sympathies. It was certain that in his hands the interests of 
France would be well safeguarded. 

The chairman replied that he was sure that nothing he could 
say would adequately express the regret that all the delegates 
felt at Mr. Briand's departure, for they had all admired his elo- 
quent presentation of the case of France, and had all felt a deep 
affection, which would remain with them permanently, for Mr. 
Briand. [Applause.] He felt, he said, that they were about to 
suffer, not only great personal loss but loss as well in the progress 
of their work. The memory of the last plenary session and of his 
moving address would always remain with them, and whatever 
might be the work that they might subsequently perform, there 
was nothing whatever that would ever surpass the interest of 
that occasion. They thought they understood the situation in 
France ; certainly the opportunity had not been lacking of fairly 
judging it. France, they realized, was moved by a common de- 
sire to be freed from the burden of armament and at the same 
time to be assured of her own safety. She must now feel a sense 
of moral solidarity, with friends and well-wishers who would 
never forget. He trusted that Mr. Briand left with the senti- 
ment that it had been a privilege for him to assist in these meet- 
ings. On behalf of the American Government he expressed 
America's sense of the high honor conferred by the leader of the 
Government in France in coming here, and America's recognition 
of the lasting tie that united the two peoples, a tie that had 
never been stronger than it was at the moment. [Applause.] 

Mr. Balfour said he did not wish to add to or modify the ad- 
mirable and eloquent speech made by the chairman in response 
to Mr. Briand. All must regret his departure on private no less 
than on public grounds. He was glad that Mr. Briand had found 
it possible to attend the opening of this conference, notwithstand- 
ing that the heavy responsibilities of a French prime minister 
weighed upon him. He rose, not for the purpose of repeating 
in worse language what the chairman had stated, but to raise a 
purely business question. The subject of land armaments was not 



20 OTHER REPLIES. 

regarded as settled even for France, and he understood it was to 
be raised in the French Chamber. He wished to know if it were 
proposed to raise it at the present conference. Although the 
question of land armaments as affecting France had been raised 
by Mr. Briand, there was no doubt that there were other impor- 
tant subjects relating to land armaments which deserved consider- 
ation. He would like to know in what order it was proposed to 
take them up. He did not suppose they were regarded as settled 
by the speeches made in public discussion. It was worth deliber- 
ating what steps it might be desirable to take in this important 
branch of the question of limitation of armaments affecting land 
warfare. If nothing could be done in the matter, there would be 
a sense of disappointment in Europe, as well as in America, 
and the opportunity could hardly be allowed to pass without some 
consideration of how the question ought to be dealt with. 

The chairman asked whether Mr. Balfour had any suggestions 
to make, to which the latter replied that he had not. 

Senator Schanzer said that he wished to join cordially in the ex- 
pressions of regret which had been uttered here upon the occasion 
of Mr. Briand's approaching departure. The situation of France 
had been most eloquently described to the conference by Mr. 
Briand, and, speaking for the Italian delegates, he said they were 
glad to have been able to express their feelings of friendship for 
France, and to say that they understood perfectly the peculiarities 
and difficulties of her situation. Mr. Briand had communicated 
his point of view to the conference in a public session. The ques- 
tion of the limitation of armaments was considered of the highest 
importance in Italy. And, moreover, public opinion in other 
countries was agreed that something ought to be done regarding 
this matter. Italy could not, indeed, forget the heavy burdens 
that armaments had forced her to bear, and the taxes and fiscal 
necessities which resulted therefrom. All must hope that it 
would be possible to ameliorate that situation. It was not his 
intention, at that time, to advance a formal proposal in the name 
of the Italian Government, although Italy desired to act in this 
matter in full agreement with the other powers. However, it 
seemed necessary to state Italy's definite intention to approach 
this question practically and as soon as possible. 

He felt that the committee should avoid giving to the world the 
impression that this conference, called to examine so important a 
question, had avoided the issue, or rather that it had sought to set 
aside indefinitely the solution of the problem. Such a course, he 
believed, would create a very bad impression in Italy. 

While presenting no formal motion upon the subject, and while 
desiring to conform to the decisions of the conference, the 
speaker ventured to express the opinion that it would be advis- 
able to continue the study of this question, without neglecting all 



HOPES AND FEARS. 21 

that concerned the traffic in arms and munitions, the means of 
war, as well as the other points indicated in the agenda of the 
conference. 

Mr. Briand said he was desirous of stating his opinion that the 
conference was facing a serious situation. Senator Schanzer and 
Mr. Balfour had said the conference had taken up the problem 
under consideration, and that it could not give up its discussion 
without creating among the peoples of the earth a feeling of keen 
disappointment. But what solution would be satisfactory to all 
the nations? Could they be content with an expression of platonic 
aspirations? The French delegation was ready to join in such an 
expression most heartily. But it was precisely such action that 
would bring disappointment to the nations. 

Was it the intention to debate the problem seriously? One 
country and one only was under discussion — France. Could France 
join in such an undertaking? The conference had conceded that 
her situation was exceptional. Under these circumstances and 
since the Governments there represented did not offer to assume, 
by a formal contract, a share of the burdens and perils that had 
fallen to her lot, they did not have the right to fix a limit to her 
armament. It was, indeed, the most sacred principle of national 
safety and sovereignty that was at stake. Since a full knowledge 
of the danger did not elicit the declaration that the peril would 
be shared, it could not equitably be said to France: Under such 
and such conditions and with such and such an army you are to 
face this danger. 

What was it that Senator Schanzer wanted? Did he mean that, 
France being left to her own resources, her military situation 
should be determined by the conference? Mr. Briand did not be- 
lieve so. If such an undertaking were attempted, nothing would 
be accomplished and France would be placed in the attitude of 
isolation, which he dreaded. Soon it would be said that France 
alone had been an obstacle to the great work of the limitation of 
armaments. Mr. Briand hoped that no such situation could pos- 
sibly arise. 

The terms of the problem would be altogether different if any 
other country were exposed to similar risks, but such was not the 
case. The conference had accepted the explanations that the dele- 
gate from France had presented in public session ; Mr. Briand de- 
clared this was his understanding, if the words that had been 
spoken had any meaning. In view of this fact, he did not see 
what could be gained by general discussion of the question. 

On the other hand, there was a series of limited problems, and, 
however delicate these might be, they could be taken up to ad- 
vantage, for instance, aircraft and the use of gases in warfare. 
But it was impossible to deal with the fundamental problem of 



22 Italy's position. 

land armament and to determine a maximum of effectives and of 
materiel for each nation as could be done in the case of navies. 

Mr. Briand desired to be clearly understood;' while obliged to 
leave Washington, he did not wish to leave such an essential point 
in doubt. He was unwilling to risk that some day the peoples of 
the earth might be told that if the problem of the limitation of 
land armaments had not been settled it was because of the opposi- 
tion of France. 

Senator Schanzer said that his reply would be very precise and 
very clear, for it would be deplorable to allow any misunder- 
standing to arise. The question of limitation of armament was 
of very special importance to Italy, as she had already limited, 
as far as possible, her own armaments. Furthermore, he might 
be permitted to observe that this question did not concern France 
alone ; it concerned central Europe also and the new countries 
created since the war, which already possessed considerable 
armies, or were engaged in organizing them. It was in the inter- 
est of all Europe that this problem should be examined. Mr. 
Briand had asked the question : What was it Senator Schanzer 
wanted? Senator Schanzer took the liberty of reminding the com- 
mittee that Mr. Balfour had expressed the same anxiety that he 
himself had just manifested with regard to the results of this 
conference. Since the question had been asked, it must be an- 
swered, if not that day, at least at some other time. It seemed 
to him almost useless to state that no one had any intention of 
giving advice to France or of setting a limit to what she consid- 
ered a necessary minimum of armament for insuring her own 
safety. In his speech the day before he had publicly expressed 
the most friendly feelings for France, and he wished to repeat, 
with heartfelt sincerity, the same sentiments. But that could 
hardly prevent the Italian delegation from explaining its point of 
view. There was, moreover, one point on which he could scarcely 
agree with Mr. Briand. The latter had asked : If the conference 
did not intend to reduce armaments, what was the use of an 
expression of platonic aspirations? The Italian delegation, Sena- 
tor Schanzer stated, believed that in this matter the affirmation 
of certain principles was also of some importance. He did not 
think that it would be useless to take into consideration ques- 
tions of principle ; they were not futile questions, and their con- 
sideration was not without importance. He hoped he had made 
himself clear. 

The Italian delegation did not propose immediate reduction of 
armament in Europe, because, among other reasons, he recognized 
that there were several nations concerned in the matter which 
were not taking part in the meeting. The Italian delegation be- 
lieved that the committee should come to an agreement, with the 
idea that its members must all endeavor to secure a limitation of 



LAND ARMAMENT. 23 

armament. They also believed in the advantage of a resolution 
expressing the hope that this object might be attained as soon 
as possible. He agreed with Mr. Briand, besides, as to the 
advantage there would be in discussing at once the secondary 
questions. He hoped he had expressed himself with all necessary 
clearness. 

Mr. Balfour asked to be allowed to say one or two words to dis- 
sipate a misconception which perhaps Mr. Briand's words might 
have occasioned. Mr. Briand had suggested— indeed, he had 
almost laid it down as a principle — that limitation of land arma- 
ments could only apply to one country, namely, France, and that 
no one who recognized — as Mr. Balfour had himself recognized — 
the special position of France, owing to the existence of the great 
nation on her eastern frontier, ought to raise a discussion on the 
subject. After the words he had spoken in public conference, 
no one would suspect him of misconceiving the cause for which 
France had stood and still stood. He had himself signed the tri- 
partite agreement under which Great Britain would come to 
the assistance of France in the event of any unprovoked move- 
ment of aggression against her being made by Germany. Mr. 
Briand should ■ realize from the terms of Mr. Balfour's speech 
what Great Britain felt in regard to France's position. But if 
Mr. Briand said that the question of limitation of land arma- 
ments must not be discussed, he was pressing his argument too 
far. It was impossible entirely to disassociate land from sea 
armaments. The people of Great Britain were so dependent on 
the sea for their being and existence that it was impossible for 
them to regard the question of sea power as entirely disassociated 
from land power. 

Another point : No word had yet been said at the conference 
on the question of aerial warfare. It was surely not proposed 
to exclude this question and that of the armaments required to 
repel aerial attack. It could not be admitted that this was to 
be barred from future discussion because France was in a diffi- 
cult position in regard to her eastern frontier. Great Britain, in 
spite of her insular position, was exposed to air attack, and could 
not admit that this question should be set aside. It would be dan- 
gerous for the conference to pass a resolution excluding from the 
scope of its agenda land power, and air power in relation to land 
power. Mr. Balfour hoped, therefore, that Mr. Briand would 
understand that Great Britain, though a party of the unratified 
treaty and far from being indifferent to the special position of 
France, could not consent to the whole question of land and air 
armaments being on that account withdrawn from the purview 
of the conference. 

Mr. Briand observed that he had specially wished to state that 
the conference could proceed with the discussion of questions such 



24 FRENCH POSITION. 

as aircraft and use of gases. On these points, therefore, he met 
Mr. Balfour's wishes, but he would like to have more definite 
information in connection with the first part of his speech. 

If the conference proceeded with the problem as a whole, the 
French delegation would like to know what result would be ob- 
tained. From a naval point of view a definite program had 
been presented. But the same thing could not be done in regard 
to land armaments. If the committee desired to confine itself 
to a recommendation, well and good ; the French delegation had 
prepared a text, but it had given up the plan of presenting it in 
order not to cause embarrassment and not to place certain Gov- 
ernments in a delicate position before their pacifists. 

For his part, however, Mr. Briand had no fear of the pacifists ; 
their object was not nearly so much peace as revolution. In so 
far as he was concerned, Mr. Briand undertook to vanquish their 
opposition. But if it appeared desirable to vote upon a text, the 
French delegation would ask that it should contain a , precise 
statement to the effect that the exceptional situation of France 
had been taken into account. 

Mr. Briand recalled to the committee that at The Hague Con- 
ference it was Germany that opposed the presentation of the dis- 
armament problem ; Mr. Briand could not allow that by reason 
of a badly worded resolution France might be put in the posi- 
tion of appearing unwilling to follow the other Governments 
in the path of disarmament. He had already stated what France 
had accomplished. Italy had not done anything different, for 
if she had reduced the number of men under the colors she 
had not modified her military laws. No doubt she would do this 
and would go further than France in the matter ; Mr. Briand 
envied her ability to do so. The reason was obvious ; the new 
States of central Europe were not enemy States ; Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Poland were either created or en- 
larged by the Allies. 

France was alone in having an enemy on her frontier. Recently 
Mr. Lloyd-George, in an eloquent speech had acknowledged this ; 
Great Britain had the sea ; Italy had her natural frontiers. 
Such was not the position of France. She had rashly reduced 
the term of military service to two years. In consequence a few 
months ago at a critical moment she had but one trained class at 
her disposal. The tasks which had devolved upon France in the 
execution of the treaties of peace and which had no especial bear- 
ing upon French interests had compelled her to maintain 180,000 
soldiers outside of France ; thus she had on the Rhine only 40,000 
trained soldiers, while the German army numbered 100,000 men. 
What would have happened, he asked, if hostilities had broken 
out? 



LAND ARMAMENT. 25 

If, therefore, it were desired to formulate a general recom- 
mendation, Mr. Briand would not oppose the step. But in that 
case the exceptional position of France must be recorded and it 
must be made clear that she could do nothing in the way of land 
disarmament so long as the situation remained unchanged. It 
was true that Great Britain had offered her assistance to France 
in case of danger, but a condition had been attached to this 
assistance, and this condition had not been fulfilled. France now 
enjoyed the friendship of Great Britain and that of the United 
States, which was assuredly a precious possession but not a 
moral support. In case of attack France should be able to defend 
herself alone. 

Mr. Briand declared himself quite ready to join in a recom- 
mendation, but only under the conditions that he had just stated. 
Otherwise it might be said that the conference was animated by 
the best intentions and, but for the obstacle presented by France, 
would have accomplished an important work and there would 
again be talk of " French imperialism." 

Should, therefore, a recommendation be all that was desired, it 
might be drawn up at once. Nothing, on the other hand, seemed 
to prevent the conference from taking up the definite problems 
that had been mentioned. 

The chairman said that in making a list of topics for the Amer- 
ican agenda, the American Government had been fully conscious 
of the difficulties involved in a discussion of land armament. The 
American Government understood the special situation of France, 
and had realized, too, that other Governments might express their 
views candidly and fully, and that some special difficulty might be 
found in the case of each of them which would prevent such a 
reduction as would satisfy the peoples of the world. Other coun- 
tries, not represented, would have to be considered. But this sub- 
ject had been included, first, because the American Government 
had no desire to foreclose any helpful consideration of views and 
their presentation either in public or privately; and, second, be- 
cause it was thought important not to limit discussion exclusively 
to naval limitation, since some important instruments of warfare 
could not be regarded as exclusively naval. The American Govern- 
ment desired to take account of actual conditions. No one wished 
to embarrass France, but what was wanted was to make progress 
toward the desired goal. It seemed to be recognized that there 
were some subjects which the committee could discuss. In the 
agenda the American Government had put in new agencies of 
warfare. The chairman's thought was that the committee should 
consider how it might satisfy the liberal opinion of the world con- 
cerning subjects dealt with. It might establish a subcommittee, 
similar to that on Chinese revenue, to get under way, for example, 
25882 — 23 3 



2G ADVANTAGE OF DISCUSSION. 

on the subject of aircraft and gas. These questions were not re- 
garded as easy. It did not seem fitting to call a conference for 
the limitation of armament and not to consider these questions. 
Any attempt to define a limit for military forces would be in vain. 
He did not believe that it could be done at that time. Each na- 
tion would do that for itself under the pressure of its own people. 
Even if the committee were not able to agree on a detailed state- 
ment in respect, for instance, to aircraft, still it could show that 
it was giving such subjects extensive consideration. It was 
known how established rules on international law had been 
blown to pieces. Some expression of the opinion of the civilized 
world in this regard should be made in the conference. 

Mr. Root said he wished to suggest an idea in connection with 
those so ably and appropriately expressed. It was this : Whether 
the committee succeeded or not in reaching a definite conclusion 
upon any matter connected with the limitation of land armament, 
sincere and practical consideration and discussion of the subject 
would itself greatly relieve the situation and furnish the com- 
mittee with a base from which some advance, not otherwise pos- 
sible, might be made thereafter. The mere ascertaining of the 
obstacles in the way was itself a step in advance, changing vague 
and indefinite impressions, regarding matters to which they had 
not addressed their minds, into definite ascertainment of the 
particular reasons why a definite agreement could, or could not, 
be reached. This might bring many minds to a consideration of 
methods which would lead to future progress. Many failures 
preceded almost every success. The clear and cogent statement 
by Mr. Briand in the plenary session of the particular situation 
which would satisfy France— still bearing the heavy burden of a 
great army — would of itself create a new situation by carrying 
a definite concept to the millions of minds which are the back- 
grounds to the governments of the world. It was impossible to 
do more now toward the reduction of land forces than to set 
those minds to. working out ways of overcoming obstacles. That 
was no slight advantage in the world of democracies. The com- 
mittee might rest assured that, if it went on with the considera- 
tion of the problems of land armament, it was accomplishing 
something very useful, even though it did not reach an agree- 
ment. 

The chairman pointed out that one of two courses was open 
to the committee in order to get on with its work. In the first 
place, it might refer to the committee on program and procedure 
(composed of the heads of the five powers) the subject of land 
armament and of new agencies of warfare, or else appoint a 
special committee to take up the different phases of the subject. 
Or, as a second solution, it might now proceed to take up the 
subject, provided, of course, that it was desired to take up the 



COMMITTEES PROPOSED. 27 

discussion of particular subjects then and there. He then sug- 
gested that attention be focused on the particular points that had 
to do with the progress of the committee's work. 

Sir Robert Borden said that surely no member of the com- 
mittee would think of imposing upon France, the victim of two 
unprovoked attempts in the last 50 years, any conditions that her 
people would regard as obnoxious. Yet he ventured to express 
the hope that the Government of Prance might, in the early 
future, find conditions so developed as to enable her to reduce her 
military preparations even below the point suggested by Mr. 
Briand. That, however, was by the way. He now wished to em- 
phasize the point that the minds of all the people of the world 
were concentrated on the conference and its works, and that the 
members of the conference would be left in a very unfortunate 
situation if they took the position that they could not discuss the 
reduction of land armament. That discussion must take place, 
with due regard to what had been urged by France. The sta- 
bility of the public opinion of the world and the return to normal 
conditions depended upon the progress made with this question 
as well as with others. The situation was difficult, but it seemed 
to him that this condition could be best met by a conference be- 
tween the heads of the different delegations. He ventured to ex- 
press the hope that a clear solution might be arrived at. 

The chairman now formally asked what disposition it was de- 
sired to make of the matter. 

Lord Lee said that it was in the power of any State to say what 
it liked about any subject or to decline to discuss any subject. If 
that were a general right, it was certainly France's right, but he 
was inclined to think that that should not preclude other States 
from discussing what they wanted. 

Mr. Briand stated that the French delegation was ready to ap- 
point three subcommittees : One on aircraft, one on gases, and the 
third on subjects relating to the laws of war. With a definite 
program in hand, these subjects might be taken up. In the same 
way the question of naval armaments had been approached with 
a definite program in view. In regard to the general question, 
Mr. Briand repeated that he needed certain further explanations. 
What was to be discussed? A limitation of armament? Matters 
of effectives and war materiel? France could not appoint an 
expert to take part in a committee of that nature. If a definite 
proposal of collaboration were advanced, if it were a question of 
establishing in common an international force with the duty of 
maintaining order, well and good — disarmament might be con- 
sidered. If the peoples of the earth were as eager as was claimed 
to see armaments limited, their representatives had only to say: 
A danger exists; we recognize it; we will share it with you 
shoulder to shoulder ; here is our signature. In that case France 



28 REFERENCE TO COMMITTEE. 

would fully agree to consider the problem of the limitation of 
armaments. But up to that time no such proposal had been 
heard, and along those lines nothing but declarations had yet ap- 
peared. France had realities to deal with ; she had suffered from 
them 5 years ago and 50 years ago. A French administration 
which should enter upon the course into which certain members of 
the conference would entice it would be false to its mandate. 
Mr. Briand had received from the French Parliament a very ex- 
plicit mandate; France might agree to any reductions of arma- 
ment, if her safety were guaranteed. If she were alone, she could 
agree to nothing. 

Mr. Briand said he must, then, either disobey his mandate or 
call upon his colleagues to reflect upon the gravity of the problem. 
He had the right to demand precise information as to the con- 
templated discussions. If a definite program were presented, 
France was ready to discuss it; but no such program could be 
laid down. There were but two solutions: Either to confirm the 
existing situation and let it go at that, or else to say to France, 
" We will join forces ; here is our signature." These words, Mr. 
Briand said, he would hear with the greatest satisfaction, but up 
to that time they had not been uttered. No nation facing a ques- 
tion of life or death could present the problem otherwise. 

When the enemy was at the door, when one saw one's country 
torn asunder, 600,000 homes destroyed, factories leveled to the 
ground, thousands of peasants living in holes, the soil itself laid 
waste, when through the streets passed 2,000,000 of crippled men 
and under the ground lay 1,500,000 dead, that was not a platonic 
situation, and one did not discuss aspirations, but realities. No 
statesman aware of his responsibilities would present the question 
otherwise. 

Senator Lodge believed that the best and most practical plan 
would be to refer the matter to the committee on program and 
procedure, with power to arrange subcommittees on aeronautics, 
poison gases, and the law of nations. 

The chairman inquired if that were agreeable, and the com- 
mittee unanimously assented. 

Senator Schanzer <said that since he had had the opportunity 
to mention the States of central Europe which had been created 
since the war, and in order to avoid any possible misunderstand- 
ing, he wished to make a formal statement that, not only did 
Italy not consider them as foes, but that she looked upon them 
as friendly States; that she was the enemy of no people, having 
no reasons for conflict with any nation whatsoever. He would 
further add that the Italian delegation agreed to the proposal 
to submit the question to the committee on program and pro- 
cedure. 



THIRD MEETING. 29 

The chairman said that it was then 1 o'clock and suggested 
that the committee adjourn subject to the call of the Chair. The 
committee would meet after lunch and after the full membership 
of the committee on Pacific and far eastern questions had been 
consulted. 

The communique was then prepared: 

CONFEKENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT. 

(For the Press. November 23, 1921.) 

The committee on the subject of the Limitation of Armament 
met at the Pan American Building at 10.30 this morning. All the 
members were present except Baron Shidehara and Signor Meda. 
After a general discussion of the subjects relating to land arma- 
ment and new agencies of warfare, these were referred to the 
subcommittee consisting of the heads of the delegations with 
instructions to bring in an order of procedure with regard to these 
subjects and with power to appoint subcommittees to deal with 
the questions relating to poison gas, aircraft, and rules of inter- 
national law. 



THIRD MEETING, COLUMBUS ROOM, PAN AMERICAN UNION BUILDING, 
MONDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1921, 1 P. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root. Ac- 
companied by Mr. Wright. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice 
Hankey, Mr. Lampson. 

France. — Mr. Viviani, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand. Accom 
panied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Massigli, Mr. Gamier, Mr. Duchene. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini. Accompanned by 
Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Mr. Fileti, Mr. Cora, Mr. Giannini. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara. 
Accompanied by Mr. Saburi, Mr. Saito, Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general. Accompanied by Mr. Cresson. 

Interpreters, Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon. 

1. The third meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Arma- 
ment was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union 
Building on Monday, December 12, 1921, at 1 p. m. 

2. The following were present for the United States, Mr. 
Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root; for the British Empire, Mr. 
Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Senator Pearce (for 



30 TECHNICAL COMMITTEE. 

Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri 
(for India) ; for France, Mr. Viviani, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand; 
for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini ; for Japan, Admiral 
Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara. 

3. Secretaries and advisers present included the following for 
the United States, Mr. Wright ; for the British Empire, Sir 
Maurice Hankey, Mr. Lampson ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. 
Massigli, Mr. Gamier, Mr. Duchene ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti- 
Venosta, Mr. Fileti, Mr. Cora, Mr. Giannini ; for Japan, Mr. 
Saburi, Mr. Saito, Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, was present. 
Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon (interpreters) were also 
present. 

4. All the members being present at a previous meeting of the 
Pacific and far eastern committee, the chairman, Mr. Hughes, 
called a meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament 
to discuss a change of procedure. The chairman referred to the 
subcommittee which had been appointed by the Committee on 
Limitation of Armament to deal with the questions of naval 
armament and to which certain persons had been appointed in 
order to benefit by their expert advice. He now suggested that 
this procedure be modified and that in its place a subcommittee 
be appointed consisting of the heads of delegations, and in addi- 
tion, as representing each delegation, a civilian (who might or 
might not be a delegate), and a naval expert. The chairman 
stated that this suggestion had been made with the object of ob- 
taining expert advice and expediting decisions by the principal 
delegates at the same time. 

Senator Schanzer asked whether he was to understand that the 
decisions of this committee were to be referred to the plenary 
committee or whether it was a mere change in subcommittee. 

The chairman stated that he believed the latter to be the sense 
of the committee. 

Mr. Hanihara asked whether it was in order to bring only one 
naval expert, in which case he desired that Baron Kato be accom- 
panied by an interpreter. 

The chairman then ruled that interpreters would not count in 
this matter and could attend. 

Senator Schanzer asked whether in place of a civil and tech- 
nical delegate he might bring two technical delegates. 

The chairman stated that the permission allowed was for a 
delegate, a naval expert, and a civilian. 

Mr. Balfour stated that the British Empire delegation would be 
composed of Lord Lee, Mr. Balfour, and Admiral Chatfield. 

The chairman stated that the American delegation would con- 
sist of himself, Col. Roosevelt, and Admiral Coontz. 



FOURTH MEETING. 31 

Mr. Viviani declared that the French delegation would be com- 
posed of Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, and Admiral de Bon. 

The chairman said that the meeting of this committee would be 
subject to the call of the Chair. 

The meeting then adjourned. 



fOURTH MEETING, COLUMBUS ROOM, PAN AMERICAN UNION BUILD- 
ING, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1921, 11 A. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by 
Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zea- 
land), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice 
Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousley. 

France. — Mr. Sarrant, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. 
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, 
Mr. Ponsot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Alber- 
tini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Vis- 
conti-Venosta, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Veg- 
liasco. 

Japan. — Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, 
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi, Commander Hori. 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont, 
and Mr. Wilson ; interpreters, Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon. 

1. The fourth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Arma- 
ment was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union 
Building on Thursday, December 22, 1921, at 11 a. m. 

2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, 
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Ad- 
miral Coontz ; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir 
Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert 
Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John 
Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, 
Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon; for Italy, Sen- 
ator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Ad- 
miral Acton ; for Japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice 
Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. 

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were pres- 
ent : For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark ; for the Brit- 
ish Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. 
Mousley; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend- 



32 PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT. 

'hal, Mr. Ponsot ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Commander 
Prince Ruspoli, Mr.* Celesia di Vegliasco ; for Japan, Mr. Ichi- 
hashi, Commander Hori. The secretary general, accompanied by 
Mr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont, and Mr. Wilson, was present. Mr. 
Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon were present as interpreters. 

4. The chairman, Mr. Hughes, opened the meeting by saying 
that, as the members of the committee would recall, at the first 
meeting of this Committee on the Limitation of Armament a sub- 
committee, consisting of technical experts, had been appointed 
for the purpose of giving information and advice in connection 
with the proposal formulated by the American Government and 
any other matters that might be considered pertinent. That com- 
mittee had proceeded with its deliberations. Conversations be- 
tween the heads of the United States, British Empire, and Jap- 
anese delegations with respect to the definite proposals for the 
limitation of the capital ships of those three nations had followed. 
An agreement had been reached between the three powers con- 
cerning their capital ships, which, however, was a provisional one, 
so far as the number of capital ships to be scrapped and the num- 
ber to be retained was concerned, depending for its final and 
definite adoption upon the future action of France and Italy. 

The chairman stated that it had been found advisable to en- 
large the subcommittee, which, it would be recalled, was originally 
composed exclusively of naval experts, in effect forming a new 
subcommittee in its place ; this new subcommittee had been com- 
posed of one delegate for each of the five powers, together with 
one naval expert and one ^civilian (who might be a delegate or 
not), so that expert and political opinions might be more closely 
related. 

The chairman was glad to say that at the first meeting of this 
new subcommittee (which had been called the subcommittee of 
fifteen on naval limitation), he had been able to announce that 
an agreement, provisional while awaiting the decision of France 
and Italy, had been reached between the delegations of the United 
States, the British Empire, and Japan. This agreement being 
familiar to all, he did not wish to take time to read it, but desired 
to have it incorporated in the records of this committee, as though 
it had been stated in full, as follows : 

" The following are the points of agreement that have been 
reached in the course of the negotiations between the United 
States of America, Great Britain, and Japan with respect to their 
capital fighting ships. 

"An agreement has been reached between the three powers — the 
United States of America, the British Empire, and Japan — on 
the subject of naval ratio. The proposal of the American Gov- 
ernment that the ratio should be 5 : 5 : 3 is accepted. It is agreed 
that with respect to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific 



RATIO OF SHIPS. 33 

region, including Hongkong, the status quo shall be maintained — 
that is, that there shall be no increase in these fortifications and 
naval bases except that this restriction shall not apply to the 
Hawaiian Islands, Australia, New Zealand, and the islands com- 
posing Japan proper, or, of course, to the coasts of the United 
States and Canada, as to which the respective powers retain their 
entire freedom. 

" The Japanese Government has found special difficulty with 
respect to the Mutsu, as that is their newest ship. In order to 
retain the Mutsu Japan has proposed to scrap the Settsu, one of 
her older ships, which, under the American proposal, was to have 
been retained. This would leave the number of Japan's capital 
ships the same— that is, 10, as under the American proposal. The 
retention of the Mutsu by Japan in place of the Settsu makes a 
difference in net tonnage of 13,600 tons, making the total tonnage 
of Japan's capital ships 313,300 tons, as against 299,700 tons under 
the original American proposal. 

" While the difference in tonnage is small, there would be con- 
siderable difference in efficiency, as the retention of the Mutsu 
would give Japan two post-Jutland ships of the latest design. 

" In order to meet this situation and to preserve the relative 
strength on the basis of the agreed ratio, it is agreed that the 
United States shall complete two of the ships in course of con- 
struction — that is, the Colorado and the Washington — which are 
now about 90 per cent completed, and scrap two of the older 
ships — that is, the North Dakota and the Delaware — which, under 
the original proposal, were to be retained. This would leave the 
United States with the same number of capital ships — that is, 18, 
as under the original proposal — with a tonnage of 525,850 tons, 
as against 500,650 tons as originally proposed. Three of the ships 
would be post-Jutland ships of the Maryland type. 

"As the British have no post-Jutland ships, except one Hood, 
the construction of which is only partly post-Jutland, it is agreed 
that in order to maintain proper relative strength the British 
Government may construct two new ships not to exceed 35,000 
legend tons each ; that is, calculating the tonnage according to 
British standards of measurement, or, according to American cal- 
culations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons each. 

" It is agreed that the British Government shall, on the com- 
pletion of these two new ships, scrap four of their ships of the 
King George V type — that is, the Erin, King George V, Centurion, 
and Ajax, which were to have been retained under the original 
American proposal. This would leave the British capital ships 
in number 20, as against 22 under the American proposal. Tak- 
ing the tonnage of the two new ships according to American cal- 
culations, it would amount to 74,000, and the four ships scrapped, 
having a tonnage of 96,000 tons, there would be a reduction in 



34 INCREASE IN TONNAGE. 

net tonnage of 22,400 tons, leaving the British tonnage of capital 
ships 582,050 instead of 604,450. This would give the British as 
against the United States an excess tonnage of 56,200 tons, which 
is deemed to be fair, in view of the age of the ships of the Royal 
Sovereign and the Queen Elizabeth types. 

" The maximum limitation for the tonnage of ships to be con- 
structed in replacement is to be fixed at 35,000 legend tons — that 
is, according to British standards of measurement, or, according 
to American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons — in order 
to give accommodation to these changes. The maximum tonnage 
of capital ships is fixed, for the purpose of replacement, on the 
basis of American standards of calculation, as follows: 

Tons. 

United States 525,000 

Great Britain „ 525, 000 

Japan 315, 000 

" Comparing this arrangement with the original American pro- 
posal, it will be observed that the United States is to scrap 30 
ships as proposed, save that there will be scrapped 13 of the 15 
ships under construction and 17 instead of 15 of the older ships. 

" The total tonnage of the American capital ships to be scrapped 
under the original proposal, including the tonnage of ships in 
construction if completed, was stated to be 845,740 tons. Under 
the present arrangement the tonnage of the 30 ships to be 
scrapped, taking that of the ships in construction if completed, 
would be 820,540 tons. 

" The number of the Japanese ships to be retained remains 
the same as under the original proposal. The total tonnage of 
the ships to be scrapped by Japan under the original American 
proposal, taking the tonnage of new ships when completed, was 
stated to be 448,928 tons. The total tonnage of the ships to be 
scrapped under the present arrangement is 435,328 tons. 

" Under the original proposal Great Britain was to scrap 19 
capital ships (including certain predreadnaughts already 
scrapped), whereas under the present arrangement she will scrap 
4 more, or a total of 23. The total tonnage of ships to be 
scrapped by Great Britain, including the tonnage of the four 
Hoods, to which the proposal referred as laid down, if completed, 
was stated to be 583,375 tons. The corresponding total of scrapped 
ships under the new arrangement will be 22,600 tons more, or 
605,975 tons. 

" Under the American proposal there were to be scrapped 66 
capital fighting ships built and building, with a total tonnage 
(taking ships laid down as completed) of 1,878,043 tons. Under 
the present arrangement, on the same basis of calculation, there 
are to be scrapped 68 capital fighting ships, with a tonnage of 
1,861,643 tons. 



FRENCH AND ITALIAN TONNAGE. 35 

" The naval holiday of 10 years with respect to capital ships, 
as originally proposed by the American Government, is to be main- 
tained except for the permission to construct ships as above 
stated. 

" This arrangement between the United States, Great Britain, 
and Japan is, so far as the number of ships to be retained and 
scrapped is concerned, dependent upon a suitable agreement with 
France and Italy as to their capital ships, a matter which is now 
in course of negotiation." 

The chairman, continuing, reported that the subcommittee of 
fifteen on naval limitation had proceeded to consider the question 
of capital ship tonnage with regard to France and Italy. Admiral 
de Bon had very eloquently presented a proposal on behalf of the 
French Government which had been discussed. He would not at- 
tempt to describe the course of that discussion. It would be suffi- 
cient for him to say that there had been a discusssion of the 
French desire to be free to build 10 capital ships of 35,000 tons 
each. The American delegation had stated its understanding that 
the present composition of France's first line navy was 7 capital 
ships, totaling 164,000 tons, and 3 predreadnaughts, giving an ap- 
proximate total tonnage of 221,000 tons. He had pointed out 
that the other Governments had agreed to scrap their predread- 
naughts without planning to replace them. Apart from this, the 
agreement to scrap capital ship tonnage represented for the three 
powers a cut of about 40 per cent in their capital ship tonnage 
exclusive of predreadnaughts. In the case of France, a similar 
reduction would have meant a reduction to about 102,000 tons. 
It had been considered fair not to ask so much of France, but that 
she should be free to keep all of her 10 ships, including the 3 pre- 
dreadnaughts. In replacing her old ships, however, France was 
asked to keep her Navy down to 175,000 tons. 

He had reported further that Italy had expressed the desire to 
maintain a naval parity with France. Italy was perfectly satis- 
fied with the limit of 175,000 tons for capital ships so long as 
it applied equally to France and Italy. He had understood 
that the French Government was also content with parity with 
Italy. Admiral de Bon had, however, presented a complete state- 
ment of France's position, of her desire to be free to have 10 
ships in the course of time to put her fleet on a footing she con- 
sidered necessary and fitting, and to begin the replacement of 
her warships at an earlier date, due to the condition of her 
dockyards and to the fact that she had already refrained from 
building for some years. 

' In view of his responsibilities as chairman and considering 
that Mr. Briand had been present at the earlier sessions of the 
conference and shown such a strong wish to see it succeed, he, 
with the knowledge of the French representative, had sent a 



36 MR. HUGHES TO MR. BRIAND. 

message to Mr. Briand and received a reply. This correspondence 
being familiar to all, he would regard it as now submitted and 
ordered spread upon the records, as follows: 

" December 16, 1921. 

" My Dear M. Briand : In view of your distinguished service 
at the Conference on Limitation of Armament and of my respon- 
sibilities as chairman of the conference, I venture to address to 
you this personal word. I am happy to say that the conversations 
between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan as to the 
proposal which I made on behalf of the American Government at 
the opening of the conference with respect to capital ships have 
resulted in a provisional agreement. Great Britain and Japan 
have accepted the naval ratio as proposed and the reduction of 
capital ships, with such modifications as do not seriously affect 
the principle involved. Japan keeps the Mutsu and scraps the 
Settsu. The United States finishes two ships, the Colorado and 
the Washington, now about 90 per cent completed, and scraps the 
North Dakota and Delaware. Great Britain will build two new 
ships and scrap four, to wit, the Erin, King George V, Centurion, 
and Ajax. The result is that the United States still scraps 30 
ships — that is, 13 of the ships under construction and 17, instead 
of 15, of the older ships, leaving the number of ships the same 
as under the original proposal, with a tonnage of 525,000 tons, 
instead of 500,000 tons. Thus the United States scraps 322,000 
tons of her ships (exclusive of predreadnaughts). Great Britain 
and Japan scrap to an equivalent extent. Japan retains the 
same number of ships as proposed and scraps 17 as proposed, 
her new tonnage being 313,300, instead of about 300,000. 

" Great Britain scraps 22,600 tons more than originally pro- 
posed, leaving her tonnage 582,000 instead of 604,400, her excess 
being allowed in view of the age of her existing ships. The new 
limits are very little different from those proposed, being 525,000 
tons for the United States and Great Britain, and 315,000 tons 
for Japan. The naval holiday as to capital ships is agreed upon 
except for the construction of the ships above mentioned. In 
short, under the original American proposal there were to be 
scrapped by the three powers 66 capital fighting ships, built and 
building, with a total tonnage (taking ships laid down as com- 
pleted) of 1,878,000 tons. Under the present arrangement, on 
the same basis of calculation, there are to be scrapped 68 capital 
fighting ships, with a tonnage of 1,861,000 tons. 

" You will thus observe that there has been simply a slight 
readjustment in the three navies with respect to the ships re- 
tained, but that the sacrifices proposed by the American Govern- 
ment have substantially been made and the principle as laid down 
is being carried out so far as these three powers are concerned. 



MR. HUGHES TO MR. BRIAND. 37 

" The agreement, however, as to the number of ships to be 
retained by them is dependent upon an appropriate agreement 
with France and Italy with respect to their capital ships. Italy 
is desirous to reduce her capital ships, because of the obvious 
requirements of her economic life, to the lowest possible basis 
and there will be not the slightest difficulty in making an agree- 
ment with Italy if we can reach a suitable understanding with 
France. 

" You will observe the attitude of France will determine the 
success or failure of these efforts to reduce the heavy burden of 
naval armament. 

" In dealing with Great Britain and Japan we have taken facts 
as they are. We have avoided an academic discussion of national 
needs and aspirations which in the nature of things could not 
be realized. It has been pointed out that the ratio of strength in 
capital ships is that which exists and that it is futile to desire a 
better one, for it can not be obtained if nations with abundant 
resources build against each other in competition. The predread- 
naughts possessed by the three powers are to be scrapped without 
any suggestion of replacement, and there has been a reduction 
of over 40 per cent of the naval strength represented by dread- 
naughts and superdreadnaughts. Now, France has seven dread- 
naughts, with a tonnage of 164,500. Reducing in the same pro- 
portion as the United States has reduced, her tonnage of capital 
ships would be fixed at 102,000, or if the predreadnaughts of 
France were taken into calculation on her side although omitted 
on the side of the United States, the total tonnage of France's 
capital ships being taken at 221,000, a reduction on the same basis 
would reduce France to 136,000 tons. 

" This would be the sacrifice of France if she made the same 
sacrifices that have been made by the other powers. We do not 
ask this. We are entirely willing that France should have the 
benefit of an increased tonnage which would preclude the neces- 
sity of her scrapping her dreadnaughts ; that is to say, her pres- 
ent strength in dreadnaughts is about 164,000 tons, and there is 
not the slightest objection to allowing this and an increase over 
this, or a total of 175,000 tons, which would be more than 70,000 
tons over what she would have on the basis of relative strength as 
it exists. 

" If it be said that France desires a greater relative strength, 
the obvious answer is that this would be impossible of attainment. 
If such an agreement as we are now proposing were not made, the 
United States and Great Britain would very shortly have navies 
of over a million tons, more than 6 to 1 as compared with France, 
and France would not be in a position to better herself, much less 
by any possible endeavor to obtain such a relative strength as has 
been suggested. In short, the proposed agreement is tremendously 



38 MR. BRIAND TO MR. HUGHES. 

in favor of France by reducing the navies of powers who not only 
are able to build but whose ships are actually in course of con- 
struction to a basis far more favorable to France than would 
otherwise be attainable. The proposed agreement really doubles 
the relative strength of the French Navy. 

" In these circumstances I feel that the suggestion that has been 
made that France should build 10 new capital ships in replace- 
ment, with a tonnage of 300,000 tons or more, suggests a program 
of such magnitude as to raise the greatest difficulties. In fact, I 
regret to say that after canvassing the matter thoroughly and 
taking the best information I can obtain, I am compelled to con- 
clude that it would not be possible on this basis to carry through 
the agreement. 

" I need not point out to you our great desire, which you your- 
self have so eloquently expressed, that the economic burden of 
armament should be lifted. It is not against the interests of 
France that we express the hope that her industry and resources 
will be devoted to economic recuperation and the enhancement of 
her prosperity rather than be expended in the building of fighting 
ships. The particular situation of France with respect to land 
armament you have vividly portrayed, but that points, as it seems 
to us, to the very great importance of reduction in naval arma- 
ment. At this time, when we are anxious to aid France in full 
recovery of her economic life, it would be most disappointing to 
be advised that she was contemplating putting hundreds of 
millions into battleships. 

" I have spoken to you thus frankly because of my deep appreci- 
ation of your friendship and of your solicitude for the success of 
the efforts we are making, and in the hope that the present matter, 
which represents perhaps the most critical position yet reached in 
the conference, may be adjusted on a satisfactory basis. I repeat 
that the provisional agreement reached with Great Britain and 
Japan hinges upon an appropriate agreement with France, and 
I can not too strongly urge the most careful consideration of all 
the matters to which I have taken the liberty to allude. Permit 
me to assure you of my highest respect and of the keen desire 
that we entertain in America that you should visit us again at 
an early date. 

" Chaeles E. Hughes." 

" London, December 18, 1921. 

" My Deae Me. Hughes : At the moment of my departure for 
London, Mr. Herrick handed me your friendly telegram in regard 
to the difficulties which have arisen in the Naval Disarmament 
Commission in reference to the tonnage of capital ships which 
have been asked for by the French delegation. 



MR. BRIAND TO MR. HUGHES. 39 

" You fear that the maintenance of this French request may 
have as its effect to hinder the agreement between the five powers. 

" The will of the French Government is to do everything which 
is compatible with the care of the vital interests of France- with 
a view to reconcile our points of view. 

" In the question of naval armament, the preoccupation of 
France is not the offensive point of view but uniquely the defen- 
sive point of view. 

" With regard to the tonnage of capital ships — that is to say, 
attacking ships, which are the most costly — I have given instruc- 
tions to our delegates in the sense which you desire. I am certain 
that I shall be sustained by my Parliament in this view. 

"But so far as the defensive ships are concerned (light cruis- 
ers, torpedo boats, and submarines) it would be impossible for 
the French Government, without putting itself in contradiction 
with the vote of the chambers, to accept reductions corresponding 
to those which we accept for capital ships under this formal re- 
serve which you will certainly understand. 

" The idea which dominates the Washington conference is to 
restrict naval armaments which are offensive and costly. But I 
do not believe that it is the program to deny to a nation like 
France, which has a large extent of coasts and a great number of 
distant colonies, the essential means of defending its communica- 
tions and its security. 

" I am certain, my dear Mr. Hughes, that you will appreciate 
the effort of conciliation which we are making in order to respond 
to your request. 

" I beg you kindly to accept my cordial remembrances and the 
ardent wish which I form for the complete and striking success of 
the conference over which you preside with so much authority and 
brilliancy. 

" Briand." 

The chairman stated that he had understood the attitude of the 
French Government in substance to be that it was not so much 
preoccupied with the question of capital ships as it was concerned 
with auxiliary vessels such as light cruisers, destroyers, and sub- 
marines. Capital ships were very costly and he had understood 
that in this regard the French Government was willing to accept 
a solution in the sense which he, as chairman, had desired, but 
that it could not accept a corresponding reduction with regard to 
auxiliary craft. 

Then had followed a discussion of the desire voiced by Admiral 
de Bon that France should have six instead of five capital ships 
and that an arrangement should be reached with respect to aux- 
iliary vessels before any decision was made concerning capital 
ships. Admiral de Bon had submitted very complete and impor- 
tant figures in connection with France's replacement problem, the 



40 COMMENT OF FRENCH POSITION. 

difficulties of constructing several ships at once in her dockyards, 
and the consequent desire of the French Government to begin 
building in 1927 and to lay down one ship annually until the 
French quota was filled. 

There had been some question as to whether, in the corre 
spondence passing between Mr. Briand and the chairman, Mr. 
Briand had conditioned his acceptance of the capital-ship tonnage 
proposed for France (175,000 tons) upon the making of a satis- 
factory adjustment with reference to auxiliary combatant surface 
craft and submarines or whether he had unconditionally accepted 
the proposed capital-ship tonnage for France (175,000) but at the 
same time had made a full reservation that such acceptance 
should in no way prejudice the position as to auxiliary combatant 
surface craft and submarines which the French might desire to 
take. He (the chairman) had understood it in the latter sense. 
He had not understood that it was in any way necessary to come 
to an understanding with regard to lighter craft before reaching 
an agreement concerning capital ships, but had understood that 
nothing that was decided in regard to the capital-ship ratio 
should be considered as involving a concession as to auxiliary 
vessels. 

The chairman stated that he had had no desire to detract in 
any manner from the French reservation or to build anything 
upon a phrase, but he had not thought it necessary to wait for 
a decision regarding lesser craft before reaching a provisional 
agreement on capital ships. Upon this point the subcommittee 
had desired to know fully the views of the French delegation. 

When this point in the deliberations of the subcommitee had 
been reached it was realized that it was not dealing with ex- 
clusively technical matters, and he had accordingly suggested that 
there were no reasons why these discussions should not proceed 
before the full committee, as many of the delegates not present 
on the subcommittee would like to hear them. It was not neces- 
sary to be a naval expert — which he himself made no pretense 
of being — in order to take part, and he felt a little reluctance at 
having the discussions proceed while the other delegates were 
absent. It had therefore been decided to continue the discus- 
sions in the full committee, inviting the technical naval experts 
to sit with the delegations. This meeting had then been called. 

The chairman stated further that he could not possibly do 
justice to the elaborate statements made by Admiral de Bon, 
who had presented detailed arguments in support of every phase 
of the French Government's position. The chairman therefore 
had merely given an outline of the whole situation and would not 
attempt to go into details. He desired only to set forth the main 
points, so that the commitee might have a basis upon which to 
proceed. To sum up, therefore, his understanding was that France 



RESERVATION ON SOME CLASSES. 41 

was ready to accept the limit of 175,000 tons for capital ships, 
but distinctly reserved her decision with regard to auxiliary 
vessels and submarines and was not willing to have her accept- 
ance taken in any way as implying an agreement to a correspond- 
ing figure for auxiliary vessels. 

The chairman then pointed out that the committee was unin- 
formed with regard to what tonnage of lighter craft, destroyers, 
submarines, etc., the French Government desired. He felt that a 
statement from the French delegation on this point would now 
be useful. In saying his, how T ever 4 he, of course, did not wish to 
foreclose discussion by others of the points he had already set 
forth. 

The chairman added that he regretted to find he had omitted 
a point which should have been included in his review. It was 
quite apparent that it was impossible to foresee the future de- 
velopment of naval construction and of scientific researches, or 
what new political conditions might arise with relation to other 
powers not represented here. Consequently the opinion had been 
generally expressed that there should be another conference after 
10 or after 7 years to reconsider questions that might result 
from new conditions produced through scientific or political de- 
velopments or to deal with questions raised by or between powers 
not represented at the conference here. This did not mean that 
this present conference should not arrive at a decision fixing 
definite points of agreement. It meant that the present gather- 
ing might provide for a later conference to consider new phases 
and developments at a later date. He added that Mr. Balfour 
had suggested that the American Government should prepare and 
submit a draft statement regarding the calling of a new confer- 
ence, and that this suggestion had been accepted. 

In conclusion the chairman said that he thought he had now 
reviewed all that was necessary and that he would accordingly 
invite discussion. 

Admiral de Bon said that he had nothing to add to the very 
clear presentation that had just been made by the chairman ; 
he only asked permission to add a few words for the benefit of 
the delegates who had not been present at the meetings of the 
subcommittee in order to make entirely clear to them the spirit 
of the French demands. 

When the French delegation had been called upon to formu- 
late their views on the program for the reconstruction of the 
future force of France in capital ships, they had first pointed out 
that the coefficient which had served as a basis for the future 
naval forces of the British, Japanese, and American Navies could 
not be used for calculating the future naval force necessary for 
France. 

25882—23 1 



42 SPECIAL POSITION OF FRANCE. 

The reason for this was obvious; this coefficient had been de- 
duced from calculations based on the considerable increases in 
the three navies, whereas the French Navy was in a situation 
which demanded special consideration ; it was far behind its nor- 
mal program and even below its normal condition. 

France had, in point of fact, already considerably reduced her 
fleet, while, during the same period, the American Navy had 
increased 48 per cent and the Japanese Navy 26 per cent. Before 
the war Great Britain had been obliged to build, in order to meet 
the threat of Germany ; then the United States and Japan threw 
themselves into that armament race which had been one of the 
chief reasons for this conference. This coefficient could not, 
then, with justice and equity, be applied to France; she must 
suggest another method of calculation. 

Her naval strength was at present composed of 10 vessels (in- 
cluding 3 predreadnaughts), the replacement of which was con- 
templated by France. As soon as she had been informed that pre- 
dreadnaughts were not to be counted, she had agreed to limit her- 
self to 7 ships. 

France did not contemplate the immediate construction of a 
fleet of 10 battleships of 35,000 tons, but only the adoption of a 
program which would permit the replacement of the ships existing 
to-day from time to time as they should become obsolete, in 
accordance with the dates specified in the American scheme and 
based upon the normal life of vessels. ■ 

Such a program could not be completed before 1941. France 
could not allow herself to disappear from the number of the mari- 
time powers, but she had never had the intention of constructing 
10 vessels within a short time; her program had in view a 
gradual increase covering the period up to 1941, which indicated 
that her ambition was not inordinate. 

At the last session the French delegation had finally agreed to 
consider a substantial reduction of their demands, leaving France 
with only 5 capital ships, with the reservation that they would 
ask a reconsideration of the point by the delegation, since 5 ves- 
sels did not constitute a tactical unit, the minimum of the weakest 
squadron that ever existed being 6 ships. 

If France remained with only 5 ships, she would be practically 
disarmed from a naval point of view ; with 6 ships she would 
be weak, but could still create a living organization. 

The proposals which have been made by the French delegation, 
in conformity with instructions received, were based upon the 
above principles. 

This enormous concession had been made for the sake of the 
success of the conference ; it had left France in a serious situa- 
tion, and it had as a consequence created the imperative need 



SUBMARINES. 43 

that she should have a greater number of light craft and sub- 
marines. Under these circumstances the French delegation be- 
lieved the future constitution of the French fleet would have to be 
considered as a whole and could not be divided into two parts — 
capital ships on the one hand and light craft and submarines on 
the other. 

Such a method would be required not only for the French fleet 
but for all the navies. The chairman had pointed out that at this 
juncture it would be desirable for France to make known her 
requirements as to submarines and light craft ; the French dele- 
gation were disposed to do so ; correspondence was in progress 
with the French Government, and a telegram was expected which 
would make known the results of the decisions reached. The 
question was a very serious one, and before definite figures could 
be presented they should receive the sanction of the Government. 

If concessions should be demanded in the matter of light craft 
and submarines, the great concession that had been made in re- 
gard to capital ships should be borne in mind and the security of 
France and the limitations of her normal naval existence should 
not be lost sight of. 

In considering the problem as a whole, the French delegation 
were confronted by a question, raised by the British delegation, in 
regard to the necessity for abolishing or retaining the submarine. 
It appeared to the French delegation that in discussion this 
matter took precedence over the others, since it might embarrass 
their labors or nullify their results. It was desirable to make 
rapid progress, and the delegation believed that the first thing to 
do was to discuss the submarine question ; this was the natural 
sequence of things, and this question should be taken into serious 
consideration and be made the subject of a very frank debate. 

In conclusion, the French delegation desired to state its convic- 
tion that the discussion could not be pursued without taking into 
account the question of submarines. 

The chairman stated that he wished to make a suggestion in 
order to avoid the possibility of any misapprehension. The pro- 
posal made by the American Government at no time contained 
any suggestion as to the exact number of ships any power might 
build in replacement. It had said how many ships the United 
States, Great Britain, and Japan should discard and how many 
they should retain. The calculations regarding replacement were 
based entirely on tonnage. What had been said regarding the 
number of capital ships had simply been inferred from calcula- 
tions based on the tonnage figures. It had not been stated in the 
American proposal that the reduction to 175,000 tons for France 
and Italy would limit them to five ships. That conclusion was a 
deduction by the French and Italian delegations. Using 35,000 



44 CAPITAL SHIPS. 

tons as the necessary size of a capital ship, it was evident that 
the result would be five ships. But no country was required to 
build vessels of that tonnage. The French Navy had at present 
seven capital ships totaling 164,000 tons. There was no objection 
to France having six or seven ships, or whatever number she de- 
sired. The chairman could understand the desire to have all ships 
built of the maximum size, but that was a matter of preference 
and was in no sense obligatory. He pointed out that there was 
therefore no question as to the number of ships ; it was a question 
of tonnage only — a question of whether France should have 
175,000 tons or should be allowed six ships of 35,000 tons, which 
would mean a total of 210,000 tons. 

The chairman then referred to Admiral de Bon's suggestion that 
there should be a preliminary discussion regarding the abolish- 
ment of submarines. The committee greatly desired, he felt, to 
proceed with the discussion concerning auxiliary craft as soon as 
the French delegation were prepared to state what France desired 
in that regard. Without such a statement there was nothing upon 
which to proceed save the original American proposal. Italy de- 
sired equality with France, but the standard on which such 
equality must be based was not before the committee. The com- 
mittee must therefore wait until the French delegation were ready 
to present their particular proposal. After that the discussion 
would continue. 

Admiral de Bon said he desired to add but one word to what he 
had already said. He did not believe it possible, when the ques- 
tion of the French Navy was considered, that anybody could be- 
lieve France so foolish as to construct small capital ships ; that is 
to say, those inferior to 35,000 tons. If France should later find 
herself obliged to construct vessels of war — although she had not 
yet expressed her intention of doing so — she must certainly build 
vessels equal in strength to the capital ships of other navies. In 
other words, to impose upon her a maximum of 175,000 tons would 
be equivalent to limiting her to five boats. With respect to this 
there could be no hesitation, he said, in the minds of properly in- 
formed persons. The total amount of tonnage must change, 
whether they built five or whether they built the proper organic 
force of six. Concerning these questions a certain delay had 
arisen because Mr. Briand was at the moment somewhere between 
London and Paris and under such circumstances consultations 
were difficult or impossible. He now came, he said, to the question 
of submarines. Whether they were to be abolished or not, in 
view of the fact that nothing could be done without clearing up 
this point, he suggested that the matter should be taken up im- 
mediately ; it would forward the work of the conference to do so. 



FUTURE MEETINGS. 45 

Lord Lee said that he rose to clear up an important point with 
reference to the prospective conference to be held seven years 
hence, or it might be earlier. The justification for the conference 
arose from the inevitable development of technical aspects of the 
naval problem, which might render technical decisions now made 
either obsolete or inadequate. Among such technical questions 
he put that of numbers as opposed to tonnage as a basis of calcu- 
lation for capital ships. Moreover, in seven years' time 35,000 
tons " legend draft " might prove no longer a useful rule as to the 
limitation of individual capital ships. These questions of tech- 
nical proportions he proposed should be left open for reconsidera- 
tion at the future conference. 

Senator Schanzer asked that he be allowed to make a few 
remarks on the subject of future meetings. Italy, of course, was 
in sympathy with the proposal for a meeting in seven years, and 
could understand that it might be necessary to discuss and review 
the work done at this conference. He suggested, however, but only 
in an informal way, that room be left in the agreement for a 
clause which would permit any one of the signatory powers to 
ask for a meeting at any time prior to the conclusion of the 
seven-year period. He pointed out that while scientific changes 
were sure to take place, political changes were also quite pos- 
sible. He was not thinking, he added, of Germany, since Ger- 
many would be held in restraint by the terms of the treaty of 
Versailles, but of Russia. No one knew what Russia might do. 
He suggested, therefore, that there be an agreement for a meet- 
ing in seven years, but that the right be reserved to call one at 
an earlier date. 

Mr. Balfour questioned whether the moment was suitable for a 
discussion on the question of the next conference. He under- 
stood that his own suggestion that the United States delegation 
should draw up a resolution on the subject for later considera- 
tion had been acceptable for the purpose of giving effect to the 
general policy of all the powers represented here. He was sure 
that the United States Government would consider the question 
of the date from the point of view not only of possible technical 
developments but also of those considerations of international 
polity which Senator Schanzer had very properly referred to. 
He himself would prefer an interval of eight rather than seven 
years, but perhaps it would be better to adjourn the discussion 
until the proposal of the United States Government was available. 

The chairman observed that a point had been reached where 
the French delegation were not prepared to present a definite pro- 
posal with regard to lighter craft and desired a discussion of 
the question of submarines, which it was understood the British 



46 SUBMARINE DISCUSSION. 

Government desired to have abolished. The British delegation, 
however, not having expected this subject to arise so soon, were 
not yet ready to introduce it. If it would be convenient for the 
members of the committee to meet at 3 o'clock that afternoon, 
progress might be made with the submarine question. He wished 
neither to hasten his colleagues unduly nor to take the responsi- 
bility of delaying the proceedings when there was so much to be 
discussed. 

Mr. Sarraut said that the French delegation would raise no 
difficulties with respect to holding a session of the committee 
during the afternoon, but in regard to the definite statements re- 
ferred to by Mr. Hughes they could not undertake to have the 
matters in question ready. The reason was obvious. Mr. Briand 
was to arrive in Paris that afternoon. It had been impossible to 
keep him informed with respect to the negotiations here. Always 
faithful to France's aim of seeking to reconcile opposing views, 
an accord was looked for which would satisfy the United States 
and the other powers. He could say that the French program 
would be carefully revised, but with respect to the second part of 
the question — i. e., that concerning submarines and auxiliary 
ships — although their views had been transmitted to Paris they 
could not act without the approval of the French Government. 
They expected to receive an early answer, but in the natural 
course of things this could not be expected during the afternoon. 
This was because Mr. Briand was only then leaving London and 
would be obliged to consult on his arrival with the French min- 
ister of marine. With these reservations he accepted the pro- 
posal of a meeting that afternoon. Or, if the British delegation so 
desired and were ready to proceed, the French delegation were 
ready to continue immediately with the discussion of the sub- 
marine question. 

The chairman remarked that as the information necessary 
would soon be available and as the conference now had its atten- 
tion focused on the naval question, to break away from this and 
return to far-eastern questions would interrupt proceedings and 
cause an unfortunate delay. While not wishing in any way to 
hurry his colleagues and while, of course, there should be a full 
opportunity for consultation and consideration, it would seem 
that the committee should meet again promptly in order to make 
progress. He, therefore, merely wished to inquire whether it 
would be more convenient to meet that afternoon or the following 
morning. 

That afternoon at 3 o'clock was the time agreed upon. 

The chairman suggested that the communique" should state that 
the progress already made in the subcommittee had been reported 



FIFTH MEETING. 47 

to this committee, which had then discussed the matter and ad- 
journed to continue the discussion that afternoon at 3 o'clock. 

The meeting adjourned at 12.45 p. m. until December 22, 1921, 
3 p. m. 



FIFTH MEETING, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1921, 3 P. M. 

PKESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by 
Mr. Wright and Mr. Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice 
Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Flint. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. 
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Oden'hal, 
Mr. Ponsot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Al- 
bertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis 
Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. 
Celesia di Vegliasco. 

Japan. — Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, 
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi and Commander 
Hori. 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Paul and Mr. Osborne. 

Interpreter, Mr. Camerlynck. 

1. The fifth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Arma- 
ment was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American 
Union Building at 3 p. m. Thursday, December 22, 1921. 

2. The following were present: For the United States, Mr. 
Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. 
Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, 
Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, 
Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Aus- 
tralia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for 
India) ; for France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral 
de Bon ; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, 
Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Acton ; for Japan, Prince Toku- 
gawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. 

J. Secretaries and advisers present included : For the United 
States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir 
Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Flint; for 
France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Pon- 



48 



SUBMARINE TONNAGE. 



sot ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Com- 
mander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco ; for Japan, Mr. 
Ichihashi, Commander Hori. The secretary general, accompanied 
by Mr. Paul and Mr. Osborne, was present. Mr. Camerlynck 
was present as interpreter. 

4. The chairman, Mr. Hughes, announced that the committee 
was ready to continue the discussion begun at the morning's 
session. 

Lord Lee said that, as he understood it, the present position 
was one of agreement between the five powers in regard to the 
ratio of capital ships, t>ut that all the powers were equally un- 
committed on the subject of submarines, small craft, and auxiliar- 
ies. Hence he agreed with Admiral de Bon that it was justifi- 
able to begin by clearing up the question of principle as to the 
future of submarines. To the British Empire the question of 
submarines was one of transcendent importance. He therefore 
regretted that any difference of opinion should have arisen on 
the subject and that submarines should have become the only 
question on which the British delegation was out of sympathy 
with the American proposals', and, perhaps, also with the views of 
France and other powers. He felt, therefore, that it was incum- 
bent upon him to explain and justify British opinion. He wished 
to present as few figures as possible, but he felt it was necessary 
to mention the following as the basis of his statement. The 
figures as regards submarines were as follows : 



Existing 
tonnage. 



The 
American 
proposals. 



Amount of 
new build- 
ing per- 
mitted 
under the 
American 
proposals. 



The United States of America 

Great Britain 

Japan 

France 

Italy : 



8?, 500 
80, 500 
32, 200 
28, 360 
18, 250 



•90, 000 
90, 000 
54, 000 
0) 
C 1 ) 



6,500 
9,500 
21, 800 
C 1 ) 

C 1 ) 



1 In proportion. 



He felt bound to say that it seemed to him very strange to put 
before a Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments pro- 
posals designed to foster and increase the type of war vessels 
which, according to the British view, was open to far more objec- 
tion than surface capital ships. Moreover, it would be a certain 
consequence, if submarines were retained, that the powers which 
possessed large mercantile marines would be compelled to in- 
crease the numbers of their antisubmarine craft. This would give 
but little relief to the overburdened taxpayer and would provide 



BRITISH FAVOR ABOLITION. 49 

scant comfort to those who wished to abolish war and to make It 
less inhumane. 

The view of the British Government and the British Empire 
delegation was that what was required was not merely restriction 
on submarines, but their total and final abolition. In explaining 
the position he wished to make it clear that the British Empire 
delegation had no unworthy or selfish motives. He would first 
like to reply in advance, since this might be his only opportunity 
of doing so, to the arguments of the friends of the submarine. 
He understood their first contention to be that the submarine was 
the legitimate weapon of the weaker powers and was an effective 
and economical means of defense for an extensive coast line and 
for maritime communications. Both these standpoints could be 
contested on technical grounds and, as he would show, were 
clearly disproved by recent history. If some weak country pos- 
sessed an exposed coast line, it would, of course, desire to defend 
it against bombardment or the disembarkation of a military force. 

It was necessary to ask, therefore, how such attacks were con- 
ducted in modern warfare. The reply was that they were con- 
ducted by powerfully armed, swift-moving vessels, fully equipped 
to resist submarine attack, and to escort and protect the convoys 
of military transports. There was no branch of naval research 
which had more closely engaged the attention of experts than the 
counter offensive against the submarine. He was giving away n > 
secrets when he stated that the methods of detection, of location, 
as well as of destruction of submarines had progressed so mu< h 
further than the offensive power of the submarines themselves 
that the latter had now already a reduced value against modern 
surface warships. This, however, was bringing him into some- 
what technical subjects. During the late war Germany had con- 
centrated her naval effort on the production and use of U-b \>ats 
and had built up the most formidable submarine fleet tha the 
world had ever seen before or since. He believed that Germany 
had employed, in all, no less than 375 U-boats of 270,000 tons in 
the aggregate. Of these, no less than 203 had been sunk. What 
had these U-boats accomplished in legitimate naval warfare? It 
was almost insignificant. In the early part of the war a few obso- 
lescent ships, which sometimes were not taking proper precau- 
tions, had been sunk, but the British Grand Fleet throughout the 
war had not been affected ; not one single ship had been sunk or 
hif by the action of submarines, whether at sea or in harbor. Its 
surface squadrons had swept through all parts of the North Sea, 
and wherever the sea had been clear of mine fields had gone 
where they wished, undeterred by the submarine. Submarines had 
not prevented the passage of troops across the sea. No less than 
15,000,000 British troops had crossed and recrossed the English 
Channel during the war, and not one man had been lost from the 



50 SUBMARINES IN WORLD WAR 

action of submarines except on board hospital ships, which in the 
twentieth century it had been deemed would be immune from the 
attacks of submarines and therefore had not been escorted. 

During the latter part of the war some 2,000,000 United States 
troops had been brought across the Atlantic, and the submarine 
had proved equally powerless to prevent them. In fact, the U- 
boat, whether considered as an offensive or defensive weapon, 
against any sort of organized naval force had proved almost con- 
temptible. 

It had been maintained that submarines were useful for the 
defense of coast lines and communications with colonies. He 
gathered from the press that this was one of the arguments used, 
and so it would have to be examined. If the argument was 
sound, and if submarines were essential for this purpose, there 
was no country which would need them so much as the British 
Empire, which possessed a coast line which, without wishing to 
boast, he believed was almost as large as that of all the four 
other powers present at this conference put together, and the 
length of which was four times the circumference of the globe, 
and which, in addition, had the longest trade routes of any coun- 
try to protect. It was partly because experience had shown that 
they were not effective for this purpose that the British were 
ready to abandon submarines. The late war had made it abun- 
dantly clear that the greatest peril to maritime communications 
was the submarine, and that peril was specially great to a coun- 
try which did not possess command of the sea on the surface. 
Hence, it was to the interest of any such power to get rid of this 
terrible menace. And in this connection it must be remembered 
that the submarine was of no value as a defense against sub- 
marines. It was against merchant ships alone that they achieved 
real success. 

It would be as well to recall what the German submarine fleet 
had accomplished against mercantile marines. No less than 
12,000,000 tons of shipping had been sunk, of a value of $1,100,- 
000,000, apart from their cargoes. Over 20,000 noncombatants— 
men, women, and children — had been drowned. It was true that 
this action had been undertaken in violation of all laws, both 
human and divine. The German excuse for it had been its effec- 
tiveness. They had used the same argument in the case of 
poison gas, which had set a precedent for unscrupulous nations, 
which appeared likely to endure for all time now that nations 
had been driven to resort to it. The menace of the submarine 
could only be got rid of by its total banishment from the sea. 
That was the intention of the treaty of Versailles, which had for- 
bidden Germany to construct submarines, whether for military or 
mercantile purposes. Was it to be assumed, Lord Lee continued, 
that Germany was always to be bad and the other powers were 



BRITISH CONDITIONS. 5i 

always to be good? Was there to be one rule for Germany and 
another rule for the rest of the world? In saying this he was 
not casting any reflection on any nation, and least of all on the 
officers and men of the submarine fleets. These men were the 
pick of their service, gallant and high-minded men, but they were 
obliged to obey orders ; and experience had shown that occasion- 
ally governments could go mad. The view of the British Empire 
delegation, therefore, was that the only proper course was the 
abolition of submarines. Their limitation was not sufficient. 
Another objection to limitation was that a submarine fleet could 
so very rapidly be expanded in time of war. Submarines could 
only be built if the industry were kept alive, and personnel could 
only be provided if a trained nucleus existed. Hence it was only 
by means of abolition that this menace to the mercantile marine 
of the world could be got rid of. He had said earlier in his 
remarks that the British delegation were animated by no selfish 
motives. At the same time it would be foolish not to recognize 
that Great Britain was the nation most exposed to the menace of 
the submarine. So long as submarine warfare continued it 
would be the greatest menace to the food supplies on which that 
country was dependent. 

The British people lived in a crowded island whose soil only 
produced two-fifths of its supply of food. For the remaining 
three-fifths they relied upon sea communications. On an average 
only seven weeks' stocks were maintained in the country. By far 
the greatest anxiety which the British Government had felt dur- 
ing the war was to prevent the reserves of food falling to zero. 
Was it surprising, therefore, if, with a danger in front of them 
as great as any to which Mr. Briand had so eloquently explained 
France was subject, the British people protested against a weapon 
which was the negation of humanity, chivalry, and civilization 
itself? There were some people who said it was this vulnerability 
of Great Britain which justified the retention of the submarine, 
since it was by these means alone that the British Empire could 
be stricken down. The late war had shown, however, that the 
British Empire was not easily stricken down, and, if war should 
ever come again, he imagined that means would be found for 
Great Britain to save itself from starvation. But, it might be 
claimed, if the U-boat had begun its operations earlier or had had 
better luck, the result might have been different. To this he 
would reply that the British Navy had constituted the keystone of 
the allied arch ; but for the British Navy France would have been 
ruined, Belgium and Holland would have been overrun, and even 
the United States of America, self-contained, self-supporting, with 
all its vast resources, would have been impotent to intervene and 
might have had to abandon its Army and all that it had in France, 
or else to make a humiliating peace. 



52 QUESTIONS ON SUBMARINES. 

That would not have heen a disaster to Great Britain alone. 
That was why he resented the idea, which had been published in a 
part of the press, that the British plea for the abolition of sub- 
marines was merely a selfish and unworthy design. It had been 
suggested that the conditions of the late war might never recur. 
Could France be so sure of this? Could France run the risk of 
a disaster to her near neighbor, and only certain ally, if the situa- 
tion of 1914 were ever reproduced? It was necessary to take long 
views in this matter, and the British Empire delegation believed 
that they were fighting the battle, not only of the allied and asso- 
ciated powers, but of the .whole civilized world in advocating the 
abolition of the submarine. 

He felt sure that some one would ask, How can we feel sure 
that, if we abolish submarines, other powers who are not repre- 
sented here will not proceed with the building of submarines? 
The same question might be asked as to the ot^er classes of craft 
mentioned in the American scheme. He found it impossible to 
believe that other powers would set themselves against the opinion 
of the rest of the civilized world regarding this particular weapon. 
If, however, the great naval powers should at some future date 
find themselves exposed to piracy by the action of some smaller 
power, surely they would find the means of bringing Nemesis to 
the transgressor. World opinion was a very powerful weapon, 
and certainly some means would be found by which the great 
naval powers could protect themselves if necessary. It was said 
that submarines were a cheap method of warfare. Surely this 
conference did not desire to make war cheap? When war had 
been cheap it had been almost continuous. He hoped the sub- 
marine would not be defended because it would be a weapon 
within the reach of all. It might perhaps be cheap for the 
aggressor, but it was not so for the victim. 

The average number of German submarines operating at any 
one time on the Atlantic approaches to France and Great Britain 
during the late war had not been more than nine or ten, but Great 
Britian had had to maintain an average of no less than 3,000 
antisubmarine surface craft in order to deal with these. It could 
be seen, therefore, that it was a very expensive form of war for 
the defender. The British Empire delegation were anxious to 
contribute toward the ideals of the present conference. They de- 
sired not only a limitation of armaments but also a limitation or 
expenditures, which constituted so great a burden in time of 
peace. That was why Great Britain, which had the tradition of 
possessing the greatest navy, had welcomed the proposals for 
curbing capital ships. What would be gained, however, if this 
competition were merely transferred to submarines? Certainly 
not much, and meanwhile the submarine threatened Great 
Britain's very life and existence. But, if the submarine were 



LIMITED WEAPON. 53 

abolished, the British Empire delegation could accept, with modi- 
fications in detail, practically the whole of the American pro- 
posals in regard to the lightening of these burdens. 

Lord Lee said he was not impressed with the argument that 
because it was found impossible to deal effectively with poison 
gas or air bombs, which were by-products of essential industries, 
it would be impossible to deal with the submarine. The sub- 
marine was not a by-product of any industry, but was essentially 
an offensive weapon. He, therefore, said that it could be, and 
ought to be, abolished. It was a weapon of murder and piracy, 
involving the drowning of noncombatants. It had been used to 
sink passenger ships, cargo ships, and even hospital ships. 
Technically the submarine was so constructed that it could not 
be utilized to rescue even women and children from sinking ships. 
That was why he hoped that the conference would not give it a 
new lease of life. 

He had endeavored to prove that the submarine was only to a 
limited extent a weapon of defense, that for offense it was only 
really valuable when used against merchant ships, and that it 
constituted the greatest peril to which the mercantile marine of 
the world was exposed. For defense he did not say it was wholly 
useless, but merely inefficient, and that its disadvantages greatly 
exceeded its advantages except for war on the mercantile marine. 
The submarine was the only class of vessel for which the confer- 
ence was asked to give — he would not say a license, but permis- 
sion to thrive and multiply. It would be a great disappointment 
if the British Empire delegation failed to persuade the conference 
to get rid of this weapon, which involved so much evil to peoples 
who live on or by the sea. 

To show the earnestness of the British Government in this mat- 
ter, Lord Lee pointed out that Great Britain possessed the largest 
and probably the most efficient submarine navy in the world, com- 
posed of 100 vessels of 80,000 tons. She was prepared to scrap 
the whole of this great fleet, to disband the personnel, provided 
the other powers would do the same. That was the British offer 
to the world, and he believed it was a greater contribution to the 
cause of humanity than even the limitation of capital ships. 

However, it was useless to be blind to the facts of the position, 
and he hardly hoped to carry with him all the powers present at 
that table, though he believed that in the end all civilized powers 
would come round to the British point of view. In any event, the 
British Empire delegation did not intend that the settlement in 
regard to capital ships should be affected if they failed to carry 
their point in regard to the abolition of submarines. Should he 
fail to convince his colleagues he would nevertheless welcome any 
suggestions for the reduction and restriction of submarines which 
they might like to make, and, in particular, he would await with 



54 FRENCH POSITION. 

the greatest interest the proposals of his French colleagues, which 
had been promised earlier in the day. 

The chairman said that he did not intend then to comment upon 
the very able and powerful argument of Lord Lee, to which the 
members of the committee had had the privilege of listening, but 
he merely wished to interpolate a statement giving the figures 
supplied by the American naval experts and upon which the 
American proposal was based, concerning the submarine tonnage 
built and building, since these figures did not appear to coincide 
with those referred to by Lord Lee. According to the American 
figures, this tonnage was as follows : 

Tons. 

United States 95, 000 

Great Britain . 82, 464 

France 42, 850 

Italy 20, 228 

Japan 31, 400 

The United States had, therefore, 95,000 tons, which it was 
prepared to reduce. The reduction was slight. But it was a 
reduction. It was, of course, not the intention to increase but to 
reduce. 

Lord Lee said that he regretted if any of the figures he had 
given had been inaccurate. 

Mr. Sarraut said the British Government had shown clearly its 
views regarding submarines ; he then read the following declara- 
tion of the views of the French Government : 

" The French Government has already set forth its views with 
regard to the question of submarines, first, during the discus- 
sions preliminary to the treaty of Versailles and also before the 
League of Nations, when the representative of the British Gov- 
ernment opposed the granting of submarines to the small Baltic 
powers. In both of these instances the point of view favoring the 
inclusion of submarines in the naval forces of States met with 
the almost unanimous approval of the various Governments rep- 
resented. 

" France believes that the submarine is the only weapon which 
at present permits a nation scantily supplied with capital ships 
to defend itself at sea. For France, therefore, the submarine 
is an essential means of preserving her independence which she 
can not give up, especially in view of the sacrifices to which 
she has been asked to consent in the matter of capital ships. 
Moreover, in the present state of the development of naval science 
the submarine can not suffice to assure the control of the seas 
to a belligerent, even if that belligerent possesses a great supe- 
riority in submarines. It is not, therefore, a weapon making for 
supremacy. 

" The French Government believes that every method of war- 
fare may or may not be employed in conformity with the laws 



ITALIAN POSITION. 55 

of war and that the inhuman and barbarous use made of the 
submarine by a belligerent in the late war is a reason for con- 
demning that belligerent but not for condemning the submarine. 

"As submarines are particularly subject to withdrawal from 
service in war time, the restriction within a certain limit of the 
total tonnage of these vessels which a maritime nation may build 
would have to a lesser degree the same effect as their total aboli- 
tion, and should be declined for the same reasons. 

"The French Government has already stated that it can not 
accept an agreement based on the principle that the total tonnage 
of submarines which a nation may build should be in direct 
proportion to the capital ship tonnage of that nation. In its 
opinion, the contrary point of view is the rational one, since a 
nation would be deprived of the protection which would be 
afforded her by capital ships. 

" The French Government believes that it is possible to recon- 
cile the use of submarines with the laws of humanity. From this 
point of view large submarines have the advantage of being able 
to rescue the crews of torpedoed vessels or to furnish prize crews 
to captured vessels. 

" The French Government is obliged to assume eventually the 
defense of its numerous colonies, some of which are far distant 
from the mother country. In view of this fact and also in order 
to safeguard its lines of communication with the colonies it must 
possess submarines with a very large cruising radius and conse- 
quently with appropriate dimensions. 

" For these reasons the French Government can not consent 
to accept either the abolition of submarines or a reduction of 
the total tonnage of submarines which it considers to be the 
irreducible minimum necessary to assure the safety of the terri- 
tories for which it is responsible, or a limitation of the individual 
tonnage of submarines.'" 

Senator Schanzer said he had listened with the greatest atten- 
tion and sympathy to Lord Lee's important speech. 

In the name of the Italian delegation he wished to declare his 
great sympathy with anything that could make war less in- 
human. 

The Italian delegate in the subcommittee for poison gas, in 
this same conference, had proposed the abolition of the use of 
poison gas in warfare. The submarine question was mainly one 
of a technical nature. Lord Lee had asserted that submarines 
were not an efficient means of defense. The Italian naval ex- 
perts did not share this opinion. They thought that the subma- 
rine was still an indispensable weapon for the defense of the 
Italian coasts, which had a very great extent and along which 
some of the largest cities, the principal railways, and a number 
of the most important industrial establishments were situated. 



56 JAPANESE POSITION. 

The Italian naval experts were furthermore of the opinion that 
submarines were necessary to protect the lines of communica- 
tion of their country, which for the greater part depended upon 
the sea for its supplies. The Italian delegation was not ready 
at that time to resolve these questions of a technical character. 

Senator Schanzer ventured to observe, moreover, that the Ital- 
ian delegation did not think this conference, in which only five 
powers were represented, could settle the question of submarines 
which concerned many other powers not represented here. For 
these reasons, and in spite of its appreciation of the humani- 
tarian arguments brought forward by Lord Lee, the Italian dele- 
gation were not in a position at the present time to associate 
themselves with the proposal for the abolition of submarines 
and were not authorized to do so. 

Mr. Hanihara said that he had listened with great interest to 
the able and highly instructive and impressive argument of 
Lord Lee for the abolition of submarines. The Japanese delega- 
tion yielded to none in condemning such atrocious and lawless 
use of submarines as was resorted to by Germany in the late 
war. They believed that the sinking of merchant vessels without 
proper warning had no justification whatever, and they felt 
called upon to insist on such international rules as would effec- 
tively prevent the future recurrence of similar barbarious acts 
from submarines. Such was the conviction of the Japanese dele- 
gation. 

However, as legitimate defensive weapons, submarines did 
not, in the opinion of the Japanese delegation, materially differ 
from destroyers. The popular idea was that submarines men- 
aced and sank peaceful merchant marines without warning; 
their legitimate uses were apparently lost sight of. Submarines 
in their legitimate employment were no more atrocious than 
poison gas or air bombs. Moreover, when employed as a means 
,of coast defense, submarines were like movable mines and thus 
constituted an effective defensive weapon. Of course, the un- 
restricted use of mines against merchant ships in the open sea 
would be as dangerous as the sinking of ships without warning 
by submarines. 

Mr. Hanihara said he thought it was clear from these observa- 
tions that submarines could not be considered as an illegitimate 
weapon. Any weapon might become illegitimate if used without 
restriction. For the protection of an insular nation like Japan 
submarines were relatively inexpensive and yet effective ; but the 
Japanese delegation would insist, at the same time, upon more 
vigorous international rules governing their proper uses. The re- 
currence of cruelties committed by submarines during the recent 
war should by all means be avoided. 



DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. 57 

The chairman observed that, as had been indicated by the 
remarks of the delegates, he thought that all could not fail to be 
deeply impressed by the statement of Lord Lee, supported as it 
was by the very definite statement of facts as to the use of sub- 
marines. He thought that one clear and definite point of view 
emerged on which all were agreed, namely, that there was no 
disposition to tolerate on any plea of necessity the illegal use 
of the submarine as practiced in the late war and that there 
should be no difficulty in preparing and announcing to the world a 
statement of the intention of the nations represented at the con- 
ference that submarines must observe the well-established prin- 
ciples of international law regarding visit and search in attacks 
on merchant ships. Much could be done in clarifying this posi- 
tion and in defining what uses of submarines were considered 
contrary to humanity and to the well-defined principles of inter- 
national law. The recommendation might go further, not only 
regarding what were conceived to be the rules regarding use of 
submarines but also what the limitations upon their use should be. 

The chairman understood that the crux of the controversy was 
as to the use of the submarine as a weapon of defense. Lord Lee 
had said that it was of little value as such, and hence that its 
continued use should not be tolerated. Lord Lee had pointed 
out "that there were only five nations present. The chairman 
could not agree, however, that these were in the same position 
regarding submarines as they were regarding capital ships, since 
in the matter of capital ships they represented the potency of com- 
petition, whereas when dealing with submarines — a more cheaply 
made weapon — they were dealing with what other nations could 
produce, if they chose. Even if they \yere ready to adopt the prin- 
ciple suggested by the British delegation, they would still have to 
.await the adherence of other nations. 

Upon the question whether the submarine was of value for 
defense, each nation must take the opinion of its naval experts. 
Indications of differences of opinion had already been manifested. 
He would not at this time make any announcement of the posi- 
tion of the United States, except to add to the expressions of 
detestation of the abuse of the submarine and of the methods — • 
the illegal methods, as they have been continually called — of their 
employment during the war. 

He wished, however, to read a report. The President had ap- 
pointed an Advisory Committee to aid the American delegation. 
The members of that committee were gathered together, men and 
women, from all fields of activity, from all parts of the country, 
and represented every shade of public opinion. That committee 
had considered this subject, and the subcommittee to which it was 

25882—23 5 



58 REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE. 

referred was headed by a distinguished admiral of the American 
Navy. The report was debated in full committee and was unani- 
mously adopted — even by those who were prepossessed against the 
submarine. He read this report, not as an opinion of the Ameri- 
can Government, but as a report of the Advisory Committee, which 
was created in order that the American delegates might be ad- 
vised as to public opinion. 

The chairman then read the following report on submarines 
adopted by the Advisory Committee of the American delegation 
on December 1, 1921: 

" In the recent World War the submarine was used in four gen- 
eral ways: 

"(a) Unlimited use against both enemy and neutral noncom- 
batant merchant vessels. 

"(&) Use against enemy combatant vessels. 

"(c) Use as mine planters. 

u {d) Use as scouts. 

"Whatever is said about unlimited warfare by submarines is- 
also true of unlimited warfare by surface craft, provided the com- 
batant wishes to violate the rules of war. The confederate 
cruisers destroyed all property, but not lives. The English ex- 
pected the Germans in the latter part of the World War to use 
surface craft for unlimited warfare, and had provided means to 
offset this. However, the Germans, with one exception, were un- 
able to get out of the North Sea. The Moewe, a surface ship, 
sank almost all merchantmen that she came into contact with,, 
saving the lives of the crews. So that unlimited warfare is not 
necessarily an attribute of the submarine alone. 

" Submarines against commerce. — The unlimited use of sub- 
marines by Germany against commerce brought down upon her the 
wrath of the world, solidified it against the common enemy, and 
was undoubtedly the popular cause of the United States entering 
the World War. 

"The rules of maritime warfare require a naval vessel desiring 
to investigate a tnerchaht ship first to warn her by firing a shot 
across her bow, or in other Ways, and then proceed with the ex- 
amination of her' character, make the decision in regard to her 
seizure, place a prize crew on her, and, except under certain ex- 
ceptionable circumstances, bring her to port, where she may be 
condemned by a prize court. 

" The rules of procedure (1917) as laid down for United States 
naval vessels when exercising the right of visit and search make 
no exception in favor of the submarine. In the early part of the 
World War the German submarines exercised this right of visit 
and search in the same manner as surface vessels. When sunk, 
the papers and crew of merchant ships so visited were saved. 
Later, when the cases came up in a German prize court sitting; 



ARMED MERCHANT SHIPS. 59 

on appeal at Berlin, the responsibility of the German Government 
was often acknowledged and indemnities paid. When unlimited 
submarine warfare commenced, in some cases where necessary 
evidence was produced by the owners making claim in the prize 
court, the court decided that the matter was outside the pale of 
the prize regulations, though it did not deny the justice of the 
claim. 

" Assuming that a merchant ship may be halted by a sub- 
marine in a legitimate fashion, it becomes difficult because of 
limited personnel for the submarine to complete the inspection, 
place a prize crew on board, and bring her into port. It is also 
difficult for her to take the passengers and "crew of a large prize 
on board should circumstances warrant sinking the vessel. How- 
ever, these remarks are applicable to small surface crafts as well. 

" During the World War, on account of the vulnerability of the 
submarine and on account of the probability of its sinking the 
vessels it captured, the tendency was for all merchant ships (in- 
cluding neutrals) to arm themselves against the submarine. Such 
action greatly hampers the activity of the submarines and tends 
toward illegal acts both by the merchant vessels and by the sub- 
marines. In other words, the general tendency of submarine 
warfare against commerce, even though starting according to 
accepted rules, was sharply .toward warfare unlimited by inter- 
national law or any humanitarian rules. This was because the 
vulnerability of the submarine led the Germans to assume and 
declare she was entitled to special exemptions from the accepted 
rules of warfare governing surface craft. The merchant ship 
sank the submarine if it came near enough ; the submarine sought 
and destroyed the merchant ship without even a knowledge of 
nationality or guilt. 

" Submarines were largely responsible for the extensive arming 
of merchant vessels, neutral and belligerent, during the World 
War. The average merchant vessel could not hope to arm effec- 
tively against enemy surface combatant vessels and as a rule 
submits to visit and search without resistance. Prospects of sav- 
ing the ship and certainty of safety to personnel have caused 
them to accept as the lesser risk the visit of belligerent surface 
vessels. When, however, as in the World War, they met a 
belligerent submarine, with a strong probability of being sunk by 
that submarine, the law of self-preservation operated, and the 
merchant ship resisted by every means in 'its power. Defensive 
armament was almost sure to be used offensively in an attempt 
to strike a first blow. The next step was for each to endeavor 
to sink the other on sight. 

" War on commerce by surface combatant craft causes change 
of ownership of merchant vessels only, provided the surface craft 
does not sink these ships, but these merchant vessels for the most 



60 VIOLATIONS OF LAW., 

part remain in service; they are not destroyed. The world does 
not lose them. The object of war on commerce is not to destroy 
shipping but to deprive the enemy of its use. Submarine warfare 
on commerce, if unlimited in character, injures the enemy and 
greatly injures the world as well. The world is so highly organ- 
ized and so dependent on ocean transportation that shipping is 
essential to livelihood ; without it vast populations would starve. 

"At present when war breaks out belligerent vessels tend to 
transfer to neutral flags and also to fly false flags. This hampers 
lawful warfare by submarines, as owing to their great difficulty in 
making the proper visit and search, it is thus impossible for them 
to prevent belligerent commerce from going forward. 

" The net results of unlimited submarine warfare in the World 
War were (a) flagrant violations of international law, (b) de- 
struction of an enormous amount of wealth, (c) unnecessary loss 
of many innocent lives, and (d) to draw into the war many 
neutrals. 

" Unlimited submarine warfare should be outlawed. Laws 
should be drawn up prescribing the methods of procedure of sub- 
marines against merchant vessels both neutral and belligerent. 
These rules should accord with the rules observed by surface 
craft. Laws should also be made which prohibit the use of false 
flags and offensive arming of merchant vessels. The use of false 
flags has already ceased in land warfare. No one can prevent an 
enemy from running ' amuck,' but immediately he does he outlaws 
himself and invites sure defeat by bringing down the wrath of 
the world upon his head. If the submarine is required to operate 
under the same rule as combatant surface vessels, no objection can 
be raised as to its use against merchant vessels. The individual 
captains of submarines are no more likely to violate instructions 
from their Government upon this point than are captains of any 
other type of ship acting independently. 

" Submarines against combatant ships. — Against enemy men-of- 
war the submarine may be likened to the advance guard on land, 
which hides in a tree or uses underbrush to conceal itself. If the 
infantry in its advance encounters an ambuscade, it suffers greatly, 
even if it is not totally annihilated. However, an ambuscade is 
entirely legitimate. In the same fashion a submarine strikes the 
advancing enemy from concealment, and no nation cries out 
against this form of attack as illegal. Its navy simply becomes 
more vigilant, moves faster, and uses its surface scouts to pro- 
tect itself. 

" The submarine carries the same weapons as surface vessels ; 
i. e., torpedoes, mines, and guns. There is no prohibition of 
their use on surface craft and there can be none on submarines. 
Submarines are particularly well adapted to use mines and tor- 
pedoes. They can approach to the desired spot without being seen, 



SUBMARINE AS SCOUT. 61 

la j' their mines or discharge their torpedoes, and make their 
escape. 

" The hest defense against them is eternal vigilance and high 
speed. This causes added fatigue to the personnel and greater 
wear to the machinery- The continual menace of submarines in 
the vicinity may so wear down a fleet that when it meets -the 
enemy it will be so exhausted as to make its defeat a simple 
matter. 

" The submarine as a man-of-war has a very vital part to play. 
It has come to stay. It may strike without warning against 
combatant vessels, as surface ships may do also, but it must be 
required to observe the prescribed rules of surface craft when 
opposing merchantmen as at other times. 

"The submarine as a scout. — As a scout the submarine has 
great possibilities. It is the one type of vessel able to proceed 
unsupported into distant enemy waters and maintain itself to 
observe and report enemy movements. At present its principal 
handicaps are poor habitability and lack of radio power to trans- 
mit its information. However, these may be overcome in some 
degree in the future. Here, again, the submarine has come to 
stay — it has great value, a legitimate use, and no nation can 
decry its employment in this fashion." 

Then followed a statement of the proposal of the United 
States for limitation of naval armament so far as submarines 
are concerned, as made at the opening session of the conference. 

The report then continued : 

"A nation possessing a great merchant marine, protected by 
a strong surface navy, naturally does not desire the added threat 
of submarine warfare brought against it. This is particularly 
the case if that nation gains its livelihood through overseas com- 
merce. If the surface navy of such a nation were required to 
leave its home waters it would be greatly to its advantage if the 
submarine threat were removed. This could be accomplished by 
limiting the size of the submarine so that it would be restricted 
to defensive operation in its own waters. On the other hand, 
if a nation has not a large merchant marine, but is dependent 
upon sea-borne commerce from territory close abroad, it would 
be necessary to carry war to her. It would be very natural for 
that nation to desire a large submarine force to protect the ap- 
proaches on the sea and to attack troop transports, supply ships, 
etc., of the enemy. Control of the surface of the sea only by 
the attacking power would not eliminate it from constant ex- 
posure and loss by submarine attacks. 

" The United States would never desire its Navy to undertake 
unlimited submarine warfare. In fact, the spirit of fair play of 
the people would bring about the downfall of the administration 
which attempted to sanction its use. However, submarines act- 



62 SUBMARINE AND WEAK STATES. 

ing legitimately from bases in our distant possessions would 
harass and greatly disturb an enemy attempting operations 
against them. They might even delay the fall of these posses- 
sions until our fleet could assemble and commence major op- 
erations. 

'" It will be impossible for our fleet to protect our two long 
coast lines properly at all times. Submarines located at bases 
along both coasts will be useful as scouts and to attack any 
enemy who should desire to make raids on exposed positions. 

" The submarine is particularly an instrument of weak naval 
powers. The business of the world is carried on upon the surface 
of the sea. Any navy which is dominant on the surface prefers 
to rely on that superiority, while navies comparatively weak may 
but threaten that dominance by developing a new form of attack 
to attain success through surprise. Hence submarines have of- 
fered and secured advantages until the method of successful coun- 
terattack has been developed. 

" The United States Navy lacks a proper number of cruisers. 
The few we have would be unable to cover the necessary area to 
obtain information. Submarines could greatly assist them, as 
they can not be driven in by enemy scouts. 

" The cost per annum of maintaining 100,000 tons of submarines 
fully manned and ready is about $30,000,000. For the work which 
will be required of them in an emergency this cost is small when 
taken in connection with the entire Navy. The retention of a 
large submarine force may at some future time result in the 
United States holding its outlying possessions. If these colonies 
once fall, the expenditure of men necessary to recapture them will 
be tremendous, and may result in a drawn war, which would 
really be a United States defeat. The United States needs a large 
submarine force to protect its interests. 

" The committee is therefore of the opinion that unlimited war- 
fare by submarines on commerce should be outlawed. The right 
of visit and search. must be exercised by submarines under the 
same rules as for surface vessels. It does not approve limitation 
in size of submarines." 

The chairman stated that he had deemed it his duty to read the 
foregoing report, which, as he had already said, represented the 
views of the Advisory Committee that had been created by the 
President for the very purpose of giving to the American delega- 
tion such aid. The American delegation would most carefully 
consider the able address of Lord Lee and would consult the 
American naval experts. 

Mr. Sarraut said that he thought that the very interesting dis- 
cussion to which the committee had been listening might well be 
postponed until the next day. Lord Lee had set forth the British 
views on the submarine question; he (M. Sarraut) had replied 



SIXTH MEETING. 63 

by outlining the divergent French views, and the chairman had 
presented the American thesis in an interesting and voluminous 
document. He could testify to the profound interest aroused 
among the French delegation by Lord Lee's speech and to the 
force of his arguments, which if not convincing were highly im- 
pressive. He (Mr. Sarraut) and his colleagues felt that the best 
tribute which they could pay to Lord Lee's able address would be 
to reply to it in detail. He requested, therefore, that time might 
be given to prepare this reply and also secure a translation of the 
document presented by the chairman, and that the meeting be 
adjourned until Friday afternoon. 

The chairman asked what was the pleasure of the 'committee in 
this matter. 

Mr. Balfour said that he placed himself in the chairman's hands. 

After some discussion it was agreed to meet Friday afternoon, 
December 23, 1921, at 3 p. m., and that the statement to the 
press should embody such portions of the remarks made at the 
present sessions as the respective delegates should communicate 
to the secretary general. 

The meeting then adjourned until December 23, 1921, 3 p. m. 



SIXTH MEETING— FRIDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1921, 3 P. M. 

PKESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. 
Wright, Mr. Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Aukjand Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zea- 
land), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Han- 
key, Capt. Little, Capt Domvile, Mr. Mousley. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. 
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, 
Mr. Ponsot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Alber- 
tini, Vice Admiral Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti- 
Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia 
di Vegliasco. 

Japan. — Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, 
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi. . 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont, 
and Mr. Wilson. 

Interpreters, Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon. 



64 TRENCH STATEMENT. 

1. The sixth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Arma- 
ment was held in the Columbus Room Of the Pan-American Union 
Building at 3 p. m., December 23, 1921. 

2. There were present : For the "United States, Mr. Hughes, Sen- 
ator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral 
Coontz ; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auck- 
land Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden 
(for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond 
(for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, Mr. Sar- 
raut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon ; for Italy, Senator 
Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral 
Acton ; for Japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral 
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. 

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were pres- 
ent : For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark ; for the British 
Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. 
Mousley ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Oden- 
d'hal, Mr. Ponsot; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count 
Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco; 
for Japan, Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont, 
and Mr. Wilson, was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon 
(interpreters) were also present. 

4. The chairman, Mr. Hughes, suggested that the discussion 
should continue from the point where it had stopped the day be- 
fore. 

Admiral de Bon said that he desired in the first place to make a 
statement for the sake of accuracy. In the course of yesterday's 
session different estimates of the French submarine tonnage were 
given by Mr. Hughes and Lord Lee. This difference seemed to 
him to arise in part from the fact that in one case the tonnage 
was estimated on submerged submarines and in the other on 
ships on the surface. 

France posseses at the present time 50 submarines representing 
a tonnage of 31,391 tons if estimated afloat and of 42,949 tons if 
estimated when submerged. These figures did not include the 12 
submarines whose construction had been authorized by Parlia- 
ment and for which contracts had been made. 

Admiral de Bon then read the following statement : 

" The conference entered yesterday upon the consideration of 
the question of abolishing submarines. It had listened to a re- 
markable statement and defense of the British point of view by 
Lord Lee, of Fareham. The argument presented is very complete 
and very logical, and it may be said that it supports the view 
favoring abolition of the submarine with the most forcible argu- 
ments that can be brought to bear upon this side of the question. 



SUBMARINE NOT USELESS. 65 

"Another consideration of this particularly remarkable and im- 
portant question was read by Chairman Hughes, and even if he 
had not had the kindness to enlighten the conference upon the 
distinguished personality of the members of the advisory com- 
mittee, the incontestable value of their arguments would have sig- 
nalized their exceptional ability. 

" The conclusion of this dissertation is the reverse of the view 
advocated by the Hon. Lord Lee, of Fareham, and is in favor of 
the preservation of the submarine. 

" The two declarations that have been made have brought to 
light about all the arguments that can be advanced. Accordingly, 
it would seem as if the debate might almost be regarded as ex- 
hausted if we did not have certain differences of opinion regard- 
ing the various arguments which it would seem desirable to pre- 
sent to the conference. 

" I ask permission to review them briefly before you. 

" In the first place, it has been denied that the submarine was 
really an efficient weapon, and this is an essential consideration, 
since, if this were admitted, it is obvious that there would be al- 
most no reason for building submarines. 

" The submarine as a weapon against warships can not be con- 
sidered useless. If it is, indeed, true that the Great Fleet was 
able to remain at sea during several months in the midst of the 
submarines without any of its ships being hit, it should be re- 
membered that France lost three battleships and five cruisers and 
had several other ships torpedoed, 130,000 tons in all. To this 
list I can add a certain number of battleships lost by Great Britain 
and by Italy. 

" Finally, the offensive action of the submarines has necessitated 
the construction of a considerable defensive system, and this cer- 
tainly had an influence toward weakening the general forces of 
the nations engaged. 

"As a means of defense the submarine has not been found use- 
less. It can not, I think, be denied that if Germany maintained 
her coast intact it was not solely because of the barrier of mines 
with which she protected it. This could have been crossed by any 
force suitably provided with mine sweepers if a" force of subma- 
rines, supplementary to the mine defenses, had not rendered the 
approach to them really dangerous. 

" In the Adriatic the submarine also formed one of the most 
powerful means of action for the enemy. 

" In the Dardanelles the Allies felt the effect of the use of sub- 
marines not only during the major actions but also throughout the 
long months during which they remained holding tight to the 
point of Gallipoli Peninsula. The bombardments which the Allies 
were led to make against the Turkish position were always con- 



€6 EXPERIENCE WITH SUBMARINE. 

siderably hindered by the measures for protecting their ships 
which they were compelled to take on account of the presence or 
threat of submarines in those waters. The Allies had, moreover, 
paid for their efforts with the loss of several ships. 

" In fighting warships the submarine can be employed as a 
scout, or rather as an observation post. 

" Everyone knows the great extent to which the submarine 
lends itself in wireless communications. It is obvious that this 
observation post, so difficult to detect, can approach very near to 
the enemy, watch his operations, and carry either to the fleet 
which it is convoying or to its governing authority information 
which can not otherwise be obtained, especially for navies which 
have no powerful surface craft at their disposal. 

" In a word, in our opinion, the submarine has proven its 
worth as a means of attack against warships as well as in the pro- 
tection of coasts. 

" The submarine has shown itself especially efficient against the 
merchant marine. 

" I need not recall the very considerable results obtained in the 
submarine warfare waged by Germany against the commercial 
fleets of the world. The mind can not return without horror to 
this subject, which has struck terror to all peoples. 

" But what causes this terror is not the fact that the German 
submarines attacked the merchant vessels of their enemies, but 
that they did not respect either the neutral flag or steamers loaded 
with nonbelligerents, or even the transports for the wounded 
which should have been protected by the Red Cross flag, which 
flag, however, even on land, they "often saw fit to violate. It has 
always been admissible to attack the enemy's merchant marine, 
and it will, I think, always seem legitimate to do so. In fact, it 
is one of the most effective means of seriously crippling one's 
adversary. 

" If, taking an extreme case, one might consider it possible to 
bring one's adversary to the point of yielding by this process, 
would it not be less cruel and less wasteful of human life than 
military operations which would arrive at the same result by di- 
rect application. of force? 

" One may protest against this interpretation, but it is the re- 
sult of the blockade, which is a legitimate practice, and its effects 
are not peculiar to submarines. 

" I understand quite well that if this kind of war is allowed, it . 
should be confined within certain limits to prevent it from violat- 
ing the laws of humanity. That is the precise point on which the 
charge that all have agreed in bringing without mercy against the 
Germans is based. But the accusation is brought against the men 
and not against the instrument that they made use of. 



GERMAN METHODvS. 67 

" In order to impart to the war, which they had decided on, the 
horrible character which they thought would cause our energies 
to yield, the Germans simply sank the boats which they stopped. 
You will recall that at the beginning of the submarine campaign 
the Germans aimed, above all, to inspire terror and expected to 
obtain from it a moral effect on which they based their hopes. In 
fact, nobody can have forgotten the propaganda launched at the 
beginning of 1915 with all the mighty and wily means of German 
propaganda. It aimed almost exclusively at a moral effect. It 
was only later on that they took into consideration the material 
results which could be surely secured by submarine attacks 
against commercial fleets and that they enlarged progressively 
their acts of piracy. 

" If it is undeniable that Germany made a frightful and aston- 
ishing misuse of the submarine against commercial fleets, can 
one contend that it would have been impossible for her to act 
otherwise? 

" Moreover, did not the Germans misuse, and to excess, prac- 
tically all their other weapons? 

" In the first place, one can not deny that they could have 
.avoided attacks against neutral ships and could have refrained 
from torpedoing passenger ships without warning, especially hos- 
pital ships. 

" The success of their fight might have been materially lessened, 
but they would certainly have gained from a moral viewpoint and 
the German submarines would not have lost the respect of the 
civilized world. 

"And then is it not permissible to think that war against 
enemy merchant ships could have been waged differently? Sup- 
pose, for instance, that in meeting a merchant ship a submarine 
advised her that she would be destroyed as soon as security for 
the crew was assured, either by proximity to the shore or by 
means of relief. It could prescribe a route to the ship and bring 
it to a safe place where it would sink it after having removed 
the crew. 

" That is merely a supposition, and I will not attempt here to 
formulate a doctrine, but you will find in it a thought similar to 
that which guided the sailors of other days when they were mak- 
ing a prize and taking it to port or until it had been taken from 
them by the enemy. 

" It may be said that the submarine would be exposed to great 
risks, but were not the frigates and the corsairs of other days 
exposed to great risks in similar operations? How many of them 
had perished either in the defense of their capture or because 
they had been unable to escape the attacks of their enemies in the 
course of the voyage? 



68 WORLD WAR USE. 

"Certainly the fruits of submarine warfare would have been 
smaller if they had been obliged to confine themselves to the limits 
of honorable warfare, but it is impossible to claim that there 
would have been none. 

" I know very well that to sink a ship even while saving the 
lives of those on board is a questionable act and may be inad- 
missible. This is a question of law which ought to be settled 
by confining such action to cases of absolute necessity. 

" In passing I would call your attention to the fact that the 
cruel use to which the Germans put their submarines was not 
confined to this type of vessels. They seized merchant vessels 
and, in order to turn them into cruisers, immediately armed 
them, keeping their crews on board and thus forcing them to 
take part in naval engagements, a practice which while less in- 
human than that inflicted on the crews that were abandoned on 
the high seas was nevertheless indefensible. 

" It follows from this that the activities of submarines against 
merchant vessels should be confined within limits that would 
render their use legitimate. A proper set of rules ought to be 
drawn up with this object in view. They should be adopted 
whenever a revision of the rules for applying international law, 
not only with regard to submarines but to all life at sea in time 
of war, was undertaken. 

" Submarine activity against the enemy's merchant fleet might 
be very effective. We have not been able to listen without great 
emotion as Lord Lee recalled the hours of anguish that all those 
who had held the guidance of affairs during the war had known 
and lived through when Great Britain, together at time with 
France, was threatened with being deprived of the supplies 
which were indispensable not merely for continuing the struggle 
but to keep the nation alive. 

"This is the consecration of the power of the submarine when 
exerted to the full extent of its destructive possibilities, without 
regard for the limits imposed by the most rudimentary princi- 
ples of humanity and respect for international law. Submarine 
activity against enemy transports and convoys, within the limits 
fixed by these considerations which should remain sacred to hon- 
orable opponents, can still be of great importance. It can be 
included among the legitimate methods of warfare as a useful 
factor, especially for nations which have not a powerful navy. 

" In this connection another consideration occurs to me. It is 
said that the submarine can never be kept from bursting through 
the moral barrier which ought to limit its activities. It will 
always yield to the temptation to make unrestricted use of all its 
powers. Lord Lee has kindly paid the submarine officers and 
crews of all navies the compliment of stating that he believed 
them incapable of the acts imputed to the German submarines. 



WEAPON OF WEAKER POWER. C9 

All naval men would be grateful to him. But the honorable first 
lord fears that officers and men may be confronted by formal 
orders from their Governments, which may be driven by danger 
into the weakness of issuing such orders. He does not think 
any Government would risk hereafter incurring such a responsi- 
bility. He thinks furthermore that if ever a nation were again 
to be capable of making such an error, it would not hesitate to 
commit analogous excesses with other means, for example, with 
air forces which could fill the world with even greater horrors. 

"Against the possibility of a Government erring to such a point, 
all measures the conference may take would be in vain. The 
submarine is useful for fighting war fleets ; it is useful for 
fighting merchant vessels. Our opinion is that it is especially 
the weapon of nations not having a large navy. It is, in fact, 
a comparatively cheap element in naval warfare, which can 
be procured in large numbers at a cost far below that of capital 
ships. 

"At the time when we are occupied above all with, economic 
questions, to the point that we are willing to give them prece- 
dence over considerations of the safety of nations, this seems, in 
the first place, an argument worth remembering. It must be 
observed, however, that in the formation of a counter submarine 
fleet the experience of the past war has brought out the fact that 
we can utilize a considerable number of elements drawn from 
both the merchant and fishing fleets. 

" The expense of providing the necessary measures of defense 
against submarine attack may be notably reduced by this means. 

" Moreover, this is an argument of a general nature and applies 
to every other naval weapon, from which, in my opinion, the 
submarine, as we view it now, does not greatly differ. 

" It seems, in fact, that henceforth the submarine has the right 
to figure as an integral part of naval forces. 

" When it first made its appearance no one knew to what precise 
use it might be put. 

" Even the Germans themselves, who in 1914 were several years 
in advance of other navies as regards submarines, did not fully 
realize what use they would make of them. Almost two years of 
war went by before they definitely decided upon their plan of 
action, because their submarines had not yet been perfected. 

" If it was not possible at that time to determine the use which 
might be made of the submarine, the means for combating its 
activity were still more completely unknown. Unless one has been 
embroiled in such circumstances, it is difficult to appreciate the 
formidable effort which was necessary to discover the indis- 
pensable measures for destroying the submarine and to execute 
them in the midst of so violent a war, which had up to that 



70 MEETING STJBMAMNE MENACE. 

time absorbed air the vital energies of the nations in the struggle 
upon land. 

" However it may be, if this small craft committed frightful 
depredations, it was not alone because the use made of it was 
barbarous in the extreme but largely because during many long 
months there was almost nothing with which it could be combated. 

"At the end of the war the situation was changed, and when 
the armistice came the ravages of the submarines had been 
greatly lessened ; the monthly destruction of merchant ships 
scarcely exceeded 60,000 tons, and the methods then in prepara- 
tion for coping with the danger would have considerably re- 
duced this, while the number of submarines destroyed had been 
steadily increasing. 

" To sum up, in judging the submarine it should not be consid- 
ered at the time of the war, and above all at that precise moment 
of the war when it was at the height of its effectiveness, but more 
in perspective and looking somewhat toward the future. As is 
the case with every new weapon, it first came upon its ad- 
versaries when they were without sufficient defense and caused 
vast damage. Yet from now on, as Lord Lee emphasized, its 
power would be greatly limited ; the risks of destruction which 
it must run have become very numerous. Without going as far 
as the first lord in feeling that the submarine has become ineffec- 
tive against its foes, it is possible to think that the struggle 
against the submarine may now be carried on under conditions 
comparable to that of any action between warships. 

"A new phase has been reached in the life of the submarine ; 
it will not be the last. . There is no doubt that further great 
progress will be made in two directions — in the power of attack 
of the submarine and in the efficiency of methods for combating its 
operations. 

" In order to establish certainty upon this point it is enough to 
recall the case of the torpedo boat. Upon its appearance this lit- 
tle craft was considered an instrument of such power of destruc- 
tion that, in the view of many distinguished naval men and 
writers upon maritime subjects, the hour of great battleships had 
struck ; to build them was no longer worth while. The people in 
France who favored this decision formed a large and influential 
group. What would have occurred if war had broken out at the 
moment of this fever in favor of torpedo boats? Evidently, if 
use had been made of them as arbitrarily as of the submarines by 
the Germans the damage caused by the torpedo boats would per- 
haps have been less ; but what is certain is that in many respects 
the conditions surrounding them were analogous to those affecting 
submarines. 

" However, the search for means to oppose the torpedo boat was 
undertaken. And now not only has this small craft ceased to be 



RANGE OF WARFARE. 71 

an object of special dread but it has developed into the destroyer 
or flotilla leader and has been found to be the greatest engine of 
war against the submarine. In this way the instrument of terror 
of 40 years ago has shown itself to be an especially efficacious 
'defender of humanity. 

" Who says that the same thing will not come to pass in the 
case of the submarine? We note as a menace which impresses 
itself greatly upon our minds the advent of powerful airships 
whose appearance each day strikes us as more real and more im- 
posing. We foresee that they will be capable not only of attacks 
on land, at present almost irresistible, but also of formidable un- 
dertakings far out at sea. In the course of these struggles the 
airship can spread gas over a considerable area of the sea, para- 
lyzing large ships, possibly squadrons. Then will we not look 
forward to utilizing the protection of the submarine which, sup- 
plied with powerful means against aircraft, may circle around 
and guard the fleet? The capacity of submerging would enable 
these guardians temporarily to escape the blows of the adversary 
in the air. This you will say to-day is fanciful. Perhaps the 
future will show what the result will be. 

" Be that as it may, the last war has shown that hereafter the 
naval warfare can be carried on simultaneously under water, on 
the surface, and in the air. That is to say, we must, for the mo- 
ment, consider the naval war of the future from this angle, if 
this greatest of misfortunes should, contrary to the wishes of all, 
some day occur. 

" These are actual facts from which there is no possible escape. 
None of you would know how to undertake to stop the progress 
of human ingenuity. It has taken possession of the submarine 
domain. This is a fact which we are unable to prevent. 

" It is very certain that the submarine, the only device by 
which man has succeeded in navigating under water, can not yet 
serve any industrial purpose or peaceful aim. This characteristic 
it shares with the torpedo boat and with most other weapons. 

" I have set forth the views of the French Navy relative to the 
suppression of submarines. I have still a word to say on the 
importance of the number of submarines. 

" The figures which have been laid before the committee have 
emphasized the paramount consideration which must guide it in 
forming an opinion. 

" Lord Lee has stated that the Germans constructed 320 sub- 
marines and that generally they had only ten of them in active 
service at sea at any one time. This would indicate that the 
proposals for submarines to be constructed must be estimated on 
a basis considerably larger than that employed in fixing the num- 
ber of these little boats that it is thought necessary to use. 



72 SUBMARINE TONNAGE. 

*' In truth, we have not quite the same figures. We have esti- 
mated that on an average one can figure that the Germans had 
possessed 80 to 100 completed submarines which at the time 
could be termed in existence. Of this number they were able to 
keep about 15 or 20 at sea at once. And the reduction thus noted 
from the number of existing submarines to the number in condi- 
tion to use was due to two causes — the need to allow the crews 
to rest, and the need of maintenance of these small boats on which 
the wear and tear was terrific, making constant repairs necessary. 

" The advisory committee, whose perfectly clear, exact, and 
precise report could be considered as an excellent base for esti- 
mating, had calculated 90,000 tons to be the tonnage necessary 
for the United States and Great Britain. No doubt that had been 
the limit of reduction which those wise men had considered rea- 
sonable. Taking it that one of the present submarines and, a 
fortiori, a submarine of a future type, an improvement on its 
predecessors, should have a tonnage of about 1,000 tons, the 
figures proposed by the American committee represent 90 sub- 
marines of recent type ; that is to say, 15 or 20 capable of simul- 
taneous action. This seems indeed the minimum submarine 
strength a power desirous of making use of this contrivance 
should have. 

" It is proposed, however, to reduce this already very smaL 
number. If we fall below this limit, we will end by having a force 
of no use whatsoever, and this measure will be nearly equivalent 
to abolishing the submarine. I think that in this conference we 
should at all costs abstain from making decisions which may not 
be practicable and which, even before our thoughts are on the 
way to realization, may weaken these to the point that instead 
of being an element of moral strength and confidence to the 
world the decisions of the conference might be a cause of doubt 
and anxiety. 

" My observation on the decrease of the tonnage seems to me 
all the better founded in that it applies more forcibly in the case 
of the construction of submarines of a greater tonnage, the free- 
dom to build which has been asked for by most of us. 

" Never has the program of navies gone forward more rapidly 
than now. It will lead us before long to increase the size of the 
submarine. 

" We are convinced that the idea of large-sized submarines 
could not be dismissed. If you impose too narrow a limit on sub- 
marine tonnage, you will obstruct the progress of submarine 
science. What you would accomplish on the one hand you would 
undo on the other. 

" To draw a conclusion from the foregoing, I think that we can 
not reasonably limit submarine tonnage, since we have before us 
an entirely new weapon, concerning which no cne of us can fore- 



SUBMARINES AND COMMERCE. 73 

see the possible trasformation and growth, perhaps in the near 
future. 

11 If, in spite of this idea — which is a menace to no one, first, 
because I think no one here can consider that any one of us 
could become the enemy of any other, and, secondly, because we 
can agree in mutual confidence to keep each other informed of 
our future constructions — you wish absolutely to fix a limit to 
submarine tonnage, I believe that 90,000 tons is the absolute 
minimum for all the navies who may want to have a submarine 
force." 

Mr. Balfour said : " Since the very remarkable statement of 
the antisubmarine case made by Lord Lee, two notable contribu- 
tions have been made to this debate. One was the document 
which you, Mr. Chairman, read out yesterday representing the 
views of the American advisory committee. The other was the 
speech of the gallant admiral who has just sat down. I rather 
wish that the advisory committee could have heard that speech 
before they drew up their report. They had reached the conclu- 
sion that the destruction of commerce by submarines, was not the 
legitimate business of submarines, and they were under the im- 
pression that regulations could be framed which would prevent 
what they held to be the inhuman employment of this particular 
weapon of war. But had they heard the speech to which we have 
just listened they would have seen, I think, that while Admiral de 
Bon condemned, as we should all expect him to condemn, the mis- 
use of the submarine against merchant ships, it was the action 
of submarines upon merchant ships which he regards as, on 
the whole, the most important purpose to which that weapon of 
maritime warfare can be put. And is he not right? Is there any 
man who knows what occurred in the late war ; is there any man 
who knows what must occur in the course of any future war, 
who doubts that if submarines are sent on their dangerous and 
difficult mission — one of the most difficult and most dangerous, 
as well as one of the most disagreeable tasks which can be' im- 
posed upon sailors — it is for something more important than the 
remote chance of destroying some well-guarded ship of war? 
Is there any man who doubts that if they are once let loose to 
deal with merchantmen their powers will not in the stress of 
war be abused in the future as they have been so grossly abused 
in the past? It is vain to dwell upon the fact that the submarine 
is a useful scout, that the submarine may destroy a few un- 
guarded and careless ships of war and impose upon any attack- 
ing forces precautions which no doubt they would gladly forego. 

" From Admiral de Bon's own speech it is clear that the main 
object they serve is the destruction of commerce ; and I can not 
doubt that if this had been heard and thoroughly considered by 

25882—23 G 



74 WAR USE OF SUBMARINES. 

the advisory committee, the conclusion they would have come to 
would not have been so very remote from that which has im- 
pressed itself upon the British Empire delegation. Now, I do 
not in the least desire unduly to minimize the utility of sub- 
marines for genuine war purposes, but I can not help thinking 
that Admiral de Bon has exaggerated it. I can assure him that 
he is in error in supposing that the immunity from attack en- 
joyed by the German coasts was, in the least degree, due to their 
submarines. I speak with knowledge upon this subject, and I 
can assure him that he is under some misapprehension. Neither 
do I believe that you will find that submarines, on the whole, are 
any defense against attack by ships of war upon an undefended 
coast town. That is, I believe, one of the duties which the Italian 
delegation think can be performed by submarines, but I greatly 
doubt it. The Germans were able from time to time, without 
much difficulty, to send a swift ship across the North Sea, throw 
a few shells into an undefended port, and then seek safety in 
flight. That produced some suffering and effected some destruc- 
tion, though whether the cost of the damage done by a shell is 
greater than the cost of the shell itself may perhaps be doubted. 
I remember one particular case in which an attack of this kind 
was made upon an open town on the east coast of England where 
there actually was a submarine; but it takes some time for a sub- 
marine to get ready ; it takes some time for it to submerge ; it 
is difficult for it to reach a much swifter surface vessel; and, 
though the submarine did its best, the aggressor was far away 
before anything could be done either in the way of protection or 
revenge. 

" Is it not in the minds of all of us who followed the history of 
the late war that the British ships bombarded hour after hour the 
Flemish coast of Zeebrugge, which was full of submarines? The 
damage these submarines inflicted was trifling, and they never 
checked the bombardment. Take the case of the Dardanelles. 
We lay opposite the Dardanelles, in the most perilous circum- 
stances you could well conceive, month after month, with subma- 
rines ever on the watch seeking what they could destroy. What 
they destroyed was quite insignificant. Now, if submarines could 
not render it impossible for ships to lie in the open opposite the 
Dardanelles, how can we believe that they are going to prove a 
very efficient weapon to maritime defense? I do not wish to 
dwell further upon this aspect of the question, because I do not 
think, as I have already indicated, that it is the fighting use of 
the submarine which is really before us now. The question before 
us now is whether you are going to encourage an instrument of 
war which, if it be encouraged, if indeed it be permitted at all, 
will undoubtedly be used in the illegitimate destruction of com^ 
merce. Now, who is that going to injure? There are two of the 



BLOCKADE AND SUBMARINE. 75 

powers represented here who, I think, have little or nothing to 
fear in such a connection. I mean the United States and Japan. 
Both are remote from any possible aggressor, and the United 
States are self-sufficient. How about the other three? 

** Take the case of Italy. Italy is not an island, but for the 
purposes of this debate she almost counts as an island. I re- 
member the extreme difficulty we had in supplying her even with 
the minimum of coal necessary to keep her arsenals and manu- 
factories going during the war. I doubt whether she could feed 
herself or supply herself or continue as an efficient fighting unit 
if she were really blockaded, if her sea commerce were cut off, 
which, please God, will never be. The fact that you are going 
to give a general blessing to submarines — at least so I gather — 
puts it in the power of every State that has a seaboard at all 
to make itself a formidable, aggressive enemy. You talk of the 
submarine as if it were by nature something that encouraged 
defense and discouraged attack. It is nothing of the kind. A 
State which is itself not dependent upon sea-borne commerce, 
but which has some access to the sea, can, without building a 
battleship, without having any great naval estimates, make itself 
one of the most formidable of aggressive powers to its maritime 
neighbors. Italy has five neighbors in the Mediterranean. I 
hope and believe that peace, eternal peace, will reign in those 
ancient homes of civilization. But we are considering these mat- 
ters from, as it were, the cold and calculating point of view of 
some member of a general staff. He, looking at the problem with- 
out any political bias, merely as a question of strategy, would 
say to Italy, ' You have five neighbors, each one of which can, if 
it desired it, blockade your coast without employing a single 
surface ship.' No troops need be landed, no battles fought. You 
would perish without being conquered. Now, compare with this 
case the case of France. France is nearly self-supporting in point 
of food, and France has a great land frontier which gives her 
access, directly and indirectly, to all the great markets of the 
world. No maritime power can blockade her. But though se- 
cure from the sea, Mr. Briand tells us that she is in a position 
of very grave insecurity on the side of the land, and he certainly 
indicated to an attentive world that France not only required a 
large army now but as events develop she might again call for 
assistance from overseas, across the Atlantic or across the 
Channel. 

" How, then, shall we think of this encouragement of sub- 
marines, these passionate declarations against any interference 
with the development of this promising weapon of war which is 
still in its infancy? The submarines which the French propose 
to build will be no protection against the submarines of Germany. 
On what, then, is she going to rely? On the trawlers and fisher- 



7() GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS. 

men of her own coasts? If the experience of the past is any guide 
to the future, these will be wholly insufficient. At a moment 
when everything turned upon keeping open the communications 
between France, Britain, and the United States the contribution 
of small craft to this vital object was as follows : France, 257 
vessels ; Italy, 288 vessels ; Great Britain, 3,676 vessels. These 
figures speak for themselves ; and it is manifest that but for the 
assistance given by British trawlers, fishermen, and merchant sea- 
men the exclusion from Italy of the necessities of national exist- 
ence, the exclusion from France of the allied armies and munitions 
would have been complete, and the war would have been lost. 
Supposing now that the situation which I have just described 
were reproduced, as M. Briand fears that it may be produced ; 
supposing that France's allies come to her assistance, as I hope 
they will; is it not clear that France will again be as dependent 
on British antisubmarine craft as she was three or four years 
ago? Is this a tolerable situation? I can not believe that on re- 
flection our French friends will think so. This is a conference 
for the diminution of naval armaments, and surely it is fitting 
that we should remember not merely that the submarine is an 
instrument of warfare certain to be abused but that the build- 
ing of them in large numbers inflicts a double burden on the 
world — a burden on the country which possesses them and a 
burden also on the countries against which they may possibly be 
used. 

' " Think not, however, that I am making any appeal of a purely 
national character. People are apt to suppose that Great Britain 
is the country which has most to fear from submarine warfare. 
They look at the map ; they see that Great Britain is wholly 
dependent on sea-borne supplies and that opposite her coasts are 
harbors over which she has no control flanking the long lines 
of commercial communication which connect her with distant 
parts of her own Empire, with the markets which she serves, 
and the countries from which she draws her raw material. They 
argue that a country so situated is at the mercy of submarine 
warfare. 

" Now, it is true that our position has its strategical difficulties ; 
but we have faced them before ; we have faced them successfully ; 
and if ever the necessity should arise we shall face them suc- 
cessfully again. Lord Lee yesterday called attention to the 
critical moment of the war. I remember it well, for I was com- 
ing over to this country, and daily we received by wireless the 
returns of our loss of merhant tonnage. A very simple calculation 
sufficed to show that if this state of things continued the war 
would end in tragedy. In the struggle between the attack by sub- 
marines and the defense, the attack was winning. All such 



Italy's position. 77 

.struggles, however, have their ups and downs, and this was the 
very nadir of our fortunes. But it brought its own remedy. 
Courage, invention, and organization did their work, and months 
before the end of the war on land piracy at sea had lost its 
terrors. And so it will be again if the necessity should arise. 
We shall know how to protect ourselves, and if need be -we shall 
know how to protect our allies. But when those allies themselves 
multiply their lleets of submarines at our very doors we know 
not what to think of a position so incongruous and so strange. 

" But there are considerations to be kept in mind which are 
wider even than the most important international relations — con- 
siderations of humanity, considerations of public morality. Ad- 
miral de Bon observed just now that the submarine must develop. 
You could not, he observed, stop the progress of invention. I 
confess that, in so far as the progress of invention consists in 
devising new methods of warfare, I would stop it to-morrow if 
I could ; and this conference could not do better work than to 
stop it in so far as it can be stopped. And, surely, if the powers 
represented in this room set themselves resolutely to the task, 
the submarine could be banned. I believe the conscience of man- 
kind w r ould help us ; I believe the public opinion of the world 
would be on our side ; and the result of our labors would be ap- 
proved, not merely by those who wish to diminish the burden 
of excessive taxation, but by those who believe that, if the pos- 
sibility of war must be admitted, we should do something to 
make it more humane." 

Senator Schanzer said : " We have listened with the greatest 
attention to Mr. Balfour's important speech. 

" Mr. Balfour has recalled England's efficient aid for Italy's 
supplies during the war. I wish in the first place to express to 
the British delegate, who represents his country with such a great 
authority, Italy's sincere gratitude. We shall never forget what 
England has done, and Mr. Balfour knows the cordial friendship 
for England which is traditional among the Italian people and 
constitutes one of the surest bases of all Italian policy. 

" I wish furthermore to express to Mr. Balfour my thanks also 
for the important remarks he made on the particular conditions 
of Italy, which depends completely on the sea for her supplies, 
which can be blockaded with the greatest facility owing to the 
fact that the Mediterranean is like a lake, and which can be ex- 
posed to an offensive action on the part of as many as five mari- 
time neighbors. His observations are such as to justify, better 
than I could ever have done myself, the position that the Italian 
delegation has assumed in the present debate. 

" Mr. Balfour has contested the utility of the submarine for 
coast defense. He maintains that submarines are of no help in 



78 SMALL STATES NOT REPRESENTED. 

guaranteeing the supplies of a country which is dependent on the 
sea, and holds, on the other hand, that they are a menace to these 
supplies. He has said that submarines are a danger, especially 
for Italy, whose coasts can be easily blockaded and whose mari- 
time neighbors might make use of submarines as an offensive 
weapon. We are confronted by a substantial technical difference 
of opinion. Your authority and that of Lord Lee's are no doubt 
very great, but there are technical experts of great authority 
who insist upon the necessity of still maintaining submarines as 
a defensive weapon. This opinion is' shared by our naval experts 
and by our Government. 

" We are disposed, however, to pursue together with you the 
study of this problem ; only we must point out that it does not 
seem possible to us to-day to decide on the suppression of sub- 
marines because many of the States that could avail themselves 
of this dangerous weapon are not represented in this conference. 

" Were we to decide to-day the suppression of submarines we 
would evidently be placing ourselves in a dangerous condition of 
manifest inferiority in respect to those States which are not rep- 
resented here and which might continue to use submarines. The 
Italian delegation believes, therefore, that this problem must be 
examined subsequently in a wider conference. For the present, 
however, one point is clear in our minds, and that is that the best 
course would be to follow even in this case the spirit of the 
American proposal and consequently to limitate submarines to 
the measure strictly necessary for the ends of a purely defensive 
naval policy." 

Admiral de Bon asked the committee for a moment's attention. 
An error, he said, had been made which might be corrected by a 
moment's reference to the minutes. Contrary to what Mr. Bal- 
four seemed to believe, he had never stated that it was permis- 
sible to use submarines to destroy commercial vessels. He had 
said that the Germans, during the war, had used them in an un- 
necessary and cruel manner, but he had never said that France 
intended to use them in any similar practice ; it had never en- 
tered into his thesis that submarine war on commerce was right 
or permissible. He said he hoped that the minutes would make 
this point clear. To sum up, he had said the Germans might have 
used the submarine less barbarously; that did not mean that he 
intended to preach barbarity himself. 

Mr. Balfour said that the last thing he had intended was to 
misrepresent Admiral De Bon. He was certain that if the ad- 
miral ever had control of a navy in time of war he would conduct 
the operations in accordance with the dictates of humanity and 
the fine traditions of the great service to which he belonged. 
What he had attempted to show, however, was that, if the sub- 
marine was to play the great role in future wars which Admiral 



SEVENTH MEETING. 79 

de Bon had suggested in his speech it could only do so by resort- 
ing to extreme methods, for it was futile to suppose that subma- 
rines would make a practice of stopping merchant ships and plac- 
ing prize crews on board to take them into port. 

Senator Schanzer asked permission to inquire with respect to 
the Christmas holiday. He said he had been informed that there 
would be a recess until Tuesday after Christmas, and asked 
whether it was correct that a meeting would be held on Tuesday 
afternoon. 

The chairman stated that as the servant of the conference he 
did not feel at liberty to recommend any Christmas recess unless 
this was the expressed desire of the delegates. He said that if 
in the judgment of the delegates the conference had arrived at a 
point where progress could be made, he would suggest that a 
meeting be held the following morning. If at that meeting a 
point should be reached where further immediate progress might 
be made, a meeting could be held the following Monday. This, 
he said, could be decided according to circumstances. 

The chairman then referred to the question of the public 
statement for the press and asked whether it would be agreeable 
to the French and British Empire delegations to publish in full 
the arguments of Admiral de Bon and Mr. Balfour. This was 
agreed to by these delegations. 

The meeting then adjourned until the following morning, De- 
cember 24, 1921, at 11 o'clock. 



SEVENTH MEETING— SATURDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1921, 11 A. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. 
Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright and 
Mr. Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice 
Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousley. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. 
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'lial, 
Mr. Ponsot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Alber- 
tini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Vis- 
conti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. 
Celesia di Vegliasco. 



80 TRENCH REPLY TO BRITISH. 

Japan,— Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato r 
Capt Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi and Commander 
Hori. 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Osborne, 
and Mr. Paul. 

Interpreters — Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon. 

1. The seventh meeting of the Committee on Limitation of 
Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American 
Union Building, at 11 a. m., Saturday, December 24, 1921. 

2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, 
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz ; for the 
British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada) T 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. 
Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, 
Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron 
Acton ; for Japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral 
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. 

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were pres- 
ent: For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the 
British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile,. 
Mr. Mousley ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. 
Odend'hal, Mr. Pensot ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, 
Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr.. Celesia di 
Vegliasco ; for Japan, Mr. Ichihashi, Commander Hori. The sec- 
retary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Osborne, and Mr. 
Paul, was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon (inter- 
preters) were also present. 

4. The chairman, Mr. Hughes, announced that the meeting was 
ready to continue the discussion begun the day before. 

Mr. Sarraut said that their eminent and venerated colleague, Mr. 
Balfour, replying the previous day to Admiral de Bon's state- 
ment — a statement which in Mr. Sarraut's opinion had been so 
substantial and convincing — had given the committee a new oppor- 
tunity for respecting the eloquence and the emotion of the phrases 
which a mind like Mr. Balfour's always so easily found to express 
the inspirations of his thought. He wished to thank Mr. Balfour 
personally for having given him that rare pleasure in which the 
regret felt at meeting opposition immediately gave way to admira- 
tion for one's adversary. He regretted the use of such a word as 
adversary, which had a displeasing sound ; for, as a matter of fact, 
his first impulse, as he rose to reply, was to think of the last words 
of Mr. Balfour's speech and to approve with all his heart and all 
his reason the dignity and the serenity with which Mr. Balfour 
looked forward to the future destiny of his great country. On this 
point Mr. Balfour knew how completely he shared this faith and 



COOPERATION DESIRED. 81 

conviction. His own country, more than any other — Mr. Balfour 
also knew this — desired for Great Britain the continuation of the 
power and security which France regarded as one of the essential 
guaranties of the peace of the world and of the future of civiliza- 
tion. France would be the last to forget how greatly the heroism 
and the tenacity of her mighty ally had contributed to bring about 
the final decision which had saved the liberty of mankind ; and in 
the effort thus made by England it was also known what a part 
had been played by the splendid British Navy, which, in coopera- 
tion with the French Navy, had done so much to make victory 
certain. 

He wished to bear these sentiments in mind in replying to Mr.. 
Balfour, and particularly to the argument " ad hominem " which 
the latter had addressed to France as well as to Italy, with the 
object of demonstrating the danger that might be created by the 
position taken by France on the submarine question. If he had 
rightly understood, Mr. Balfour had said : Beware ! You may be 
the first victims of your own attitude ; you know what England 
has been enabled to do for you with the aid of her navy ; this help 
ran great risk of being impaired by the action of the German 
submarines ; let us suppose, he had said, that the situation at the 
time the last war should recur, as has been suggested by Mr. 
Briand ; suppose the former allies of France again came to her 
assistance (as Mr. Balfour said he hoped they would do) ; the- 
efficiency of their help might be impaired by the resumption of 
that submarine campaign which the attitude of France would have 
helped to render possible by its unwillingness to abolish the sub- 
marines. 

Such, Mr. Sarraut believed, was Mr. Balfour's line of reason- 
ing ; he had not understated it and believed that he had exactly 
reproduced it. He might remark that, in reality, the danger 
contemplated by Mr. Briand was the same as that which Mr. Bal- 
four himself had called " the very great insecurity from the land 
side." But he also agreed with Mr. Balfour that the peril might 
extend to the sea and, far from putting aside this supposition, 
he hastened to accept it, because it would still further strengthen 
the French contention. 

At this point he would borrow from Mr. Balfour himself an. 
argument in answer to the latter's own reasoning. In fact, Mr. 
Balfour, in pointing out to France the eventual danger of main- 
taining submarines, had maintained that countries having coast 
lines or with access to the sea might take advantage of this situa- 
tion to gather together a force of submarines representing a con- 
siderable aggressive strength for use against their neighbors or 
against other countries. Herein lay the very danger — pointed 
out by Mr. Balfour himself — which France feared and wished to- 
avoid. It had been suggested that France give up the idea of re- 



82 FRENCH VIEAV COMMON. 

taining submarines ; but, he asked, were all the powers possessing 
fleets of submarines equally anxious to support such a decision? 
There were five powers represented on the committee ; sometimes 
they were called " the Big Three," sometimes " the Big Five " ; a 
decision could be reached as far as those present were concerned, 
but what would the other countries do? Who could give assur- 
ance that they would submit and follow the example set them? 
What would happen, moreover, if these other countries con- 
tinued to build submarines, either for their own use, or for some- 
one else? In what situation would those countries who were 
represented on the committee find themselves if, peradventure, 
war were to break out? They would have given up submarines 
only to be confronted with the great submarine forces which other 
nations had constructed, retained, or ceded to enemy powers. 

Thi-s was the eventuality which must be faced. Would anyone 
tell him, Mr. Sarraut asked, that that was fantastic? The coun- 
tries he had in mind were countries not represented here, and 
which would therefore preserve their freedom of action and their 
submarine forces ; what way was there, he asked, of persuading 
them or of forcing them to follow thej example of the countries 
represented on the committee? 

Great Britain had tried persuasion without success. Those at- 
tempts Had been made in the deliberations preliminary to the 
peace treaty, during which Great Britain had expressed the wish 
that the use of submarines be forbidden, as well as in discus- 
sions before the League of Nations in the course of which, if Mr. 
Sarraut was not mistaken, the matter had been brought up 
twice. The other countries concerned refused to accept the Brit- 
ish proposals. There was nothing surprising in this; it went to 
prove that these suggestions were in opposition to a sentiment 
which was very natural and which was not peculiar to the 
French. There must be no misunderstanding on this point; the 
views upheld by the French delegation were not exclusively the 
views of France ; they were shared by many other countries 
whose ideas France only reflected. No country worthy of the 
name could leave to others the care of its national defense; 
every country had the desire and the right to assure its own 
safety and to refuse to intrust to anyone else the defense of its 
independence or its integrity. Every country tried to do this 
through its own means and its own resources. Some countries 
were able to build mighty fleets and possess capital ships; but 
those which did not have the same resources to dispose of and the 
same financial facilities were building, or would build, subma- 
rines, which constituted the weapon of the weak and were less 
costly. Should this right be denied them? They had no choice 
when they saw other countries maintaining powerful fleets, with- 
out any warlike intention, to be sure, but with a view to protect- 



NEED OF EQUITY. 83 

ing their own safety against any eventuality. Persuasion was of 
no avail ; constraint would not succeed any better. No one pres- 
ent could even dream of constraint, for the very simple reason 
that they all saw the danger of taking such an attitude. 

Mr. Sarraut said he had called the attention of Great Britain 
in a friendly way to the construction which might be given to de- 
cisions of the conference by certain countries, a construction 
which would run counter to the common efforts of the conference 
to create a spirit of peace. An atmosphere of peace could only 
exist throughout the world if all peoples were given the assurance 
and guaranty that this peace was based on a feeling of equity 
and justice which took the interests of all into account. On the 
day on which the peoples began to think that there was likelihood 
of moral constraint being used to impose^ upon them the point of 
view of the powers here represented — and he ventured to empha- 
size this idea at a time when the susceptibilities of nations ought 
to be carefully considered — he feared that there might grow up, 
around the beneficial work that was being accomplished here, 
certain legends, and even calumnies, distorting the trend of the 
purposes of the powers represented on the committee, such as 
those from which the French had suffered, which had only re- 
cently been used in the press against France, representing her as 
imperialistic. 

It must not be permitted, Mr. Sarraut continued, that such 
campaigns, misinterpreting true sentiments, should be initiated 
against any one of the powers present — France, Great Britain, 
Japan, or any other. If certain of these powers preserved more 
or less considerable naval forces and if, at the same time, other 
peoples, not represented here, were forbidden the right to procure 
for themselves the smaller but still efficacious weapons of defense 
which they believed they needed, might not the legends to which 
he had referred tempt them to think that other more powerful 
countries wished to keep them in subjection, to force them to place 
themselves under their protection, and to retain them in a sort of 
vassalage. That was an impression which must be avoided. 
Careful consideration, he wished to repeat, must be given to the 
mental attitude of the peoples not represented here, whose sus- 
ceptibilities might lead them to misconstrue the exact meaning 
of the decisions which the members of the committee were col- 
laborating. 

The committee would perceive, Mr. Sarraut said, the conclu- 
sions to which he was leading. It was impossible to assume here 
certain obligations in the matter of submarines in the name of 
countries not taking part in the conference ; these countries could 
neither be persuaded nor coerced; that was to say, there could 
be no guaranty that they would follow the example of those not 
constructing submarines. 



84 LACK OF GUARANTIES. 

Hence, in the absence of these guaranties, he considered that 
the committee could not come to a decision. An agreement had 
been reached on the reduction of offensive naval armaments, but 
the question of means of defense must be left to the consideration 
of the countries interested. 

He readily understood that a general conference might be sug- 
gested in which all the countries interested in the question of sub- 
marines would be represented. In this conference the rules ap- 
plying to a more humane use of submarines might be determined ; 
the question of the principle of the retention or abolition of the 
use of submarines could be raised. Then all the nations inter- 
ested in the question might express their opinion and really effec- 
tive decisions might be reached. For the time being, he wished 
to repeat, he believed, "that no decisions could be reached, even 
regarding the questions of what amount of submarine tonnage 
constituted a defensive navy or what amount constituted an 
offensive weapon. Let the tonnage of the great ships, of the 
attacking vessels, be limited as had been done ; that was well, 
and each country might make its contribution along with its per- 
sonal sacrifices in the matter ; but, in regard to the defensive 
navy, it was those countries concerned which best knew their 
needs and the situation which they must face. It was essentially 
a question dependent upon the sovereignty of such countries and 
upon the perception they had of their responsibilities in regard to 
national safety. 

Such, Mr. Sarraut added, were the considerations which he 
wished to lay before Mr. Balfour; he did not know whether he 
had succeeded in convincing him, but at least he had had the great 
honor of having entered into debate with him. 

Mr. Balfour said that he did not mean to weary the committee 
with another long speech, but he had to say one of two sentences 
to make his position clear after the speech just delivered by Mr. 
Sarraut. Those observations, so far as he was concerned, were 
not only most courteous but they were flattering far beyond his 
deserts, and he gratefully acknowledged the spirit in which they 
were made and the language in which they were couched. But 
he felt bound, of course, to make quite clear — he would not say 
the whole case of the British Empire delegation — but certain 
points in that case which he thought it possible Mr. Sarraut' s 
speech might have confused. The argument that he (Mr. Bal- 
four) brought forward in its relation to France might be put in 
this way: The conference had been given to understand on the 
very highest authority, namely, the French prime minister's, that 
the danger to France in the future was a danger that came to 
her from the land side, and the conference had been told in terms 
of unforgettable eloquence that that danger was so great and 
pressed so much upon the consciences of public men and the 



NEED OF LA.ND ARMAMENT. 85 

sentiments of the French public that it was quite impossible for 
France to permit any diminution of land armaments. The deci- 
sion thus announced had had a most serious effect upon the devel- 
opment of the work of a conference called together to diminish 
armaments. This ideal had to be abandoned ; and the confer- 
ence found itself confined to naval disarmament alone. France, 
having thus put a^i end to all chance of even discussing disarma- 
ment by land, had proceeded to develop her sea policy, and her 
sea policy embraced the creation of a vast submarine fleet. Now, 
let those two positions taken together be considered. 

If the danger to France was of the magnitude which had been 
indicated, and if France (which Heaven forbid) should again in 
the future have to call upon her friends and allies, or late allies, 
for assistance in men and in munitions, it would be, he supposed, 
because her great eastern neighbor had not merely revived her 
army but had also revived her navy. The one was not likely to 
take place without the other ; both were contrary to the Treaty 
of Versailles. Very well. It must then be assumed that there 
were 60,000,000 or 70,000,000 Germans against whom France 
would have to be prepared, and it must be assumed that those 
80,000,000 or 70,000,000 Germans would be supplied, if with noth- 
ing else, at least with the easiest and the cheapest of all ships that 
could be built — namely, submarines. How was France going to 
deal with that situation? Her fleet of submarines would be of 
no use at all. Let her make that fleet what she would, they 
would not protect or help to protect either her own merchant ships 
or the transports of her neighbors and friends. Submarines were 
weapons of offense not, as was so often said, weapons of defense ; 
and in no sense would they be able to give one atom of assistance 
to the French nation if she was threatened with the dangers on 
which Mr. Briand had so eloquently dwelt. They would afford 
her no assistance in her hour of need. To whom, then, was she 
going to look ? There was but one nation in Europe which was or 
could be made, so far as he could see, adequately safe against 
submarine attack, and that for social and economic reasons which 
could not well be copied. 

Great Britain, and Great Britain alone in Europe, so far as he 
knew, had that large seafaring population which could be utilized 
for the manning of the small craft by which submarines could be 
controlled in those narrow waters — a population which, as shown 
conclusively by the experience of the late war, not only had the 
numbers but the individual skill, courage, and capacity to deal 
with that situation. So that he must assume, if it were true 
that France, in the crisis contemplated by Mr. Briand, was going 
to call upon her ancient allies for assistance, it was upon Great 
Britain's antisubmarine craft that she would be dependent for 
the possibility of that call being obeyed. How was such a policy 



86 WHY HAVE SUBMARINES. 

consistent with the building of this huge mass of submarines 
which anybody who looked at the matter from a strictly strategi- 
cal and tactical point of view would certainly be driven to say 
was built mainly against Great Britain? He remembered, and 
of course he accepted, the eloquent protest made by Mr. Sarraut. 
He knew that Mr. Sarraut, in his expression of friendship for 
Great Britain, had said not one word in excess of the truth. 
He knew it represented what came from the heart. But no 
present expression of good will, however sincere, could control 
the future. Facts were facts. And when one tried to combine 
the military policy announced by Mr. Briand with the naval 
policy announced by Admiral de Bon, one could not fail to see 
that here was a naval and military scheme strangely incoherent 
and inconsistent. Men would inevitably ask themselves: What 
is the ultimate end underlying all that is being done? Against 
whom is this submarine fleet being built? What purpose is it 
to serve? What danger to France is it intended to guard against? 
He knew of no satisfactory answer to such questions. 

He had so far confined himself strictly to the Anglo-French 
position, and he had tried to explain to those who he knew were 
Great Britain's friends why the position seemed to the British 
public so inconsistent and so difficult to justify. He asked to be 
allowed to say one word upon the more general aspect. He 
thought there was something to be said in favor of this part of the 
contention of Mr. Sarraut. Mr. Sarraut had asked the committee 
by what authority the five nations at the table could legislate for 
the world? They could not legislate for the world ; they could not 
compel the world to take their opinion. When Mr. Sarraut had 
argued from that undeniable proposition he had merely repeated 
what Mr. Hughes himself had stated in a sentence which really 
covered the whole ground : " Even if they were ready to adopt the 
principle suggested by the British Empire delegation, they would 
still have to wait the adherence of other nations." That was a 
statement which he (Mr. Balfour) entirely accepted. But even 
if it were granted in its full extent, as it should be granted, did 
it follow that if a conference of the five great naval powers were 
really unanimous and really put forward upon broad moral 
grounds the statement that in their view submarines were not 
a weapon of war which was consistent with civilization, that 
such a declaration would have no effect. Would it not be the prel- 
ude to their ultimate abolition? Was mankind indeed deaf to 
such appeals? Would they fall vainly upon unheeding ears? He 
did not think so. He thought if it were possible for this con- 
ference of the United States of America, Japan, France, Italy, 
and Great Britain — the five great naval powers — to give expres- 
sion in fitting language to that view, it would be the beginning 
of a great and beneficent reform. Mr. Sarraut apparently 'did 



BRITISH POSITION. 87 

not think it would be a reform, or at all events he thought that 
whatever it might be, taken by itself, the very fact that it had 
been brought forward by Great Britain, advocated by Great 
Britain, and adopted by this conference on the appeal of Great 
Britain would give rise to endless calumnies and that Great 
Britain herself might suffer from the notion that in making this 
appeal she had been animated solely by selfish motives and a de- 
sire to dominate weaker neighbors by her superior sea power. 
But was such misrepresentation possible? If it were attempted, 
would it be believed? 

It seemed to him incredible that anybody could think it was in- 
tended as a prelude to British domination over weaker neighbors. 
Without going into the depths of history, let him observe that for 
the whole of the nineteenth century, after the Peace of Paris in 
1815, Great Britain possessed sea power which had no rival. 
Those who had had the wealth to build against her had not 
thought it worth while, and for all those years the British fleets 
had been by far the largest that traversed the ocean. Then Ger- 
many had begun to build, the United States and Japan had fol- 
lowed suit, and a new state of things arose. But was the history 
of Great Britain during those years one favorable or unfavorable 
to peace, favorable or unfavorable to liberty? It had been during 
those years that Greece became free, that Italy became united, 
that all the States of South America had declared themselves 
independent Republics. So far as he remembered, there had been 
only one European war in which Great Britain had been engaged, 
and in that war Great Britain had been the ally of France. He 
could not imagine anybody who read history supposing that, even 
if the sea power of Great Britain in the century which was to 
come was comparable to her relative sea power in the century 
which had passed, the liberties of the world would have anything 
to fear. He himself looked forward to the changed situation with- 
out fear and without any misgivings. The British Empire was 
strong enough to defend itself. It asked no more. Nor did he 
believe that any of the nations to whom reference had been made 
by Mr. Sarraut were going to run away with the idea that, for 
any purpose whatever, Great Britain meant to be a tyrant either 
on land or sea. 

Mr. Sarraut seemed to think that the smaller powers who might 
have rejoiced in the power to build for themselves submarine fleets 
would resent an international arrangement by which the use of 
submarine fleets was forbidden. This, they would say, is an 
example of Great Britain's arrogance and pride. But if he knew 
anything of the smaller nations of Europe, that was the very last 
thing they were going to say. It was not from British avarice or 
British love of domination that they had ever suffered. If they 



88 FRENCH NEED OF ARMY AND NAVY. 

•considered the power of Great Britain at all, they considered it as 
a power to which in time of difficulty they might look for protec- 
tion. If they considered the influence of Great Britain at all, they 
knew that that influence had always been exercised on the side 
of freedom, and he was certainly not going to be prevented from 
doing his best to promote this great moral reform by the fear that 
the action of himself and his friends around him could, even by 
the bitterest and most unscrupulous calumny, be misrepresented 
in the way which Mr. Sarraut seemed to fear. That was all he 
had to say. He had not attempted, as his friends would see, to 
go over the ground traversed yesterday or to deal with all the 
fundamental verities of the situation; but as Mr. Sarraut had 
thought it desirable to bring up these international relations and 
to paint the future in these gloomy colors, he thought it would 
have hardly been respectful either to Mr. Sarraut or to the other 
friends who were present if he had remained perfectly silent 
under the observations made by the French delegation. 

Mr. Sarraut said that he did not intend to monopolize the at- 
tention of the committee, but he considered it most essential to 
avoid any misunderstanding ; it was indispensable to the clear- 
ness of this discussion that his thoughts should not be miscon- 
strued. In this connection he felt he must clarify two points on 
which Mr. Balfour had dwelt : One concerned the definition of the 
general situation of France ; the other dealt with the possible 
result of the decision which the conference might take in regard 
to submarines, upon the public opinion of the world, or at least 
upon the opinion of the powers not represented here. 

In regard to the situation of France and the policy pursued by 
her in safeguarding her independence and her security, Mr. 
Balfour, in referring to the attitude on land armaments taken by 
Mr. Briand, and its relation to the French demands in naval mat- 
ters, had appeared to experience a feeling of surprise in regard 
to this policy, which he had considered as a unit — a feeling of 
surprise, the causes of which, to tell the truth, Mr. Sarraut had 
had difficulty in understanding. 

France, it was true, was compelled to make a double effort, 
military and naval. The reasons for this were simple and clear. 
In regard to land defense, Mr. Briand had made a statement of 
the perils against which France was obliged to guard — a state- 
ment which everyone considered final. 

Mr. Briand had indicated, with a cogency to which he could 
add nothing, the necessity which confronted France of providing 
for her defense by retaining a burden of armaments which was 
for her a grievous servitude. It was not for pleasure that France 
assumed these sacrifices, and he did not believe that anyone would 
venture to contradict this. 



LAND AND COAST LINES. 89 

What was the object of France's efforts on the seas? Was she 
impelled by some proud aspiration toward an increase of mari- 
time power ? No ; the committee well knew that she was not, 
since, in regard to capital ships, in which lay true offensive power 
(that power which alone could give support to an ambitious 
scheme), France had made the greatest sacrifice and was satis- 
fied with the amount of tonnage which had been allotted to her. 
It was true that France asked for submarines — but to what end? 
To attack her neighbors? He would not deign to reply to such 
a suspicion. The truth was that France was confronted by a 
situation of fact of which Mr. Balfour must be aware. Besides 
her continental coast lines, the defense of which could not be 
neglected, she possessed a colonial domain whose ramifications 
were spread all over the world. France must have the weapons 
she needed to defend her possessions, just as she must have the 
weapons necessary to the safety of her transports and her lines 
of communication between the motker country and her colonies, 
both near and distant. In time of peace France scattered her 
military forces throughout her possessions ; her forces, as the 
committee knew, were divided among the mother country, North 
Africa, and her various colonies. 

There was, then, a logical connection between her indispensable 
military power and her naval force. She ought in any event to 
keep the means of assuring the safe transportation of her troops 
to the mother country, and for this purpose she must decidedly 
have at her command a certain force. This was why, after hav- 
ing consented to the sacrifice which had been asked of her in the 
matter of capital ships, she came there to set forth the situation ; 
to state in all frankness and all simplicity the obligations and the 
reasons of her naval program, which was based on needs whose 
reality could not be doubted. And when the French delegation 
had laid before the committee the sincere, definite, and precise 
reasons for France's program, how could it be suspected of any 
secret designs against which the very frankness of its explana- 
tions protested? 

As to the myths, the imputations to which he had referred as 
possibly penetrating beyond the circle of the powers there repre- 
sented, he was astonished at the interpretation put upon them; 
he had said nothing — there was no need to insist on the fact — 
which was especially aimed against Great Britain. And if, on 
the contrary, he had outlined these fears very frankly to the com- 
mittee, it had been because the reproach to which he had already 
alluded might some time be laid against their common work, 
against all the powers, without exception, which were deliberating 
there, and because he wished to avoid for all the powers there 
present, without exception, any suspicion of having attempted to 

25882—23 7 



90 DIFFICULTIES IN AGREEMENT. 

reduce to vassalage those powers, large and small, which had not 
participated in these counsels, by removing from them their 
weapon of defense, the submarine. 

In fact, if Mr. Balfour harbored the slightest idea that he 
wished to impugn the motives of Great Britain, the words spoken 
by him (Mr. Sarraut) at the beginning of his speech would bear 
witness to the affectionate feelings which had continually inspired 
his thoughts. He had then stated clearly that the might and the 
safety of Great Britain constituted one of the essential safeguards 
of the peace of the world and of the progress of civilization. 
Who, moreover, would dream to-day of speaking of the possible 
hegemony of any country in the world? That dream of an earlier 
day, which was of a whole people, had forever vanished -in the 
last war. And it was Mr. Balfour's own country which had 
largely contributed to the overthrow of that hegemony by a con- 
tribution toward the victory of right which would remain the 
honor and the supreme glory of Great Britain. 

Nevertheless, the fact remained that, in the fulfillment of the 
task which the conference was engaged upon, the susceptibilities 
of certain peoples had to be taken into account. He had said 
that, if one wanted to settle such a question as that of the sup- 
pression or retention of the submarine, the small powers should 
be aligned by the side of the great, because the small ones had also 
the right to express their views and make their voices heard. 

In conclusion, Mr. Sarraut said he could not express himself 
otherwise, even when speaking on behalf of a country whose 
liberal and peace-loving sentiments could not be mistaken, even 
when dealing with the problem of her safety on land and at sea. 
The creation of a will to peace in the world could be based only 
on confidence and a spirit of justice. This was the deep convic- 
tion which must be imparted to all nations ; they should be per- 
suaded of this fact, not by having it forced on them but by letting 
it penetrate gently into their minds. This, and nothing else, was 
what heiiad said. 

The chairman said that he thought the committee had pro- 
ceeded to a point where it must be concluded that it was not pos- 
sible to reach an agreement on the matter just discussed. It had 
been the highest privilege to listen to the strong and persuasive 
arguments of Mr. Balfour. It would be superfluous to say that 
the arguments he addressed to the committee had been perfect in 
construction and comprehensiveness and admirable in their entire 
candor. All present must feel that they were his debtors for the 
intellectual pleasure he had given them. The chairman wished, 
however, to express a far deeper sense of obligation. The confer- 
ence had been called for the limitation of armament; and the 
economic importance of limitation had been emphasized. But in 
that way, limited though it might be, the conference was striving 



PUBLIC OPINION A FACTOR. 91 

to lay a basis for an enduring peace. That was the real point of 
their effort. What had impressed him most in Mr. Balfour's 
statement was the spirit with which it was imbued and the mani- 
fest desire to present and enforce, against apparently hopeless 
odds, a proposition which was deemed important for the mainte- 
nance of the peace of the world and for such an adjustment of 
weapons of war as might favor the maintenance of conditions of 
peace. He said that he wished to express his profound sympathy 
with what Mr. Balfour and Lord Lee had said ; their argument 
had derived force not only from humanitarian sentiment, not only 
from abhorrence of the atrocities of submarine warfare, but also 
because it had been buttressed by facts drawn from the extended 
experience of Great Britain — an experience which presented tests 
of all the questions raised here. If the argument of Mr. Balfour 
and Lord Lee could be answered, the chairman thought that that 
answer had yet to come. He perceived from his more or less im- 
partial position the great difficulties involved in presenting a tech- 
nical answer. He distrusted his ability to judge of the technical 
naval argument, but he believed that those taking upon themselves 
the burden of that effort would have much to do. 

He was quite aware that in the United States there was wide- 
spread sentiment against the submarine, largely due to the feel- 
ing that had been aroused by the abhorrent uses to which the sub- 
marine had been put. There was a very strong sentiment against 
the submarine, and that as an offensive weapon it should be out- 
lawed, a feeling that would be powerfully reinforced by what had 
been said here. While the chairman felt that there was no im- 
mediate prospect of the adoption of the proposal, the words of 
Mr. Balfour and Lord Lee would carry far beyond this conference 
and powerfully influence the development of public opinion 
throughout the world. He was not prepared to say that their 
suggestions might not ultimately be successful in inducing the 
nations to forego the use of a weapon which, as Mr. Balfour had 
urged, was valuable only as an aggressive weapon, and then only 
in a form of aggression, condemned by humanity and international 
law. 

There existed a very great difficulty because of the difference of 
technical opinion on this point. Naval experts did not agree, and 
it was impossible to ignore their views. So far as the United 
States was concerned, the matter had been examined by the ad- 
visory committees, which, although it had not had the advantage 
of hearing these arguments, had nevertheless produced an able, 
illuminating, and conservative report. As France, Italy, and 
Japan had manifested an inability to agree, it would be impos- 
sible at this time to expect a result favorable to the adoption here 
of a resolution to abolish the submarine. 



92 FURTHER DISCUSSION NEEDED. 

The chairman said that he had had the pleasure of conferring 
with the President in regard to this matter, and had found him 
deeply impressed with the strength of the arguments presented 
and the spirit animating them. If at any time it were found to 
be feasible to take the matter up, the United States Government 
would give it their most serious attention. The chairman hoped 
that what had been said here would prove provocative of thought 
throughout the entire world. When adherence could be expected 
to the principle of abolition the subject would be again con- 
sidered. He hoped that it would be clearly understood that the 
submarine would not be countenanced as a weapon really suited 
only to offensive attack (if that be the fact) under the guise of a 
weapon which was only available for a very limited purpose of 
defense (if that, too, be the fact). He was not a naval expert; 
the position of the American Government was as well set forth 
as it could be in the statement of the advisory committee. The 
American Government welcomed the discussion as of the utmost 
importance and was greatly impressed by the strength of Mr. 
Balfour's arguments in the light of the experience of the late 
war. 

What could be done? It had been said that there were other 
powers which were not represented here. The powers partici- 
pating in the Conference on the Limitation of Armament were 
bound not to use that conference to impinge upon the full liberty 
of discussion of those desiring to be heard in a matter relating 
to their defense. A moral offensive— if he might be permitted to 
use that term — should not be conducted against them. He felt in 
honor bound by what had been communicated to him by other 
powers not represented on the committee that nothing should 
be done which would compromise their position on a question 
which they believed related to their security, or which might 
prevent them from taking the measures they thought necessary 
for their defense. A discussion, however, which tended to bring 
out the truth would be as helpful to those who were not present 
as to those who were represented. • 

He hoped that the discussion would lead the five powers present 
to agree to a denunciation of the illegal methods of submarine 
warfare in terms clearly understandable and to bind themselves 
to assure the application of the principles of international law 
in connection with submarine warfare and to consider and debate 
what could be done to strengthen the laws governing the use 
of this weapon. 

The chairman then said that unless further discussion of the 
principle of the abolition of the submarine was desired the com- 
mittee should consider its restriction, numbers, tonnage, etc. He 
believed that those who considered that the submarine was es- 
sential should frankly tell the committee how far they were pre- 



FORMAL BRITISH DECLARATION. 93 

pared to go, what their minimum requirements were, and how 
far they were prepared to accept reduction or restriction. The 
point of limitation of armament as regards submarines had been 
reached. With respect to the point of proposing and considering 
the law in the case, that matter was one where the precise 
phraseology must be carefully considered. With the permission 
of the committee, precise proposals would later be brought for- 
ward by the American delegation, pending which the committee 
was ready to discuss the subject of the limitation of the tonnage 
of submarines and all that pertained thereto. He would therefore 
ask the delegates to express themselves on that point. 

Mr. Balfour asked that he be allowed to express, on behalf not 
only of himself but of his colleagues on the British Empire dele- 
gation, their thanks for the speech which the chairman had just 
delivered. They thought that it was the happiest augury for the 
future. Looking at it from the point of view of peace, and in so 
far as peace could not be attained with humanitarian conduct of 
war, they regarded the chairman's utterance from those two 
points of view as a great step forward, and they did not doubt 
that it would find an echo in all parts of the civilized world and 
would greatly promote the cause they had so much at heart. 
The chairman had indicated that it would be for the general con- 
venience that this stage of the discussion should now be brought 
to an end, and certainly he believed that to be right. He asked, 
however, to be permitted to have placed formally upon the com- 
mittee's records the views, very briefly expressed, of the British 
Empire delegation, which would take the following form : 

" The British Empire delegation desired formally to place on 
record its opinion that the use of submarines, whilst of small 
value for defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which are in- 
consistent with the laws of war and the dictates of humanity, and 
the delegation desires that united action should be taken by all 
nations to forbid their maintenance, construction, or employment." 

The chairman assumed that there was entire agreement that the 
statement just read by Mr. Balfour should be placed on the 
record, and that as the views of all the delegates had been heard 
with regard to the abolition of submarines, the committee might 
proceed to the discussion of the limitation of submarine tonnage. 

In the course of the discussion it had been remarked that as far 
as submarines were concerned the American proposal was hardly 
a limitation. The American delegation thought that, so far as 
American submarine tonnage was concerned, the remark in ques- 
tion had been based on a misapprehension, and that there had 
been a reduction — from 95,000 tons to 90,000 tons — slight, to be 
sure, but still a reduction. 

He desired, however, to make this suggestion. It was impos- 
sible to hear all the arguments regarding submarines without 



94 EIGHTH MEETING. 

forming an impression of the views entertained by the delega- 
tions on this matter. The American delegation was entirely will- 
ing to accept instead of 90,000 tons, proposed as the maximum 
limit for the United States, 60,000 tons, thus scrapping 35,000 
tons of the existing submarine tonnage, on the basis that Great 
Britain should also accept 60,000 tons as the maximum limit of 
submarines and scrap 22,464 tons, her present amount of subma- 
rine tonnage being 82,464 tons, according to the American figures. 
Then, in a desire to make whatever accommodation was possible 
to meet the views entertained by the other delegations, the chair- 
man suggested that if the United States and Great Britain each 
reduced the maximum limit of their submarine tonnage to 60,000 
tons, France, Japan, and Italy should retain the tonnage they 
have — in other words, maintain the status quo as regards sub- 
marine tonnage. He made the suggestion in order to show that 
so far as the American Government was concerned it was not in 
favor of anything that savored of expansion. This was a con- 
ference on limitation. 

In reply to an inquiry by Lord Lee the chairman said that he 
understood that the present submarine tonnage of Japan was 
31,452 tons; that of France, according to the figures given the 
other day, was 31,391 tons, and that of Italy somewhat less — 
about 21,000 tons. 

The meeting then adjourned until 3.30 p. m., December 24, 1921. 



EIGHTH MEETING, COLUMBUS ROOM, PAN AMERICAN UNION BUILD. 
ING, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1921, 3 P. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States, Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. 
Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. 

British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield. (For Canada), Sir Robert Borden. 
Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark. (For Australia), Sena- 
tor Pearce. (For New Zealand), Sir John Salmond. (For India), 
Mr. Sastri, Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Captain Little, 
Captain Domvile, Mr. Christie. 

France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. Ac- 
companied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Captain Odend'hal, 
Mr. Ponsot. 

Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Polandi Ricci, Senator Alber- 
tini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Vis- 
conti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. 
Celesia di Vegliasco. 



SUBMARINE TONNAGE. 95 

| 

Japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, 
Captain Uyeda. Accompanied by. Mr. Ichihashi, Commander 
Hori. 

The Secretary General, Assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Wil- 
son ; Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon, Interpreters. 

1. The eighth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Arma- 
ment was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union 
Building at 3 p. m. Saturday, December 24, 1921. 

2. There were present for the United States, Mr. Hughes, Sena- 
tor Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz ; for the 
British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. 
Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon ; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, 
Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron 
Acton ; for Japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral 
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. 

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were pres- 
ent: For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the 
British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Dom- 
vile, Mr. Christie ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. 
Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, 
Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Veg- 
liasco ; for Japan, Mr. Ichihashi, Commander Hori. 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Wilson, 
was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon, interpreters, 
were present. 

4. The chairman (Mr. Hughes) said that the committee would 
now proceed from the point reached in the discussion before the 
recess, when he had modified the American proposals concerning 
submarine tonnage. 

Mr. Balfour stated that in so far as the British delegation was 
concerned they accepted the proposal as set forth by the chair- 
man. 

Admiral de Bon said that he had on the previous day explained 
that a submarine force composed of 90 boats only corresponded 
to 15 to 20 units ready for action. This, he said, was a mini- 
mum limit for a submarine fleet and was in no way to be con- 
sidered a figure of speech. To speak, therefore, of reducing the 
French force below this limit was equivalent to abolishing the 
whole French program and opening a door to a fresh discussion 
of the whole problem considered that morning. The new figures 
proposed were so far below those contemplated by the French 
instructions that the French delegation was unable to accept 
them and must refer the whole matter to their Government. 



96 ITALIAN COMMENT. 

Senator Schanzer said that his colleagues were acquainted 
with the principles upon which, according to his opinion, the solu- 
tion of the problem of naval armaments must be based. These 
principles had been laid down ever since the first meeting of 
the committee ; they had been accepted and could not be departed 
from even to-day. 

These principles were the parity of the Italian fleet with all 
other large neighboring fleets and the reduction of naval arma- 
ments to the quantity strictly necessary for a defensive naval 
policy. 

The above principles had been applied in regard to capital 
ships; they must also be applied with regard to the other cate- 
gories of naval armament. 

He added that, in view of the entirely special conditions of 
Italy's maritime position, she could claim, without being accused 
of advancing excessive demands, an even greater proportion with 
regard to categories other than capital ships, such as submarines 
and light craft. 

He appealed. to the explanations which Mr. Balfour himself 
had made yesterday in his eloquent speech in reference to Italy's 
almost insular geographical situation, in consequence of which 
she depended on the sea for her supply of food and of the most 
indispensable of her raw materials, and the extent of whose coasts 
exceeded by far that of all other countries in the Mediterranean. 

It was also true that the conditions of her submarine flotilla 
were absolutely insufficient from a technical point of view. 

Despite the limited field of operations in the Adriatic Sea and 
the proximity of the enemy's naval bases to her own (roughly 
100 miles), Italy found during the war that her submarines were 
insufficient, both with regard to their field of action and to their 
habitableness ; in other words, they were too small for efficient 
use, and Italy was indebted to the cooperation of French and 
British submarines for having been able successfully to meet the 
situation. 

Since the armistice Italy had demolished as many as 30 sub- 
marines ; she was actually left with 43 units in active service 
and 4 under construction, the total amounting to 20,250 tons. 

Only 10 of the first units could be considered of any utility, 
since they were of more than 700 tons displacement ; the others 
would have to be successively replaced. Although some naval 
technical authorities in Italy believed that the allotment of sub- 
marine tonnage should not necessarily be proportionate to that of 
capital ships, and that the quota of 31,500 tons for submarines cor- 
responding to the American proposal of a tonnage of 175,000 in 
capital ships was not sufficient, the Italian delegation was ready 
in the interest of reduction of armaments to accept this amount 
upon the condition of parity with France. 



PROPOSALS AS TO TONNAGE. 97 

The principle of parity had been fully accepted by France, 
and Senator Schanzer took this occasion to observe that the 
friendly attitude of the allied nations would greatly contribute 
to strengthen the cordial relations of friendship between France 
and Italy which constituted one of the principal guarantees of 
peace in Europe. 

The Italian delegation were convinced on the other hand that, 
considering the particular conditions which had been pointed 
out, the chairman would have no difficulty in agreeing that the 
total tonnage of Italian submarines should be fixed at the above- 
mentioned limit of 31,500 tons, on the well-understood condition 
that the same limit should be accepted by the neighboring nation. 

Concerning this point they had precise and categorical instruc- 
tions from their Government. 

The chairman stated that Senator Schanzer's suggestion was 
entirely acceptable. The situation now appeared to stand as 
follows : The United States of America and Great Britain were 
willing to accept as a maximum for submarine tonnage the figure 
of 60,000 tons. The French delegation was not able to formulate 
its demands, and would not be able to do so until they received 
instructions from their Government. The Italian delegation was 
willing to accept 31,500 tons as a maximum, providing that Italy 
was put on a parity with France. 

Mr. Hanihara then said the Japanese delegation had been pro- 
foundly impressed by the able and powerful arguments of their 
most esteemed British colleagues against submarines which it 
had been not only a privilege but an inspiration to listen to. And 
yet the Japanese delegation was unable, he had to confess, to 
convince itself that the submarine was not an effective and neces- 
sary weapon of defense. 

The Japanese delegation hoped that it had made clear, at the 
time when the provisional agreement was reached between the 
United States, Great Britain, and Japan on the question of the 
capital ship ratio, that the acceptance by Japan of the ratio of 
5:5:3 meant for Japan a considerable sacrifice. Yet, because of 
her desire to contribute toward the achievement of the great ob- 
ject for which the conference had been called, Japan finally 
accepted the said ratio under various great difficulties. In the 
same manner Japan was prepared to accept the same ratio in 
regard to submarines. That would have given Japan 54,000 tons. 
So far as Japan is concerned this figure was considered as the 
minimum of submarine tonnage with which the insular position 
of Japan could be adequately defended. 

The new proposal was to allow the United States and Great 
Britain 60,000 tons each, while France, Italy, and Japan were to 
maintain the status quo in regard to their respective submarine 
tonnage. In other words, under this new plan, Japan would be 



98 JAPANESE REQUIREMENT. 

allowed to have only 31,000 tons. That was considered by the 
Japanese delegation to be wholly inadequate for Japan's defen- 
sive purposes. 

The Japanese delegation, therefore, felt constrained to insist 
upon the assignment of the tonnage proposed in the original 
American project, i. e., 54,000 tons of submarines. 

Without wishing for a moment to debate or to call in question 
any part of the arguments so ably and so eloquently presented by 
the various delegates, Mr. Hanihara hoped that he might be 
permitted to point out that this demand on the part of Japan was 
actuated solely by consideration of defense. Japan was geo- 
graphically so remotely situated that it must be evident to all 
that her submarines could not constitute a menace to any nation. 

The chairman said he did not know whether it would be pos- 
sible to make further progress that afternoon, in view of the fact 
that it was necessary for the committee to hear first from their 
French colleagues regarding the proposals which had been made. 
That matter had first to be cleared up. Their Japanese col- 
leagues still asked for 54,000 tons, even in face of the American 
and British reduction from 90,000 to 60,000 tons. The situation, 
he believed, had been clarified as far as possible at the present 
meeting. He asked whether further discussion was desired; 
unless so desired, he proposed postponing the matter until Mon- 
day or Tuesday. 

Mr. Balfour then said that as the committee appeared to be at 
the end of their day's program he would like to ask the chair- 
man and his colleagues whether a technical examination should 
not be initiated of the system of naval tons and the measurement 
of tonnage. He had been brought to make this suggestion by 
a discovery, made somewhat late in the day, that although there 
had been much talk of " tons," different nations did not always 
mean the same thing. The United States had one method of 
measurement, the British another, the French a third, the Italians 
a fourth, and the Japanese a fifth. He did not say that it mat- 
tered very much in ordinarj^ circumstances which system of 
tonnage was employed ; but now that international arrange- 
ments were being made for the future he thought it eminently 
desirable and almost indispensable to settle two questions. First, 
to decide the system of measurement of tons for incorporation 
in the treaty; and, second, to adopt a system which could be 
measured without difficulty and, above all, without any inter- 
national misunderstanding as to its precise meaning. Nothing- 
could be more unfortunate than a controversy arising as to 
what ton was intended, how the measurement was to be made, 
and whether the measurement had been properly and honestly 
reached. He suggested this question might with advantage be 
referred to technical experts. Although he believed that this 



SUBCOMMITTEE ON TONMGE. 00 

matter was outside the range of thought of the ordinary naval 
officer, yet he helieved that among the various delegations people 
could be found who could reach a proper conclusion. This would 
be a fitting corollary to the labors of the conference, which in 
many respects had already been brought to a satisfactory con- 
clusion. Whether the total tonnage should be a multiple of that 
of the largest ship he did not venture to say, but he thought 
all would agree that to establish exactly what a ton meant 
must be desirable. How this inquiry, if approved, should be 
carried out he would gladly leave to the discretion of the chair- 
man. 

The chairman said that the matter of tonnage had already been 
informally discussed ; the British, with their legend ton, accord- 
ing to Mr. Balfour, came within 4 or 5 per cent of the American 
ton, and Admiral Kato had said that the Japanese ton was even 
closer to the British than the American. The chairman said he 
thought the suggestion of great importance ; while the difference 
was not great, the method of arriving at the calculation was the 
question on which it was necessary to agree. He suggested that 
a subcommittee of experts should determine upon the standard 
ton. If it were agreeable to the committee, he would suggest 
that each of the delegations appoint two naval experts for the 
purpose of arriving at a definite conclusion in this matter. This 
procedure was agreed to and the following subcommittee on naval 
tonnage was named: 

United States: Admiral Taylor, Admiral Pratt. 

British Empire: Rear Admiral Sir Ernie Chatfield, Instruc- 
tion Commander Stanton. 

France: Capitaine de Vaisseau Frochot, Capitaine de Vaisseau 
Dupuy-Dutemps. 

Italy: Vice Admiral Baron Acton, Commander Prince Fabrizio 
Ruspoli. 

Japan : Vice Admiral Yamanashi, Lieut. Commander Taji. 

Mr. Sarraut stated that, in view of the fact that the new Ameri- 
can proposal contemplated a considerable reduction in the sub- 
marine tonnage which appeared necessary to the French Govern- 
ment, the French delegation could not do otherwise than await 
instruction. 

The chairman said that it was so important to have full de- 
liberation with respect to the matters raised that he wished in 
no way unduly to hasten the matter. Moreover, unless it was 
certain some useful work could be done, it would be better to take 
a holiday, in order not to subject the members of the committee 
to possible unnecessary inconvenience. An adjournment until 
Tuesday morning seemed in order, and he would set the time of 
the next meeting for Tuesday, December 27, 1921, at 11 a. m. 



100 NINTH MEETINGr 

Mr. Sarraut said that before adjourning he wished to refer to 
one more matter — the delegates were well aware that all were 
subject to the solicitations of the press in the very natural desire 
of these gentlemen to be fully informed w^th respect to the news 
of the conference. The French delegation deemed it their duty to 
revise the. somewhat copious report of the last sessions before 
publishing the same. He then asked whether the secretary gen- 
eral would not be the proper person to charge with transmitting 
the texts which the delegations might desire to have published. 

The chairman said that an important distinction must be ob- 
served between what was stated outside to newspaper men and 
that which concerned the communique. The former lay in the 
discretion of the delegates ; the latter was an official statement, an 
abstract of what had passed, subject to the discretion of the 
committee. In order that each delegation might be correctly 
represented, he assumed that the secretary general arranged for 
a revision of their remarks in order that the statements of their 
official communique might be deemed accurate. This seemed to 
be entirely in accord with Mr. Sarraut's desire. 

The other delegations formally agreed to the above. 

The chairman added that it was not his intention to confine 
to the secretary general the statements to be given out. The 
delegations were free to give out what they wished privately, but 
the official statements issued by the secretary general must above 
all assure accuracy and completeness, with the aid of the secre- 
taries of the various delegations. The chairman asked for com- 
ments upon the above, but no remarks were made. 

The meeting then adjourned until Tuesday, December 27, 1921, 
at 11 a. m. 



NINTH MEETING— WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1921, 11 A. M. 

PEESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Colonel Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by 
Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zea- 
land), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Han- 
key, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Knowles. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by 
Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Alber- 
tini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Vis- 
conti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. 
Celesia di Vegliasco. 



FRENCH STATEMENT. 101 

Japan. — Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, 
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general. Assisted by Mr. Pierrepont, Mr. Osborne, 
and Mr. Paul. 

Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon, interpreters. 

1. The ninth meeting of the Committee on the Limitation of 
Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American 
Union Building on Wednesday, December 28, 1921, at 11 a. m. 

2. There were present: Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, 
Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz (for the 
United States) ; Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield (for the British Empire) ; Sir 
Robert Borden (for Canada) ; Senator Pearce (for Australia) ; 
Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand) ; Mr. Sastri (for India) ; 
Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon (for France) ; Senator Schan- 
zer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral 
Baron Acton (for Italy). ; Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice 
Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda (for Japan). 

3. Secretaries and advisers present included: Mr. Wright, Mr. 
Clark (for the United States) ; Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, 
Capt. Domvile, Mr. Knowles (for the British Empire) ; Mr. Kam- 
merer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot (for France) ; 
Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince 
Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco (for Italy) ; Mr. Ichihashi (for 
Japan). 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Pierrepont, Mr. Osborne, 
and Mr. Paul, was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon 
(interpreters) were also present. 

4. The chairman (Mr. Hughes) announced that the committee 
was ready to continue the discussion with respect to submarines. 

Mr. Sarraut, on behalf of the French delegation, read the follow- 
ing statement : 

"At the last meeting of the committee, and as the outcome of 
the examination of the submarine question, a proposal was made 
to fix for each of the nations represented in the conference the 
submarine tonnage that they might possess. Instead of the 90,000 
tons required by France, it was proposed that this tonnage 
should be limited so far as France is concerned to 31,500 tons. 

" Confronted by such a considerable reduction of the figures 
which had been given as the minimum of what France considered 
necessary for herself in the future, the French delegation was 
obliged to refer the matter to its Government. 

"At a meeting of the cabinet and of the supreme council of 
national defense the situation was examined and discussed with 
the most earnest desire to do whatever seemed possible to further 
the aim of the conference and assist in reaching results. 



102 ACCEPTANCE OF RATIO. 

" This deliberate intention has been carried out in the resolu- 
tion passed at the meeting as regards capital ships. 

"As a token of the readiness of France, it has been resolved to 
accept the reduction to 175,000 tons of her tonnage of capital 
ships, although it seems practically impossible with such reduced 
tonnage to constitute a naval force composed of ships such as 
those which it is contemplated to build, and one normally organ* 
ized, according to the tactical principles in force in every fleet. 

" The conditions of application of the agreement as regards 
capital ships will be easy of settlement by taking into account 
such qualifications of it as may usefully be introduced in carrying 
out the naval holiday with regard to freedom of action in laying 
down, as from 1927, ships intended to replace, within the limits 
of the admitted tonnage, French ships as they reach their twen- 
tieth year of existence. 

" It will be likewise easy to settle the question still outstand- 
ing of the duration of the agreement as to limitation of capital- 
ship tonnage. 

"After examining, on the other hand, the composition of the 
forces needed by France in auxiliary craft and submarines which 
are specially intended for the protection of her territory and its 
communications the cabinet and the supreme council of national 
defense have reached the conclusion that it is impossible to accept 
a limitation below that of 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and 
90,000 tons for submarines without imperiling the vital interests 
of the country and of its colonies and the safety of their naval 
life. 

« rpftg French delegation has been instructed to consent to no 
concession in regard to the above figures. 

, "To sum up, France accepts, as regards capital ships, the sacri- 
fice which she must face in order to meet the views of the confer- 
ence and which represents an important reduction of her normal 
sea power. She limits her program for the future composition of 
her fleet to 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and to 90,000 tons for 
submarines. 

" While regretting that she can not possibly, under the present 
circumstances, entirely carry out the reductions and limitations 
contemplated in the American proposal, she at least feels quite 
certain that she is taking an important share in the work of the 
conference by reducing the French naval power in capital ships, a 
weapon specifically offensive and particularly costly, and by 
accepting a limitation for craft of other categories." 

The chairman said that the committee had heard the statement 
on behalf of the French Government. It was a definitive state- 
ment, made after careful deliberation, and he assumed that it 
should be accepted as the final expression of the attitude of the 
French Government in regard to the limitation of naval arma- 



SUBMARINE TONNAGE. 103 

ment. He was greatly gratified at the willingness of the French 
Government to limit the tonnage of their capital ships to 175,000 
tons. He felt that the importance of this statement should not 
in any way be minimized. Capital ships were the chief weapon 
of offense. If the conference could succeed, as it was now evi- 
dent that it would, in reducing in a fairly satisfactory manner 
armament as represented in capital ships, it would have done 
much to relieve the burden of taxation and would aid in estab- 
lishing a better basis for a lasting peace. He wished to repeat 
that he was highly gratified and appreciated the manner in 
which the problem had been approached by the French Govern- 
ment. He understood that there were, however, certain reserva- 
tions with respect to replacements and the duration of the agree- 
ment. These matters must receive further consideration and be 
the subject of continued negotiations. 

He confessed that he was disappointed with the statement con- 
cerning submarines and auxiliary craft. If submarines were to 
be available for distinctly defensive purposes in connection with 
the movements of fleets, it would seem that they should bear 
some definite proportion to the fighting fleets. That is, if they 
were to be used in connection with the laying of mines, scouting, 
etc. — the necessities inherent in large defensive preparations — 
they should bear some relation to the operations of the fleet as a 
whole. The suggestion that France should have 90,000 tons of 
submarines would, on any basis of a practicable ratio, involve 
the assumption that Great Britain and the United States should 
greatly mcrease their submarine tonnage. This could hardly be 
called a limitation or reduction. Furthermore, if a large number 
of submarines were to be provided, then cruisers and destroyers, 
the natural enemies of submarines, would have to be provided in 
numbers adequate to deal with the situation created by a large 
submarine fleet. It was a serious question whether there was 
hope of accomplishing anything like limitation in regard to sub- 
marines and auxiliary craft. He understood that the attitude of 
the French Government was that, regardless of the requirements 
of other nations, 90,000 tons of submarines was deemed to be the 
minimum essential for France. If this were so, the suggestion of 
330,000 tons of auxiliary vessels for France would have its bear- 
ings on what was considered necessary for the other nations and 
might make it difficult to arrive at an agreement limiting sub- 
marines and auxiliary craft. He did not desire at this time and 
in view of the existing situation to discuss details, but he wished 
to say that an agreement for the expansion of armament was not 
under consideration. The conference was called to consider the 
limitation of armament. He left it for the committee to decide 
in the light of the very definite statement of the French Govern- 
ment what was practicable to be done. 



104 BRITISH COMMENT. 

In conclusion he wished to say that in expressing his disap- 
pointment in regard to submarines he did not wish in any way 
to detract from the importance of the definite acceptance by 
France of the program for capital ships. This was a matter of 
the first importance, and he could assure his French colleagues 
that their attitude was cordially and sincerely appreciated. 

Mr. Balfour admitted, as the chairman had justly pointed out, 
that there was a side to the statement just made by their French 
colleagues which profoundly disappointed him. The French posi- 
tion with regard to disarmament on land they already knew. 
What was their position with regard to disarmament on sea? 
They were prepared, and he rejoiced that they were prepared, 
to accept the ratio which gave them 175,000 tons of capital ships. 
He was glad that the French Government had accepted that all- 
important part of the American program, and he agreed that if 
nothing else was done by the conference in reference to naval dis- 
armament, the scheme already in sight with regard to the limita- 
tion of capital ships did immensely relieve the burden of arma- 
ment upon an overburdened world. He did not feel himself that 
the sacrifice on the part of France was in itself of an overwhelm- 
ing character, even in regard to capital ships, for the thought 
that if the naval strength of a nation was to be estimated in 
relation to the naval strength of other nations, it would be found 
that the relative strength of France under the arrangement al- 
ready accepted in regard to capital ships would be increased. 
He did not begrudge her that increase; he rejoiced in it. 

But when he turned from the matter of capital ships to the 
matter of other craft he confessed that a very different picture 
met the eye. The French proposed to increase the number of 
submarines threefold. If they carried out that intention, it was 
evident that they would not only be equal to the other two 
greatest naval powers, America and Britain, in point of tonnage, 
but that they would have a very much larger proportion of sub- 
marines of a newer type than either of them. He understood the 
submarine was still in process of development ; it was still add- 
ing to its powers of offense, and each new model was an im- 
provement on the capacity of its predecessors for commerce de- 
struction. Thus it was certain that when that program was car- 
ried out the French quota of submarines would exceed that of 
any other power in the world. It had further to be noted that 
their French colleagues accompanied their view of the necessity 
of submarines with the announcement that they intended greatly 
to increase the tonnage of their auxiliary craft. It must be ac- 
knowledged that this constituted a somewhat singular contribu- 
tion to the labors of a conference called for the diminution of 
armament. Considered in connection with the refusal of the 
French delegation to discuss land armament, this position must 



EFFECT ON NAVAL HOLIDAY. 105 

cause anxiety and disappointment to those who had come to the 
conference with high hopes regarding the limitation of naval 
armament. Furthermore, it had to be observed that the pleasure 
derived from the agreement with regard to the limitation of capi- 
tal ships was subject to qualification. He understood that the 
French intended to begin replacing ships in 1927. 

This seemed to be a serious interference with the proposal for a 
10 years' naval holiday, but that was only a small part of the 
anxiety and disappointment which the French program had cre- 
ated in his mind. They had now come forward with a great build- 
ing program of submarines and auxiliary craft. He was perfectly 
unable to conceive how that could be regarded as a defensive 
policy. If submarines were to be used as a strictly military 
weapon, in the manner contemplated by the American advisory 
committee, how came it that a fleet of capital ships limited to 
175,000 tons required 90,000 tons of submarines to scout for it 
and protect it? And if 90,000 tons of submarines were really 
required for a fleet of 175,000 tons of capital ships, how many 
submarines would America and Britain require to build to assist 
their fleets of 500,000 tons? It was perfectly obvious that the 
proposed 90,000 tons of submarines were intended to destroy com- 
merce. They could not be intended for any other purpose. It 
therefore appeared that, at a moment when the delegates were all 
assembled to discuss the limitation of armament, they were asked 
to agree to its increase, and that a country which did not desire 
to be among the first three naval powers in the world proposed, 
nevertheless, to build instruments of illegitimate warfare to an 
extent equal in numbers and superior in efficiency to those legiti- 
mately required by any other fleet in the world. We should, there- 
fore, have the melancholy spectacle of a conference called for the 
limitation of armaments resulting in a vast increase in the very 
weapon which the most civilized elements in all civilized countries 
condemned. For the moment he need say no more. The whole of 
this controversy would again come up before the public confer- 
ence. For that occasion he reserved himself. 

He must, however, dwell shortly on the effect which the British 
declaration of naval policy must inevitably produce upon British 
opinion. It was perfectly clear that if at Britain's very gates 
a fleet of 90,000 tons of submarines (60,000 tons of which were 
to be of the newest type) was to be constructed, no limitation 
of any kind on auxiliary vessels capable of dealing with subma- 
rines could be admitted by the Government which he represented. 
Public notice had now been given in the most formal manner that 
this great fleet was to be built on the shores nearest to Britain, 
and it would necessarily be a very great menace to her. He had 
no doubt, if the occasion ever arose, that Britain would be equal 

25882—23 S 



106 ITALIAN COMMENT. 

to it, but it was on condition that she reserved the full right to 
build any auxiliary craft which she considered necessary to deal 
with the situation. 

Senator Schanzer said that the Italian delegation did not dis- 
pute the importance of an accord with respect to capital ships, but 
they could do no more than to express their deep regret that it 
was not possible to arrive at an arrangement concerning aux- 
iliary boats and submarines. 

In the absence of an agreement concerning the limitation of the 
latter, it was but natural that each nation should retain full 
liberty of action. At the same time it was impossible not to 
realize that the absence of such an agreement would give new 
impetus to the competition of naval armament respecting auxiliary 
craft and submarine which could only have a most unfortunate 
effect on the finances of the countries interested. It was not his 
intention to discuss what France considered necessary for her 
national security ; but he would not attempt to conceal the fact 
that the naval program announced by France was one which gave 
him serious concern from the point of view of the economic 
sacrifices which might follow for Italy, as Well as from the point 
of view of the political consequences which it might produce. 
This was all the more true because the solution of the land arma- 
ment problem had been deferred. 

The chairman said he gathered from what had been said that it 
was not deemed practicable to reach an agreement on the basis 
suggested by his French colleagues, and that it was apparent that 
other powers desired freedom of action with regard to the con- 
struction of auxiliary craft which would be built to deal with 
submarines. 

He assumed that Mr. Balfour, in referring to the entire liberty 
of action of Great Britain in this respect, did not intend to include 
capital ships, nor did he understand that it was intended to build, 
under the guise of auxiliary ships, vessels which might possibly 
come within the category of capital ships. 

He desired to present, for the consideration of the committee,- 
the suggestion that, if it was not possible to reach a satisfactory 
agreement for the limitation of the total tonnage of auxiliary 
craft, some arrangement might perhaps be made defining the ton- 
nage limit of individual ships. He therefore desired to propose 
the adoption of the following resolution : 

" No ship of war other than the capital ship or aircraft carrier 
hereafter built shall exceed a total tonnage displacement of 10,000 
tons, and no guns shall be carried by any such ship with a caliber 
in excess of 8 inches." 

Mr. Hanihara said that he desired to be permitted to say a few 
words in order to avoid possible misunderstanding as to Japan's 
attitude with regard to the question of naval limitation. The 



ATTITUDE OF JAPAN. 



107 



Japanese delegation believed that oy the agreement which had 
been reached as to the ratio of capital ships a great step forward 
had been made toward the attainment of the high aim of the 
conference, thereby relieving the powers concerned of the heavy 
burden of costly armament. At the same time they thought it 
would be a misfortune if the conference failed to come to an 
agreement as regards the limitation of auxiliary combatant craft. 
The Japanese position was not to claim freedom to build auxiliary 
combatant craft, but, generally speaking, to maintain the tonnage 
allotment of auxiliary craft provided in the original American 
proposal of November 12 in order that an agreement might be 
reached as between the powers concerned on this basis and that 
full and final success of the conference might thus be assured. 

Mr. Sarraut said that the decisions of the French Government, 
which he had had the honor of imparting to the conference, had 
just given rise to certain observations which he could not allow to 
go unanswered. If this reply had not been immediate, it was 
because he wished first to hear the remarks of each delegation 
regarding his statement. 

To speak frankly, he was not there to make comment on the 
orders of his Government, which possessed an authority and a 
weight which sufficed in themselves ; the decisions which he had 
just communicated to the committee had been carefully consid- 
ered by the highest authorities representing national sovereignty 
in his country, from whose hands he had received them respect- 
fully and had brought them, just as they stood, to the conference. 

It was his duty, however, and he performed this duty in the 
perfectly friendly spirit which had never ceased to animate the 
French delegation, to take up the allegations which had just been 
made, certain ones of which he found wholly inacceptable. 

Certain delegations, while expressing their satisfaction at seeing 
France accept the reduced proportion of capital ships which had 
been allotted to her, had expressed real disappointment on learn- 
ing that the French Government was unable to make similar sac- 
rifices in regard to other classes of vessels. 

Mr. Sarraut wished to say that this disappointment, if it ex- 
isted, must already have had its counterpart in his own country 
when it was learned there how the amount of tonnage allotted to 
France had been authoritatively determined without taking any 
account of her manifest and ascertained needs and of the abso- 
lute necessities of her defense, the security and safeguarding of 
which no country was justified in intrusting to the care and good 
offices of its neighbors. 

It was this idea, this conception of the true needs and interests 
of France and of her colonies, which had inspired the decisions of 
the French Government ; it was this idea which both guided and 
limited their demand; and this idea was in no way influenced by 



108 FRENCH REPLY; 

any comparison with what France's neighbors were doing or by 
any anxiety to measure her naval force against theirs. 

Herein lay the profound difference between the French point of 
view and that of others. France had not determined upon her 
needs and her demands after examining the consequences to the 
French Navy of the increase of the naval power of certain neigh- 
boring countries with whom she maintained, under the happiest 
of conditions, relations of friendship, cooperation, and alliance. 
France was not guided by any fear of what their strength might 
be, precisely because they were friends. Great Britain, with her 
525,000 tons of capital ships, would possess a fleet of great vessels 
stronger than the corresponding fleets of France and Italy put 
together. France, however, did not take offense at that. She was 
not in any way haunted by this prospect, any more than she was 
apprehensive of the fact that the fleets of the other friendly na- 
tions, the United States and Japan, would be considerably in- 
creased in comparison with her fleet. 

Why, then, it had been asked, was a submarine fleet such as was 
demanded by France a necessity for her? Did France quibble 
over the needs of the others? Did she call into question their 
possible intentions? Did she suspect them'? Assuredly not. 
It was not only the right but the duty of each country to assure 
its safety by its own means, and it was perfectly possible to 
consider this problem without being haunted by the idea of a pos- 
sible aggression on the part of a neighbor. That others should 
apply to France such a method of reasoning while she did not 
think of applying it to them could not possibly be permitted. 
This would be still more painful to the French delegation and 
would appear to them more especially inadmissible at this table 
around which they and their colleagues were gathered in a spirit 
of the most cordial cooperation, and at the very moment when, in 
bringing the answer of France in regard to capital ships they 
were furnishing the most positive proof of the effective par- 
ticipation of their country in the success of the great ideals of 
peace aimed at by the conference. 

If the answer of the French delegation in regard to other 
categories of vessels was not the same as for the capital ships, 
it was because of the tonnages which they had indicated corre- 
sponded to material needs of defense, to necessities of protection 
which must no longer be denied, since they would not cease to 
emphasize them. France had no desire to destroy merchant 
\essels, as Mr. Balfour had said; the contrary had formally been 
declared here, and this declaration had been echoed not later 
than yesterday in the debates which took place in the French Sen- 
ate. But France had coast* lines which she must defend; above 
all, she had a great colonial domain, second in importance only 
to that of Great Britain, which was distributed over all the seas, 



SUBMARINES FOR DEFENSE. 109 

and concerning which she might have, Mr. Surraut presumed, 
anxiety in regard to its defense, its police, and its supervision. 

France had the duty of safeguarding the communications of 
these colonies with the mother country ; and as he had already 
si. id, in case of war safety of transportation to France of her 
troops over-seas would be among the first of her obligations. 
This was not a mere theory. Had it not been seen how, in the 
last war, a belligerent had transformed merchant ships into 
auxiliary cruisers or into privateers to torpedo French trans- 
ports; and had not this been done against all the allied navies? 
And should it cause surprise here to see the minister of colonies 
of France take account of colonial considerations and call to 
mind that France's colonial empire, though some would seem to 
be ignorant of the fact, really existed, and that its needs, as well 
as its interests, must be strongly affirmed, defended, protected, 
especially in regard to safety of communications with the mother 
country? 

Mr. Sarraut said he must reiterate that the French delegation 
was bound by formal instructions from their Government ; this 
was a fact of which he wished to remind the committee anew. 
They could not deviate from these instructions. He wished to 
repeat again that it was impossible for them to hear it said with- 
out protesting to the contrary that there was an inevitable and 
necessary correlation between what France was obliged to do 
and what her neighbors as a result would deem themselves 
obliged to do. Nor did he admit that there was an indispensable 
and logical connection between the proportion of a country's naval 
force in capital ships and the proportion of its auxiliary craft 
and submarines. That was an abstract rule which it had been 
felt should be laid clown here. But the French delegates had 
shown why they could not recognize it. They were guided by the 
needs of France, duly stated, proved, and fully justified. This 
rule and no other thought had dominated their feelings on the 
question of submarines. They objected to having it believed or 
to having it said that the construction by France of a certain 
tonnage of submarines as a defensive weapon could be consid- 
ered as a menace to any of her friends. If such a thought were 
to weigh all too heavily on the deliberations of the conference, 
if he found himself obliged to defend his country here against 
such a suspicion, the result would certainly be the elimination 
of the hopefulness and the enthusiasm with which he had so 
far collaborated in the work of relieving the burden of arma- 
ments, in accordance with the desire of France as clearly mani- 
fested by the sacrifice to which she had consented in the matter 
of capital ships. But, to tell the truth, he was not likely to be 
discouraged in this matter. The work was too beautiful and too 
generously humanitarian for the determination of the French 



110 BRITISH AND FRENCH POSITIONS. 

delegation ever to grow weary in their endeavors. They would re- 
main faithful to the end to the noble aims of the conference. 

Mr. Balfour assured Mr. Sarraut that he was the last man in 
the world whom he (Mr. Balfour) would suspect of hostile in- 
tentions toward his country, but the speech which Mr. Sarraut 
had just delivered was sufficient to show that he had not really 
understood the way in which Britain regarded the question now 
under consideration. Mr. Balfour begged him to consider one or 
two elementary facts without which he would not understand 
the position taken up by the British Empire delegation. While 
it was almost unthinkable that their respective countries could 
be on anything but the most cordial terms, one must not overlook 
the teachings of history. Britain had had many conflicts with 
France, though happily in the distant past. Britain had always 
been superior in naval armament and always inferior in land 
forces. Never in the history of France had she had to fear the 
power of Great Britain to strike a blow at her heart. In the 
nature of things that must be so. No inferior military power had 
ever yet been able to invade or seriously imperil a superior mili- 
tary power merely because she had more ships. Suppose the 
almost inconceivable happened and close allies became enemies, 
it was perfectly clear that in that case no British superiority 
of capital ships would imperil the life of France for an hour. 
To be fair he must admit that it might conceivably imperil 
some remote islands belonging to France; but France, with her 
land armament, would remain secure in the face of superior sea 
power. 

He asked Mr. Sarraut to compare the position of France in the 
face of a superior British surface fleet with the position of 
Britain in the face of France with the largest submarine fleet in 
the world. She could use that fleet, if she chose, for commerce 
destruction, and it was difficult to believe that in time of stress 
she would not so use it. If Britain were unarmed against sub- 
marines it was evident that France, using that felonious weapon, 
could destroy her very existence. Therefore it was quite im- 
possible for Britain to treat the submarine fleet with the serene 
and friendly philosophy shown by Mr. Sarraut in connection with 
the British fleet of capital ships. Mr. Sarraut talked of the 
absolute necessity for France of possessing a fleet of 90,000 tons of 
submarines. For what purpose? Not to cooperate with a fleet 
of 175,000 tons of capital ships. It was altogether out of propor- 
tion. What did he want the 90,000 tons of submarines for? Ac- 
cording to Mr. Sarraut, it was not for commerce destruction, it 
was for the protection of France's lines of communication. There 
was no doubt that submarines were powerful for the destruction 
of lines of communication; but they were powerless to protect 
them. Mr. Sarraut would not obtain security for his lines of 



TONNAGE OF NONCAPITAL SHIPS. Ill 

communication by those means. For those purposes they were 
useless, or nearly useless. They were powerful weapons for one 
purpose, and for one purpose only, namely, the destruction of 
commerce ; and it was not unreasonable that Great Britain, when 
threatened by the establishment within a few miles of her coasts 
of a vast fleet of submarines which were of no use except to 
destroy commerce, should say candidly that she could not look 
with indifference upon the situation which would be thus created. 

He regretted that he had been compelled to insist upon an 
aspect of the question which he would gladly have left undealt 
with. He did not yield to Mr. Sarraut in his conviction that the 
good feeling existing between his own country and their great 
ally across the Channel would remain unshaken through all the 
changes which time might bring. 

With regard to the resolution w T hich had been proposed by the 
chairman, he desired to intimate that Lord Lee would address 
the committee on that subject. 

Lord Lee said he would pass to the resolution which the chair- 
man had proposed a few minutes before, and which he hoped 
would be regarded by his colleagues as noncontroversial. It was, 
indeed, a necessary corollary of the agreement to limit capital 
ships, that there should also be a limitation on the size of other 
classes of ships. Otherwise it would be possible to build so-called 
light cruisers which would be capital ships in disguise and which 
would impose upon the world a fresh competition of armament 
which would be as costly as that which had preceded it. He 
understood there had been a certain amount of conversation 
between the naval experts of the countries represented at the 
conference, and he was led to suppose that there was an agree- 
ment that 10,000 legend tons — or whatever kind of tons were 
agreed upon — would be a reasonable maximum size for all ships 
other than capital ships or aircraft carriers. He thought also 
that there was a general agreement regarding the limitation of 
guns to 8 inches. So far as Britain was concerned, she had no 
gun in excess of 7£ inches. He understood France had a gun of 
an approximately similar size, namely, 7.6. That seemed a 
reasonable figure to fix, but if for any strong reason it was 
desired to fix 8 inches Britain would not oppose any serious 
objection to that size. He thought it was essential that the limi- 
tation of armament should apply also to the aircraft carrier ; 
otherwise, while prohibiting capital ships, one might have what 
would be in effect a capital ship with the addition of flying ap- 
pliances. He did not want to discuss, on this occasion, the 
matter of the limitation of tonnage of the aircraft carrier, but 
he thought the resolution should be amended to read as follows : 

" No ship of war other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier 
hereafter built shall exceed a total tonnage displacement of 



112 



TENTH MEETING. 



10,000 tons, and no gun shall be carried by any such ship, other 
than a capital ship, with a caliber in excess of 8 inches." 

The chairman stated that the American Government had no 
objection to the amendment proposed by Lord Lee. 

Mr. Hanihara said he would like to have further discussion 
postponed until the afternoon or the following morning. 

The chairman asked what was the pleasure of the committee. 
He assumed that what had been said that morning could be given 
to the press, each delegate having the privilege of looking over 
and correcting his own remarks, as they were to appear in the 
statement to the press. 

Senator Underwood said that the subcommittee on Chinese 
revenue was to hold a meeting in the afternoon ; he would there- 
fore have to absent himself from the afternoon meeting of the 
committee. 

The meeting then adjourned until Wednesday, December 28, 
1921, 3.30 p. m. 



TENTH MEETING— WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1921, 3.30 P. M. 

PEESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. 
Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. 
Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Senator Pearce (for Australia), 
Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). 
Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, 
Mr. Flint. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by 
Mr. Denaint, Capt. Oden'hal, Mr. Ponsot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Al- 
bertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis 
Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, 
Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco. 

Japan. — Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, 
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi. 

The Secretary General, assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Os- 
borne. 

Interpreter, Mr. Camerlynck. 

1. The tenth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Arma- 
ment was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union 
Building, on Wednesday, December 28, 1921, at 3.30 p. m. 

2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, 
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for 
the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 



NONCAPITAL SHIPS. 113 

Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Senator Pearce (for Australia), 
Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; 
for France, Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon ; for Italy, Senator 
Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral 
Baron Acton; for Japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice 
Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. 

3. Secretaries and technical advisers present included the fol- 
lowing: For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the 
British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. 
Domvile, Mr. Flint; for France, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, 
Mr. Ponsot; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, 
Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco ; for Japan, 
Mr. Ichihashi. The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson 
and Mr. Osborne, was present. Mr. Camerlynck (interpreter) 
was also present. 

4. The chairman, Mr. Hughes, said that the meeting was ready 
to proceed with the discussion of the resolution, as amended by 
Lord Lee, as follows: 

"No ship of war other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier 
hereafter built shall exceed a total tonnage displacement of 10,000 
tons, and no gun shall be carried by any such ship other than a 
capital ship with a caliber in excess of 8 inches." 

Admiral de Bon said he did not see the reason for the limita- 
tion of tonnage proposed by the resolution just read. It was 
apparently aimed at avoiding a confusion between cruisers and 
capital ships. The difference, however, Admiral de Bon believed, 
lay mainly in the caliber of the guns. If a vessel was not armed 
with guns superior to 8 inches, it fell naturally into the cruiser 
class. Why, therefore, create another distinction in tonnage 
which might be inconvenient? 

Admiral de Bon explained further that it was his understand- 
ing that the conference contemplated that cruisers would be used 
as a means of communication with colonial possessions, and in 
this respect long distances must be covered. These vessels should, 
therefore, be able to offer sufficient conditions of well-being for 
their crews and passengers. In order to offer proper conditions 
of stability, they might also require a tonnage superior to 10,000 
tons. When the difference between cruisers and capital ships 
had already been fixed by settling a maximum for the caliber of 
their guns, the admiral said that a priori he could see no sufficient 
reason for further restrictions. He was, however, merely anxious 
to elucidate the question, and this was the reason for his remarks. 

Lord Lee explained to Admiral de Bon why he had considered 
it desirable to limit the size of cruisers. He agreed with Admiral 
de Bon that if the caliber of the guns was limited it was not 
likely that a cruiser could be designed which in effect would amount 



114 CRUISER TONNAGE. 

to a capital ship. One main object of this conference, however, 
was to limit not only armament but the expenditure on armament. 
The possibility of a cruiser of 20,000 or 30,000 tons, bristling 
with 8-inch guns, and possible large enough to carry large bodies 
of troops to the colonies, was one which could hardly contribute 
toward the object he had just named. Great Britain, for example, 
was not in a financial position to bear the burden of such an 
expenditure. Admiral de Bon had said that 10,000 tons was 
rather small from the point of view of commodiousness and 
habitability. Speaking as a layman, the larger the ship he had 
to travel in the better he was pleased. He understood, however, 
that 10,000 tons was a very ample size for a cruiser, and this 
figure had been selected because at the present time no light 
cruisers of even this tonnage were being built in any country, and 
the British delegation therefore thought it was a good oppor- 
tunity to put an end there and then to the development of this 
type of vessel. He was under the impression that the allowance 
was very liberal, in view of the tonnage being adopted for cruisers 
now under construction, and he hoped it would not be exceeded. 

The chairman, referring to Lord Lee's remarks, said that he 
was advised that the new cruisers now building for the United 
States Government were of 7,500 tons burden. He had just been 
informed, subject to correction, that the French light cruisers 
were of 8,000 tons. Unless, therefore, an endeavor was being 
made to expand navies, it would be a wise thing to fix a limit 
which was only slightly larger than the navies were now provid- 
ing and thus reach an agreement as to what would be reasonable 
for these craft. 

The chairman asked whether the committee was ready to dis- 
pose of the matter or wished to postpone further discussion of it. 

Vice Admiral Acton said that the Italian delegation very well 
understood the spirit which underlay the American proposal and 
the aim toward which it tended. A tonnage limit for ships other 
than capital ships must be fixed, and the conditions of armament 
must be defined. They could then and there accept the caliber of 
8 inches. In regard to the tonnage of auxiliary craft the Italian 
delegation had telegraphed to their government and was await- 
ing instructions. 

Mr. Hanihara said that as far as the Japanese delegation was 
concerned there was no essential objection to the adoption of the 
proposed resolution, particularly as to the limitation of the cali- 
ber of guns to be carried by light cruisers. He did not wish to 
delay matters, but Admiral Baron Kato expected to be present at 
the next meeting of the committee and he would greatly prefer it 
if formal action could be postponed until then. 

The chairman said that with the committee's permission the 
discussion of the resolution would be postponed until the next 



USE OF SUBMARINES. 115 

meeting. He understood the present state of mind of the commit- 
tee to be that there was no objection, so far as the caliber of the 
guns was concerned, but that certain reservations but no decided 
objections had been made concerning tonnage. Definitive discus- 
sion of that matter would therefore be postponed, and the com- 
mittee would then necessarily come to the subject of aircraft 
carriers. Before leaving the question of the submarine, however, 
he suggested that the committee return to the consideration of 
the appropriate action to be expressed by the powers concerned 
as regards the illegal use of submarines. As the committee was 
aware, it had been suggested that a resolution be proposed deal- 
ing with the present rules of law obligatory on submarines and 
with respect to the improvement and amendment of existing laws. 
He said he would ask Mr. Root to bring the matter to the atten- 
tion of the committee. 

Mr. Root said that the resolutions he was about to read were 
based on two lessons taught by the Great War. One fact which 
seemed very clear was that mere agreements between (govern- 
ments, rules formulated among diplomats in the course of the 
scientific development of international law, had a very weak 
effect upon belligerents when violation would seem to aid in the 
attainment of the great object of victory. This had been clearly 
demonstrated in the war of 1914-1918. 

Another fact established by the war was that the opinion of the 
people of civilized nations had tremendous force and exercised a 
powerful influence on the condition of the belligerents. The his- 
tory of propaganda during the war had been a history ©f an 
almost universal appeal to the public opinion of mankind and the 
result of the war had come largely as a response. 

The public opinion of mankind was not the opinion of scientific 
and well-informed men, but of ill-informed. men who formed opin- 
ions on simple and direct issues. If the public could be confused, 
public opinion was ineffective ; but if the public was clear on the 
fundamentals of a question, then the opinion of mankind was 
something which no nation could afford to ignore or defy. 

The purpose of the resolutions he was about to read was to put 
into such simple form the subject which had so stirred the feel- 
ings of a great part of the civilized world that the man in the 
street and the man on the farm could understand it. 

The first resolution, Mr. Root said, aimed at stating the existing 
rules, which, of course, were known to the committee but which 
the mass of people did not know, in such a form that they would 
be understood by everyone. 

Mr. Root then read the following: 

" I. The signatory powers, desiring to make more effective the 
rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives 



116 SUBMARINE RULES. 

of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, declare that 
among those rules the following are to be deemed an established 
part of international law : 

" 1. A merchant vessel must be ordered to stop for visit and 
search to determine its character before it can be captured. 

"A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to stop 
for visit and search after warning. 

"A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and 
passengers have been first placed in safety. 

" 2. Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances 
exempt from the universal rules above stated ; and if a submarine 
can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules 
the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack 
and from capture and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed 
unmolested. 

" The signatory powers invite the adherence of all other civi- 
lized powers to the foregoing statement of established law to 
the end that there may be a clear public understanding through- 
out the world of the standards of conduct by which the public 
opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future bellig- 
erents." 

This, Mr. Root said, was a distinct pronouncement on the Ger- 
man contention during the war in regard to the conflict between 
the convenience of destruction and the action of a belligerent un- 
der the rules of international law. 

Mr. Root then read the following additional resolutions : 

" II. The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility 
of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the 
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the pro- 
tection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end 
that the prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted as a 
part of the law of nations, they declare their assent to such pro- 
hibition and invite all other nations to adhere thereto. 

" III. The signatory powers, desiring to insure the enforcement 
of the humane rules declared by them with respect to the pro- 
hibition of the use of submarines in warfare, further declare that 
any person in the service of any of the powers adopting these rules 
who shall violate any of the rules thus adopted, whether or not 
such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be 
deemed to have violated the laws of war, and shall be liable to 
trial, and punishment as if for an act of piracy, and may be 
brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any such 
powers within the jurisdiction of which he may be found." 

Mr. Root said that, made between diplomats or foreign offices 
or Governments, these resolutions would be ineffective; but if 
they were adopted by the conference and met with the approval 



NEED OF RULES. 



117 



(as would surely be the case) of the great mass of the people, the 
power of the public opinion of the world would enforce them. 

It was hardly necessary for him to add that he did not ask that 
these resolutions should be acted on or discussed until copies of 
them had been distributed and until the delegates had had an op- 
portunity to examine them. 

The Chairman said that Mr. Root's resolutions would be put in 
form for distribution at once. Any action upon them could be de- 
ferred until they had been considered by the delegations. They 
seemed, however, simple and direct arguments in support of a 
thesis which had been ably stated. He thought, therefore, it 
might be the desire of the committee to discuss their general pur- 
pose on the spot, leaving their precise language to a later time. 

Mr. Balfour said he was sure the chairman was well advised in 
suggesting that Mr. Root's proposals should be circulated in order 
that each delegation might examine not only the spirit which ani- 
mated them but the\vords in which that spirit had been expressed. 
So far as he himself was concerned, however, having listened to 
Mr. Root's admirable exposition, he wished to express not only 
on his own behalf but he thought also on behalf of his colleagues, 
his warm sympathy both with the substance of the resolutions 
and their form. 

Senator Schanzer said that, in the name of the Italian delega- 
tion, he could not but express the keenest sympathy for Mr. 
Root's proposal. Italy, being the birthplace of law, could but 
regard with the greatest pleasure everything which could con- 
tribute to the improvement of international law. The Italian 
delegates were not in a position at that time to consider the de- 
tails of the proposed resolution, but when they were distributed 
they would be glad to do so with the greatest interest, in the 
hope that this conference would result in the establishment of 
provisions dealing with the use of submarines which would safe- 
guard the requirements of right and of civilization. 

Mr. Sarraut said that he rose less to comment upon the reso- 
lutions which had been read than to render homage to the high 
and noble spirit of which they were the expression. He especially 
desired to profit by the opportunity which was offered him to 
express the feelings of deep sympathy and admiration for Mr. 
Root which animated the French delegation. The French dele- 
gates had not been surprised at hearing the feeling terms in 
which Mr. Root had denounced the piratical acts committed dur- 
ing the war and against * which France had been the first to 
protest. 

In view of these observations, it- seemed wise to the French 
delegates to wait until the document in question had been dis- 



118 AIRCRAFT CARRIER TONNAGE. 

tributed and until they had been able to examine it with all the 
attention it deserved. 

Mr. Hanihara said that he would be glad to have an oppor- 
tunity to examine the text of Mr. Root's resolution. It was 
hardly necessary for him to add anything in regard to the feel- 
ings of sympathy and hearty accord with which the Japanese 
delegation views the aim and spirit of Mr. Root's resolutions. 

The chairman said that it seemed to be the desire of the com- 
mittee, beyond the cordial approval which had been expressed, 
to have an opportunity to examine and bring forward at a con- 
venient time the proposal which was to be acted upon. The next 
point to be considered was the subject of aircraft carriers. In 
the American proposal, made at the opening session, it had been 
agreed that the total tonnage of aircraft carriers should be fixed 
as follows : 

Tons. 

United States 80, 000 

Great Britain 80,000 

Japan . 48, 000 

If the same ratio for capital ships should be applied to aircraft 
carriers for France and Italy, the result would be as follows : 

Tons. 

Prance 28, 000 

Italy 28, 000 

The American proposition had added a proviso that no country 
exceeding the quota allowed should be required to scrap such 
excess tonnage until replacement began, at which time the 
total tonnage of airplane carriers for each nation should be re- 
duced to the prescribed allowance. Certain other rules had been 
proposed. 

The chairman added that in view of the fact that aircraft car- 
riers might approach capital ships in tonnage, it would be wise 
also to set a limit in this respect. It was now proposed not to 
lay down any ships of this character whose displacement should 
exceed 27,000 tons. This was the proposition which he now pre- 
sented for discussion. He said that he thought he should add 
that what had appeared in the resolution regarding aircraft car- 
riers should be deemed to be the same as that included in the 
resolutions respecting all ships of war except capital ships, i. e., 
that their guns should not have a caliber exceeding eight inches. 
If added to the resolution regarding aircraft carriers the latter 
would read : 

" No airplane carrier shall be laid down during the term of this 
agreement whose tonnage displacement is in excess of 27,000 tons, 
and no gun shall be carried by any such ship other than a capital 
ship with a caliber in excess of eight inches." 



GUN LIMITATIONS. 119 

Lord Lee said he had not anticipated such rapid progress that 
afternoon and had not expected to reach the subject of airplane 
carriers. This matter involved very technical considerations, and, 
if it was convenient to his colleagues, he would prefer to have an 
opportunity to discuss it with his technical experts before ex- 
pressing an opinion. In saying this he did not wish to suggest 
that the British Empire delegation were not in complete sympathy 
with the principle of the limitation both of numbers and tonnage 
of airplane carriers. In view of the technical considerations in- 
volved, however, he would be glad of a short postponement until 
to-morrow before expressing a definite opinion on the resolution 
proposed by the chairman. 

The chairman asked whether any other delegates desired to ex- 
press their views in regard to the proposal, or whether it would be 
agreeable to adjourn until the following morning and continue the 
discussion then. 

Lord Lee said that he had another question of the same char- 
acter which he would like to raise, namely, the subject of limita- 
tion in the maximum caliber of the gun to be employed on board 
warships in the future. Perhaps it would be more convenient to 
the committee if he were to put forward a definite proposal on 
the subject, but he could say at once that his proposal would take 
the form of a limitation to the largest caliber of gun now mounted 
on board any ship of war, namely, 16 inches. 

Lord Lee's proposal read as follows : " That no warship shall 
carry a gun of greater caliber than 16 inches." 

The chairman said that the United States Government was 
ready to accept the proposal, and asked whether the other dele- 
gates were ready to express themselves thereon. 

Mr. Hanihara accepted the proposal. 

Admiral Acton accepted the proposal. 

Admiral de Bon made no objection. 

The chairman stated that it would therefore be considered as 
unanimously approved that no warship should carry a gun of a 
larger caliber than 16 inches. 

The chairman stated that he understood that so far as capital 
ships were concerned the committee was in complete accord ex- 
cept as to the replacement program, upon which subject a chart 
was being prepared. It would be unwise to discuss in committee 
such a technical and detailed matter and it was therefore under- 
stood that the naval experts would prepare a replacement chart 
with the understanding that in case any questions of principle 
or policy arose on which they might not agree, the matter should 
be referred to the full committee. When that had been done the 
question of capital ships might be considered as disposed of, and 



120 ELEVENTH MEETING. 

the other questions which had been raised could be discussed on 
the following day. 
The meeting then adjourned until December 29, 1921, at 11 a. m. 



ELEVENTH MEETING, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1921, 11 A. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. 
Wright and Mr. Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice 
Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousley, and Mr. 
Malkin. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by 
Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, and Mr. Ponsot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral 
Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count 
Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, 
Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Pierrepont and Mr. Paul. 
Interpreters, Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon. 

1. The eleventh meeting of the Committee on the Limitation 
of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan Ameri- 
can Union Building on Thursday morning, December 29, 1921, 
at 11 o'clock. 

2. There were present : For the United States, Mr. Hughes, Sen- 
ator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral 
Coontz ; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auck- 
land Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir.E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden 
(for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Sal- 
mond (for New Zealand), and Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France. 
Mr. Sarraut and Vice Admiral de Bon ; for Italy, Senator 
Schanzer, Senator Albertini, and Vice Admiral Baron Acton ; for 
Japan, Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, 
Vice Admiral Kato, and Capt. Uyeda. 

Secretaries and advisors present included : For the United 
States, Mr. Wright and Mr. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir 
Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Mousley, and 
Mr. Malkin ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. 
Odend'hal, and Mr. Ponsot; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, 
Count Pagliano, and Commander Prince Ruspoli ; for Japan, Mr. 
Ichihashi. 



SUBMARINE RULES. 121 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Pierrepont and Mr. Paul, 
was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon, interpreters, 
were also present. 

3. The chairman, Mr. Hughes, opened the meeting by saying 
that if there were no objections the committee would take up the 
resolution proposed and read the previous day by Mr. Root 
relative to the action of submarines in warfare. It seemed best 
to take the articles up separately. The first article related to 
rules deemed an established part of international law. It sum- 
marized in a clear, concise manner the existing rules governing 
the action of belligerent ships of war in relation to merchant 
craft and stated the unequivocal position that belligerent sub- 
marines were not exempt from these rules. 

He then invited discussion. 

Mr. Balfour said that as he understood the question which Mr. 
Hughes had put it referred to the first of Mr. Root's propositions, 
which, as Mr. Hughes had said, purported to be a statement in 
clear and explicit language of the existing rules of war and 
their application to submarines. So far as he personally was 
concerned, he agreed that such a statement should be made. He 
was not lawyer enough to say whether the existing rules were 
correctly summarized, and on this he would have to consult his 
own legal advisers. Provided, however, that the resolution did 
really embody the existing rules of war, he thought it most de- 
sirable that these rules should be reaffirmed in their relation to 
submarine warfare. Perhaps on this matter he ought only to 
speak for himself. He personally held the view that a formal and 
authoritative statement that submarines had no license to break 
the rules by which other ships of war were bound could do nothing 
but good. 

Admiral de Bon said that he shared wholly the views ex- 
pressed by Mr. Balfour. The French delegation had repeatedly 
had occasion to condemn the practices followed by the German 
submarines during the last war. 

The French delegation was thoroughly imbued with the high 
humanitarian motives which had dictated the resolutions pre- 
sented by Mr. Root to which it gave in principle its general 
adhesion. But there was no jurist in the French delegation and 
they recognized that certain of these resolutions had a bearing 
on the complicated rules of international law. 

Admiral de Bon said that he could then hardly do otherwise 
than to subscribe to the spirit of these resolutions and to repeat 
that the submarine should of necessity be bound by the rules 
of international law. But this law being of a very special 
nature it seemed to the French delegation that the most practical 
solution would be to refer the consideration of the text sub- 

25882—23 9 



122 TECHNICAL ADVICE. 

mitted by Mr. Root to a committee of jurists which would advise 
the committee as to its opinion in regard to the wording to be 
adopted. 

Senator Schanzer said that he associated himself entirely with 
Mr. Balfour's and Admiral de Bon's remarks. The Italian dele- 
gation at the preceding meeting gave its full adherence to thg 
aim to which Mr. Root's proposal tended, but they also thought 
that the question of formulating rules for the use of submarines 
in war was, above all, a legal question, which ought to be 
examined by a competent committee of jurists. 

He had forwarded the text of Mr. Root's proposal to the Italian 
Government from which he was awaiting comments at a later 
date. 

At any rate, it might be useful even now to point out a few 
questions to which the proposal might give rise in order to con- 
tribute to the future discussion^ 

It seemed to him difficult, in the first place, to separate the- first 
resolution from the second, which definitely prohibited the use 
of submarines for the destruction of merchant craft. The first 
resolution, on the contrary, admitted in determined cases the 
destruction of merchant craft after certain provisions had been 
observed. He would like therefore to know in what way the 
second resolution tallied with the first. 

In the second place, Senator Schanzer believed that it might 
be useful to give a clear definition of merchant craft in order 
to make them recognizable and to establish plainly in which 
cases a submarine should abstain from attacking a ship and 
in which cases, on the contrary, attack was to be permitted, as, 
for example, in the case of a merchantman regularly armed or 
of a privateer. 

Senator Schanzer observed that he had not made these remarks 
in any spirit of opposition, as the Italian delegation had decided 
to collaborate to the best of its ability in order to attain the aim 
which the American delegation had in view. His reason for 
speaking was to give Mr. Root the opportunity for such explana- 
tions as might throw light on the terms in which his proposals 
were formulated. 

Sir Robert Borden said that, in offering a few observations in 
regard to the proposals presented, he was without the advantage 
of having heard Mr. Root's explanation on the previous day, hav- 
ing been in attendance at a subcommittee. Further, his views 
were purely personal and must not be regarded as binding on any 
other member of the delegation to which he belonged. As he 
understood the proposals, Mr. Root had set forth existing rules 
which had been, or should have been, the general practice in the 
past to govern the action of nations in time of war. In setting 
forth article 1 Mr. Root had placed the rules of submarines on a 



NEED OF PENALTIES. 123 

much higher plane than had been the case with the nations with 
whom the Allies had been at war for a period of four years. 
Those nations had wantonly violated these 'rules. He had no 
doubt that the statement of the rules in article 1 was correct and 
that these rules should have been followed by belligerent vessels. 
Mr. Boot's proposal, however, went much further. 

In article 2 the signatory powers were asked to pledge them- 
selves to recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines 
as commerce destroyers without violating the requirements uni- 
versally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of lives 
of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that the prohibi- 
tion of such use should be universally accepted as a part of the 
law of nations the nations here represented were asked to declare 
their assent to such prohibition and to invite all other nations 
to adhere thereto. As he understood this resolution, it was in- 
tended to mark a notable and most desirable advance on the 
existing rules. Mr. Root had first stated the existing practice and 
had then suggested this advance. He thought it would be wise 
and, indeed, essential in the interests of humanity that this pro- 
posal should be accepted. The exact wording, however, must be 
considered and he did not disagree with the suggestion for ex- 
amination by an expert body provided that this should not pre- 
vent action by this conference. In article 3 Mr. Root had gone 
rather further. He had laid down the principle that any person 
in the service of any of the powers adopting these rules who 
should violate any of the rules thus adopted, whether or not such 
person was under orders of a governmental superior, should be 
deemed to have violated the laws of war and should be liable to 
trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy, etc. Having 
regard to some experiences of his own country in the late war, 
and especially to one occasion when nearly 20 Canadian nurses 
had been drowned as the result of the torpedoing of a hospital 
ship and the subsequent sinking of the ship's boats, he could say 
that the feeling of his country was strongly in favor of the pro- 
posal that any person guilty of such conduct, whether under the 
orders of his Government or not, should be treated as a pirate and 
brought to trial and punishment as such. 

Mr. Hanihara said that the Japanese delegation was in entire 
accord with the substance of article 1 of the proposed resolution. 
As regards the suggestion whether it was not advisable to refer 
the matter to a committee of experts for drafting, he was rather 
inclined to follow it, not that the Japanese delegation had any 
particular point in mind on which it had observations to offer but 
merely in order to make it sure that the resolutions left nothing 
to be desired as to their precise wording. The committee might 
be instructed to examine it in this sense and not to touch the 
substance of it. 



124 " MERCHANT SHIP." 

Mr. Root said that Senator Schanzer had asked some questions 
co which he would reply. 

First, as to the agreement Article I of the resolutions now 
before the committee, with the second article relative to the pro- 
hibition of making use of submarines as commerce destroyers, 
which Senator Schanzer deemed inconsistent with Article I. 

Article I was a statement of existing law ; Article II, if 
adopted, would constitute a change from the existing law, and 
therefore it was impossible to say that it was not inconsistent. 
If it were not inconsistent, there would be no change. Article II 
could not be consistent with Article I and still make a change. 

Senator Schanzer had also suggested that the resolution I be 
completed by including a definition of "a merchant ship." 
Throughout all the long history of international law no term had 
been better understood than the term " a merchant ship." 

It could not be made clearer by the addition of definitions 
which would only serve to weaken and confuse it. The merchant 
ship, its treatment, its rights, its protection, and its immunities, 
were at the base of the law of nations. Nothing was more clearly 
or better understood than the subject called merchant ship. 

With regard to the proposal to refer this matter to a committee 
of lawyers, Mr. Root stated that it would be far from his thought 
to say anything derogatory of the members of the profession of 
which he had been a humble member for more years than he 
cared to remember. They were the salt of the earth ; they were 
the noblest work of God ; they were superior in intellect and 
authority to all other people whatsoever. But both this confer- 
ence and his own life were approaching their termination. He 
did not wish these resolutions to be in the hands of a commission 
even of lawyers after the committee adjourned. 

He had supposed when the committee adjourned the previous 
day and after what had been said concerning the opportunity for 
critical examination, that the different delegations would call in 
their own experts and ask their advice with regard to this resolu- 
tion, which was at this time the only one before the committee. 
He had supposed that the experts in international law brought 
here for the purpose of advising would have been asked whether 
this was a correct statement of the rules, and that the results of 
that inquiry would be before the committee to-day. 

Mr. Root said that he felt he was entitled to know whether 
any delegation questioned this statement of existing international 
law. All the members of the committee were in favor of the prin- 
ciple of the resolution if it were correct. Did this or did it not 
state the law of nations as it exists? If it did, all the delegates 
were in favor of it. What then hindered its adoption, asked Mr. 
Root. 



VISIT AND SEARCH. 125 

In describing the action of submarines with regard to merchant 
vessels Senator Schanzer had repeated on his own behalf the 
very words of this resolution. The very words — ipsissimis 
verbis — of this resolution might be found in Senator Schanzer's 
remarks. Mr. Root said that his respect for the learning, expe- 
rience, and ability of the various delegates around this table for- 
bade him to doubt that everyone present was perfectly familiar 
with the rules and usages as stated in the first clause of Article I. 
This article did not purport to be a codification of the laws of 
nations as regards merchant vessels or to contain all of the 
rules. It said that the following were to be deemed among the 
existing rules of international law. The time had come to re- 
affirm them. He read Clause I of Article I, as follows : 

"A merchant vessel must be ordered to stop for visit and search 
to determine its character before it can be captured." 

Did not all of the members of the committee know that to be 
true? It was a long-established principle. 
Mr. Root then read the second and third clauses : 
"A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to 
stop for visit and search after warning. 

"A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and 
passengers have first been placed in safety," and asked if there 
were any question whatever as to the correctness of these state- 
ments. 

Turning to Mr. Malkin, one of the British legal advisers, Mr. 
Root asked if there were any doubt about that. 
Mr. Malkin replied that in principle there was no doubt at all. 
Mr. Root, continuing, said that, as Mr. Lodge had remarked to 
him, this was only elementary. The object of the resolution was 
to form something which would crystallize the public opinion of 
the world. He had made it perfectly simple on purpose. 

The next article stated a principle of vital importance, on which 
he challenged denial. If all the lawyers in the world should get 
together they could not state the question more conclusively. The 
public opinion of the world said that the submarine was not under 
any circumstances exempt from the rules above stated ; and if so, 
a submarine could not capture merchant vessels. This was of the 
greatest importance. This was a negation of the assertion of Ger- 
many in the war that if a submarine could not capture a merchant 
vessel in accordance with established rules, the rules must fail 
and the submarine was entitled to make the capture. The public 
opinion of the civilized world had denied this and had rendered its 
judgment in the action that won the war. 

It was the revolt of humanity against the position of Germany 
that led to Germany's defeat. Was that not a true rendering of 
the opinion of the civilized world which the committee sought to 



126 LUSITANIA.. 

express? Mr. Root addressed his friends and colleagues of the 
committee, saying this was real life they were dealing with here. 
This was no perfunctory business for a committee of lawyers. 
It was a statement of action and of undisputed principles uni- 
versally known and not open to discussion, put in such a form 
that it might crystallize the public opinion of the world, that 
there might be no doubt in any future war whether the kind of 
action that sent down the Lusitania was legitimate war or piracy. 

This conference was called for what, asked Mr. Root — for the 
limitation of armament. But limitation was not the end, only 
the means. It was the belief of the world that this conference 
had been convened to promote the peace of the world — to relieve 
mankind of the horrors, and the losses, and the intolerable bur- 
dens of war. 

Mr. Root declared that the members of the committee could not 
justify themselves in separating without some declaration that 
would give voice to the humane opinion of the world upon this 
subject, which was the most vital, the most heartfelt, the most 
stirring to the conscience and to the feeling of the people of all 
our countries of anything that occurred during the late war. He 
felt to the depth of his heart that the man who was responsible 
for sinking the Lusitania committed an act of piracy. He knew 
that all his countrymen with whom he had had intercourse felt 
the same, and he would be ashamed to ge on with this conference 
without some declaration, some pronouncement, which would 
give voice to the feeling and furnish an opportunity for the 
crystallization of the opinion of mankind in the establishment of 
a rule which would make it plain to all the world that no man 
could commit such an act again without being stigmatized as a 
pirate. 

Mr. Root said there were two ways in which this question that 
Germany raised about the right of submarines to disobey the rules 
of international law — what they had said in the way of destroying 
a merchant vessel — could be settled. With the whole dominion of 
the air unregulated by international law, with a score of difficult 
questions staring the conference in the face (such as blockade, 
contraband, and other questions in the field of law), there was a 
recommendation made by the committee of jurists which assem- 
bled at The Hague last year, 1920, upon the invitation of the 
Council of the League of Nations, to devise and report a plan for 
an international court of justice. The committee had met at The 
Hague and after some months of labor they had recommended a 
plan which, with some modifications, was adopted by the council 
and by the assembly of the League of Nations, under which judges 
of the new court had been appointed and under which that court 
was about to convene next month, January, 1922. The committee 



COMMITTEE OF JURISTS. 127 

of jurists selected by the Council of the League of Nations for its 
advisors went beyond the strict limit of its authority, and so 
much impressed were they all with the necessity for a restatement 
of the rules of the law of nations as a result of the war (what 
happened during the war, and the consequences of the war) that 
they made a recommendation upon it. There were present a rep- 
resentative of Great Britain, a most able and learned judge of 
the highest court, and representatives for France (a very dis- 
tinguished representative), of Belgium, of Japan, of Holland, of 
Norway, of Spain, of Brazil, and one from the United States of 
America. They were all there in their individual capacities, but 
coming from nine different countries and selected by the Council 
of the League of Nations, and invited there to be their advisors. 
All of these gentlemen had unanimously agreed upon the following 
resolution, which Mr. Root proceeded to read : 

" The advisory committee of jurists, assembled at The Hague to 
draft a plan for a permanent court of international justice, con- 
vinced that the security of states and the well-being of peoples 
urgently require the extension of the empire of law and the devel- 
opment of all international agencies for the administration of 
justice, recommends : 

" I. That a new conference of the nations in continuation of the 
first two conferences at The Hague, be held as soon as prac- 
ticable for the following purposes: 

"(1) To restate the established rules of international law, espe- 
cially, and in the first instance, in the fields affected by the events 
of the recent war. 

"(2) To formulate and agree upon the amendments and addi- 
tions, if any, to the rules of international law shown to be neces- 
sary or useful by the events of the war, and the changes in the 
conditions of international life and intercourse which have fol- 
lowed the war. 

"(3) To endeavor to reconcile divergent views and secure gen- 
eral agreement upon the rules which have been in dispute here- 
tofore. 

"(4) To consider the subjects not now adequately regulated by 
international law, but as to which the interests of international 
justice require that rules of law shall be declared and accepted. 

" II. That the Institute of International Law, the American 
Institute of International Law, the Union Juridique Interna- 
tionale, the International Law Association, and the Iberian In- 
stitute of Comparative Law be invited to prepare with such con- 
ference or collaboration inter esse as they may deem useful, 
projects for the work of the Conference to be submitted before- 
hand to the several governments and laid before the conference 
for its consideration and such action as it may find suitable. 



128 REASON FOR RESOLUTION. 

" III. That the conference be named ' Conference for the ad- 
vancement of international law.' 

" IV. That this conference be followed by further successive 
conferences at stated intervals to continue the work left un- 
finished." 

That recommendation, Mr. Root continued, was communicated 
to the Council of the League of Nations, was somewhat modified 
by the council and then referred to the assembly of the League 
of Nations, and by the assembly was rejected. The door was 
closed. Where did we stand? Was this not to be a world regu- 
lated by law? What were disarmaments worth if assent were 
given to the proposition that the impulse of the moment, the un- 
regulated and unconstrained instincts of brute force, were to 
rule the world and that there was to be no law? If there was 
to be a law, somebody must move. There was no adequate exist- 
ing law now with regard to submarines. There was no existing 
law regarding aircraft. There was no existing law now regard- 
ing poisonous gases, and somebody must move. The door to a 
conference was closed, and here delegates of the five greatest 
powers were met in a solemn conference upon the limitation of 
armaments and charged to do something toward the peace of the 
world. This resolution, Mr. Root said, proposed to restate the 
rules of war that had been trampled under foot, flouted, and dis- 
regarded. This resolution proposed that the domination of those 
humane rules for the protection of human life be once more as- 
serted, and that the attempt to overturn them be discredited and 
condemned. 

This resolution proposed to tell what the conference really be- 
lieved — that it characterized, as it ought to be characterized, the 
attempt to overturn the rules impressed by humanity upon the 
conduct of its Governments. Was there a delegation here which 
could afford to go back to its own people and say to them, " Upon 
the proposal being presented to us, we referred it to a committee 
of lawyers and adjourned " ? Those resolutions would not down. 
They spoke with a voice that would continue insistently. Mr. 
Root said that he was not going to be buried under a committee 
of lawyers and that these rules could not be buried under one. 
Either the delegates assembled here must speak clearly and intel- 
ligently the voice of humanity which had sent them here, and 
to which they must report, or that voice would speak for itself 
and, speaking without them, would be their condemnation. 

In conclusion, Mr. Root declared he was opposed to the ref- 
erence of this resolution to a committee of lawyers or to any other 
committee. He asked for a vote upon it here. If the delegation 
of any country represented here liad any error to point out in it, 
be was ready to correct it, but he asked for a vote upon it, in fur- 



COMMENT ON RESOLUTIONS. 129 

therance of the principle to which every one of his colleagues 
around the table had given his adherence. 

After the foregoing had been interpreted, Mr. Root said that he 
had omitted in answering Senator Schanzer's very discriminating 
question regarding the relations between Articles I and II to say 
that, of course, if the second Article were adopted by all the 
world, it would supersede Article I. This, however, would be a 
long, slow process, and during the interval the law as, it stood 
must apply until an agreement was reached. Article I also 
explained in authorized form the existing law and could be 
brought forward when the public asked what changes were 
proposed. In proposing a change, he said, it was necessary to 
make clear what the existing law was. It was very important 
to link this authoritative statement in Article I with the new 
principle proposed in Article II. 

Sir John Salmond said that while not doubting the substantial 
accuracy of the resolutions proposed by Mr. Root, and while he 
was of the opinion with him that it was unnecessary to appoint a 
committee of jurists to determine the law as regarded merchant 
ships in war or the capture of private property at sea, at the 
same time the resolutions as they stood were not free from am- 
biguities and formal defects. Although reference to such a legal 
committee was unnecessary, he thought opportunity should be 
given for verbal amendments. For example: Paragraph 3 of 
rule 1 stated that a merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless 
the crew and passengers had been first placed in safety. Was 
this intended to give absolute immunity to the merchant ship 
from attack unless the crew and passengers were first placed in 
safety, even although the ship had refused to stop on being 
warned? Read literally, this would be the effect of the rule. 
Secondly, the relation between Resolutions I and II did not 
appear in the text, and a verbal explanation by Mr. Root 
was necessary to explain it. While, therefore, he was in abso- 
lute agreement with the substance of Mr. Root's resolutions 
and supported his refusal to put off the matter by reference to a 
committee of lawyers, he thought there was no haste which could 
justify the committee not being given opportunity for the exami- 
nation and formal amendment of these resolutions. 

Senator Lodge said that he would not ask to take up the time 
of the conference if he could attend the meeting that afternoon. 
He hoped a reasonably speedy decision might be reached in this 
matter, and he did not like to have this decision reached without 
having expressed his feeling in regard to it. He had a great 
respect for experts, but some of the delegates present had given 
attention to international law for some time, and several of 
them were capable of putting these resolutions in proper form. 
He believed the first thing to aim at was simplicity of statement. 



130 SIGNIFICANCE OF RULES. 

The rules laid down by Mr. Root, especially in Article I, were 
elementary. Anyone who had read a textbook of international 
law knew them. He would not attempt to add to the powerful 
argument presented by Mr. Root, who, though he said it in his 
presence, was one of the greatest international lawyers now liv- 
ing. As far as his arguments went, Mr. Lodge would follow a 
historic British example and say, " Ditto to Mr. Burke." 

Continuing, Mr. Lodge said that what he would like to see 
done by the conference was to decide on a policy — for this was a 
question of policy. The committee could easily take care of the 
amendments suggested by Mr. Salmond. The delegates were 
here to settle a policy and must do so. This policy had been pre- 
sented and would not down. The world to-day wanted an un- 
equivocal declaration against the sinking of the Lusitania. He 
took the Lusitania as an example, summing up the horrors of the 
submarine as it was used in the war with Germany. He knew 
the opinion of his country. The feeling aroused here as well as 
in Great Britain had been intense. He wanted a declaration 
showing the representative opinion in this matter and preventing, 
so far as possible, the use of submarines for the destruction of 
commerce and against innocent noncombatants, women, and chil- 
dren. The conference could at least erect a standard. After the 
Constitution of the United States was adopted by the constitu- 
tional convention in 1787, George Washington wrote to a friend : 
" We have erected a standard to which the wise and good can 
repair. The rest is in the hands of God." Mr. Lodge said he 
thought a standard could be erected here to which the civilized 
world can repair in the matter of submarines. He believed the 
world will rally to it. What would be the alternative if the con- 
ference failed to reach this decision? The door of uncertainty 
would be left open — open to the type of man commanding the 
submarine which sank the Lusitania — open to people who wished 
to wage war in that way ; opportunity would be given them to 
trample under foot the laws of nations relating to merchant ves- 
sels, and the committee would leave matters in that most dan- 
gerous of conditions without any settled law upon the subject. 
But if after formulating it at this table the committee were to 
declare in a most clear and solemn manner that submarines must 
not sink merchant vessels with crews and passengers on board, 
he hoped and prayed the resolution might be adopted and sent 
out to the world. The people of the United States desired this 
declaration to be made, and that the world might hear the voice 
of this conference speaking clearly against the continuance of the 
use of submarines for the destruction of merchant vessels and 
innocent lives — those of women, children, and noncombatants. 

Senator Underwood said he wished to take a few minutes to 
express his hearty concurrence in the statement of his colleague, 



EFFECT OF KULES. 131 

Mr. Root, in regard to this matter. He hoped this resolution, 
controlling the unlawful use of submarines, with such amendments 
as might be necessary, might be passed before this conference ad- 
journed. He believed the dividing of the ways as to what the con- 
ference stood for had now been reached at this table. Were they 
to proclaim that they were still tied to the dead body of the war 
that was past, or that the civilized nations of the world desired to 
attain and accomplish new ideals of peace ; that they intended to 
put war behind and peace ahead. If the delegates were only met 
here for a temporary armistice, if they were only temporarily 
tired of war, with their treasuries exhausted — if they agreed to 
fly the white flag for a few years until they grew strong for war 
again, they had better adjourn now, and let the horrors of the 
next war teach statesmen the lesson which was necessary, in or- 
der that civilization might progress again toward the ideal of 
permanent peace. If they were only met here to save dollars or 
francs or shillings for a few years, they had better adjourn.. 

Senator Underwood said his countrymen had never particularly 
prided themselves on military expenditures. They had gone for 
many years at a time without much armament, because they did 
not fear their neighbors, and because they could say in their 
hearts that they wanted to be at peace with the world. If the 
conference was met only to save dollars or other coins, the great 
heart of the people of the world would be grievously disappointed. 
Unless the flag of civilization could be planted on a higher point — 
unless this conference were to move forward, then a failure 'would 
have been made. As for himself he would like to see in the future 
the great Empire of Japan leading the Far East as a nation of 
commerce and high ideals rather than as a nation of great, arma- 
ments ; he would like to see a great Italy assured of the safety 
of the seas that carry the fuel necessary to her national life ; he 
would like to see France secure in her territorial integrity; he 
would Lke to see the day come when she might feel that her 
safety was assured for all time and that she had no longer a need 
for a great army. He would like to see the day come when Great 
Britain need no longer fear any danger of attack on the food 
supply of her people ; when commercial ships might always safely 
enter her ports and bring the supplies necessary to her national 
life. These were the ideals toward which the conference should 
move rather than toward the ideals of the horror and extended 
power of war. If the committee rejected this resolution, they 
would be saying to the peoples of the world that they were de- 
claring only a temporary armistice and that they were going back 
to war. But if they were willing to take this one step — no matter 
how small — to make the seas safe for the peaceful ships of com- 
merce, to that extent they would have removed one of the great 
causes of war — and the world would never be free from war un- 



132 ITALIAN ATTITUDE. 

til the causes of war were removed. He therefore heartily sup- 
ported the proposal of his colleague. He felt it represented great 
principles underlying the desire of the people of the world for 
peace, that lasting peace that should banish war from the world. 

Senator Schanzer said that he would like to remark that a mis- 
understanding had arisen in this discussion which it was neces- 
sary to eliminate. From some of the speeches that had been made 
here to-day by eminent orators it might seem as though there 
were opposition to the fundamental principles upon which Mr. 
Root's proposals are based. Now, each one of those present had 
responsibilities toward the public opinion of the entire world, and 
they could not even for one instant allow that it should be thought 
that they were opposed to any measure tending to render war less 
inhumane. It was the Italian delegation which proposed the aboli- 
tion of poisonous gases, and it was only yesterday that it had 
declared its most implicit and unconditional sympathy for Mr. 
Root's proposals. Could there be anyone who might suppose even 
for one instant that it did not share the sentiments of horror for 
the methods of war which brought about the criminal sinking of 
the Lusitaniaf. 

It was surely not the Italian delegation that could be re- 
proached for any hesitation in supporting anything which could 
make the world progress toward a higher civilization. No country 
was more interested than Italy in putting an end to the abuses 
of submarine warfare. It was, therefore, not the principle itself 
which he had contested. He had only wished to submit a few 
remarks on the wording of the text which had been put before the 
committee. That his observations had not been useless was 
shown by the explanations which Mr. Root had been kind enough 
to give him and for which he thanked him. He had asked to 
know in what way Resolution II was to be understood, in respect 
to Resolution I. In fact, the systems contemplated in the first and 
second resolutions could exist at the same time. 

Resolution I declared an existing law regarding submarine war- 
fare, which admitted, in certain cases and subject to certain ob- 
servances, even the destruction of merchant ships. Resolution 
II condemned in the most absolute way the use of submarines for 
the destruction of merchant ships. Mr. Root had now explained 
that Resolution II represented a new and subsequent phase to 
which things must tend. He felt this ought to be more clearly 
expressed in the wording of the resolution. The Italian delega- 
tion did not insist on the proposal of submittting the whole dis- 
cussion of the question to the study of a committee of jurists. If 
it were deemed preferable to continue to discuss it in this same 
committee, it saw no obstacle to agreeing. As he had already ob- 
served, what we would ask was that, pending the arrival of its 
Government's instructions, the committee examine the various 



TWELFTH MEETING. 133 

sides of this proposal with the attention which the subject re- 
quired, and only because the Italian delegation had the keen de- 
sires that the new regulations of international law which would 
come forth from this conference should be fully satisfactory to all 
those who believed that the world could and must make further 
progress on the path of civilization. 

The chairman remarked that it being now 1.20 p. m. he would 
suggest that the committee adjourn for luncheon and reconvene 
at 3 p. m. In saying this, however, he did not wish to foreclose 
the opportunity for further debate now if anyone desired to say 
anything further. 

Mr. Sarraut called attention to the fact that the personnel 
both of the French delegation and of the staff of experts accom- 
panying it had been greatly reduced and that with such a short 
time between meetings little opportunity was afforded for send- 
ing and receiving cables and attending to other such matters. 
He therefore requested that the afternoon session should begin 
at 3.30 instead of 3 o'clock. 

The chairman announced that the meeting would adjourn until 
3.30 o'clock. 



TWELFTH MEETING— THURSDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1921, 3.30 P. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, 
Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, 
Mr. Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Adnrral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice 
Hankey, Capt. Domville, Mr. Knowles, Mr. Flint, Mr. Malkin. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by 
Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Pensot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Al- 
bertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis 
Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, 
Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Vice Admiral 
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Os- 
borne. 

Interpreter, Mr. Camerlynck. 

1. The twelfth meeting of the Committee on the Limitation of 
Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American 
Union Building, at 3.30 p. m., December 29, 1921. 



134 PROCEDURE. 

2. There were present : For the United States, Mr. Hughes, Mr. 
Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz ; for 
the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, Mr. Sarraut, Vice 
Admiral de Bon ; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi- 
Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron 'Acton; for Japan, 
Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Ad- 
miral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. 

3. Secretaries and advisers present included: For the United 
States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark ; for the British Empire, Sir Mau- 
rice Hankey, Capt. Domville, Mr. Knowles, Mr. Flint, Mr. Mal- 
kin ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, 
Mr. Ponsot; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, 
Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco; for Japan, 
Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Osborne, 
and Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter, were also present. 

The Chairman, Mr. Hughes, said that the committee had before 
it the first resolution in regard to submarines. 

Mr. Root said that he wished to say a few words following Sir 
John Salmond's remarks of that morning. He was in full agree- 
ment with Sir John Salmond's suggestion, and he had no idea of 
asking the adoption of the resolution without the critical exami- 
nation which carried with it the result of such examination. Mr. 
Root believed that the resolutions should go through the process 
sometimes described by parliamentarians as " perfection by 
amendment." Sir John Salmond had made a valuable suggestion 
which, embodied in a few words, could but result in the improve- 
ment and clarification of the resolution. This ought to be done 
and he hoped it would be done ; whether it was done here by the 
members of the committee, speaking upon the advice and expe- 
rience of their experts, or by a drafting committee of experts 
was of little consequence. The great question was whether the 
committee would agree to make such a declaration as this. In 
any case the process of destructive and constructive criticism 
should be gone through. 

Mr. Balfour said that, as he understood Mr. Root's proposal, it 
was, in British Parliamentary language, to proceed to the second 
reading of the resolutions and then to send them to committee. 
This phraselogy he understood was not used in this country and he 
did not know how far it was employed in the Parliaments of the 
other States represented on this committee. Nevertheless, it 
clearly expressed what Mr. Root proposed, i. e., to put on record 
the agreement to the principle of the resolutions and then to pro- 



APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE. 135 

ceed to discuss them in detail. It was an admirable method 
and was, he believed, the only way to escape from mixing up 
principles with details. So far as the second reading aspect was 
concerned, he believed that the underlying principle had already 
been informally approved. Only the formal vote remained to be 
registered. His own view, after listening to the powerful, persua- 
sive, and impassioned speech of Mr. Root, was that the important 
words of the resolutions were the following, at the bottom of 
the first page : 

" To the end that there may be a clear public understanding 
throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which the 
public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future 
belligerents." 

That was the central core of the doctrine which Mr. Root had 
formulated. He valued these words partly because they removed 
a misconception and partly because they included a positive con- 
structive proposal. The misconception was that the committee was 
occupied in an attempt to formulate the full code of maritime law. 
If this were the case, not only would it be necessary to weigh and 
scrutinize every word and every clause, but also to insure that 
nothing was omitted which ought to be included. That, no doubt, 
would be a very useful task, but was not what the committee had 
been invited by Mr. Root to do. The positive and constructive side 
of Mr. Root's proposal was to secure a clear understanding of the 
standards of conduct which the public opinion of the world would 
apply to future belligerents. That was the object of the docu- 
ment ; that was what it set out to accomplish. He thought that 
this end could best be achieved by transferring the words he had 
quoted from paragraph two of section one to the preamble, which 
would then read as follows: 

" The signatory powers desiring to make more effective the 
rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives 
of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war invite the 
adherence of all other civilized powers to the following statement 
of established law to the end that there may be a clear public 
understanding throughout the world of the -standards of conduct 
by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon 
future belligerents." 

This was a mere matter of arrangement, but he thought it 
would help the world to see the great object which Mr. Root's 
draft was intended to accomplish. He therefore welcomed the 
procedure now proposed. The principles underlying this docu- 
ment had the warm approval of the British Empire delegation. 
The members of that delegation would have preferred that the 
document itself should have been rendered unnecessary by the 
abolition of submarines. Since they had not been able to carry 



136 FRENCH APPROVAL. 

out this policy, however, Mr. Root's resolution provided them with 
an alternative. If they could not hold their first line of defense, 
they had at least a second line to fall back on, for in Mr. Root's 
document the abuse of submarines had been unsparingly dealt 
with. Everyone must recognize that when a weapon had been 
misused in the past, could be misused in the future and would 
be much more effective if so misused, no professions of morality 
or declarations of law could be relied upon to supply a sure pro- 
tection against this abuse. While all must regretfully admit this, 
he would like to associate himself with what Mr. Root had said 
yesterday about the immense advantage of embodying the plain 
dictates of humanity in explicit terms. It was not sufficient for 
them to be buried in works on international law or lost in depart- 
mental correspondence, they must be proclaimed in the most 
public manner. He agreed with Mr. Root that, if so stated, they 
could not and would not be without effect on the conduct of 
mankind. To suppose that submarines would never again be 
abused, in spite of all the professions of the committee, would no 
doubt be sanguine. But he believed that the adoption of these 
resolutions would be a great step toward the education of the 
world, and might do much to mitigate the horrors of war and 
its needless cruelties. Holding these views, he could only con- 
gratulate Mr. Root and promise his best support in the objects 
which he sought to attain. 

Mr. Sarraut said that on two occasions already the French 
delegation had joined with all its heart in the high spirit of 
humanity which had inspired Mr. Root's resolution. It congratu- 
lated itself also on having heard the discussion which had taken 
place that morning and which had permitted everyone to grasp 
his (Mr. Root's) thought more fully, especially after the ad- 
mirable comments which he had been good enough to make in his 
splendid speech. If there were still people who doubted the neces- 
sity to condemn the unmentionable abuses committed against 
^humanity during the last war (and no one there present doubted 
it) their uncertainty would have been eliminated by the con- 
vincing eloquence of their eminent colleague. 

Once more, Mr. Sarraut continued, he brought the full and com 
plete adherence of the French delegation to the sentiment ex- 
pressed in the first motion of Mr. Root, the principles of which 
the French delegation accepted formally. 

The French delegation did not want to stop with this adherence 
to principle, but wanted to see the resolution go into force by 
virtue of a definite text which would combine all the assents of 
the Powers represented in the committee. Certain modifications 
had been proposed. He was perfectly convinced that Mr. Root, 
whose modesty equaled his great ability, would make no objec- 
tion to the suggested amendments to his text. As a matter of 



* 
MISUSE OF SUBMARINES. 137 

procedure and in order to reach prompt results, it would be wise 
if each of those who had made observations regarding the text 
of Mr. Boot's resolution, or had suggested modifications of de- 
tails, would take the trouble to prepare and communicate the 
drafts which they proposed. These drafts could just as well 
be discussed and the committee would arrive in the end at a 
general text which would combine, he hoped, the unanimity of 
their acceptances, and would then be clothed with an authority 
such that, if ever — and all his hope repelled this idea — war 
should again occur, the peoples would be bound by an agreement 
the moral force of which would be borne in upon their con- 
sciences. 

Mr. Balfour appeared to apprehend that certain countries 
might, in spite of everything, yield to the temptation to misuse 
the weapons remaining in their hands. For his part he believed 
that these peoples would reflect deeply before violating such obli- 
gations. If the committee had any doubt of this, if it could sup- 
pose that decisions such as those which were to be taken there 
would not be carried out, debate would not be worth while, and 
the only thing left for the committee would be to leave the table. 
But Mr. Balfour himself had not entertained this pessimistic con- 
clusion, since he had stated that a resolution invested with the 
moral force of this decision would impress itself on the attention 
of the world. One must not deduce from the abuses committed 
by Germany the idea that inevitably others would commit the 
same abuses. 

It was just because the consciences of all present had re- 
volted against these abuses ; it was because their consciences 
refused to accept the idea ; it was because they were incapable 
of acting likewise that their alliance became spontaneously so 
strong against all those who had committed {hem. 

He firmly believed in the influence that these joint decisions 
might exercise over the world. The time must come, as he had 
already stated, when they must call upon the other nations to 
ratify their conclusions by approbation, thus giving them a uni- 
versal and definite value. But it was precisely for that reason 
and with that object that the text which would be the outcome 
of their deliberations, strengthened by their unanimous approval, 
should after mature consideration take on an emphatic and 
authoritative form which would impose itself upon the consent 
of the whole civilized world. 

The chairman then asked whether it was desired to continue 
the discussion of the first resolution. The suggestion had been 
made that this resolution be adopted in principle, with reference 
to a subcommittee for the purpose of considering verbal sug- 
gestions which should be in conformity with its obvious purpose. 

25882—23 10 



138 ITALIAN APPROVAL. 

Before that was done, however, there should be an opportunity for 
any destructive or constructive comments in. the committee that 
might be of use to the subcommittee. 

Mr. Sarraut said that if he understood the proceedings sug- 
gested it had now come to what in French parliamentary language 
was called " taking the matter under advisement " ; that is to say, 
keeping the resolution before the committee but referring it for 
further consideration to a subcommittee. 

The chairman said that that was his understanding of the pro- 
posal. 

Senator Schanzer, on behalf of the Italian delefation, said that 
he could only reemphasize the most sincere and most cordial 
sympathy with the idea and spirit of the resolution. The au- 
thority of Mr. Root was so great that the Italian delegation 
could adhere to the first point to which Mr. Balfour had re- 
ferred, namely, the statement of the existing international law. 
The second point put the Italian delegation in a somewhat em- 
barrassing position, as it had not received any instructions from 
its Government. He, therefore, could not give unreserved ad- 
herence to this part of the resolutions. They did not wish to 
delay the work of the committee, but felt they must make this 
reservation. 

The chairman then said that the question before the committee 
was confined to the first resolution, declaratory of the principles 
of international law as it now exists. 

He asked to be permitted to add a single word. Upon the adop- 
tion of this resolution in principle, it would be subject to such 
verbal changes as might be thought best by the drafting com- 
mittee. This resolution represented, the chairman thought, a 
most emphatic condemnation of the abhorrent practices which had 
been indulged in during the late war. It would seem, indeed, 
extraordinary if this conference, unmindful of these abhorrent 
practices which shocked the world and contributed more than 
anything else to the defeat of the Imperial German Government, 
should pass them unnoticed, and should deal only in a technical 
spirit with the matters connected with submarines. 

There was another reason which made the declaration oppor- 
tune and necessary. The committee had had a long discussion 
in regard to the question of submarines, particularly as to the ad- 
visability of their continued use, their numbers, and as to the 
practicability of their limitation. The committee had been unable 
to reach an agreement on this question. That was a fact con- 
fronting them. Such a declaration as the one proposed in the 
first resolution would go to the whole world as an indication that, 
while the committee could not agree on such limitation, there was 
no disagreement on the question that submarines should never 
be used contrary to the principles of law governing war. The 



DRAFTING COMMITTEE. 139 

adoption of the resolution might, furthermore, avoid misunder- 
standing on the part of those who were looking to the conference 
with great hope. It certainly could not be considered as a vain 
declaration after the experiences with submarines which the 
powers there represented had had and the feelings engendered 
by those experiences, to declare in the most precise terms that the 
rules of international law should be observed. He believed that 
such a declaration would be of the greatest value. 

He hoped that when the resolution was referred to the drafting 
committee, it would not be overlaid with lawyers' niceties. There 
was, he knew, nothing which anyone could write which could not 
be improved by lawyers, but when it came to the expression of 
vague fears, to which lawyers so like to give expression, he hoped 
that such verbal criticisms would receive scant attention. Any- 
thing genuine and direct which carried the real point, the world 
would understand — such as the resolution proposed by Mr. Root. 

Another important point was that the powers, should a differ- 
ence arise between them, would have to remember that the 
weapons which they possessed were not to be used as in the past 
without reference to the laws of God and man. This would 
greatly detract from the value of a submarine fleet, for when 
nations counted their weapons they counted not only their num- 
ber but the manner in which they could be used. Such a decla- 
ration would help the universal endeavors of diplomatists, charged 
with the conduct of affairs to settle difficulties without strife, and 
he hoped that the resolution would be agreed to with the under- 
standing that, if it could be improved, it should be, but that the 
principle was recognized and adopted as sound in substance. 

Unless there was objection, therefore, he would put the first 
resolution in this* form, i. e., that agreement was requested in 
substance, with reference to a drafting committee (to consist of 
a member designated by each delegation) to consider the form of 
expression and such verbal changes as might be deemed advisable. 

The chairman, after announcing the assent of the American 
delegation to the first resolution, as amended by Mr. Balfour, put 
the question to the other delegations, to which each assented 
in turn. 

The chairman therefore announced the unanimous adoption of 
the resolution and stated that he had asked Mr. Root to represent 
the American delegation on the proposed committee and requested 
that the other delegations should appoint their representatives so 
that the matter could be referred to that committee for consid- 
eration of forms of expression. 

The chairman then said that the second resolution would be 
considered in the form presented as follows : 

" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the 



140 NEW LAWS. 

requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the 
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the 
end that the prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted 
as a part of the law of nations they declare their assent to such 
prohibition and invite all other nations to adhere thereto." 

As Mr. Root had explained, this was a proposition to change 
the law. The first resolution attempted to state the law, the law 
which had been ignored and which had been trampled under foot, 
but which nevertheless had been and still was regarded as inter- 
national law. This resolution fundamentally recognized, how- 
ever, the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce 
destroyers without violating the requirements universally ac- 
cepted by civilized nations for the protection of neutrals and non- 
combatants. He assumed the resolution to mean that, while the 
rules of war were as stated in the first resolution — at least in 
substance- — and while it was the sense of the powers there repre- 
sented that they should be adhered to and clearly understood, 
the civilized world should be asked to outlaw the submarine as a 
weapon against commerce. 

The point had been made that morning that there might be a 
question in regard to the assent of the powers here represented to 
the prohibition, i. e., in relation to the last words of the resolu- 
tion, which provided that the powers here represented were to 
invite all other nations to adhere. He supposed that this meant 
that, if the prohibition should receive the assent of the powers 
here represented, they adopted it in the hope that it would be made 
a part of international law upon the adherence of all the other 
powers — not that it would become binding upon the powers here 
represented, if it did not become a part of international law, and 
if others by their refusal to assent prevented ifc from becoming a 
general principle. He assumed that the intention of the resolu- 
tion was not that these powers should try to make international 
law for themselves, which, of course, they could not do, but that 
they should use their influence to obtain the adherence of nations 
to a new rule of law outlawing the submarine as a destroyer of 
commerce. 

Mr. Root said the cnairman had correctly stated the sense of 
the closing words of the resolution ; it was to the end that the 
prohibition of the use of submarines should be universally ac- 
cepted. Two things were done in the resolutions. First, a dec- 
laration was made, then an assertion. If a single nation were 
to lead with such a proposal, it might have no effect. It required 
universal assent to establish a law of nations. There was a 
difference between the second and the first resolutions. The 
first was a declaration of existing law and created nothing, 
merely certifying to what existed. The second resolution called 



OPERATION OF LAW. 141 

for an act which did not take effect until assent had been re- 
ceived. 

Mr. Balfour said he would like to make a suggestion to Mr. 
Root. He understood Mr. Root's view to be that the powers 
represented on this committee were only endeavoring to initiate a 
great reform of international law, by declaring their own view and 
pledging themselves to induce other nations if possible to sup- 
port it. He desired to ask whether he could not go a little further. 
Why should not the five nations represented here agree between 
themselves to act on the rule which Mr. Root proposed? This 
suggestion was not inconsistent with Mr. Root's plan. On the 
contrary it would greatly promote it. Nothing could be better 
as an example than that the five states, instead of merely adopt- 
ing a resolution which would be inoperative till generally adopted, 
should adopt immediately the principles which they desired even- 
tually to see embodied in international law. He did not wish to 
dogmatize on the subject, but he wished to put the proposal be- 
fore Mr. Root for his consideration. 

Mr. Root said that he would illustrate : The United States had 
the practice of amending the Constitution. The Constitution 
could be amended by a proposal of Congress and the assent of 
three-quarters of the States. One State voted, another, then an- 
other, then another — their votes were of no consequence what- 
ever unless and until the necessary number had been recorded — 
and only when the assent of the necessary number had been re- 
corded could they become effective. The committee could not 
make a rule of international law ; all that they could do was to 
propose a law, and in proposing it they might add to it their as- 
sent, which did not become a law until the necessary number of 
assents had been received to make it a rule of law. He said that 
a great mass of nations agreeing might make international law, 
but the general rule was that international law requires univer- 
sal acceptance. 

He observed, speaking for himself and without opportunity to 
consult the other members of the American delegation, or with- 
out intending to speak for them, that it would be entirely satis- 
factory as far as he was concerned to have such an addition to 
this second prohibition as Mr. Balfour had suggested. It was an 
addition providing for the five powers who were here and who 
would be bound by such a prohibition as between each other, and 
he observed that he was quite sure that every power at the con- 
ference intended to shape its conduct in accordance with the 
rule proposed. Such an intention would make for security and 
good understanding. 

Mr. Root said he did not suppose that such a course would in 
any degree change the conduct of any power here, but an assur- 



142 BROAD PROHIBITIONS. 

ance of an intention respecting that conduct would be of great 
value in settling this disturbed and distracted world. 

' Mr. Balfour had asked a question as to policy. Mr. Root said 
he would give this point but passing notice. It was a very com- 
mon thing in the legislation of all of their countries to deal with 
objectionable practices by broad prohibitions, because broad and 
simple prohibitions could be enforced, while complicated prohi- 
bitions filled with many items were exceedingly difficult to en- 
force. He supposed that a very broad prohibition like that we 
now live under here was necessary in order to make a simple 
rule which would prevent people from doing things in an ob- 
jectionable way. In this case if they tried to make the prohibi- 
tions in detail, it would be impossible to enforce them, just as 
it was now impossible in the United Sta'tes to have a glass of 
wine at dinner because it was necessary to have a broad prohi- 
bition to prevent a lot of poor fellows from getting drunk on 
bad whisky. This was a proposal of the same character as the 
proposal made by the British delegation, which had not been 
received with favor, i. e., the proposal to ban all submarines, with 
a broad prohibition based upon the fact that though submarines 
may have a useful purpose, nevertheless the painful purposes to 
which they might be put were so serious and so injurious that 
they justified the establishment of a broad and simple prohibition 
of all submarines. If you undertook to deal with submarines in 
detail you failed. You could not make a prohibition that could 
be enforced. Therefore the abuses were so great that the world 
would be wise to ban them altogether. Now this was a proposal 
the same in character, resting upon the same considerations ; that 
is to say, it saved the submarine for legitimate purposes and 
banned only the injurious use of submarines. It substituted a 
general prohibition for a detailed prohibition — the rule which 
they had just recognized in their action upon the first resolution, 
and the wisdom of which did not rest upon theory. It rested in 
their memory of the most painful events of recent times. 

When the German submarines began torpedoing innocent mer- 
chant ships and when they had stopped them for the purpose of 
visit and search and had begun to place bombs in the hulls and 
blow up vessels, indignant protests were made. The German 
answer was that it was impossible to comply with the rules that 
had been made to govern the actions of surface ships. There was 
an agreement upon that. Germany declared it to be impossible, 
and it was impossible. The submarines could not successfully 
carry on warfare against merchant ships and summon them in 
the ordinary way to stop for visit and search. And when a vessel 
had been stopped for visit and search, the submarine could not 
put its crew and passengers in safety because the work was 



SANCTION FOR RULE. 143 

done while the submarine itself was in a danger from which it 
could escape only by swift submersion. The submarine could 
not take a great boat load of passengers and crew into its interior, 
where air had to be furnished artificially. The distressing cir- 
cumstances of the crew. and passengers of merchant ships deemed 
the prey of submarines and left to die, were obvious. Germany's 
assertion that it was impossible for the submarine to war on 
merchant ships in accordance with these rules was well founded, 
and for one, the Government of the United States assented to it, 
agreed to it, admitted it. But they said the consequence was not 
that the rule failed, but that such warfare must end. 

There was no fact more firmly established than that all the 
temptations that beset a belligerent to gain its point at whatever 
cost would stand between the submarines and conformity with 
civilized procedure. The only way to secure the safety of innocent 
passengers and crews, noncombatants, neutrals, women, children, 
etc. — the only way to secure their safety was to say that no belli- 
gerent should attack a merchant ship through an instrumentality 
which can not achieve the attack without violating the rule. It 
created a simple and forcible rule in the place of the complicated 
and detailed rules which were required by the weakness of human 
nature. Mr. Root said a forcible rule, because a rule that could 
be understood by the people. He repeated again with regard to 
what he had said before regarding the first resolution, that he 
granted that contracts between nations would not enforce them- 
selves. He granted that the rules made by diplomatists, confer- 
ences, and foreign offices, might not be enforced. But he also 
asserted that when a rule is based upon the principles of 
humanity and when the public of all free countries had got hold 
of it, understood it, and adopted it as a guide in its conduct of 
belligerent operations, the public opinion of all civilized countries 
would furnish sufficient support of the rule — because the con- 
demnation of the public of the world brings with it a condign 
punishment for any Nation that offends, a punishment that no 
Nation dares to face. 

The chairman said that there were two distinct propositions 
before the committee. The first, broadly stated, was an attempt to 
amend and improve existing international law in the sense that 
submarines should not be used at all as destroyers of commerce. 
There might be some difficulty in determining definitely when 
international law had actually been amended, but he believed that 
some means could probably be found of establishing a criterion, 
as for example, by stating that the agreement should be effective 
on the adherence of powers named. 

The other proposal, which had been made by Mr. Balfour and 
accepted by Mr. Root, was that, regardless of the outcome of the 
first proposal, the five powers represented on the committee should 



144: THIRTEENTH MEETING. 

bind themselves, as among themselves, not to use the submarine 
for the destruction of commerce. Quite apart from any attempt 
the committee might desire to make to change international law, 
such a proposition was entirely within the competency of the 
powers here represented. So far as the American delegates were 
concerned, there was no doubt as to the approval of the policy. 
It was really a practical application of existing rules, as it was 
only in exceptional cases that submarines could operate success- 
fully against commerce and the existence of the exceptional 
cases constituted an invitation and temptation to violation of the 
law. On this point it was hoped agreement could be reached. 
The two propositions, while distinct, could be set forth in one 
declaration or in separate declarations. The chairman desired 
to know whether such discussion should take place then or 
should be postponed until the following day. 

Mr. Balfour said that the chairman had pointed out that the 
discussion had brought two propositions before us: First, the 
change in international law proposed in Article II of Mr. Root's 
resolutions, and second, the addition which he himself had sug- 
gested in that resolution whereby the powers represented on this 
committee would bind themselves immediately to accept and act 
upon the new policy as between themselves. He thought it would 
assist the consideration of this question if he were to give the 
exact words in which his own proposal should be formulated. 
He would amend the last part of Article II so as to read as 
follows : 

" They declare their assent to such prohibition and they agree 
to be bound forthwith thereby as between themselves, and they 
invite all other nations to adhere to the present agreement." 

The subcommittee for drafting a resolution regarding subma- 
rines was made up as follows : United States, Mr. Root ; British 
Empire, Sir Auckland Geddes; France, Vice Admiral de Bon, 
Mr. Kammerer ; Italy, Signor Ricci ; Japan, Mr. Hanihara. 

The meeting then adjourned until 11 o'clock a. m., December 30, 
1921. 



THIRTEENTH MEETING— FRIDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1921, 11 A. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by 
Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Senator Pearce (for Australia), 
Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). 



AMENDMENTS. 145 

Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Flint, 
Mr. Malkin. Mr. Mousley. 

France. — Mr. Sarrut, Vice-Adiniral de Bon. Accompanied by 
Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Al- 
bertini, Vice-Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis 
Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, 
Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Paul and Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon, interpreters. 

1. The thirteenth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of 
Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American 
Union Building, on Friday, December 30, 1921, at 11 a. m. 

2. There were present : For the United States, Mr. Hughes, 
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, 
Admiral Coontz ; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, 
Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, (for Aus- 
tralia) Senator Pearce, (for New Zealand) Sir John Salmond, 
(for India) Mr. Sastri ; for France, Mr. Serraut, Vice Admiral de 
Bern ; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator 
Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton ; for Japan, Admiral Baron 
Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, 
Capt. Uyeda. 

3. Secretaries and technical advisers present included the fol- 
lowing : For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark ; for the 
British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Flint, Mr. 
Malkin, Mr. Mousley ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, 
Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, 
Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli ; for Japan, Mr. Ichi- 
hashi. The Secretary General of the conference, assisted by Mr. 
Paul and Mr. Wilson, was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. 
Talamon (interpreters) were also present. 

4. The Chairman, Mr. Hughes, said that the committee had under 
consideration the second resolution which had been proposed and 
which had for its object the elimination of the submarine as a 
commerce destroyer. There were two phases of the resolution 
under the amendment proposed by Mr. Balfour : The one was the 
proposition to amend the existing rules of war so as to provide 
that submarines should not be permitted to act as commerce de- 
stroyers, and the other was that the five Governments here repre- 
sented should not only recommend the adoption of the new rules to 
which he had referred, but should at once agree among themselves 
that they would observe such rules. 

The Chairman asked whether the committee desired time to con- 
tinue the discussion of this proposition. 



146 LACK OF INSTRUCTIONS. 

Senator Schanzer said that he did not wish in any way to oppose 
the continuation of the discussion on the second resolution pro- 
posed by Mr. Root ; but, as he had said the previous day, the 
Italian delegation had had to communicate with its Government. 
Its instructions had not yet been received. Of course, he wished 
to make it plain that the Italian delegation had no objection to 
the continuation of the debate if the other delegates so wished. 

Mr. Sarraut said that he had no objection to the discussion 
proceeding, but he wished to remark that as yet he had been 
unable to receive instructions from his Government. It would be 
an unprofitable discussion, he thought, unless all the delegates 
were provided with instructions from their Governments and could 
speak with authority. 

The Chairman remarked that it would certainly be desirable 
that the discussion be continued at a time when the French and 
Italian delegates were in a position to state with definiteness the 
attitude of their Governments in regard to the subjects presented 
for discussion and he was sure that the members of the commit- 
tee had no desire in any way to proceed with the discussion at 
such time or in such manner as would seem to make it necessary 
to have questions presented and debated which their colleagues 
were not really in a position to discuss. But, of course, if there 
were any views which any of the delegates desired to present, 
there was opportunity to do so. 

Lord Lee said that he quite appreciated the position in which 
the committee stood in the absence of complete instructions to 
two of the most important delegations here. He could not help 
feeling, that in the minds of the French delegation and Govern- 
ment, there existed some misunderstanding as to the attitude of 
the British Government in regard to submarines which it was 
desirable to clear up before the French Government committed 
itself in regard to the second resolution. He could not help feel- 
ing that here was a unique opportunity for the French delegation 
and Government to reassure the British Admiralty and public 
opinion in regard to this matter", of which he hoped they would 
avail themselves. British apprehension in regard to the use of 
submarines was deep founded and, as the events of the war had 
shown, well founded. He had no desire to take advantage of 
this occasion to reopen the question of the tonnage of submarines 
to be allotted to the different Powers. That would not be in order 
in discussing the present resolution. What the committee was 
considering was the uses to which submarines might be put. 
While the late war showed that rules of war Were of little pro- 
tective value when a nation was in desperate straits, at the same 
time these resolutions proposed by Mr. Root would, in the view 
of the British delegation, be of immense value as a deterrent. 
They would represent the most civilized opinion of the world, 



USE OF SUBMARINES. 147 

and any country who broke them would be morally outlawing 
itself and running in an intensified form the risk which Germany 
ran in bringing down upon her head the active hostility of other 
civilized Powers. But he wanted to explain to his French friends, 
if he might, why it was that the British delegation had these 
special apprehensions which had been expressed so forcibly in 
connection with France. 

Lord Lee went on to say that of course there was no one in the 
British delegation, or, indeed, among any of his fellow country- 
men, who had not the highest esteem and admiration both for 
Mr. Sarraut and Admiral de Bon. Mr. Sarraut was obviously 
not only sincere in everything that he said, but the whole spirit 
of his remarks breathed statesmanship, moderation, and hu- 
manity. As to Admiral de Bon, if he would allow Lord Lee to 
say so in his presence, everyone regarded him — at any rate those 
at the Admiralty who knew his distinguished record — as the very 
embodiment of French chivalry and sea honor and, as Lord Lee 
believed had been said before, he did not think there was any 
officer in the British fleet who would not be proud to serve under 
his orders if the occasion arose. But the difficulty was (and 
this was a point that the British Admiralty and the British 
naval staff had to face) : They were not clear as to the views of 
the French naval staff on the matter of the utilization of sub- 
marines in time of war. It was true that the views expressed 
by experts did not always by any means determine the action 
of governments ; if they did, no doubt every country would some 
day be placed in the position which the late Lord Salisbury once 
described when he said, " If we listened to the experts we should 
have to put a garrison in the moon to protect it against an inva- 
sion from Mars." But the views of naval staffs, of the experts, 
were of importance unless and until they were disavowed by the 
governments which they served. 

Mr. Briand quoted the other day in his memorable speech the 
atrocious sentiments expressed by Gen. Ludendorff and by Von 
Moltke, sentiments which still constituted in his view a menace to 
France and one which it was essential that France should guard 
herself against. It was, therefore, he hoped, not improper nor in 
any sense provocative if he had to call attention to the kind of 
statement, the kind of suggestion of policy, which was openly 
made in high and responsible quarters of the French naval gen- 
eral staff in connection with the use of submarines. If, as he 
believed, they did not represent the views of the French Govern- 
ment; if, as he 'hoped and believed, they would be at once re- 
pudiated, and in an effective manner, then possibly British 
apprehensions and the attitude which Britain was compelled to 
adopt with regard to the use of submarines in war might be very 



148 TRENCH PUBLICATIONS. 

largely modified. He felt bound to give chapter and verse to 
illustrate the anxiety that was felt in regard to this matter. 
There was published quite recently in the "Revue Maritime," a 
technical and official publication, published in January, 1920, 
under the direction of the French naval general staff, a series of 
articles now incorporated, he believed, in " Synthese de la guerre 
sous-marine " by Captaine de Fregate Castex, who at that time was 
chief of one of the important bureaus of the French naval staff ; 
who was now Chief of Staff of the Admiral of the second division 
in the Mediterranean, and who had just been designated as prin- 
cipal lecturer to the senior officers' course for the next year. 
Therefore, he was not quoting some retired naval officer writing 
from his club ; all countries suffered from such gentlemen who 
propounded extraordinary theories. He was speaking now of a 
responsible officer of the French naval staff -in a high position, 
who wrote in particular an article on " Piracy," in which, after 
some preliminary observations destined to throw ridicule on those 
who criticized the German methods in the late war and to treat 
them with great contempt, he proceeded to say this : 

" In the first place, before throwing stones at the Germans, we 
should have recalled that this war of the torpedo was, like so 
many other novelties of our planet, the application of an idea 
which in its origin was essentially French." 

Then he quoted in support of his view the doctrine which had 
been laid down some years ago by Admiral Aube, who was a very 
distinguished and celebrated French minister of marine, who had 
used the following words when speaking of the use of the torpedo 
from a torpedo boat (Capt. Castex went on to point out that they 
were equally applicable to the submarine to-day) : 

" Will the torpedo boat tell the captain of the liner that it is 
there, that it is lying in wait for him, that it can sink him, and 
in consequence take him prisoner? In one word, will it seize its 
prize by platonic methods? On the contrary, at an appropriate 
distance, and unseen, the torpedo boat will follow the liner which 
it marks out for its victim. In the dead of night, quietly, silently, 
it will send to the abyss, the liner, cargo, passengers, and crew ; 
then with a mind not only serene, but fully satisfied with the 
results achieved, the captain of the torpedo boat will continue his 
cruise." 

Capt. Castex continued : 

" The Germans, as is their wont, have only appropriated in this 
case the invention of others. The young French school no doubt 
only had in mind the torpedo boat as such, but, if the effect of 
the torpedo is independent of the tube which launches it, it will 
be agreed that the German submarine war had its germ in the 
observations quoted above. But approaching the question from a 
higher standpoint than that of mere inquiry as to who conceived 



BRITISH COMMENT. 149 

this new form of warfare, it must be recognized that the Germans 
were absolutely justified in resorting to it." 

Cant. Castex said, indeed, that to " neglect to do so would have 
been to commit a great blunder." Further : 

" It is thus that resolute belligerents have acted throughout the 
course of history When people have been engaged in desperate 
conflict." 

Further : 

" To sum up, one can see nothing in the attitude of the Germans 
which, militarily speaking, is not absolutely correct. The failure 
to give notice before torpedoing has raised a storm of protest, but 
it is not so inadmissible as at first sight appears." 

There were many other passages, Lord Lee continued, of a simi- 
lar description, and interspersed among them was the laying down 
of a doctrine with regard to the value of submarines, to which the 
Briash Delegation heartily subscribed and to which it had shown 
its adherence in the debates which had preceded this : 

"The submarine is a mediocre torpedo boat; that is to say, it 
has only very limited chances of damaging by means of a torpedo 
a ship enjoying, like itself, full liberty of movement on the broad 
sea, as is proved by the relative immunity enjoyed by big warships 
even in the most dangerous zones and at times when submarines 
were swarming around. With regard to submarines, the English 
seem to have an opinion very similar to that which we entertain." 

There was much more of the same kind, but Capt. Castex con- 
cluded the first section of his article by quoting these words. 

" After- many centuries of effort, thanks to the ingenuity of man, 
the instrument, the system, the martingale is at hand which will 
overthrow for good and all the naval power of England." 

Lord Lee said he had drawn attention to these passages because, 
as he had said, they were the utterances of a responsible member 
of the French naval staff who at the time of writing was in a high 
position and was the actual head of a bureau. These things were 
known to the British naval staff, of course ; indeed, they were pub- 
lished to the world under the authority of the French naval staff. 
Now this officer, who was "appointed principal lecturer to the 
Senior Officers' Course, would, no doubt, unless a change of policy 
took place, be pouring what the British delegation regarded as this 
infamy and this poison into the ears of the serving officers of the 
French Navy. That was the justification for what he could only 
describe as the apprehensions and even bitterness that the British 
delegation must feel in the thought that under any conceivable cir- 
cumstances their present allies, their late comrades in arms in the 
greatest war the world had ever known, should contemplate the 
possibility of warfare of that kind. It seemed to him, now that 
these apprehensions had been expressed, that the way was open 
for the French delegation and the French Government, as he 



150 EXPLANATION REQUESTED. 

fervently trusted they would, to disavow and repudiate these 
things. He suggested respectfully that there was only one way 
in which that could effectively be done, and that was by, the 
adoption of these resolutions which had been moved by Mr. Root, 
and particularly No. 2, with the amendment suggested by Mr, 
Balfour, attached to it. 

The French had told the committee here again and again that 
they only required submarines for purposes of defense, particu- 
larly for the defense of their colonial possessions, their home ports, 
and their lines of communication. There had been differences of 
opinion as to the utility of submarines for these purposes, but 
now, it seemed to Lord Lee, there was an opportunity of proving 
to the world that they meant what they said in regard to this, 
and that they were not prepared under any circumstances to con- 
sider the use of submarines in the manner in which the Germans 
used them in the war, which a member of their general staff had 
claimed as their own* and as being in every way legitimate and 
desirable. If that repudiation took place, in the only form in 
which it could be effective, then the position, so far as the Brtisti 
people were concerned, would be very largely changed; the feeling 
they had of apprehension and even of bitterness would be re- 
moved, because he was sure his French friends would believe him 
when he said this, that they took no pleasure in any kind of re- 
crimination, public or private ; they regarded it as a offense and 
a reproach to the world that such a thing should ever take place 
between them. But here was a situation where the very existence 
of Britain, its life as a nation, might' be at stake, and now was 
the chance of the conference, and perhaps the only chance, of 
making its appeal to the world to remove the horrors which were 
so vivid in the minds of everyone. If this resolution as amended 
by Mr. Balfour were accepted by every nation around this table, as 
applying to themselves and their conduct in any future wars as 
between themselves, then, he thought he might say, that France 
would have regained much of the ground which he believed had 
been lost between them, largely through a misunderstanding, a 
genuine misunderstanding in their hearts. If that were done all 
her friends, among whom he was proud to count himself one, 
would unfeignedly rejoice. 

Admiral de Bon said, after thanking Lord Lee from the bottom 
of his heart for the flattering expressions used by him in regard 
to Admiral de Bon, he wished to declare that he considered it 
a great good happiness and a great honor in his life to have col- 
laborated during several years, especially through the most try- 
ing hours of the war, with his friends of the British Admiralty, 
among whom he had made deep and lasting f^ndship* which 
would endure as long as he lived. 



EXPLANATION GIVEN. 151 

He had been deeply gratified by Lord Lee's statement. Since 
the beginning of the discussion he had been unable to comprehend 
the misunderstanding which seemed to have arisen between them, 
because — he stated it openly and declared it most emphatically — 
there was nothing more foreign to the minds of the French than 
the idea of attacking a friend. It was not even conceivable to 
them. Their only regret was that this misunderstanding had 
lasted so long and that they had not known that it was based on 
on article like that written by Capt. Castex. 

He was, it was true, an officer who belonged to the general 
staff, but who was attached to a literary section. He was above 
all a man of letters. His article had been published in the Revue 
Maritime, which was, to a certain extent, an organ recognized by 
the French Navy, but on its title page it bore a statement to the 
effect that the French Admiralty and general staff declined to 
assume any responsibility whatever as regards the utterances con- 
tained in the articles, which responsibility rested wholly with the 
authors of the articles. Each writer was free to express his own 
opinions, but he did so at his own risk. 

The charge should be laid at the door of the man who wrote that 
article, and to him only. The article in no way represented, thank 
heaven, the views of the French Navy. 

Capt. Castex brought up an old argument regarding the torpedo 
boat. Admiral de Bon had told the committee only the other day, 
in regard to the submarine, that once more the same stages of dis- 
cussion were being gone through which marked the appearance of 
the torpedo boat. There had been no instance in history when the 
appearance of a new weapon had not unleashed a sort of fanaticism 
in the ranks of the partisans ; there were always extremists who 
wished to impose their ideas, and made fantastic statements to 
that end. But in the end common sense always stepped in and 
public opinion kept the ultimate judgment within reasonable 
limits. 

At the time when frantic enthusiasts believed that torpedo boats 
were the noblest of inventions, abominable things appeared in 
print which had no affect on actual practice or on the doctrines 
adopted by the various Governments with regard to the use of 
torpedo boats. He could find no better way of condemning the 
article in question. 

The author of that article had written what the French delega- 
tion considered to be a monstrosity. The French delegation had 
repeatedly stated that it unreservedly condemned the practices of 
the German submarines during the late war and that it desired 
that a declaration strongly condemning them should issue from 
the conference and be spread over the entire world. 

He begged Lord Lee to believe that the French Navy had never 
harbored any idea of using methods" of w T ar practiced by the Ger- 



152 EXPLANATION ACCEPTED. 

man submarines (for which they felt only horror) against the 
British Empire, nor against any other country whatever. 

He maintained that the honor of the French general staff and 
of; the French Navy, which had a record of centuries of struggle 
without a single stain on their escutcheon — could not be sullied by 
the article in question. This article was the work of an officer 
who was a man of letters rather than a sailor; and Admiral de 
Eon formally repudiated it in the name of the French Navy. 

Mr. Sarraut said that although he must await the instructions 
of his Government with regard to certain points in the resolutions 
proposed by Mr. Root, he had no need of any instructions to asso- 
ciate his sentiments with those of Admiral de Bon, which he 
solemnly confirmed as head of the French delegation, or to offer 
the French Government's formal repudiation of those methods of 
warfare which had just been mentioned. 

He hoped that these explanations — he thanked Lord Lee for 
having given him the opportunity to make them — would be of 
such a character as to dispel for all time the misunderstanding 
which, to his profound regret, had arisen between them — a mis- 
understanding of which he did not comprehend the reason or 
the nature. He hoped and believed, moreover, that all the 
delegates might draw a lesson of mutual confidence from this 
incident which would permit them in future to avoid misunder- 
standings of this sort by forming the habit of frank and fore- 
handed explanations. The misunderstanding which had arisen 
might easily have been avoided, even before it was thought of, 
by a direct and friendly conversation in which the French delega- 
tion would have been glad to take part had the opportunity been 
offered them. In future, as far as they were concerned, they 
would continue to have the same sincere desire to explain their 
point of view before public opinion had been molded under such 
circumstances as had been seen. 

Lord Lee had uttered a word with which he (Mr. Sarraut) 
would not reproach him, for he did not wish to use the word 
" reproach " in speaking of friends. He had spoken of the 
ground which had been lost by France since these deliberations 
commenced. This phrase was well known to the French delega- 
tion; they had heard it throughout the war; there were days 
when France lost ground or positions which nevertheless she 
contrived to regain immediately. He was well aware that every 
day in the press the French delegation witnessed a campaign of 
bitter criticism launched against their country, against the 
motives of France, to the end that she might be made to appear 
under an aggressive guise of imperialism and militarism. That 
very morning there was an odious caricature representing France 
trying on the spiked helmet of Frussia. The French delegation 
had borne these attacks calmly and with serenity, not wishing 



FRENCH DEFENSE. 153 

to embitter the discussion by replying to them. Strong in their 
right and in their loyalty, they had remained silent in spite of 
the violent prejudice which this campaign was arousing against 
them. There were times, Mr. Sarraut said, when one must suffer 
for one's friends ; true friendship was measured by the extent of 
the sacrifices suffered in its name ; but, just as the French 
delegation had never dreamed of holding their British friends 
responsible for these cruel attacks, so the British delegation 
should not dream of thinking that that organization which 
France had created for her national defense, in the name of the 
right of French sovereignty, and for the protection of vital 
interests with which the French were better acquainted than 
any one else, could possibly be directed against friends. 

If each and every day the members of, the French delegation 
Tiad to continue to defend themselves against such suspicions ; 
if, when they had come here for the purpose of working for the 
proposed peace by means of the reduction of armaments, they 
must constantly see the specter of war dangled before them and 
he made aware of an undercurrent of thought concerning mutual 
threats or of the idea that is attributed to them of plans of 
aggression against those who had mingled their blood with that 
of the French soldiers on all the battle fields of the greatest war 
the world has known ; then indeed they would be impatient to 
see the end of a conference which had brought them the 'bitter- 
ness of such a disappointment. They were impatient to see a 
clearing of the atmosphere and the disappearance of all unwhole- 
some insinuations. The French people had been given to under- 
stand (and in what terms!) that even before reconstituting their 
defensive forces, and before thinking of again fortifying their 
country against renewed devastation, they would do well to pay 
their debts. They felt no shame for those debts, nor did they 
forget them ; they regarded them with pride as the wounded 
man his scars. 

There were things more painful to the French people than 
these ; the lack of confidence in their gratitude and affection 
toward their great ally. Mr. Sarraut said that he could attest 
its sincerity and with very deep emotion. He had had the honor 
to be a member of the cabinet at the moment when the war of 
1914 was declared against them ; and never without profound 
emotion did he recall the feeling of exaltation that he experi- 
enced when, in ministerial council, he learned that the English 
Army which the Emperor of Germany had called the " contempti- 
ble little army," and which was to become the great and powerful 
British Army, had just aligned itself resolutely at the side of 
France in the vast conflict which was looming up. He would 
never forget that hour ; it was eternally graven on his heart ; 

25882—23 11 



154 ACTION DEFERRED. 

and it had always dominated liis thought. Truly there had been 
enough of these misunderstandings ; they must be done away 
with ! Mr. Sarraut, for his part, hoped for it with all his heart ! 
Mutual confidence free of all reserve must again prevail among 
the nations represented at the conference. In this respect the 
French Government had given and was ready to give every 
guaranty ; its word indeed should suffice. Mr. Sarraut concluded 
by saying that if he did not ask to pursue the discussion of the 
second resolution, and to formulate the conclusions which as all 
present must appreciate rose to his lips, it was in order that the 
expression of his feelings might have not only the authority of 
the head of the French delegation but might be clothed with all 
the moral force that belonged to the decisions of the French 
Government. 

Mr. Hanihara said that so far as the Japanese delegation itself 
was concerned no objection was seen to the adoption of Article II 
of the proposed resolution as amended by Mr. Balfour. However, 
as a matter of formality and procedure, they were required to 
submit to their Government the precise text of it, and ask for in- 
structions thereon before they could give formal assent to it. 

The chairman asked whether anyone desired to speak further 
upon this matter at that time. As the representatives of three 
of the Governments were not in a position at the moment to 
speak under definite instructions with respect to this article, 
it seemed desirable that the discussion should be postponed. The 
committee would then come to the third resolution ; but anticipat- 
ing what would probably be said with regard to it, the chairman 
suggested that the same course be adopted, and that both these 
resolutions (which had a relation to each other) should go over 
for further discussion until such time as the chairman was ad- 
vised by the delegations that they had received instructions and 
were ready to proceed. 

Senator Pearce said that there was one point involved in 
Article III which might possibly require amendment,' and, if so, 
he thought it might be advisable to embody this amendment at 
once. He referred to the fact that the declaration included per- 
sons in service of any of the powers "adopting these rules." If 
the resolution were adopted in its present form, it would mean 
that whilst the officers of the nations which adhered to these 
articles would be liable to the penalty under Article III, the 
officers of nations not adhering would not be so liable. He 
thought, however, that an amendment should be made so that the 
rules might become part of international law, with general ap- 
plication, in order to be effective. 

Mr. Root said that the point to which Senator Pearce had re- 
ferred was very important and very interesting. The draft 
limited its operations to those powers which hafa adopted the 



NEW CAPITAL SHIP TONNAGE. 155 

rules ; but the question whether it should be so limited or should 
extend to other powers was a question open to discussion, upon 
which different views might be taken. That question was in the 
proposition, and as it seemed to be understood that there was 
not to be a discussion upon the subject at the time, he would con- 
tent himself with an acknowledgment to Senator Pearce of the 
importance and interest of the suggestion which he had raised. 

The chairman said that it seemed quite clear that the com- 
mittee should not proceed with the discussion of these resolutions 
in parts when several of the delegations were not in position to 
discuss them under appropriate instructions. As had been said, 
the point which had been raised by Senator Pearce was one which 
could not very well be discussed without bringing into the dis- 
cussion the general bearing of the resolution, its import, the policy 
involved in it, and a number of questions which would have rela- 
tion to the particular point raised. With the committee's permis- 
sion he would assume that the discussion of both the second and 
the third resolutions should be postponed until the chair was ad- 
vised that the delegations had heard from their Governments and 
were ready to proceed with the discussion ; in the meantime, of 
course, any amendments which occurred to any of the delegates 
for the purpose of clarification or modification could be brought 
to the attention of Mr. Root or of the chair, so that they might be 
circulated, if desired, among the delegations and might be taken 
under advisement pending full explication and consideration at 
the time when the discussion was resumed. 

With the committee's permission, therefore, the resolution which 
had been proposed the other day, and the discussion of which had 
been postponed with respect to the limitation of the tonnage of 
individual ships of war, other than capital ships or aircraft car- 
riers, would be taken up. That resolution, as proposed and as 
amended, was now presented as follows : 

" No ship of war other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier 
hereafter built shall exceed a total tonnage displacement of 10,000 
tens, and no guns shall be carried by any such ship other than a 
capital ship with a caliber in excess of 8 inches." 

The chairman said that the committee would recall that general 
agreement had been expressed with the provision of the resolution 
as to the limitation of armament in the case of ships of war other 
than capital ships or aircraft carriers, i. e., that no guns should be 
carried with a caliber in excess of 8 inches. 

There were reservations, however, with respect to the limitation 
on total tonnage, i. e., the suggested limitation of a total tonnage 
displacement of 10,000 tons. The chairman asked if the committee 
would take up the discussion of this question. 

Baron Kato said that on behalf of the Japanese delegation 
he accepted the proposal to limit the tonnage of light cruisers to 



156 TONNAGE AND CALIBER. 

10,000 and the caliber of guns carried by such ships not to exceed 
8 inches. He asked, however, that he be permitted to make a sug- 
gestion while he was on his feet. The question of large merchant 
ships with high speed should be considered according to the princi- 
ple enunciated in paragraph 30 of the original American plan. Un- 
less this question were settled, he feared that the limitation put 
upon light cruisers would remain meaningless. 

The chairman said, with reference to the last suggest on of 
Baron Kato, that he ought to say that the question of merchant 
ships and appropriate regulations with regard to their use or to 
the armaments applied upon them, to the end that they should not 
be used to contravene or make futile the limitations upon which 
the committee might be able to agree, would be brought up later 
for discussion. That was a very important matter. 

With respect to the range of application of the present resolu- 
tion, he felt bound to call the attention of the committee to the 
fact that originally it had been proposed to refer to auxiliary 
cruisers, but that at the suggestion of Lord Lee that resolution had 
been amended to read as follows : " No ship of war other than a 
capital ship or aircraft carrier " ; he assumed that the limitation 
therein expressed referred to every ship of war other than a 
capital ship or aircraft carrier, of every sort built hereafter. 

There were three exceptions to the application with respect to 
tonnage displacement and armament, and those three except "ons 
were capital ships, aircraft carriers, and ships now existing. 
These were the three exceptions. This did not apply to any ship 
existing, but it did apply to every ship of war hereafter built 
which did not come within the category of capital ship or aircraft 
carrier. It was important that that be understood before it was 
acted upon. 

If he had interpreted the amended resolution correctly, he was 
inclined to the view that its meaning would be clearer if there 
were some change in the arrangement of the words, and he sug- 
gested the following: 

" No ship of war hereafter built, other than a capital ship or 
aircraft carrier, shall exceed a total tonnage displacement of 
10,000 tons, and no gun shall be carried by any ship of war here- 
after, other than a capital ship, with a caliber in excess of 8 
inches." 

The chairman then asked whether the committee should pro- 
ceed to a discussion of this question. 

Admiral Acton accepted for the Italian delegation the proposal 
just read by the chairman. 

The chairman said that the situation was that all the powers 
present had accepted the resolution with the exception of the 
French delegation, which had not as yet received definite instruc- 



FOURTEENTH MEETING. 157 

tions upon the point. The matter would therefore be delayed 
until he was notified that such instructions had been received. 

The meeting was then adjourned until 3 p. m. December 30, 
1921. 



FOURTEENTH MEETING— FRIDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1921, 3 P. M. 

PBESENT. 

United States.— Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by 
Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), 
Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). 
Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Knowles. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by 
Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertirii, Vice Admiral 
Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count 
Pagliano. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral 
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi. 

The Secretary General. Assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. 
Pierrepont. Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter. 

1. The Fourteenth Meeting of the Committee on Limitation of 
Armament was held in the Columbus Room, Pan American Union 
Building, on Friday afternoon, December 30, 1921, at 3 o'clock. 

2. There were present : For the United States, Mr. Hughes,. 
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, 
Admiral Coontz ; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, 
Sir Auckland Geddes, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator 
Pearce (of Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), 
Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral 
de Bon ; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice 
Admiral B/iron Acton ; for Japan, Admiral Baron Kato, Mr. Hani- 
hara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. 

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were pres- 
ent : For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark ; for the 
British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. 
Knowles ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. 
Odend'hal ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano ; 
for Japan, Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general of the conference, assisted by Mr. Cres- 
son and Mr. Pierrepont, was present. Mr. Camerlynck (inter- 
preter) was also present. 



158 AIRCRAFT CARRIER TONNAGE. 

The chairman (Mr. Hughes) said that he assumed that the 
next subject to be brought before the committee for discussion 
was the proposal with regard to the total tonnage of airplane 
carriers which each of the powers should have as a maximum 
under the proposed agreement. This was item 23 of the pro- 
posal circulated at the opening of the conference on behalf of the 
American Government. 

" It was proposed that the total tonnage of airplane carriers 
allowed each power should be as follows : 

United States 80, 000 tons. 

Great Britain 80,000 tons. 

Japan : 48, 000 tons. 

" Provided, however, that no power party to this agreement 
whose total tonnage in airplane carriers on November 11, 1921, 
exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such 
excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total 
tonnage of airplane carriers for each nation shall be reduced to 
the prescribed allowance as herein stated. 

" 24. (a) All airplane carriers whose keels have been laid down 
by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion. 

"(b) No new airplane carrier tonnage except replacement 
tonnage as provided herein shall be laid down during the period 
of this agreement ; provided, however, that such nations as have 
not reached the airplane carrier tonnage hereinbefore stated may 
construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance. 

" 25. Airplane carriers shall be scrapped in accordance with 
methods to be agreed upon." 

And there was a supplement to those proposals, the additional 
proposal being as follows: 

" No airplane carrier shall be laid down during the term of 
this agreement whose tonnage displacement is in excess of 27,"000 
tons, and no gun shall be carried by any such ship other than a 
capital ship with a caliber in excess of 8 inches." 
' The chairman said that he ought to add that the allowance to 
the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, as stated in item 
23 of the proposal, was based on the ratio which had been proposed 
with respect to capital ships of 5-5-3, and, if the same ratios 
were provided with respect to France and Italy as would be 
furnished by the relation of the capital ship tonnage agreed upon, 
of course the figures would correspond accordingly. 

There were a number of points embraced in the proposition. He 
supposed that it would be an advantage that the committee should 
not scatter the discussion by talking to different points at the 
same time; and, if it was quite agreeable to the delegates, he 
would suggest that the committee begin with the discussion of 
the maximum limitation of total tonnage, i. e., the maximum 



ITALIAN STATEMENT. 159 

allowed for the total tonnage of airplane carriers — not the maxi- 
mum for individual carriers, but the total tonnage allowed for 
airplane carriers as stated in the proposal, namely, United States 
80,000 tons, Great Britain 80,000, Japan 48,000 tons, and so on 
in proportion to the capital ship tonnage allowed. 

Admiral Acton then read the following statement : 

" With respect to aircraft carriers, the American proposals 
assign to Italy 28,000 tons, corresponding to the capital ship 
tonnage of 175,000 tons already determined upon. This would 
permit the construction of only one aircraft carrier of the 
maximum of 27,000 tons agreed upon for this class of vessel. It 
must, however, be taken into consideration that if a single vessel 
of this character were obliged to go into dry dock or were to be 
sunk at sea, Italy would find herself under these circumstances 
temporarily or definitely without any aircraft carrier whatso- 
ever. We believe it therefore to be indispensable that we should 
be equipped with a total tonnage of aircraft carriers superior to 
that which has been assigned to us. To be precise we ask as 
our minimum a tonnage corresponding to a figure double that 
of the maximum tonnage displacement allowed to individual 
vessels of this class, i. e., 54,000 tons. It is moreover understood 
that if a tonnage superior to 54,000 tons is assigned to any other 
Mediterranean power, we demand a parity of treatment in this 
respect ; i. e., we demand the allowance of an equal amount of 
tonnage." 

The chairman said, merely as a matter of clarification, he would 
like to ask whether, when Admiral Acton spoke of " any other 
power in the Mediterannean," he included Great Britain. 

Admiral Acton replied in the negative. 

Lord Lee said he had listened with attention and with a certain 
sympathy to the remarks of Admiral Acton, because the admiral 
had suggested a situation which might and perhaps must occur in 
every navy through a ship being out of action at intervals during 
her career. The admiral had complained that, having only one 
airplane carrier, the Italian Navy would be deprived altogether of 
that arm if their one ship happened to be in dock or out of action. 
Looking at the matter impartially it appeared to him that the 
claim put forward by the Italian delegation was very difficult 
to resist. Since the proposal of the United States delegation to 
limit the maximum size of airplane carriers to 27,000 tons, with 
an armament not to exceed the 8-inch gun, he himself had had 
an opportunity to discuss the matter with his experts. They 
regarded those limits as reasonable and in strict accordance, so 
far as the British Empire was concerned, with the up-to-date 
needs of airplane carrier construction. Without claiming undue 
credit for the British Navy, he thought, perhaps, that it had 
experimented with and developed this class of vessel to a greater 



160 CARRIER A FLEET WEAPON. 

extent than had any other navy, and in the opinion of his experts 
the limits proposed provided all that was necessary for fleet 
purposes. 

At this point Lord Lee said he would like to mention that the 
airplane carrier was essentially a fleet weapon. It was not an 
independent unit, but was essentially an auxiliary to a modern 
fleet, and it was therefore important that the number of airplane 
carriers should be adequate and proportionate to the size of the 
fleet. For this reason the British Empire delegation associated 
themselves with the view that the ratio of capital ships could be 
applied also to airplane carriers in order to bring both number and 
tonnage into line with actual requirements. At the present time 
the British Navy possessed five airplane carriers, which included 
four vessels which were really experimental, and. three of which 
were small and inefficient. These vessels, in fact, were in the 
nature of gropings, in the light of experience gained by the war, 
and certainly four of these were experimental and obsolete. In 
these circumstances, whatever decision might be reached as re- 
gards the total tonnage, he would have to demand that Great 
Britain should be entitled, in spite of the rule as regards new 
construction, which would be discussed later, to scrap at any 
moment the experimental ships which they now possessed and to 
replace them with new ships designed to meet the requirements 
of the fleet. This was the only way in which the British fleet 
could attain that equality with the other fleets to which it was 
entitled. With that reservation the British Empire delegation 
regretted, in view of the fact that submarines, which were an im- 
portant weapon of war, were to be continued, and airplane carriers 
were an equally important weapon of antisubmarine defense, that 
it would be impossible to reduce the number of their airplane 
carriers for fleet service. In these circumstances the delegation 
to which he belonged felt that the tonnage laid down in the origi- 
nal American proposals was inadequate to the essential require- 
ments of the British Empire, as indeed it must be if the British 
Navy was to have numbers proportional to the number required 
by Italy, and he presumed by the other powers. Before commit- 
ting himself finally to the exact figures at which he thought the 
total tonnage limit should be fixed, Lord Lee said he would be 
glad to hear the views of the other delegations present. The 
British Empire delegation were most anxious, as indeed they had 
shown, to limit not only armaments but expenditure on arma- 
ments, and they were most anxious to avoid competition in every 
class of craft, and therefore to limit the numbers and tonnage of 
airplane carriers to the lowest point compatible with safety. 

In conclusion, Lord Lee said he would like to hear the views of 
his colleagues of the other delegations. 



CARRIERS AND OTHER UNITS. 161 

Admiral de Bon said that the question of the total tonnage of 
aircraft carriers was evidently intimately related to the maximum 
of each unit. Now, in this respect, there was evidently great 
uncertainty, aircraft being still the subject for further study and 
examination, and he did not see that in any country definite views 
concerning a type of aircraft had been reached. If there were 
uncertainty with regard to aircraft, this uncertainty would evi- 
dently apply to the aircraft carriers. The decisions which the 
committee could take on this subject were therefore marked in 
advance by a degree of weakness due to this uncertainty, and 
could therefore be only provisional. 

Having made this reservation, Admiral de Bon asked nothing 
better than to support the views of the other members of the com- 
mittee. In the present case it could be assumed that about 25,000 
tons would be the maximum tonnage of an ordinary aircraft 
carrier. 

The French delegation considered that France actually required 
two aircraft carriers for European waters. This followed the 
same line of reasoning advanced by Italy. They also considered 
that a third was necessary for use in their colonial possessions. 
The use of aircraft for police purposes in the colonies was con- 
sidered by them as of the greatest service. If newspaper reports 
might be believed, the French delegation suggested that an actual 
example of this fact was now offered in Egypt, where, in order 
to maintain order, the effect created by the presence of aircraft 
was invaluable. 

Admiral de Bon, stated that in view of the aoove the French 
delegation considered that three aircraft carriers were necessary 
for the needs of France. If each one of these were of 25,000 tons, 
that would make a total of 75,000 tons ; but in order more nearly 
to approach the general wishes expressed, he said that he would 
voluntarily agree that 60,000 tons might be sufficient for the 
present, and by a rearrangement of tonnage three vessels might 
be built in conformity with this allowance. 

Admiral Baron Kato said that he had listened with pleasure to 
the remarks made by Lord Lee on the question of airplane car- 
riers. Lord Lee's sympathies with the Italian demand for two 
carriers were in accord with his position. He, too, believed the 
Italian demand to be justifiable. 

Now the American proposal allowed Japan a total tonnage of 
48,000, with which she could construct only one and a half air- 
plane carriers. That would not, in his judgment, give Japan a 
sufficient force for her protective purposes. Admiral Baron Kato 
sought permission again to call the committee's attention to the 
insular character of his country, the extensive line of her coast, 
the location of her harbors, and the susceptibility of her cities, 



162 TONNAGE EATIOS. 

built of frame houses, to easy destruction by fire if attacked by air 
bombs. All these necessitated Japan's having a certain number 
of airplanes and " portable " airplanes ; that is to say, a means of 
distributing airplanes in such a manner as adequately to meet her 
local needs. Japan could not have an enormous number of air- 
planes to be stationed in all places where they were needed 
because she was economically incapable. To meet all these needs 
Japan was exceedingly desirous to have three airplane carriers 
of 27,000 tons each, or a total tonnage of 81,000. In asking for 
this increase, he would, of course, raise no objection to a propor- 
tionate increase on the part of the United States or Great Britain. 

The chairman said that, as he understood it, the situation dis- 
closed by the discussion was as follows : Great Britain desired 
five airplane carriers at whatever the maximum for each indi- 
vidual ship might be taken to be, and, if that were 27,000 tons, 
it would mean a maximum of 135,000 tons. France desired 
60,000 tons, which, of course, could be divided in such a way as 
would be deemed best suited to the special needs of France. 
Italy desired two, which, at a maximum of 27,000 tons, would 
make an allowance of 54,000. 

Japan desired three, which, at the maximum of 27,000 tons, 
would be 81,000 tons. 

Now, the chairman continued, this appeared to be, with the 
single exception of a very slight difference between 54,000 and 
60,000 in the case of France, in the ratio of the capital ships. It 
was quite apparent, for the reasons that had been very cogently 
presented, that the original figures of the American proposal 
would not meet what were deemed to be the needs of the various 
governments. He also understood that there was agreement by 
all that the caliber of guns carried should be limited to 8 inches, 
in connection with the suggested maximum tonnage of 27,000 tons. 

If that disposition was agreeable to the other powers, he saw 
no reason why the American delegation should not accept it, 
with the maximum allowance for the United States correspond- 
ing to that which Great Britain had asked. And he assumed 
also that there would be no objection, if France had this slight 
excess over the exact amount allowed by the ratio — that is, 
60,000 tons instead of 54,000 tons — in allowing Italy a corre- 
sponding amount on the basis of parity for which Italy had 
always contended. 

If that was agreeable, he would put it to a vote, unless it was 
desired to continue the discussion further. 

The delegations being polled in turn, each voted in the affirm- 
ative. 

The chairman said that he understood that that vote, in view 
of the discussion which had preceded it, might, without separate 



REPLACEMENTS. 163 

action, be taken to include the maximum of 27,000 tons for the 
individual tonnage, and the armament of 8-inch guns. 

The chairman added that in the course of his remarks Lord 
Lee had referred to a fact which had been emphasized by other 
delegates, namely, that the development not only of airplanes, 
but of airplane carriers, was in an experimental stage and that 
the airplane carriers which they now had were not deemed to be 
anything more than experiments; hence, that the proposal made 
at the beginning, which was stated in item 24 of the proposal, 
i. e. : 

" No new airplane carrier tonnage except replacement tonnage 
shall be laid down during the period of the agreement would 
not be applicable to the situation in which the powers found 
themselves, because the existing tonnage was not of a definite 
type, but provisional and experimental ; and that, therefore, those 
who had carried their experimentation to the point of having 
actual ships would be placed at an inequitable disadvantage as 
compared with those who had not built their ships and who ' 
could take advantage of the latest information and inventions. 
That seemed to be a very reasonable position, and the American 
delegation would bring* forward a proposal based on the liberty 
of the powers to consider the existing airplane carrier tonnage 
as an experimental tonnage and to provide for replacement from 
that standpoint." 

Subject to that matter of replacement of airplane carriers (which 
he assumed, might well go with the other provisions as to replace- 
ments now under consideration by the technical staffs) he believed 
that there was nothing more that need be considered at this time 
with regard to airplane carriers. He asked whether he was right 
in this assumption. 

In view of what had been said in the general discussion, he un- 
derstood that that was the view of all present, but perhaps he 
should ask for a definite expression. Without awaiting the draft- 
ing of a specific resolution at the moment he would ask whether 
there was assent to the proposal to regard existing airplane car- 
riers as being of an experimental character and to the principle 
that, in defining the rule of replacements as to airplane carriers, 
each power should be entitled to proceed to supply itself, to the 
maximum stated, with airplane carrier tonnage. 

Lord Lee asked, in order to avoid misunderstanding, if it was 
understood that the principles of replacement, which he had indi- 
cated as desirable, were accepted. 

The chairman answered that this was of course so, with the 
understanding that the old experimental carriers should be 
scrapped ; that it was understood that this liberty was a liberty 
of replacement, not a liberty of addition. 



164 PROPOSALS ACCEPTED. 

The chairman said that the United States of America assented 
to the proposal he had just made. He then polled the other 
delegations and each replied in the affirmative. 

The chairman declared the proposal unanimously adopted. 

The chairman said that there were a number of points stated in 
the American proposal with respect to replacement and scrapping 
and other restrictions and regulations. He had no desire to pre- 
clude discussion in the slightest degree on any of these points, 
but possibly, as they were almost all of a technical character, it 
would be of advantage to have the experts, who were considering 
the replacement chart, consider all these detailed matters relat- 
ing to capital ships and airplane carriers, the two subjects upon 
which an agreement had been reached, and bring in for the con- 
sideration of the committee a statement both as to replacement 
and the particular regulations as to scrapping which they pro- 
posed to suggest, and as to any other restrictions or modifications 
of restriction contained in the American proposal. 

Those matters being relegated for the moment to the consider- 
ation of the subcommittee of experts, he asked whether there was 
any other question which the committee desired to discuss in re- 
lation to the limitation of naval armament. 

The chairman then said that he supposed it would be in order to 
have a formal agreement prepared relating to capital ships and 
including the limitation of the size of individual ships of war and 
the armament of individual ships, as well as the limitation upon the 
size and armament of airplane carriers themselves. That agree- 
ment might be put in course of preparation while the experts 
were dealing with the replacement chart in detail. In other 
words, the committee could have the general form of it, the 
articles upon which it had agreed, in the course of preparation 
and that could await the insertion of the particular details of 
replacement, etc., when they were ready. 

His suggestion, then, would be, if the committee had nothing 
further it wished to discuss at the moment in relation to naval 
armament, that a committee be formed consisting of the heads 
of the delegations, merely to take note of the progress that was 
made with the preparation of the agreement and of the progress 
that was made by the committee of experts, and to have such 
informal consultations as might seem helpful in the course of 
that work, and that the committee should adjourn subject to the 
call of the chair and a meeting could be had when this agree- 
ment was ready to be presented for consideration and approval. 
He inquired whether this was acceptable. He said he should add 
to this that, as he understood it, in the matter of the resolution 
presented by Mr. Root which the committee had had under 
consideration at the morning meeting — that is, the second and 



FIFTEENTH MEETING. 165 

third resolutions as well as the resolution with regard to the 
tonnage of individual auxiliary craft, the committee was await- 
ing the receipt of instructions by certain of the delegations, and 
that as soon as the committee could take them up, the chair 
would call a meeting for that purpose. There was also the sub- 
committee dealing with the first resolution, as to submarine 
warfare, and whenever that committee was ready to report the 
chair would be advised. 

In conclusion, the chairman, at the request of Mr. Root, an- 
nounced that there would be a meeting of the subcommittee to 
which the first resolution regarding the rules of international law 
covering submarine warfare had been referred, on Saturday 
morning, December 31, at 11 o'clock in the Governors' Room, to 
which each member might bring any expert or experts he might 
desire. 

The chairman assumed that there would be no objection to 
making public all that had been said at this meeting. 

The committee then adjourned at 4.45 p. m., subject to the call 
of the chair. 



FIFTEENTH MEETING— THURSDAY, JANUARY 5, 1922, 3.30 P. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. 
Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. 
Clark, Mr. MacMurray. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice 
Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Flint, Mr. Mousley. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Admiral de Bon. Accom- 
panied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Mr. Ponsot, Capt. 
Odend'hal, Commandant Frochot. 

Italy — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci* Senator Alber- 
tini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Vis- 
conti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, 
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Prof. Tachi, Mr. Sugimura, Mr. 
Shiratori, Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general, accompanied by Mr. Cresson and Mr. 
Osborne. 

Interpreter, Mr. Camerlynck. 

1. The fifteenth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of 
Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American 
Union Build !ng on Thursday, January 5, 1922, at 3.30 p. m. 



166 USE OF SUBMARINES. 

2. There were present : For the United States, Mr. Hughes, 
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Colonel Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz ; for 
the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. 
Jusserand, Admiral de Bon ; for Italy,' Senator Schanzer, Senator 
Roland i-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton ; for 
Japan, Admiral Baron Kato, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, 
Captain Uyeda. 

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were pres- 
ent : For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark, Mr. Mac- 
Murray ; for the British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. 
Domvile, Mr. Flint, Mr. Mousley ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, 
Mr. Denaint, Mr. Ponsot, Capt. Odend'hal, Commandant Frochot; 
for Italy, Marquis-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince 
Ruspoli ; for Japan, Prof. Tachi, Mr. Sugimura, Mr. Shiratori, 
Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Osborne, 
was present. Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter, was also present. 

The Chairman, Mr. Hughes, said that the committee had met to 
continue the discussion of the resolutions which had been pro- 
posed relating to submarine warfare for the use of submarines in 
war. . He suggested, in order that the committee might proceed 
as expeditiously as possible, that it take up the first of these 
resolutions for the purpose of discussing it separately and not 
for the purpose of discussing what might be embraced in other 
resolutions. 

The chairman said that this first resolution purported to state 
existing international law. It had already been discussed at con- 
siderable length, and the matter had been referred to a subcom- 
mittee on draft to consider such verbal changes as might be found 
advisable in order to express succinctly but with complete accu- 
racy the existing principles of law upon the subject to which the 
resolution referred. 

The chairman then asked Mr. Root to present the resolution in 
the form upon which the drafting subcommittee had agreed. 

Mr. Root said that in presenting the resolutions referred to it 
the subcommittee had divided what was included under No. 1 
into two parts, making Resolutions I and II. 

Mr. Root then read the first two resolutions, as follows : 

" I. The signatory powers desiring to make more effective the 
rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lines 
of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, declare that 
among those rules the following are to be deemed an established 
part of international law : 



ITALIAN DECLARATION. 167 

" 1. A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and 
search to determine its character before it can be seized. 

"A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to 
submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed 
after seizure. 

"A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and 
passengers have been first placed in safety. 

"2. Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances 
exempt from the universal rules above stated ; and if a sub- 
marine can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with 
these rules the existing law of nations requires it to desist from 
attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to pro- 
ceed unmolested. 

"II. The signatory powers invite all other civilized powers to 
express their assent to the foregoing statement of established 
law so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout 
the world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion 
of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents." 

Mr. Root stated that the subcommittee had agreed unani- 
mously on these two resolutions but that Senator Schanzer had 
requested that the following entries be made in the minutes of 
the subcommittee : 

"It is declared that the meaning of article 2 is as follows: 
Submarines have the same obligations and the same rights as 
surface craft." 

And: 

"With regard to the third paragraph of article 1, it is under- 
stood that a distinction is made between the deliberate destruc- 
tion of a merchant vessel and the destruction which may result 
from a lawful attack in accordance with the rules of the second 
paragraph. If a war vessel under the circumstances described in 
paragraph 2 of article 1 lawfully attacks a merchant vessel, 
it can not be held that the war vessel, before attacking, should 
put the crew and passengers of the merchant vessel in safety." 

The chairman stated that the question before the committee 
was the adoption of this resolution, which, as now formulated, 
was in two sections. He supposed there would be no special 
point raised by the second section ; but possibly, as there were two 
distinct sections, it might be well to deal with them separately. 
Therefore he would present for consideration the first provision as 
read by Mr. Root. The chairman then read Resolution I as given 
above. 

The chairman asked Mr. Root whether it was the intention in 
Mr. Root's report to have the declaration made by Senator 
Schanzer as a part of the recommendation of the subcommitte. 

Mr. Root replied that Senator Schanzer had merely asked that; 
that entry be made in the minutes. 



168 " MERCHANT VESSEL." 

Senator Schanzer stated that the Italian delegation accepted 
Hesolution I but that, so far as they were concerned, the appli- 
cation of the resolution was subject to the two statements made 
by him in the subcommittee as entered on the minutes of the 
first meeting (Dec. 31, 1921) of the subcommittee of five on 
drafting and as just read by Mr. Root. 

Senator Schanzer stated, in addition, that the Italian delega- 
tion understood the term " merchant vessel " in the resolution to 
refer to unarmed merchant vessels. 

Mr. Hanihara said that he wished to suggest that the word 
" seize " should be substituted for *' capture " in the last paragraph. 
Mr. Root, replying to Mr. Hanihara, said that the subcommittee 
understood the word " capture " to describe the whole process, one 
step of which was seizure, and that it was intended to make the 
term " capture " comprehensive. 

Lord Lee said that there were only two points to which he 
wished to draw attention. The object of the signatory powers 
was stated to be to make more effective rules for the protection of 
the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war. 
So far as submarines were concerned, the resolution was a step in 
that direction. Having stated the principle, however, there ap- 
peared to be one serious omission in carrying it out, insomuch as 
no provision was made for dealing with attack by aircraft. If 
it were impossible for a submarine to make provision for the 
safety of the passengers and crew, a fortiori, this *was still more 
impossible for aircraft. Hence, if the committee were to lay 
down principles, it ought also to provide that in article 2 the 
words " and aircraft " should be inserted after the first two 
words " belligerent submarines," and also in the third line the 
words "or aircraft" should be added after "a submarine." 
Otherwise the committee would be permitting a peculiarly in- 
humane method of warfare, namely, attack on merchant ships by 
aircraft armed with torpedoes. That was the first point and 
perhaps it would be best to deal with that separately. 

The chairman said he did not desire to press upon the com- 
mittee a mere question of procedure, but he felt it was very im- 
portant in the interest of progress that the committee should make 
its procedure as simple and as definite as possible. As the com- 
mittee knew, a subcommittee on aircraft had been appointed, to 
consider the number and use of aircraft, and other questions 
which would naturally engage the attention of the delegates in 
relation to aircraft. He greatly feared that, if the question of 
aircraft were brought into this discussion, it would be very dif- 
ficult to proceed to a solution of either question. He had no desire 
to forestall in any way the discussion of the important question 
raised by Lord Lee, but he suggested to the committee that possi- 
bly a separate discussion of the matter of aircraft might be useful, 



ARMED MERCHANT VESSELS. 169 

unless Lord Lee intended to press the point that there should 
be no statement of the law relating to submarines unless some 
restriction were put upon the use of aircraft. That would make 
the proposition clearly germane. But, if it were not intended 
to go so far as that, the chairman hoped that the matter of air- 
craft, which presented difficulties of its own, would be reserved 
for a separate discussion. The chairman hoped Lord Lee would 
pardon him for this suggestion, but it was made merely in the 
interest of expedition. 

Lord Lee said he certainly had no intention that the first resolu- 
tion should not be adopted unless aircraft was dealt with there- 
in. It would be improper to take such a stand. He had thought, 
however, that this would be the most convenient method of 
dealing with the question of aircraft, since the rules for sub- 
marines were applicable also .to the latter. If, however, air- 
craft were to be dealt with in a separate discussion, he would 
not object to the procedure proposed by Mr. Hughes. He had 
only wished to draw attention to what appeared to him a very 
serious omission. If it was the general desire to deal with air- 
craft separately, he would not wish to contest it. 

The chairman stated that it was quite impossible, of course, to 
forecast the result of a discussion with regard to the use of air- 
craft. There might be questions pertaining to aircraft of a differ- 
ent sort from those pertaining to submarines, so that no assurance 
could be given that this or that disposition would be made of the 
matter ; the point was simply that the question of aircraft might 
profitably be considered by itself, without dealing with it in the 
same resolution in which the existing international law as to 
submarines was dealt with. With Lord Lee's permission, there- 
fore, discussion, would be continued upon the original resolution 
as to submarines. 

Lord Lee said he would now develop his second point. He was ' 
not sure if he had understood Senator Schanzer to say that the 
Italian delegation only accepted Resolution I on condition of a 
drastic change in international law under which merchantmen 
would not have the right to be armed against attack from any 
quarter. The arming of merchant ships was not a purely British 
practice ; it was recognized in the Italian Code of 1877, which laid 
down that a merchant ship which was attacked might be ordered 
to defend itself and even to seize the enemy. He did not suppose 
that Senator Schanzer proposed to destroy the* privilege allowed 
the merchantmen to defend themselves. 

Senator Schanzer said that he would like to observe, with re- 
spect to what Lord Lee had said, that a limitation of the arma- 
ment of auxiliary vessels had already been fixed. It had been 
agreed that they might not carry guns of more than 8-inch caliber. 

25882—23 12 



170 "merchant vessel." 

No rules, however, had been established governing the principles 
to be applied to merchant vessels, nor had they been forbidden to 
carry armament above a certain caliber. This omission might 
be dangerous, and even change their character. There were mer- 
chant vessels of 45,000 tons which might carry armament even 
heavier than 8 inches. Were these merchant vessels or not? 
The committee had established that a submarine should not 
attack a merchant vessel except in conformity with a resolution 
which had been adopted. Yet a merchant ship with guns was a 
war vessel. Might not a cruiser attack such a vessel? This was 
a point which Senator Schanzer believed should be cleared up. 
He said that he could not agree that a merchant vessel, even one 
armed with 6-inch guns, had rights which a surface cruiser must 
respect. It was aimed to lay down rules for the advantage of 
a, merchant vessel, not of vessels of war. He said that he felt 
that a declaration was necessary concerning this matter. 

Lord Lee said he thought the difference between Senator 
Schanzer and himself was not really so great as appeared. Sena- 
tor Schanzer appeared to him, perhaps, to have confused two 
things. It had been considered absurd to limit the armament 
of light cruisers and not to impose any limitation on the armament 
of merchant ships. When this question, which was a purely 
technical one, came to be discussed, he would be willing to apply 
the principle that the armed merchant cruiser must not be more 
powerful than the light cruiser. He understood, however, that 
Senator Schanzer had said that merchant ships must not be 
armed at all. That would involve an alteration of international 
law which the British Empire delegation could not possibly accept. 

Senator Schanzer said he did not deny that under the existing 
rules of international law a merchant vessel might properly carry 
a limited armament for defensive purposes, but he wished to say 
that the Italian interpretation of the term " merchant vessel " 
took into account this limitation. He therefore repeated that the 
Italian interpretation was in accord with his preceding declara- 
tion and with the existing rules of international law. 

The chairman stated that he supposed that this subject, which 
presented endless opportunities for exposition, might be left with 
the suggestion that, under this resolution, merchant vessels re- 
mained as they now stood under the existing rules of law, with all 
their rights and obligations; that the resolution then undertook 
to state what might be done by submarines in relation to merchant 
vessels thus placed. The chairman thought it hardly necessary 
that the committee should enter into a discussion of the question; 
although he had no desire to preclude discussion of any sort, yet 
he hardly thought it necessary to enter into a review of all the 
rules of international law as to merchant vessels and their rights 



VOTE ON RESOLUTION. 171 

and obligations. He assumed that all the representatives present 
accepted the proposition that merchant vessels, as merchant ves- 
sels — a category well known — stood where they were under the 
law, and that this resolution defined the duties of submarines with 
respect to them. 

The chairman thereupon put resolution I to vote. 

The chairman assented on behalf of the United States. 

Mr. Balfour assented for the British Empire. 

Mr. Sarraut said that the French delegation would give its full 
adherence to resolution I, but that an interesting discussion had 
just taken place, the results of which he had not quite understood. 
He suggested that, If Senator Schanzer's statements were not 
attached to the resolutions, they should be recorded in the min- 
utes. 

The chairman replied that the question was on the adoption of 
the resolution, and asked whether France assented. 

Mr. Sarraut replied that it did. 

Senator Schanzer, speaking for Italy, and Mr. Hanihara, speak- 
ing for Japan, assented to Resolution I, and the chairman stated 
that the assent of the United States of America and the British 
Empire had been given and that Resolution I Was unanimously 
adopted. 

The chairman thereupon stated that Resolution II was the sec- 
ond part of the original Resolution I, and read it, as follows : 

" The signatory powers invite all other civilized powers to ex- 
press their assent to the foregoing statement of establishing law 
so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout the 
world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of 
the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents." 

The chairman asked if the delegates were ready to proceed with 
the discussion of that resolution. There being no discussion he 
then asked if the committee was ready for action upon this reso- 
lution and said that the United States of America assented. 

The other delegations being polled each assented, and the chair- 
man declared Resolution II unanimously adopted. 

The chairman then said, that the time had come to consider a 
resolution which had not been submitted to any subcommittee and 
which had remained in this committee. It had been originally 
Resolution II, but had become Resolution III, and, as it had not 
been committed to any subcommittee, he would take the liberty of 
presenting it for the committee's consideration. In the form in 
which it had been amended at the last meeting, it read as follows: 

" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the 
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the 
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the 



172 FRENCH STATEMENT. 

end that the prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted 
as a part of the law of nations they declare their assent to such 
prohibition, and invite all other nations to adhere thereto." 

Mr. Sarraut then read the following statement : 

"The Germans have made war on commerce almost exclusively 
with their submarines, which were instructed to sink without 
mercy the merchant vessels of the enemy, with the object of 
destroying that enemy's commerce. 

" The abominable program was made worse by sinking without 
distinction steamers and hospital ships as well as vessels carrying 
cargo — neutral as well as those of the enemy. 

" These ships were destroyed without the passengers and crew 
having been first put in a place of safety. 

" France has already proclaimed and she has reiterated her 
denunciation of the barbarous methods thus used contrary to the 
law of humanity, and she has condemned the pitiless destruction 
of merchant ships as contrary to international law. 

" With these' views, the French delegation fully endorses the 
spirit of Senator Root's resolution and of the amendment proposed 
hy Mr. Balfour. 

" But the delegation considers it desirable that the sentiment of 
condemnation of the methods employed in the last war should be 
expressed in the resolution, and for this purpose it suggests the 
addition of the words ' as was done during the last war ' at the 
end of the phrase. 

" The first phrase of the resolution would then read as follows : 

" ' The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
utilizing submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the 
rules universally adopted by civilized nations for the protection of 
the life of neutrals and noncombatants as was done during the 
last war.' " 

The Chairman said that Mr. Sarraut had called attention to the 
amendment which had been proposed by Mr. Balfour. The resolu- 
tion, as it had been read a moment before, had not included that 
amendment and therefore it should be restated ; he would, there- 
fore, read Resolution III with the amendment proposed by Mr. 
Balfour : 

" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the 
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the 
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the 
end that the prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted 
as a part of the law of nations, they now accept that prohibition 
as henceforth binding as between themselves, and they invite all 
other nations to adhere thereto." 



" COMMERCE DESTROYERS." 173 

That was the resolution before the committee with the amend- 
ment suggested by. Mr. Balfour. Mr. Sarraut had suggested that 
it should also embrace a reference to the methods adopted by the 
Imperial German Government in the last war which had received 
general condemnation. As he understood it, the resolution with 
the amendment of Mr. Balfour and the further amendment pro- 
posed by Mr. Sarraut would read as follows : 

" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the 
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the 
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants in the 
manner that was employed in the last war, and to the end that 
the prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted as a 
part of the law of nations, they now accept it as henceforth 
binding as between themselves, and they invite all other nations 
to adhere to the present agreement." 

The question before the committee was the adoption of this 
resolution. Before the discussion proceeded, he wished to ask 
Mr. Sarraut whether the words which Mr. Sarraut desired in- 
serted, to wit, " in the manner that was employed in the last war," 
were to be inserted at the place which had been indicated. 

Mr. Root said that Admiral de Bon and he had worked out a 
phrase on the exact line of Mr. Sarraut's and he wondered 
whether it would not meet the purpose. After the word 
" violating " in the third line the words " as they were violated 
in the recent war of 1914—1918," should be inserted, so that the 
resolution would read : 

" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as. 
they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the require- 
ments universally accepted by civilized nations," etc. 

The chairman asked whether this wording was agreeable to 
Mr. Sarraut. 

Mr. Sarraut assented. 

The .chairman said he would read the complete resolution, so 
that there would be no question upon what action was being 
taken. 

" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as 
they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the require- 
ments universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection 
of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that 
the prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted as part 
of the law of nations they now accept it as henceforth binding 
as between themselves, and they invite all other nations to adhere 
to the present agreement." 



174 AMENDMENTS. 

Mr, Balfour said he wished to ask a question in regard to the 
amendments, now slightly modified, which Mr. Sarraut had pro- 
posed and which read as follows : 

" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as 
they were violated in the recent war of 1914—1918, the require- 
ments universally accepted by civilized nations," etc. 

If that was intended merely as an illustration, it might be wise 
or unwise ; it might be necessary or unnecessary ; at any rate used 
in this manner it could do no harm. It added form and perhaps 
picturesqueness to the whole resolution. He wished to ask, how- 
ever, whether it was not possible so to twist the phrase that the 
article would apply only to German methods. The ingenuity of 
man for wrongdoing was very great. Was it not unfortunate 
that the wrongdoers should be hampered only by the methods 
adopted by the Germans? Would it not be possible for them to 
say, "It is true we have used our submarines as commerce de- 
stroyers, but we have not used them as the Germans did, and 
consequently we are not violating this resolution." Perhaps the 
question he asked was oversubtle, but it appeared to be worthy of 
consideration. 

Mr. Root asked whether that question would not be obviated 
by simply repeating the words " The use of submarines as com- 
merce destroyers " in the place of " of such use " ? 

Mr. Balfour replied in the affirmative. 

The chairman asked whether that amendment was acceptable. 

Admiral de Bon said that his reasons, as already stated by 
Mr. Sarraut, were based upon the fear that the Germans might 
use the first draft suggested as a pretext to justify some of their 
actions during the recent war. They might claim that, if the 
Washington conference took the ground that it was not possible 
to use submarines otherwise than in contravention of actual in- 
ternational law, they were in a measure absolved. This was the 
only idea that he had sought to convey. In his opinion there 
ought to be a full and complete condemnation of these methods. 
It was for this reason that the French delegation had desired 
specifically to object to German practices and thus to remove all 
possibility of their being able to use the resolution in question to 
justify their conduct. 

The chairman asked whether the amendment as suggested was 
acceptable. The amendment was that the clause " to the end 
that the prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted as a 
part of the law of nations " should read " to the end that the pro- 
hibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall 
be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations." 

The chairman said that the reason he asked whether this was 
acceDtable was that it was an amendment to meet the amendment 



" COMMERCE DESTROY ER." 175 

suggested by Mr. Sarraut, and therefore really formed part of the 
amendment in the line suggested, and he thought it would be well 
to know whether there was any objection to the amplification of 
Mr. Sarraut's amendment in that manner. 

Mr. Sarraut replied that be had no objection. 

The chairman said that, in view of what had just been sa'.d by 
Admiral de Bon, it might be well to call attention to the fact 
that this resolution was not, and did not purport to be, a state- 
ment of existing law ; it purported to go beyond existing law and 
to prohibit the use of submarines as commerce destroyers. 

Lord Lee asked what was the precise meaning of the term 
" commerce destroyer." In a recent speech Mr. Root had said 
that the submarine was unfitted for attacks on commerce. He 
did not know if " commerce destroyer " was a recognized legal 
term or whether it included the processes of attack and seizure 
referred to in the first resolution. 

Mr. Root said he believed it covered the whole process. He 
thought that " commerce destroyer " was a perfectly well-known 
term. 

Lord Lee said that doubts were being expressed in his delega- 
tion as to the precise meaning of the phrase " commerce de- 
stroyer." He asked whether the term " for seizure or attacks on 
commerce " would not produce the same effect. 

Mr. Root said he thought that if the committee undertook to go 
into the details of the processes, it would find itself involved in 
statements which were neither clear nor intelligible to the com- 
mon mind, and that it really did not accomplish its purpose as 
well as would be done by the use of perfectly well-known terms, 
such as " commerce destroyers." He did not think there was any 
more question about the mean'ng of that term than was inherent 
in the use of words in all statutes, constitutions, treaties, con- 
tracts, and wills, about which, it was true, the courts in all 
civilized nations had been for centuries seeking to know what the 
scope and effect of the terms nrght he. It was impossible to use 
any language in such a way that questions could not arise, and 
the use of a term according to its ordinary use was, he thought, 
altogether more satisfactory than to try to go into details. 

Lord Lee said that it had been suggested by technical experts 
that in view of the paragraph in the first resolution in regard to 
putting passengers and crew in safety, the term " commerce de- 
stroyer " would apply only to that. If there were any doubts, it 
was desirable that they should be cleared up. 

Senator Lodge said it seemed to him that if the committee be- 
gan to enumerate the different processes which would be used by 
any vessel engaged in the destruction of commerce, it would simply 
be circumlocution, and if the conference once entered on that 



176 UNDERSTANDING OF T^RM. 

course, it might come within the scope of a well-known legal 
rule, namely, that if a thing was not specified, it was excluded. 
He thought that when one came to making catalogues one ran a 
great risk, and that it was better, if possible, to use one genera] 
word which, in this case, was merely a descriptive word ; it 
simply described them as " common destroyers." Probably that 
word was only familiar in the United States, but it was very 
familiar here, and was used to represent just what submarines 
had been used for. 

Sir Auckland Geddes said that he thought the term " commerce 
destroyer " was a well-known legal term, but it was also a phrase 
used in a popular and loose sense. He would suggest that an- 
other term, " operations against commerce," would be equally suit- 
able and was less liable to be used loosely. He wondered if that 
would suit Mr. Root. 

The chairman said the suggestion was made that the amendment 
be as follows ; leaving the general term as it now was in the first 
clause, the second clause, which defined the prohibition, should 
be made to read as follows : 

" and to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines 
in operations against merchant vessels shall be universally ac- 
cepted as a part of the law of nations," etc. 

That seemed, he said, to be acceptable as an amendment and 
in order to avoid any misapprehension, he would read the resolu- 
tion in its present form, namely: 

" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as 
they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the require- 
ments universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection 
of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that 
the prohibition of the use of submarines in operations against 
merchant vessels shall be universally accepted as a part of the 
law of nations, they now accept that prohibition as henceforth 
binding as between themselves, and they invite all other nations 
to adhere to the present agreement." 

Mr. Hanihara said he desired to be informed with respect to 
the exact meaning of the term " commerce destroyers." As he 
had already pointed out in a previous discussion, he believed 
that the words were intended to apply to vessels suitable for the 
destruction of merchant shipping. He said that he thought it was 
also clear that merchant vessels engaged in giving military assist- 
ance to the enemy ceased, in fact, to be merchant vessels. There 
was, however, another point. It seemed apparent that, if the 
resolution were adopted, it excluded the use of submarines for 
purposes of blockade. It did not appear to him possible to use 
submarines for this purpose in conformity with rule 1. Mr. 
Hanihara then asked whether this interpretation was correct. 



BLOCKADE AND SUBMARINES. 



177 



Mr. Root said he thought that the prohibition would apply to 
submarines attacking or seizing or capturing or destroying mer- 
chant vessels under any circumstances, so long as the vessel re- 
mained a merchant vessel; he also thought it was' necessary to 
have an effective prohibition, to have it so apply. It was merely a 
question of the use of words.. Germany, for instance, declared 
a blockade of the whole British Channel. One could say " block- 
ade," and the rule would disappear. 

Senator Schanzer said that he must decline, in the name of the 
Italian delegation, the above interpretation. The Italian delega- 
tion had accepted Mr. Root's third resolution with the amend- 
ments of Mr. Balfour and Mr. Sarraut. He asked that further 
amendments should not be insisted on. It was necessary for the 
Italian delegation to declare that it accepted only the original 
project and the amendments mentioned. It must also confirm, 
with respect to the question of blockade, that in its view, that 
question had nothing to do with the destruction of commerce. It 
was a military process. What if a merchant ship attempted to 
run a blockade? Was the use of submarines forbidden to prevent 
this act? In summing up, Senator Schanzer said he accepted 
Mr. Root's resolution, but he could not accept it without certain 
reservations in line with those indicated by his Japanese colleague, 
i. e., that the situation set up by blockade brought into play an 
entirely different set of principles of international law with re- 
spect to merchant vessels. 

The chairman said the first question, then, was on the amend- 
ment proposed, i. e., that, instead of the words " commerce de- 
stroyers " in defining the prohibition, the words should be " the 
use of submarines in operations against merchant vessels." He 
understood that Senator Schanzer, on behalf of the Italian dele- 
gates, refused assent to that amendment. 

Senator Schanzer said that a mistake had been made. Sir 
Auckland Geddes had just informed him that the term " commerce 
destroyers " was retained. 

The chairman said that the term " commerce destroyers " re- 
mained in the second line, but it did not remain in the definition 
of the prohibition. The definition of the prohibition was as fol- 
lows, according to the proposed amendment : 

"And to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines in 
operation against merchant vessels shall be universally accepted as 
a part of the law of nations, they now accept that prohibition as 
henceforth binding as between themselves, and they invite all 
other nations to adhere to the present agreement." 

The chairman asked whether that was acceptable to Senator 
Schanzer. 

Senator Schanzer said that he was not satisfied because of the 
second line of the amendment. 



178 ITALIAN OBJECTIONS. 

The chairman said that of course the committee was acting only 
on the principle of unanimity, and therefore this amendment must 
be considered as defeated. 

That brought the committee to the resolution in its original 
form, with Mr. Balfour's amendment and with the amendment 
proposed by Mr. Sarraut. 

As he understood it, the substitution of the words "submarines 
for operation against merchant vessels," which referred to "Com- 
merce destroyers," was not acceptable to Senator Schanzer. 

He had further understood Senator Schanzer to present a reser- 
vation to the effect that the resolution should not apply in the 
case of a merchant vessel endeavoring to run a blockade. That 
was the purport of it, as he had understood it. 

This matter should be carefully considered and thoroughly un- 
derstood, because a blockade might be declared of such a general 
character as to make it impossible for merchant vessels to reach 
a particular coast ; assuming that such a blockade could be ef- 
fectively maintained by vessels that were regarded as legally 
used for the purpose of maintaining it, the use of submarines as 
against merchant vessels endeavoring to run a blockade of that 
sort would involve a very large activity for submarines as com- 
merce destroyers. That matter should be faced because the 
value of the resolution might well be doubted, if that reserva- 
tion was effective. 

Senator Schanzer said he did not ignore the fact that during 
the last war nominal blockades of an absurd character had been 
declared. He believed that the whole of the United States and 
all of Italy had been declared blockaded. But under the rules 
of existing international law, a blockade to be legal must be 
effective. He did not ask that any exceptions be made to the 
present rules of international law and he hoped that this would 
appear in the minutes. 

The chairman said that of course the point of effectiveness was 
very well taken, and he intended to have that clearly stated; 
but the question remained whether the submarine under the 
resolution was to have an opportunity to operate as against 
commerce in case an effective blockade had been declared — a 
blockade, indeed, made effective by the use of submarines. 

Mr. Balfour said he confessed he had listened with considerable 
misgiving to Senator Schanzer's statement. Senator Schanzer 
-did not wish to break the unanimity with which the second 
resolution had been accepted, but he had given it a meaning which 
to his (Mr. Balfour's) mind entirely destroyed its value, and 
Senator Schanzer had requested that his interpretation of that 
meaning should receive formal record in the minutes. Mr. Bal- 
four could not imagine that in every resepct Senator Schanzer 
-saw the full extent of the proposition which he had laid down. 



BRITISH COMMENT. 179 

The chairman had pointed out — he would not say an absurdity — 
hut one very obvious difficulty. Senator Schanzer's opinion was 
that a submarine could never be used to attack a merchant ship 
in the case of a blockade, but that it could begin to attack mer- 
chant ships as soon as a blockade was effective. It could, there- 
fore, not assist in making a blockade effective ; but when other 
ships had made it effective, it might come in and destroy what 
the ether ships had left undestroyed. That surely was a most 
impossible position for international law to be placed in. It 
could not be said that a submarine could be lawfully employed 
in blockade only when the blockade had already been established 
by ships other than submarines. That was a theoretical objection 
to the proposed resolution which he himself would have thought 
would have been enough by itself to destroy it. He would ask 
Senator Schanzer to consider how the term "blockade" was now 
more or less used in international law. He agreed that it was 
not a probable supposition, but supposing Italy were at war with 
Germany, either with or without allies, and supposing the Ger- 
mans declared a blockade upon Italy ; they would use their sub- 
marines not always close to the coast ; he imagined they would 
choose the Straits of Gibraltar and they would haunt the eastern 
part of the Mediterranean as well as the Gulf of Lyons and the 
Adriatic. For himself he could not quite understand Senator 
Schanzer's point of view. There was no international difficulty 
that he knew of in declaring all the coast of Italy blockaded. 
At all events, so long as there was an international law it would 
have to be tried in international courts. That was not an obvious 
absurdity on the face of it and, if that were admitted, it seemed 
to him, that, if Italy could be blockaded, if all the ships carrying 
merchandise could lawfully be stopped by submarines if they 
attempted to go to Italy, then he thought that they need trouble 
themselves no further with attempting to limit the use of subma- 
rines. Even after all these regulations were passed, or at all 
events after the first two were passed, submarines would remain 
absolutely free, so far as he could see, to work their will in the 
true German fashion upon every merchant ship which desired to 
carry to Italy the very necessaries of national existence. In 
these circumstances it seemed to him that their labors on the first 
two of these resolutions had been practically thrown away, if 
the matter were left as Senator Schanzer proposed to leave it. 
He hoped, and indeed he was confident, that the discussion of 
this question would extricate them from the present position 
and he hoped that the Italian delegation would on reflection see 
that, if they sincerely desired — as he was perfectly sure they 
did — to prevent submarines being used against merchant ships, 
they would modify in the most important degree and qualify to 



180 . VOTE ON RESOLUTION. 

an extreme extent the reservation which they had announced 
their intention to record upon the minutes. 

Senator Schanzer said that the Italian delegation was inspired 
with a spirit of conciliation. He must, however, reply to Mr. Bal- 
four. He did not think that all Italy could be effectively block- 
aded, as that term was understood in international law. He 
wished also to have it understood that he had never said that a 
blockade must first be established by surface vessels and then 
maintained by submarines. Submarines were military weapons 
and should be allowed the privileges of military weapons. They 
might even act in the same way as surface vessels. The entire 
question of blockade had been brought up by the Japanese dele- 
gate. His own delegation merely wished to be fully informed and 
to act in a conciliatory spirit. If the Japanese delegate withdrew 
his objections and all the other delegates agreed, the Italian dele- 
gation would not prevent the common resolve from being carried 
into effect. 

Mr. Hanihara said that he had made his previous inquiry in 
order to be informed with respect to " commerce destroyers " and 
the use of submarines for the purposes of blockade. He had not, 
however, intended to enter any objection to the prohibition of the 
use of submarines for blockade. 

The chairman said that he understood that, in the light of the 
statement by Mr. Hanihara Senator Schanzer would withdraw his 
suggestion as to the limitation of the prohibition, and he assumed 
that the resolution would then be acceptable to all the powers 
represented on the committee. 

The chairman asked whether the committee would now act upon 
the resolution in the following form : 

" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as 
they were violated in the recent war of 1914—1918, the require- 
ments universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection 
of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that the 
prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall 
be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations they now 
accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between them- 
selves and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto." 

The delegations, being polled, each assented in turn and the 
chairman declared Resolution III unanimously adopted. 

Lord Lee said he would like to express to Mr. Sarraut and Ad- 
miral de Bon his sincere appreciation of the statements they made 
the other day in repudiating the writings of Capt. Castex. He 
accepted their explanation, as given on behalf of the Government, 
with all his heart and wished to assure them personally that the 
matter had passed completely from his mind. 



SIXTEENTH MEETING. 181 

Mr. Sarraut replied that he had noted with sincere satisfaction 
the statement that Lord Lee had just made and he could only 
express regret that Lord Lee had not given the French delegation 
an earlier opportunity to express their sentiments by informing 
them in advance of the references that he intended to make to the 
entirely personal views of a naval officer who could, under any 
circumstances, only speak for himself and on his own responsi- 
bility without assuming in the slightest degree to express the views 
of the French Admiralty. 

It gratified Mr. Sarraut to hear the statements of Lord Lee at 
the moment when the French delegation had just given their 
assent to a resolution containing a clause which bound together all 
the powers represented on the committee by prohibiting the use 
against each other of certain weapons which France, at least, 
had never thought of directing against her friends, a clause to 
which the French delegation subscribed with especial willingness. 

Mr. Sarraut hoped that this interchange of statements would do 
away with certain misunderstandings and assist in clearing the 
atmosphere which, outside of this hall, had been befogged, and 
thus facilitate the establishment of a durable peace on earth — the 
work which all present had most deeply at heart and the consum- 
mation of which was their highest aspiration. 

The chairman said that he was sure that all would be deeply 
gratified to have spread upon the minutes the statement made by 
Lord Lee and the response which had been made by Mr. Sarraut ; 
these statements, which showed a mutual appreciation of the senti- 
ments that were cherished by both, would greatly aid the committee 
as it continued its efforts to bring about results which would 
greatly promote not only the economic administration of the re- 
spective governments, but a better understanding and an enduring 
peace among their peoples. 

He assumed that the committee might not care to have all the 
discussions that had taken place over various legal and other ques- 
tions appear in the communique. There was, of course, no objec- 
tion to it, if it was desired. Possibly it would be sufficient to say 
that these resolutions, now numbering three, were presented, dis- 
cussed, and adopted. General assent was expressed. 

The committee then adjourned until Friday, January 6, 1922, at 
11 a. m. 



SIXTEENTH MEETING— FRIDAY, JANUARY 6, 1922, 11 A. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. 
Wright, Mr. Clark. 



182 USE OF SUBMARINES. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, (for Canada), Sir Robert Borden, 
(for Australia), Senator Pearce, (for New Zealand), Sir John 
Salmond, (for India), Mr. Sastri. Accompanied by Sir Maurice 
Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Knowles, Mr. Flint. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. 
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. 
Ponsot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron 
Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pag- 
liano, Commander Prince Ruspoli. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, 
Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Tachi, 
Mr. Sugimura, Mr. Ichihashi, Mr. Shiratori. 

The Secretary General. Assisted by Mr. Pierrepont and Mr. 
Paul. Mr. Camerlynck (interpreter). 

1. The sixteenth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of 
Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American 
Union Building on Friday morning, January 6, 1922, at 11 a. m. 

2. There were present : For the United States of America, Mr. 
Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roose- 
velt, Admiral Coontz ; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord 
Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes; Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. 
Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon ; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, 
Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Acton ; for Japan, Admiral Baron 
Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. 
Uyeda. 

3. The following secretaries and technical advisors were 
present : For the United States of America, Mr. Wright, Mr. 
Clark ; for the British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Dom- 
vile, Mr. Knowles, Mr. Flint ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. 
Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti- 
Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli ; for Japan, 
Mr. Tachi, Mr. Sugimura, Mr. Ichihashi, Mr. Shiratori. 

The secretary-general of the conference, assisted by Mr. Pierre- 
pont and Mr. Paul, was present. Mr. Camerlynck (interpreter) 
was also present. 

The chairman, Mr. Hughes, said that the committee would 
proceed with the discussion of the use of submarines in warfare, 
and placed before the committee the final resolution presenting 
this question, mentioning that it was originally the third resolu- 
tion presented by Mr. Root, but was now designated as No. 4. 
He then read the resolution, as follows : 

" The signatory powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of 
the humane rules declared by them with respect to the prohibition 



ITALIAN PROPOSAL. 183 

of the use of submarines in warfare, further declare that any 
person in the service of any of the powers adopting these rules- 
who shall violate any of the rules thus adopted, whether or not 
such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be 
deemed to have violated the laws of war, and shall be liable to 
trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy, and my be brought 
to trial before the civil or military authorities of any such 
powers within the jurisdiction of which he may be found." 

Senator Schanzer said that the Italian delegation, while asso- 
ciating itself completely with the condemnation of submarine 
warfare methods as expressed in the resolutions which had 
already been approved, and also agreeing in principle with the 
resolution now being discussed, felt called on to point out that 
while the rules reconfirmed in the first resolution, approved 
yesterday, concerned both submarines and surface craft, thus 
strengthening principles which corresponded to rules of existing 
international law, the new resolution proposed contained sanctions 
the exceptional gravity of which might appear justified, but 
which it was desired to apply only to submarines. 

The Italian delegation could not accept the resolution under 
discussion except on the condition that the principle therein ex- 
pressed should not be limited solely to the crews of submarines,, 
but extended to all the cases contemplated by the first resolu- 
tion, and therefore also to the crews of surface vessels. The 
Italian delegation proposed that the resolution should be modified 
in this sense and that the identical sanctions should be applied 
to officers and crews of all ships, without distinction, who should 
infringe the rules contemplated in the first resolution. 

He did not doubt that the spirit in which the Italian delegation 
had proposed this amendment would be appreciated by every- 
body, for it tended in no way to weaken the strength of the reso- 
lution, but, on the contrary, to augment it, and was inspired by 
an evident principle of justice and equity. In fact, it was not 
admissible that the commander of a submarine should be con- 
demned as guilty of a determined act while the commander of a. 
surface vessel would not be submitted to trial in an identical 
case. 

He was sure that all the delegations would recognize the equity 
of the Italian proposal, which constituted, as a matter of fact, the 
indispensable condition for the acceptance by the Italian delega- 
tion of the resolution proposed by Mr. Root. 

Senator Pearce said that he did not propose at this juncture to 
discuss the amendment suggested by Senator Schanzer, but he 
rose to bring before the committee aga!n, in order that it might 
be discussed at the same time, the amendment which he pre- 
viously suggested as to whether if the clause under consideration 
were to be adopted as a whole it should not be made to apply not 



184 BRITISH AMENDMENT. 

only to the powers that adopted these rules but also to other 
powers not represented at the conference. It seemed to him that 
the object of bringing forward the declaration was to obtain for 
it universal acceptance and application. It might, however, be 
possible that one or two powers might not adhere to the rule. 
Was it to be considered that in the unhappy event of a power 
which adopted the rule going to war with a power which did 
not adhere to it the power which adopted the rule should be 
bound by the rule, while the other power should be free to give 
orders for the sinking of merchant ships, and that the officers of 
the latter power should be free from the penalties set out merely 
because the power had not adhered? If his amendment, that the 
words " adopting these rules " should be omitted, were accepted, 
the rule would become universal in its application. 

Mr. Balfour suggested that Senator Pearce should move to omit 
the words " in the service of any power adopting these rules." 

Senator Pearce accepted the suggestion of Mr. Balfour and inti- 
mated that he considered that the rule as proposed to be amended 
would be a notification to the world at large. He ventured to say 
that if the rule was amended as he suggested it would be rather 
an inducement to powers to adhere. But if there was any power 
not represented at the conference that wished to have an unre- 
stricted use of submarines against merchant ships it would be 
encouraged not to give its adherence to the rule if it were left 
in its present form. In that case not only would such a power 
not be bound by the rule, but its officers would be free from 
punishment. He pointed out that at the Versailles Conference 
the powers took up the attitude that the submarine commanders 
who had violated these laws were liable, and they demanded 
that they should be tried by a court set up by the Allies. Al- 
though that was not obtained, some of the commanders had been 
tried by the German court sitting at Leipzig. Thus, although the 
declaration before the committee was not in existence before the 
war, the Allies said that these submarine commanders should be 
tried as pirates for the offenses that they had committed, and, 
as he had mentioned, some of them had been tried. If therefore 
the committee adopted a declaration in the form originally sug- 
gested, it would not even be in keeping with what the powers 
had done at Versailles. He suggested therefore that the decla« 
ration if adopted should be made universal in its application. 

The chairman said that these amendments brought before the 
committee two distinct questions. Quite apart from the specific 
phraseology which might finally be adopted, there were two dis- 
tinct questions presented which, perhaps, might be considered 
separately. Senator Schanzer's amendment related to two mat- 
ters, first, the broadening of the provision so as to embrace all 



SUBMARINES AND PIRACY. 185 

.•ships of any class or description ; second, the broadening of the 
provision as to individuals so as to embrace persons belonging to 
the crew, specifically, as well as officers. 

Senator Pearce's amendment provided for the application of 
the resolution to all powers, and not simply to the powers adopt- 
ing these rules. 

Unless the committee desired a different course, the chairman 
thought that, in order to bring the discussion to a point, these 
matters could be dealt with, and should be dealt with, separately. 
He suggested that they take up Senator Pearce's amendment, that 
the words " in the service of any power adopting these rules " 
should be omitted, so as to broaden the provision to apply to all 
powers, and asked if discussion of that amendment was desired. 

Sir John Salmond suggested that before discussing the amend- 
ment it might clarify the situation if he were to ask a question, 
namely, as to whether Resolution IV referred to the humane rules 
decided on by the powers with reference to the action of sub- 
marines, or to the prohibition of submarines provided for in the 
third resolution. The first resolution, Sir John Salmond said, 
referred to existing law and laid down rules for the conduct of 
submarines, restricting but not prohibiting their use. The third 
resolution, which was passed yesterday, was a new rule prohibit- 
ing the action of submarines against commerce. He assumed that 
the fourth resolution referred to the first and not to the third 
resolution. The rules in the first resolution were provided to 
prevent a gross abuse of submarines, whereas the rules in the 
third resolution were against the use of submarines altogether. 
He assumed that it was not intended to brand this as an act of 
piracy. He suggested therefore that some clarifying words should 
he introduced in the fourth resolution to show what was intended. 
The chairman said that, in answering Sir John Salmond's ques- 
tion, it was understood that the rules the violations of which were 
-to be deemed acts of piracy were rules of law. It would be dif- 
ficult to maintain the position that an act of piracy had been 
committed in the manner stated unless it was a violation of rules 
of law. They had set forth, in the first resolution adopted, the 
existing law, and he assumed that the humane rules referred to in 
the fourth resolution were the rules of law set forth in the first 
resolution. He also assumed, subject to correction if a different 
intention had been entertained, that the third resolution pro- 
posed an amendment of law, as distinct from the immediate agree- 
ment of the five powers here represented. When that amendment 
should be adopted, there would be a new rule of law, and he sup- 
posed that it was the intention to characterize the violation of that 
rule of law, if it became a rule of law, in the same manner ; but 
Jor the present the committee were dealing with the humane 
25882 — 23 13 



186 EXISTING AND PROPOSED LAW. 

rules declared in the first resolution, since those were the only 
rules of law at present operative. 

The chairman then asked the committee if it was their desire to 
proceed at once to a discussion of Senator Pearce's amendment, 
which was to the effect that this declaration should apply not 
simply to the five powers here acting, but to all the powers, and 
asked if there was any objection to that amendment. He said 
that this was not a question on the resolution. Assent to this 
amendment did not involve approval of the resolution, but merely 
the acceptance of the amendment to present the resolution for 
consideration in the amended form. 

Mr. Root said he thought Senator Pearce's amendment raised 
very clearly a somewhat difficult question involved in their ac- 
tion and developed a little confusion between the two classes of 
rules with which they were dealing. The first set of rules, the^ 
rules in Article I, were rules of existing law, and he thought 
they were competent to make a declaration about those without 
any limitation, following Senator Pearce's suggestion. They were 
competent to make a declaration that would characterize a vio- 
lation of the existing law of nations as being a crime which should 
subject the violator to punishment ; they were competent to declare 
that those who violated the laws of war were guilty of acts of 
piracy. They were not making law, they were making a declara- 
tion regarding existing law, and that necessitated no limitation at 
all to the powers that were here. 

The next resolution, which forbade the use of submarines as 
commerce destroyers, that was to say, forbade submarines at- 
tacking merchant ships, and which if it were to become a part 
of the law of nations would supersede these other rules so far 
as submarines were concerned — but which would not supersede 
them until it had become a part of the law of nations— was an 
entirely different proposition. It certainly was not competent for 
them to make an agreement between the five powers here that 
would produce the effect of a law of nations, upon which they 
could denounce a punishment as for piracy. 

Now, there were several ways to avoid that confusion, which 
he thought did not exist in the orginal resolution. One way would 
be to limit the resolution to the existing rules of law, and 
there was no reason why they should put in the descriptive words 
"of the powers now present." 

There was another way which he thought would meet Sena- 
tor Pearce's proposal, and he was inclined to think that it also 
disposed of Senator Schanzer's suggestion. It would satisfy the 
purpose that underlay Senator Schanzer's suggestion, and would 
include both, but would discriminate between the contractual 
stage of the provision against use of submarines as commerce 
destroyers and its eventual status after it had become established: 



EXPLANATIONS OF RULES. 187 

and had become a rule of international law. Until it' had be- 
come a rule of international law they had to limit what they did 
to their contracts between themselves. They could not treat the 
rule as if it were a rule of law ; after it had been accepted then it 
would come under the same basis as the first one. 

He had jotted down a suggestion or two, rather to define his 
own ideas about it than to offer it ; but he would like to see how 
it met the views of his colleagues around the table. 

Mr. Root then read : 

" The signatory powers desiring to insure the enforcement of 
the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect 
to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant 
ships and the enforcement of the prohibition against the use of 
submarines as commerce destroyers after that prohibition shall 
have been accepted as a part of the law of nations, further de- 
clare that any person in the service of any power who shall violate 
any of the rules thus adopted" — 

Mr. Root here mentioned that that would include everything 
that Senator Schanzer wanted, and then continued reading: 

"Any person in the service of any power who shall violate any 
of the rules thus adopted " 

That was to say, Mr. Root explained, the existing rules and this 
special rule of prohibition against submarines after it should have 

been adopted 

" whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental 
superior, shall be deemed to have violated the rules of war and 
shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy 
and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities 
of any power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found." 

Sir Robert Borden asked that Mr. Root, before resuming his 
seat, inform him whether the proposal which he had made took 
into account the fact that Rule III took effect at once as be- 
tween the five powers represented at the conference. 

Mr. Root answered that it was only a contractual obligation; 
it was not a rule of law upon which they could denounce punish- 
ment. This last resolution which they were then talking about 
denounces a punishment and that can not apply except for a 
violation of the rules of law. 

The proposed amendment, he said, aimed to deal with the sug- 
gestion made by Senator Pearce and was also aimed to deal in 
part with the suggestion made by Senator Schanzer. In order, 
however, to avoid mingling two distinct things in the discussion, 
he wished to call attention to the fact that it did not deal with 
the suggestion of Senator Schanzer as to the application of the 
resolution to all ships. He suggested that merely to preserve 
that suggestion for a later discussion while the committee pro- 
ceeded to deal with the form of the resolution in its present ap- 



188 FURTHER SUGGESTIONS. 

plication to submarines. The amendment desired could be pre- 
sented later. He meant merely that this was an amendment 
dealing with the other phases of the suggestions made. The 
resolution in its amended form — that is, in the form proposed — 
read as follows: 

" The signatory power, desiring to insure the enforcement of 
the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to 
attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships, 
and the enforcement of the prohibition against the use of sub- 
marines as commerce destroyers, after that prohibition shall have 
been accepted as a part of the law of nations, further declare 
that any person in the service of any power who shall violate any 
of the rules thus adopted, whether or not such person is under 
orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have vio- 
lated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment 
as if for an act of piracy, and may be brought to trial before the 
civil or military authorities of any power within the jurisdic- 
tion of which he may be found." 

The chairman asked whether this resolution was in a form now 
acceptable upon the question of the application to all the powers 
in the light of the different aspects presented by the existing 
rules of law and the proposed amendments to the existing rules 
of law. 

Senator Schanzer said he wished to* thank Mr. Root for his 
explanation. With the proposed amendment, he felt he could 
accept the resolution in principle, though he would like to ex-' 
amine the written text before speaking more definitely. He 
wished to say that Senator Pearce's amendment served to sup- 
port his suggestion that vessels of all classes be included in the 
scope of the resolution. If he had understood it correctly, the 
new formula would satisfy the wishes of the Italian Government. 

Sir John Salmond said he did not wish to raise any objection 
to Senator Schanzer or Senator Pearce's amendments. The 
amended resolutions just proposed by Mr. Root, however, went 
further and extended its scope to include the prohibitions agreed 
to in Resolution III on the previous day as soon as those pro- 
hibitions became international law. There was, however, no 
particular moment at which it could be stated that a declaration 
of this kind had become international law. International law was 
created progressively by the adherence of one power after an- 
other. It was impossible to say that on any particular day the 
rule had become part of international law so that a submarine 
commander would know whether he was liable to be treated as a 
pirate. He therefore suggested the limitation of Resolution IV 
to the rules laid down in Resolution I. It was fit and proper that 
a breach of these rules should be branded as a crime ; but to say 



AMENDMENTS. 1 HJ) 

that breaches of new rules only just established between the five 
powers should be branded as piracy would, he thought, not meet 
with public approval. He would therefore suggest that Resolu- 
tion IV should be confined to a statement that the signatory 
powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the humane rules 
of existing law declared by them with respect to the use of sub- 
marines in warfare, further declare that any person violating 
those rules shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an 
act of piracy. Further, he would propose to insert this rule im- 
mediately after the present Resolution II. 

The Chairman said that Sir John Salmond's amendment was. 
first, that the resolution in the form which he suggested* ( and 
now numbered IV) should be a part of resolution II. Coming 
at the end of resolution II as now adopted, it was proposed that 
the resolution read as follows : 

" The signatory powers desiring to insure the enforcement of 
the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect 
to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant 
ships, further declare that any person in the service of any power 
who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person 
is under orders of a governmental snperior, shall be deemed to 
have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and 
punishment as if for an act of piracy, and may be brought to 
trial before the civil or military authorities of any power within 
the jurisdiction of which he may be found." 

He then asked if the amendment was accepted. 

Mr. Root said that he hoped Sir John Salmon d would, before 
pressing his amendment, abandon the idea of making it a para- 
graph of the present Article 2 and make it a separate paragraph. 

Sir John Salmond said that this was what he had intended. 

Mr. Root said there was a distinct idea in the subcommittee's 
article which was referred to by Mr. Balfour the other evening, 
and the two should not be confused. 

The chairman asked whether, with this, it was acceptable. 

Mr. Root said that he was quite satisfied with it. 

The chairman said that the proposal of Sir John Salmond, 
with the modification suggested by Mr. Root, was that this article 
should appear as the third article in the series of resolutions 
adopted ; and that, he assumed, would carry the point that the 
article which had been adopted as number III would not become 
Article IV. 

The chairman then asked if the committee was ready to pro- 
ceed to action upon that resolution. 

Senator Schanzer said that he accepted in the name of the 
Italian delegation the new formula as worked out by Mr. Root 
and Sir John Salmond, which gives entire satisfaction, as its 



190 "act of piracy." 

wording has the effect to extend the sanctions of trial and pun- 
ishment to all persons violating the rules of law laid down in 
the first resolution, without distinction. 

The chairman asked whether any further discussion was de- 
sired. No reply being made, he said that the matter would be 
put to vote ; whereupon the delegations of the United States of 
America, the British Empire, France, and Italy assented. 

Mr. Hanihara said that before speaking for the Japanese dele- 
gation he would like to be enlightened as to the exact meaning 
of the words " punished as if for an act of piracy." 

The chairman said he assumed the phrase to mean that viola- 
tion of the laws of war thus declared should be created as 
amounting to an act of piracy and that the person violating the 
laws would be subject to punishment accordingly. 

Mr. Root interposed that such a person would not be subject 
to the limitations of territorial jurisdiction. The peculiarity 
about piracy was that, though the act was done on the high seas 
and not under the jurisdiction of any particular country, never- 
theless it could be punished in any country. That was the really 
important point. 

The chairman asked whether the Japanese delegation assented. 
Baron Kato replied in the affirmative. 

The chairman then stated that the resolution was unanimously 
adopted. He assumed that that closed the discussion upon the 
subject of submarines. 

He now desired to bring to the attention of the committee the 
question of the use of gases, or what has been called chemical 
warfare. The committee would recall that a subcommittee, com- 
posed of members representing the five powers, had been ap- 
pointed to consider this question. He was advised that this com- 
mittee agreed — their memorandum stated " more or less unani- 
mously " — on certain points. He would read their memorandum, 
stating the points thus agreed upon : 

" The committee agreed more or less unanimously on the fol- 
lowing points : 

"(«) Chemical warfare gases have such power against unpre- 
pared armies that no nation dare risk entering into an agreement 
which an unscrupulous enemy might break if he found his 
opponents unprepared to use gases both offensively and defen- 
sively. 

■■I'd Since many high e?:nlosi\-ps produce warfare gases <>r 
gases which are the same in their effects on men, any attempt t<> 
forbid the use of warfare gases would cause misunderstandings 
at once in war — that is, one or both sides would in. the first battle 
find men dead or injured from gas. The doubt would at once 
arise whether gas is actually beiim used as such or whether the 
casualties were due to high explosive gases. This could be made 



CHEMICAL WARFARE. 191 

-the excuse to launch a heavy attack with warfare gases in every 
form. 

"(c) Research which may discover additional warfare gases 
can not be prohibited, restricted, or supervised. 

" (d) Due to the increasing large peace-time use of several war- 
fare gases, it is impossible to restrict the manufacture of any par- 
ticular gas or gases. Some of the delegates thought that proper 
laws might limit the quantities of certain gases to be manufac- 
tured. The majority opinion was against the practicability of 
even such prohibition. 

"(e) It is possible to confine the action of chemical-warfare 
gases the same as high explosives and other means of carrying 
on war. The language used in this connection was that ' it is 
possible, but with greater difficulty.' On this question, as in the 
case of (f) and (g) following, it was evident that among the rep- 
resentatives of the three nations thoroughly acquainted with 
chemical-warfare gases, namely, the United States, Great Britain, 
and France, there was less doubt as to the ability to confine these 
gases than among the Japanese and Italians, who know less 
about them. 

"(f) The kinds of gases and their effects on human beings can 
not be taken as a basis for limitation. In other words, the com- 
mittee felt that the only limitation practicable is to wholly pro- 
hibit the use of gases against cities and other large bodies of 
noncombatants in the same manner as high explosives may be 
limited, but that there could be no limitation on their use against 
the armed forces of the enemy, ashore or afloat. 

"(g) The committee was divided on the question as to whether 
or not warfare gases from a method of warfare similar to other 
methods, such as shrapnel, machine guns, rifle, bayonet, high 
explosives, airplane bombs, hand grenades, and similar older 
methods. In this, as in (e) and (f), the United States, Great 
Britain, and French members (five in number), who know gas, 
were emphatic that chemical-warfare gases form a method of 
waging war similar to the older forms." 

The chairman then said that he desired to read, on behalf of the 
American delegation, the report adopted by the advisory com- 
mittee of the American delegation, to the constitution of which he 
had already referred. This report had been adopted by the ad- 
visory committee upon the recommendation of its subcommittee 
which had dealt with new agencies of warfare. The report was as 
follows : 

"The committee (of the advisory committee) on new agencies 
of warfare having had a number of meetings, one conjointly with 
the committee (of the advisory committee) on land armaments, 
has the honor to report that it has given careful consideration to 
the subject referred to it. Chemical warfare, which is the scien- 



192 EFFECT OF CHEMICALS. 

tific term to, cover use of gases in all of their forms, reached very 
important and significant phases during the World War. The 
surprise of the first gas attack on the British forces at Ypres 
shocked the civilized world, but its military effectiveness caused 
the allied Governments at once to take measures not only of pro- 
tection against gas attacks but also offensive action. In conse- 
quence, at the close of the war, the use of poison gases, not only 
temporarily injurious but of toxic character, became universal. 

" The committee has found on consultation with experts and ref- 
erence to scientific study of the subject that there are arguments 
in favor of the use of gas which ought to be considered. 

" The proportion of deaths from their use when not of a toxic 
character is much less than from the use of other weapons of war- 
fare. On the other hand, the committee feels that there can be no 
actual restraint of the use by combatants of this new agency of 
warfare, if it is permitted in any guise. The frightful conse- 
quences of the use of toxic gases if dropped from airplanes on 
cities stagger the imagination. No military necessity can excuse 
or extenuate such events as were of frequent occurrence during 
the recent war when bombs were dropped on undefended and 
thickly populated cities, towns, and villages for no other purpose 
apparently than to demoralize the population. If lethal gases 
were used in such bombs it might well be that such permanent 
and serious damage would be done, not only of a material charac- 
ter, but in the depopulation of large sections of the country as to 
threaten, if not destroy, all that has been gained during the pain- 
ful centuries of the past. 

" The committee is of opinion that the conscience of the Amer- 
ican people has been profoundly shocked by the savage use of 
scientific discoveries for destruction rather than for construction. 

" The meeting of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament 
in the City of Washington affords a peculiarly advantageous 
opportunity for comparison of views on all questions bearing on 
the subject. Whatever may be the arguments of technical experts, 
the committee feels that the American representatives would not 
be doing their duty in expressing the conscience of the American 
people were they to fail in insisting upon the total abolition of 
chemical warfare, whether in the Army or the Navy, whether 
against combatant or noncombatant. Should the United States 
assume this position, it would be no evidence of weakness but of 
magnanimity. Probably no nation is better equipped by reason 
of scientific knowledge among its technicians and by means of its 
material resources to use chemical warfare effectively. This 
committee, therefore, submits the following resolution for adop- 
tion by the advisory board and to be communicated to the 
American delegates to the Conference on the Limitation of 
Armament : 



ARMY REPORT. 103 

" Resolved, That chemical warfare, including the use of gases, 
whether toxic or nontoxic, should be prohibited by international 
agreement, and should be classed with such unfair methods of 
warfare as poisoning wells, introducing germs of disease, and 
other methods that are abhorrent in modern warfare." 

The chairman observed that the foregoing resolution, as he had 
said, was submitted to the advisory committee of the American 
delegation by its subcommittee and, he was advised, was unani- 
mously adopted by the advisory committee. 

The committee would observe that in this report reference was 
made to the fact that the subcommittee reporting had held a 
meeting jointly with a committee of the advisory committee which 
dealt with the subject of land armament. He had been furnished 
by the advisory committee with a copy of the report of its sub- 
committee on land armament, this report having been unanimously 
adopted by the advisory committee. It contained the following 
recommendation with regard to chemical warfare : 

" Chemical warfare should be abolished among nations, as 
abhorrent to civilization. It is a cruel,, unfair, and improper use 
of science. It is fraught with the gravest danger to noncom- 
batants and demoralizes the better instincts of humanity." 

The chairman pointed out that this report was signed by Gen. 
John J. Pershing, as chairman of the subcommittee on land 
armament of the advisory committee, and it had been adopted by 
the advisory committee. 

Continuing, the chairman said that in view of the reference to a 
difference of opinion among experts, and especially in view of the 
statement contained in the findings of the subcommittee of this 
committee of the conference, he desired to read, for the informa- 
tion of this committee, a report by the General Board of the 
United States Navy upon this question of the prohibition of gas 
warfare. This report had been submitted to the American 
delegates. 

"Question. Should gas warfare be prohibited? 

"Answer. Yes. 

" Comment : The United States would undoubtedly give up a 
material advantage if gas warfare were abolished. The resources 
and scientific development of this country place it in the front rank 
of nations in the ability to wage efficient gas warfare and insure 
an adequate supply of special gases. Nevertheless, its abolition 
would be popular in this country, even though its effectiveness as 
a weapon in war has been clearly proved when employed under 
special conditions. 

" 2. The tendency of rules of modern warfare is toward restraint 
in the employment of weapons that produce unnecessary suffering. 
The limitations in the employment of the different weapons have 
that end in view. The dum-dum bullet and the explosive bullet 



194 GENERAL BOARD REPORT. 

are well-known examples. Following this general principle, gases 
which produce unnecessary suffering should be prohibited. 

" 3. Gas warfare has a peculiar quality different from any 
method heretofore employed, in that though directed toward a 
particular target its destructive effect is not limited to that target, 
but passes beyond control of the belligerent agent and may involve 
a sacrifice of innocent lives over a wide area. On account of 
this peculiarity the use of gas which causes death is objectionable 
because not only the combatant is killed, a perfectly legitimate 
target, but many noncombatants may also be victims, and these 
innocent persons may deliberately be made the objects of gas 
attack by unscrupulous belligerents. Lethal gases should there- 
fore be prohibited. 

" 4. The two principles in warfare, (1) that unnecessary suffer- 
ing in the destruction of combatants should be avoided, (2) that 
iimocent noncombatants should not be destroyed, have been ac- 
cepted by the civilized world for more than 100 years. The use 
of gases in warfare in so far as they violate these two principles 
is almost universally condemned to-day, despite its practice for 
a certain period during the World War. 

" 5. Certain gases, for example, tear gas, could be used without 
violating the two principles above cited. Other gases will, no 
doubt, be invented which could be so employed; but there will be 
great difficulty in a clear and definite demarcation between the 
lethal gases and those which produce unnecessary suffering as 
distinguished from those gases which simply disable temporarily. 
Among the gases existing to-day there is undoubtedly a difference 
of opinion as to which class certain gases belong. Moreover, the 
diffusion of all these gases is practically beyond control and many 
innocent noncombatants would share in the suffering of the war, 
even if the result did not produce death or a permanent disability. 

" 6. The General Board foresees great difficulty in clearly lim- 
iting gases so as to avoid unnecessary suffering in gas warfare 
and in enforcing rules which will avert suffering or the possible 
destruction of innocent lives of noncombatants, including women 
and children. Gas warfare threatens to become so efficient as to 
endanger the very existence of civilization. 

" 7. The General Board believes it to be sound policy to prohibit 
gas warfare in every form and against every objective, and so 
recommends. 

"(Signed) W. L. Rodgers." 

The chairman thought it was hardly necessary to add anything 
to these comprehensive statements with respect to the use of 
gases in warfare. He said that despite the conclusions reached 
by the subcommittee of this committee and set forth in the report 
which he had read, the American delegation, in the light of the 
advice of its advisory committee and the concurrence in that 



RESOLUTION ON GAS. 195 

advice of General Pershing, the head of the American land forces, 
and of the specific recommendation of the General Board of the 
Navy, felt that it should present the recommendation that the 
use of asphyxiating or poison gas be absolutely prohibited. He 
would ask Mr. Root to present the resolution* 

Mr. Sarraut said that the hour was late ; in order not to weary 
the interpreter unduly he suggested that the committee adjourn 
and that copies of the documents read by the chairman be circu- 
lated among the various delegations for their consideration before 
the next meeting. 

The chairman said that he felt sure it would be quite agreeable 
to all present to postpone the translation; but he suggested that 
Mr. Root should present the resolution before the adjournment of 
the committee. 

Mr. Root said that the chairman had asked him to prepare this 
resolution, pursuant to the recommendation of those military and 
naval authorities and advisory committees to which the American 
delegation was bound to pay the highest respect. There was an 
expression on this subject which presented the most extraordinary 
concensus of opinion that one could well find upon any interna- 
tional subject. He had drafted the resolution which he would 
present in a moment in the language of the treaty of Versailles 
which was subscribed to by four of the five powers here and was 
appropriated and taken over by the United States and Germany 
in the treaty concluded between them on the 25th of August last 
and was repeated in the treaty of St. Germain between the same 
powers and Austria, and again in the treaty of Neuilly of the same 
powers with Bulgaria, and again in the treaty of the Trianon 
with Hungary, and taken over and homologated by the United 
States in its treaty with Austria and its treaty with Hungary and 
repeated again in the treaty of Serves. He read from article 171 
of the treaty of Versailles, which says : 

" The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and all 
analogous liquids, materials, or devices being prohibited, their 
manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany. 
The same applies to .materials specially intended for the manu- 
facture, storage, and use of the said products or devices." 

That declaration of prohibition against the use of poisonous 
gases be understood to be a statement of the previous rules which 
had been adopted during the course of The Hague conferences; 
and, without undertaking to question or to inquire into it, it stood 
as a declaration of all the countries here represented that that is 
prohibited. And accordingly, following the language of the treaty, 
the language which all had adopted, he would present the reso- 
lution : 

" The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or analogus liquids 
or other gases and all materials or devices, having been justly con- 



196 APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE. 

demned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a pro- 
hibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a 
majority of the civilized powers are parties — 

"Now, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally ac- 
cepted as a part of international law, binding alike the con- 
science and practice of nations, the signatory powers declare 
their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby be- 
tween themselves, and invite all other civilized nations to adhere 
thereto." 

In these various treaties there were, Mr. Root thought, between 
30 and 40 powers which had assented to the statements of the 
prohibition of these practices, so that there was not much further 
to go in securing that general consent which changes a rule 
from contract to law. 

Senator Schanzer said that it was with a deep feeling of 
satisfaction that the Italian delegation welcomed the statements 
made by the chairman. The Italian representatives in the sub- 
committee had had the honor of being the first to propose the 
abolition of poisonous gases as weapons of warfare. Therefore 
he could only heartily indorse the American proposal which, if 
accepted — and this would no doubt be the case — would constitute 
one of the greatest claims to honor of the conference and a real 
step in the path of. progress and civilization. 

Mr. Balfour said that he associated himself with the view to 
which he understood the chairman had agreed, that all documents 
of this nature should be circulated as soon as possible. There 
was one about which there appeared to be some misunderstand- 
ing. It was a report of the committee with respect to poison gas. 
A report on this subject had been circulated to the British dele- 
gation, but not to anybody else and, though it might be similar in 
substance to the report which the chairman had read, it differed 
in length and in phraseology. He suggested, therefore, that they 
had both better be circulated. He took- this opportunity of ex- 
pressing his view that it would be better if documents containing 
reports of subcommittees should be circulated a little sooner than 
they were. As an instance, be wished to mention the report of 
the subcommittee on aircraft. He suggested that that report 
should be circulated at once. 

The chairman said that the matter was not presented now for 
discussion - because these documents must be circulated and an 
opportunity accorded to study them. He wished to say that the 
report presented by Mr. Balfour had not been brought to the at- 
tention of the chairman. He knew nothing about it, and a hasty 
glance at it did not indicate that it differed in substance, although 
it did differ strikingly in language, from the memorandum of con- 
clusions reached by the subcommitte which he had read. He as- 
sumed that it did emanate from the subcommittee, and as the del- 



SEVENTEENTH MEETING. 197 

egates should possess all information presented to the committee, 
he assumed there was no objection to its being circulated. 

The chairman said he feared it would not be possible to get all 
these reports circulated in time to be examined and discussed 
that afternoon, and if it was thought best the committee might 
adjourn until the next morning. 

Accordingly, the meeting was adjourned until Saturday, Jan- 
uary 7, 1922, at 11 o'clock a. m. 



SEVENTEENTH MEETING— SATURDAY, JANUARY 7, 1922, 11 A. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by 
Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia). Accompanied by Sir Maurice 
Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousley, Col. Day, Mr. Flint. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. 
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal. 
Mr. Pensot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral 
Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count 
Pagliano, Col. Asinari di Bernezzo. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Vice Admiral 
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi, Mr. Shira- 
tori, Mr. Sugimura. 

The secretary general. Assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Os- 
borne. Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter. 

1. The seventeenth meeting of the Committee on the Limitation 
of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan Ameri- 
can Union Building on Saturday, January 7, 1922, at 11 a. m. 

2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, 
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senatof Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, 
Admiral Coontz ; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, 
Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert 
Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia) ; for 
France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon ; for 
Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Acton ; 
for Japan, Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Vice Admiral 
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. 

3. Secretaries and technical advisors were present as follows: 
For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the British 



198 CHEMICAL WARFARE. 

Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousley, Col. 
Day, Mr. Flint ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. 
Odenci iial, Mr. Ponsot ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, 
Count Pagliano, Col. Asinari di Bernezzo ; for Japan, Mr. Ichi- 
hashi, Mr. Shiratori, Mr. Sugimura. The secretary general, as- 
sisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Osborne, was present. Mr. Cani- 
erlynck was present as interpreter. 

The chairman, Mr. Hughes, at the opening of the meeting, rec- 
ognized Prince Tokugawa. 

Prince Tokugawa said that it was for an unpleasant purpose 
that he arose to say a word. As some of the committee already 
knew, he was about to take his leave of the conference; he was 
starting that afternoon on his return journey to Tokyo to re- 
sume his responsibilities in Parliament, which had already con- 
vened. 

It was needless for him to say how greatly he appreciated the 
courtesies which had been accorded to him by all the delegates 
and for their cooperation in the work of the conference. That 
work had already achieved remarkable success and, as was 
known, its full list of accomplishments was not yet completed. 

In bidding to the members of the committee adieu, he wished 
to say that he would always remember with gratification and 
pride the unique privilege which he had had of sitting with them 
and would be delighted whenever their and his paths might cross 
again. 

The chairman said he was sure the members of the committee 
would all deeply regret that Prince Tokugawa had to leave them. 
They were indebted to him for his cooperation and he might be 
assured of their abiding affection and esteem. He was leaving 
the most pleasant memories of his association with them in this 
important work and the contribution that he had made personally 
to the success of their efforts. 

The chairman then suggested that the committee proceed with 
the consideration of the resolution which had been presented with 
respect to the abolition of the use of asphyxiating and other 
poisonous gases in warfare. He then read the resolution, as 
follows : 

" The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases 
and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices having been justly 
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a 
prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which 
a majority of the civilized powers are parties ; 

" Now, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally ac- 
cepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience 
and practice of nations, the signatory powers declare their assent 
to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby between them- 
selves, and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto." 



LIMITATIONS ON RULES. 199 

Mr. Sarraut said he rose to express his full and frank ad- 
herence to Mr. Root's resolution. From the first France had con- 
demned the barbarous inventions and the abominable practices 
introduced by Germany in the late war and the new methods 
consisting in the use of gases, burning liquids, and poisonous 
substances ; the first thing the committee should do was officially 
and solemnly to denounce those who had taken the initiative in 
these things. All present should hope and work for the final dis- 
appearance from warfare of these infamous practices if, indeed, 
other wars were to come — a thought which, he said, was abhorent 
to him. 

This might, no doubt, be accomplished by setting an example to 
the other countries. The reports of experts who had maturely 
considered the question had indeed pointed out the extreme diffi- 
culty, if not impossibility, of taking practical precautions against 
the threat and the use of these poison gases and these chemicals. 
It was an established and indisputable fact that those chemicals 
which were used in the manufacture of gases and poisons were 
the same that were used for innumerable ordinary substances 
necessary to the industrial and peaceful life of the human race. 

The reports of experts had established the impossibility of 
exercising an effective supervision over the production of gases 
which might be used as weapons of war and hence the impossi- 
bility of preventing or limiting such production. This entailed, 
as a logical consequence, the impossibility of preventing any coun- 
try from arming itself in advance against the unfair use of those 
gases which an unscrupulous enemy might secretly prepare for 
sudden use upon an unprotected enemy, as had been done during 
the late war. 

But, if the exercise of authority in the matter did not at the 
moment appear practicable, the Root resolution was none the less 
a useful accomplishment because, in the first place, it would be 
a bond of union between the Powers here represented and, fur- 
ther, because their agreement and their example might be such 
as to bring about the adherence of all the nations to the same 
principles. It was necessary, indeed, that this adherence should 
be unanimous in order that an effective and salutary result might 
be obtained. But, in the meantime, the conference would have 
presented a great example possessing a not inconsiderable per- 
suasive power, thus possibly preventing the repetition of certain 
atrocities committed by certain belligerents during the late war. 
It was with this lofty and humane motive that the French dele- 
gation subscribed with all its heart to the Root resolution. 

Mr. Balfour said that as he understood the matter, the pro- 
posal before the meeting was the reaffirmation of the admitted 
principles of international law. In that sense there was nothing 
new in the proposals made by Mr. Root. Indeed, on the very 



200 EXTENSION OF RULES. 

face of the document itself, it was pointed out that the greater 
number of nations, in the various treaties which they had made 
subsequent to the armistice, had explicitly or implicitly declared 
that, in their view, the present proposal was already part of the 
accepted law of nations. He believed that the United States of 
America, who had not ratified those treaties, had made separate 
treaties ; but in those treaties also they had by implication af- 
firmed the present proposal as part of the general law. Moreover, 
he remembered that in March, 1918, a declaration had been 
made by all the allied and associated powers, in response to an 
appeal made to them by the Red Cross Society, in which in ex- 
plicit terms they had laid down the same doctrine. Behind all 
those formal acts there had been the findings of the two Hague 
conferences which, although so far as he was aware were not 
ratified by the United States of America, were accepted by all 
the other powers engaged in those conferences, undoubtedly with 
the sympathy although not with the explicit ratification of 
America. Therefore, he supposed he was right in saying that 
the document before them neither made nor professed to make 
any change in international law. 

It would be interesting to compare the procedure on this point 
with that which had been adopted with regard to submarines. 
There also they had declared in very clear terms what they con- 
ceive to be the law, and what undoubtedly was the law of nations 
as regards attacks on merchant ships by ships of war. In that 
case they went further than it was now proposed to do, and 
further than it was possible to go now, for. they had made an 
alteration and had proposed an extension of the law of nations. 
They had agreed among themselves to be bound by regulations 
which were in advance of the actual law of nations ; and they had 
also altered the sanctions which lay behind the law of nations, in 
that they introduced the fourth of Mr. Root's clauses which would 
convict the individuals who broke the law as guilty of piracy. So 
that in dealing with submarines they had gone a good deal 
further than was practicable in the present case. They could now 
do no more than reaffirm the law. It might be asked in the first case 
what was the use of merely coming forward and reaffirming what 
nobody denied? Personally he thought such a course was im- 
portant and valuable, if all the lamentable occurrences of the late 
war and all the developments which that war caused in the use 
of noxious gases were taken into account. 

Of course, they must all admit, as Mr. Sarraut had well pointed 
out, that a mere affirmation of the law without adding any sanc- 
tions to it would not relieve the nations of the world from taking 
precautions against those who were prepared to break the law ; 
and who, if they were allowed to do so with impunity, might domi- 
nate the world by the mere indifference they showed to the laws 



GAS AND SUBMARINES. 201 

which the world had endeavored to lay down. That was what 
had actually occurred in 1915. In 1915, as in 1922, the present 
proposal was the law of nations ; and, because it was the law of 
nations, no nation but one had taken any steps toward using 
noxious gases, or had contemplated as part of their possible mili- 
tary operation that such gases should be used either by themselves 
or by their enemies. The result had been very near to a complete 
disaster for the Allied armies. The shock of that new weapon of 
warfare had been wholly local, for the invention of science came 
to the rescue, and finally the Allies and their unscrupulous enemy 
fought out the war on equal terms.* That example unhappily 
was now before them and could not be ignored. Their specialists 
had pointed out in Washington, and an examination by a com- 
mittee of the League of Nations had brought out a similar re- 
sult at Geneva, that it was perfectly impossible so to arrange 
matters that a nation bent upon doing so should not in times of 
peace — whatever the rules of war might be — make such prepara- 
tions as would enable it to use that monstrous and inhuman 
method of warfare at its will if war broke out. , They knew that 
at least one great civilized nation had not thought it improper, 
or at all events had chosen, whether proper or not, to break the 
law of nations. That wretched example might unhappily be fol- 
lowed in the future ; and therefore no nation could forget that it 
was open to attack by unscrupulous enemies ; no nation therefore 
could forego that duty of examining how such attacks could be 
properly dealt with and effectively met. 

Again there was a parallel in the case of the submarine. The 
British Empire delegation had desired to abolish submarines, but 
that was found impossible, and it was admittedly impossible to 
stop the erection of works in which poison gases could be manu- 
factured in unlimited quantities. The British Empire delegation 
therefore had to say — and he was sure they had the sympathy 
around that table, for no dissentient voice had been raised — that if 
submarines were allowed they had to contemplate as a conceivable 
possibility that they would be misused, and that precautions would 
have to be taken against such misuse. He believed that every 
other nation recognized that unhappily submarines would remain 
a necessity as in the case of poison and lethal gases. Therefore 
the relief which such a resolution as this would give to the world 
in connection with poison gas would not be the complete relief 
which they all desired ; it would not remove the anxieties and 
preoccupations which the possible use of gas necessarily involves. 
But were they therefore to say that they would do nothing? Were 
they therefore to say that resolutions such as that now before 
tli em were useless? Were they therefore to say that it was an 
empty form solemnly to repeat rules which were already accepted, 

25882—23 14 



202 SANCTIONS FOR RULES. 

although they were not in a position by the establishment of new 
sanctions absolutely to prevent their use by any nation unscrupu- 
lous enough to desire to use them? Those questions he would 
answer in the negative. He believed that if by any action of 
theirs on such an occasion as the present they could do something 
to bring home to the consciences of mankind that poison gas was 
not a form of warfare which civilized nations could tolerate, they 
would be doing something important toward discouraging them. 

No sanctions were provided in the present document ; no sanc- 
tions could be provided there. But if anyone looked back even 
upon the history of the late lamentable war, he would see, notably 
in the great test case of the United States, that the gradual rising 
of public indignation against some grossly immoral use of the 
weapons of war had had a profound influence upon the history of. 
the world. He was quite sure that the moral indignation roused 
in the consciences of the United States had had a most powerful 
effect upon the whole trend of events. He thought that by the 
present resolution, backed as it was by the consciences of the 
civilized world, although there was no sanction laid down in it, for 
no sanction was possible, they would in fact be creating a sanc- 
tion not formally but informally. He believed that the outraged 
consciences of the world would rise in indignation and that any 
nation would be very bold and very ill-advised, if, in the face of 
that universal opinion, it deliberately violated the rules which on 
the present occasion they were invited deliberately to affirm. 
Therefore, without committing himself to the actual language of 
the resolution, he most heartily associated himself and also the 
British Empire delegation with the policy which the American 
delegation, through the mouth of Mr. Root, had put forward for 
their acceptance. 

Admiral Baron Kato said that the question of poison gases. had 
been discussed fully and the opinions in regard to them were now 
very well known. He would not, therefore, take the committee's 
time by repeating them; he simply wished to express his ap- 
proval, on behalf of the Japanese delegation, of the resolution 
presented by Mr. Root. 

The chairman remarked that there seemed to be unanimity in 
support of the resolution and added that, unless further discus- 
sion was desired, he would ask for the formal assent of the delega- 
tions to the resolution in the form in which he had read it. 

The delegations being polled, each voted affirmatively, and the 
chairman declared it unanimously adopted. 

The chairman said that the next subject presented for the com- 
mittee's consideration was the question of limitation of aircraft 
an: to numbers, character, and use. 

It would be recalled that a subcommittee of experts to deal 
with this subject had been appointed; that committee had made a 



REPORT ON AIRCRAFT. 203 

careful, comprehensive, and somewhat voluminous report, which 
had been distributed. In view of the fact that the members of the 
committee all had this report before them, he assumed that it 
would not be necessary to read it in extenso. The question, he con- 
tinued, was not presented for discussion ; the desire was simply 
to get the report before the committee for such disposition as 
they might desire; and in order that they might make a begin- 
ning, he would simply refer to some of the main points of the 
report. Whatever time was necessary for its full examination 
and analysis would, of course, be afforded ; it was not necessary 
that the committee should proceed with the discussion of it, 
which would not be continued until all the members of the com- 
mittee were agreeable to that course. 

Sir Robert Borden said that he would be grateful if the chair- 
man would make as full an exposition of the report on the limi- 
tation* of aircraft as he was prepared to do. This would serve as 
an introduction of the principal issues and would facilitate the 
general understanding. 

The chairman then briefly outlined, and read extracts from, the 
following report : 

" COMMITTEE ON AIRCRAFT REPORT ON LIMITATION OF AIRCRAFT AS TO 

NUMBERS, CHARACTER, AND USE. 

" 1. Form of procedure. — In considering the limitation .of air- 
craft as to numbers, character, and use, the Committeei on Air- 
craft adopted a form of procedure which took up the various 
questions involved in the following order: (1) Commercial air- 
craft; (2) civil aircraft ; (3) military aircraft. Heavier-than-air 
and lighter-than-air craft were considered separately, since the 
conditions governing the two are not in all cases the same. An 
effort was made to determine whether or not it is possible to im- 
pose limitations upon their (1) number, (2) character, (3) use, 
and after discussion of the methods that might be employed to 
effect such limitation, whether limitation was practicable or not. 
This committee feels that the desirability of placing any limita- 
tions whatever upon aircraft is a matter of policy, one which it 
is for the main committee itself to determine. Nevertheless, it 
feels it to be a duty to point out the essential facts which will 
have a decided bearing upon the determination of the proper policy 
to be adopted, and this is done in this report. 

" 2. Commercial aircraft. — Different methods of imposing such 
limitation may be adopted by different states. The precise 
methods adopted by any state must be in conformity with its 
organic law. In some states it may be possible to impose an 
arbitrary limitation ; in others, by the exercise of the police power, 
or of the power to tax, a practical limitation may be enforced.. 



204 COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT. 

In the United States, where laws passed by the Congress must 
conform to the written Constitution of the country, there may be 
some difficulty in finding an effective means of imposing this 
limitation, but nevertheless it is believed that if necessary such 
means can be found. .. . 

" 3. Before discussing any other phase of the matter it will be 
well to consider carefully the effects which would follow the 
imposition of the limitation upon the numbers and character of 
commercial aircraft which may be owned and operated by the 
nationals of a state. In the first place, if commercial aeronautics 
is allowed to follow the natural laws which have governed the 
development of all other means of transportation and communica- 
tion, the number and character of such aircraft will probably 
depend on financial considerations. That is, commercial aero- 
nautics as a business will not thrive unless the operation of the 
aircraft will return a substantial profit. The state may interfere 
with the operation of these natural laws by granting to the 
owners and operators of such aircraft a direct or indirect subsidy. 
By so doing enterprises which would not otherwise be financially 
successful may be enabled to live and in this way the number of 
aircraft used for commercial purposes will be greater than if 
the natural laws of development had been allowed to take their 
course. 

"It is not easy to foresee what consequences to human progress 
will come in the future from the development of aeronautics in 
all its branches. They will certainly be marvelous where natural 
conditions are favorable to such development. To try to limit 
them now with arbitrary laws, even if these laws have the 
purpose of preventing war, would be in the opinion of this com- 
mittee disastrous from the point of view of world progress. 

" 4. If, among commercial aircraft, we class those owned and 
operated for sport or pleasure or convenience, the numbers of 
these will depend largely upon the wealth of the nation, upon the 
inclination of the people toward aeronautics, upon the cost of the 
aircraft thus employed. 

" 5. The development of aircraft has presented the world with 
a new and improved means of transportation and communication. 
One of the causes of warfare in the past has been a lack of the 
proper distribution of the world's resources in raw material, food 
products, and the like. Another potent cause of war has been the 
lack of understanding between races, peoples, and nations. Any 
addition to the transportation and communication facilities of 
the world should operate to improve the distribution of resources 
and likewise to lessen the causes of misunderstandings between 
peoples, and thus lessen the causes of warfare. Any limitation, 
therefore, placed upon commercial aeronautics would have the 
effect of limiting a means of transportation and communication 



HEAVIER-THAN-AIR CRAFT. 205 

between the different parts of the same state and between dif- 
ferent states. It seems inconceivable that any limitation should 
be imposed upon commercial aeronautics unless it were with the 
avowed object of thereby limiting the air power of a state and 
thus decreasing the liability of war. Commercial aeronautics 
with its attendant development of an aeronautical industry and 
a personnel skilled in the manufacture, operation, and the main- 
tenance of aircraft does furnish a basis of air power. The 
development of commercial aeronautics and the development of a 
nation's air power are inseparable. 

"6. Speaking broadly, all aircraft will be of some military value 
no matter what restrictions may be placed upon their character. 
Some can probably be converted with but few changes into military 
aircrafts; others can be designed so that with major or minor 
alterations, or even with none at all, they can be employed for 
military purposes. As a matter of fact, the uses of aircraft in 
war are many. During the World War highly specialized types 
were designed for special uses. Military aircraft have likewise 
been developed to a degree of perfection not yet reached in com- 
mercial aircraft. It is quite reasonable to suppose that similar 
development will take place in commercial aircraft, that they, 
too, will be especially designed for the uses to be made of them, 
and that they may depart quite radically from the military types 
used in the World War. 

" In military aircraft, as a rule, a premium is placed upon per- 
formance. Consideration of initial cost and cost of operation and 
of maintenance are largely disregarded. The safety and con- 
venience of the operators and passengers are considered only as 
these affect their ability to perform their military duties. If, as 
seems evident, commercial aircraft must be specially designed for 
the service they are to perform in order to have a chance of being 
financially successful, any effort to provide for their conversion 
into military craft will introduce complications which will in- 
crease the cost of production and operation. This may itself auto- 
matically act as a limitation, for business enterprises will not be 
willing to have such conditions imposed unless they are compen- 
sated in some way for the extra cost. 

" 7. Heavier-than-air. — The war value of an airplane may be 
said to lie in a combination of two or more of the following char- 
acteristics : 

"(a) Its suitability for offensive and defensive equipment. 

"(&) Its radius of action. 

"(c) Its speed. 

"(cZ) Its carrying capacity. 

"(e) The height it can attain. 

" It is not desired to go too deeply into technical matters in this 
report. The committee wishes, however, to point out that the 



206 METHOD OF LIMITATION. 

peace value of aircraft is at present intimately bound up with the 
general characteristics which make up the value of the airplane 
in war. The last four of the characteristics enumerated above are 
dependent upon the relation between the amount of fuel carried, 
the horsepower of the engine, the lifting surface, and the total 
weight. The committee is of the opinion that formulae could be 
evolved defining the inter-relationship of these factors in such a 
way as to limit the war value of the machine built in conformity 
therewith. It is more difficult to insure that war equipment 
shall not be mounted in a commercial airplane. In this matter 
the committee is of the opinion that definite rules can not be laid 
down. 

" Radius of action is of high commercial value. A reliable air 
service from Europe to America in, say 24 hours, should prove a 
highly profitable undertaking. Again, in countries where there 
is perhaps the greatest scope for the development of airways, 
countries of great deserts for example, radius of action is es- 
sential. Speed is plainly the characteristic on which aircraft 
rely to gain advantage in their competition with other means of 
transportation. It is not yet comfort and security but time- 
saving that will tempt passengers, mail, and valuable cargoes from 
old established services. To limit speed is to stop progress, to 
throttle aviation in its infancy. 

"The power of carrying numbers of passengers or quantities of 
goods is of obvious commercial value and even the attainment of 
considerable heights may eventually be a definite requirement. 
As a matter of fact the success of recent experiments indicates 
that, with special means of supercharging motors, navigation of 
the air will in the future utilize high regions of the atmosphere 
to take advantage of less resistance of the air and of favorable 
high velocity winds. 

" The factors which comprise ' military ' performance have there- 
fore, a high commercial value, and it is the opinion of this com- 
mittee that any limitation of the character of civil and commercial 
aircraft must hinder the natural development of aviation; it is 
probable that restriction as to character will have, in fact, an 
even more adverse reaction on the progress of aviation than would 
be caused by a restriction on numbers. 

"8. Method of limitation. — Aircraft can be limited as to num- 
ber and character by an agreement arbitrarily fixing a maximum 
number for each nation that will not be exceeded and by imposing 
technical restrictions in such a way as to limit performance. 

"9. The difference in organic law as between nations will 
probably prevent a single system of limitation being of universal 
application. Moreover, the rules of formulae, whereby alone the 
character of civil and commercial aircraft can be limited, must 
be detailed and stringent. At the same time, they will be easy 



SUBSIDY. 207 

to evade, and infringement will not be obvious to the casual 
glance. Measurements of horsepower, supporting surface, fuel 
capacity, and weight will be necessary if security against eva- 
sion is to be insured by any other means than by trusting to the 
good faith of the contracting parties. No State could consent to 
having the nationals of another power continually inspecting all 
of its manufacturing plants in order to ascertain whether the 
limitations it imposed were being enforced. 

"All these points received the closest of consideration with 
reference to the limitation of Germany's airpower and the matter 
is so complicated that the final drafting of the technical rules has 
not yet been completed. But taking rules as drafted and even 
assuming continuous inspection of a most stringent character, 
it appears that there are still loopholes for evasion. No rules 
can prevent aircraft being designed in peace to permit of the 
ready installment of larger tanks in war ; engines can be made in- 
terchangeable, enabling one of higher power to be rapidly in- 
stalled ; even carrying surface can be increased by the standard- 
ization and interchangeability of wings and other methods, and 
it is not impossible to conceive of civil and commercial aircraft 
being designed with a view to ultimate war requirements. 

" 10. For the above reason, the committee is agreed that in the 
present stage of development of aviation a universal limitation 
by formulae of the character of commercial aircraft is impracti- 
cable. 

" 11. Question of subsidy. — Without expressing an opinion as 
to the desirability of abolishing subsidies for the encouragement 
of commercial aviation, the committee points out that such 
subsidies, direct or indirect, can have a great influence on the 
character and number of commercial aircraft in relation to their 
war value. In fact, subsidies will tend to decrease the natural 
divergence between military and commercial aircraft and render 
the latter more readily adaptable to war uses. It is necessary, 
however, to add that indirect subsidies or other encouragement 
are most difficult to prevent, and even when acting in good faith 
Governments of different nations will place different interpreta- 
tions on such encouragement. 

" The question of whether subsidies are granted or not will 
have great bearing upon development of commercial aircraft in 
general, and will affect the future welfare of the nations. This 
question, therefore, can not be determined from the point of view 
solely of the adaptability for war uses. 

" 1.2. Civil aircraft. — In this discussion a distinction is drawn 
between commercial aircraft and civil aircraft ; the latter will 
comprise all aircraft operated by a State except those which it 
operates in connection with its military enterprises. Civil air- 
craft will, therefore, include any which are State-operated in 



ZU8 LIGHTER-THAN-AIR CRAFT. 

the customs service, for transporting the mails, the exercise of 
its police powers, and the like. It is readily apparent that as 
aircraft operate in a medium where there are no physical bar- 
riers, they can compete in some measure with every means of 
transportation used on land or water. It is therefore possible 
for much of the transportation requirements of any State to 
be met by the operation of aircraft. Such aircraft manifestly 
are not dependent for their being upon their ability to be oper- 
ated at a profit. The State will decide how best it may enforce 
its laws, exercise its police power, transport State-owned mer- 
chandise or mails, and the means used will be those which are 
most efficient and most economical from the standpoint of the 
State itself. The cheapest will not always be the best or the most 
satisfactory. 

"The number and the legitimate use of aircraft by any Gov- 
ernment for such civil purposes will, therefore, be limited only 
by the estimate placed upon the service which they can render 
and by the consent of the people to raising by taxation the amount 
of money which must be employed for their acquirement, opera- 
tion, and maintenance. 

" 13. If the civil agencies of a State use aircraft for police or 
other purposes that are essentially military in character this 
class of civil aircraft should be discussed under the limitation 
of military aircraft. 

" 14. The number and character of such civil aircraft can be 
limited only by an arbitrary agreement among the States. 

" 15. It would, again, be utterly impracticable to set up any 
agency acting under authority other than that of a nation itself 
to regulate the number of civil aircraft owned and operated by 
the State. 

LIGHTER-THAN-AIR CRAFT. 

" 16. Limitation of number and character.^- The character- 
istics of lighter-than-air craft are such that limitation of num- 
ber and character presents little technical or practical difficulty. 
It is a peculiarity of these craft that their efficiency is very in- 
timately bound up in their size. Small dirigibles have a war 
value of their own, but it is limited and they can not be con- 
sidered as offensive weapons. For example, a small vessel of this 
kind can not attain any considerable height while carrying a 
useful load, and even if filled with noninflammable gas its vul- 
nerability to gunfire at the heights it could reach preclude its 
being utilized for such purposes as aerial bombardment. Only 
in large-sized dirigibles can a useful load be carried to a reason- 
able military height at a fair speed. Limitation of size is there- 
fore sufficient to insure that lighter-than-air craft should be in- 
capable of offensive aerial action. Moreover, the construction of 



LIMITATION OF USE. 209 

large dirigibles requires large shed accommodation and can not 
be kept secret ; in this respect they resemble surface warships. 

" 17. It is therefore possible to regulate their numbers and 
size by a simple system of international agreement, and infringe- 
ment of such agreement can be readily detected without a de- 
tailed system of control. 

" 18. The committee is agreed that the possibilities of war use 
for large dirigibles may still exist. Although in the later stages 
of the World War it appeared as if the defense had the mastery 
over attack in lighter-than-air craft, the introduction of larger 
craft filled with noninflammable gas and carrying their own pro- 
tective aeroplanes may again permit bombardments being carried 
out by dirigibles. 

" This committee desires, however, to draw attention to the 
fact that dirigibles become increasingly efficient with increase of 
size. Any limit which is imposed on the size of commercial diri- 
gibles must shut the door on the possibility of their development 
for legitimate civil enterprises. 

" 19. Limitation of the use of aircraft. — The committee is of the 
opinion that it would be useless to attempt to lay down a rule 
that civil and commercial aircraft should not be used in war, as 
they consider that no nation could deny itself the value for war 
purposes of their commercial machines provided that they are 
suitable for any warlike purposes. It is understood that when 
so used they will be manned by service personnel of the State 
and carry the proper distinguishing marks, and will in fact be- 
come war aircraft ; their use does not therefore require discus- 
sion in this part of the committee report. 

" 20. The use of civil and commercial aircraft in peace is gov- 
erned by the International Air Convention, which amply safe- 
guards a State's sovereignty in the air against abuse. 

" 21. This convention has already been ratified by Great Brit- 
ain, France, Japan, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Serb-Croat and 
Slovene State, and Siam. It will at a very near date come into 
force for these various powers and later for the other signatory 
States and also nonsignatory powers who desire to adhere to it. 

"22. The committee is aware, however, that for certain reasons 
the United States has not yet announced its adherence to this 
convention. The committee therefore suggests for the considera- 
tion of the subcommittee on program and procedure that a con- 
vention covering the different phases of aerial navigation and 
based upon the one mentioned above could be drawn up at this 
conference to which the assent of all powers represented could 
be given. The committee further believe that this is most 
desirable. 



210 MILITARY AIRCRAFT. 

" SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS. 

" 23. Civil and commercial aircraft. — This committee under- 
stands that the purpose of this conference is to promote peace and 
to remove the causes of warfare. It must be understood dis- 
tinctly that if the conference decided to limit the development of 
commercial aircraft in order to retard the development of air 
power the immediate result will be the retarded development of 
means of transportation and communication, which will itself, if 
unrestricted, largely act to bring about the same result, the 
removal of some of the causes of warfare. 

" 24. This committee is unanimously of the opinion that in the 
present state of development of aeronautics there is a technical 
possibility of the limitation of numbers, character, and use of 
civil and commercial aircraft with regard to their utilization in 
war ; they are, however, agreed that such limitation of numbers, 
and especially of character, is not practicable, except in the case 
of lighter-than-air craft of above a certa'n displacement. 

" 25. As regards the desirability of limitations, the committee 
has touched on those factors which must be understood before 
arriving at a decision. It feels it to be a duty to lay great stress 
upon the following fact, which will have a decided bearing upon 
any determination of the proper policy to be adopted : Any limita- 
tion as to number and character of civil and commercial aircraft, 
heavier than air or lighter than air, which is efficacious to hinder 
their utility for war purposes must interfere disastrously with 
the natural development of aeronautics for legitimate civil and 
commercial enterprises. To limit the science of aeronautics in its 
present state is to shut the door on progress. It is for the con- 
ference to decide whether the limitations which can with diffi- 
culty be devised and imposed are to be adopted at such a cost. 

" Military aircraft. — (Note. In the part of the report which fol- 
lows the word ' military ' is used in its widest sense to denote 
'pertaining to the fighting services, whether naval, military, or 
air.') 

" 26. Preliminary remarks. — The committee agreed that before 
entering upon a discussion of possible limitation of the numbers 
of military aircraft it was desirable that the present relative 
strength of the nations represented should be ascertained and 
tabulated in a simple form designated to fac'litate comparison 
between them. The results of this investigation are tabulated in 
appendixes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, attached to this report. It is remarked 
that though these forms afford a guide to the relative military 
air strengths at the present day, it is impracticable to present a 
complete estimate of a nation's air power, since air power is (as 
has been already shown) intimately bound up in factors other 
than the military establishment. Differences in organizat'.on and 



NUMBER. 211 

administration of the Various national aerial forces are a further 
obstacle to direct comparison in detail ; these factors must not be 
forgotten when studying the statement presented and must be 
kept in the foreground of all discussions as to the possibility of 
limitation. 

"27. As to number. — The limitation of the number of military 
aircraft presents from one point of view less difficulty than the 
similar problem in the case of commercial aircraft. It is obvious 
that if a limitation on the number of military aircraft is agreed 
upon between nations, it can be imposed by a state without that 
interference with the liberty of citizens which complicates the 
question of aircraft devoted to commercial pursuits. But when 
the details of such an agreement are considered, it will be found 
a matter of great difficulty to find a reasonable basis on which 
the allotment of relative strengths can be made. For example : 

"(i) The 'status quo' cannot serve as a starting point, since 
the state of development of air services differs widely in the case 
of the various powers (see appendixes), and in no case can these 
services be considered as complete. 

"(ii) The size of a nation's navy and army will influence the 
basis, in so far as aircraft are essential auxiliaries to those 
services. 

"(iii) National policy will differ as between nations: some na- 
tions, for example, will wish to have large air forces for coast 
defence where others prefer to trust to older methods. Develop- 
ment on the lines of the substitution of air forces for other forms 
of force are likely to be considerable. 

"(iv) The potentialities of air forces in policing and garrisoning 
semicivilized countries or uncivilized countries, are as yet only 
partially realized. The number of aircraft required for such 
duties will vary with the size and nature of the territories to be 
patrolled and with the value placed on their services by different 
nations. 

"(v) The geographical position and peculiarities of a state, the 
situation and strength of its possible enemies, and the nature of a 
possible attack must influence the number of aircraft it will desire 
to maintain. 

"(vi) Different terms of service for personnel will influence the 
effectiveness of air services and the size of the reserve. 

"(vii) The state of development or possibilities for civil aero- 
nautics will have, as has been shown above, a direct bearing on the 
number of military aircraft which it may be desirable for a state 
to maintain. 

" The problem of finding a suitable ratio between the air forces 
of various powers is thus at the present time almost insuperable. 

" 28. As to character. — But even should it be possible to fix the 
ratio, such a limitation would be of little value without some limit 



212 METHODS OF LIMITATION. 

as to the character of the aircraft. When the question of limita- 
tion of naval armaments was considered by the conference it was 
found necessary to limit the displacement of individual ships as 
well as the total tonnage. In the absence of similar provision the 
limitation of numbers of aircraft would only result in competitive 
building of aircraft of greater and greater power and size. The 
methods of limitation must therefore attempt to legislate for both 
number and character. 

" HEAVIEK-THAN-AIE. 

"29. Methods of limitation. — The following methods may be 
employed : 

" First. The limitation of the number of military aircraft. 

" Second. The limitation of the amount of horsepower for mili- 
tary aircraft. 

" Third. The limitation of the lift tonnage for military aircraft. 

" Fourth. The limitation of personnel for military aircraft. 

" Fifth. The limitation of military aircraft budgets. 

" These five methods may be applied in combination or singly 
and are considered in detail below: 

" 30. Limitation of the number of aircraft is the most obvious 
method of limiting the strength of the aviation force, but in at- 
tempting to apply this method the question of size and type at 
once arises. It might be necessary to limit the maximum wing 
surface permitted to a single aircraft or it might be necessary 
to prescribe the number of aircraft in each of the type groups, 
such as combat planes, bombing planes, etc. ; this question of de- 
finition of type presents great difficulty. In order to make an 
effective limitation of the numbers of military aircraft to be main- 
tained in peace time by any nation, it will be necessary to have 
a detailed understanding on the following points: 

"(1) On the number and types actually in use by organized 
aerial units. 

" (2) On the number and types held in reserve. 

"(3) On the number and type of engines held in reserve. 

"(4) On the replacement of planes crashed, worn out, or re- 
placed by later models. In the case of obsolete and other planes 
that are replaced by other models it would be necessary to enter 
into an agreement regarding the disposal of planes so replaced. 
Otherwise it would be possible to build up an unlimited war re- 
serve merely by classifying the planes so held as obsolete, or by 
converting them into civil or commercial planes. 

"(5) On the limitation of the adoption of new and more power- 
ful types. 

"All these points will present great difficulty in an age when 
aircraft can become obsolete in a few months, and when their 



HORSE POWER, LIFT TONNAGE. 213 

nature is such that war wastage may be as high as 200 per cent 
per month. 

" 31. The second method of limitation, limitation of horsepower, 
may apply to: 

"(1) Total horsepower in assembled planes. 

"(2) Total horsepower in assembled engines. 

"(3) Horsepower in a single individual plane of a given type. 

" This can only be based on the cubic capacity of the engines ; 
there will be no guaranty that a nation has not discovered a secret 
which will enable greater horsepower to be got out of limited 
capacity, nor is it reasonable to expect any nation to disclose such 
a secret. The more detailed the limitation the greater the admin- 
istrative difficulty of enforcement, particularly under present con- 
ditions, when administrative methods are so widely different, and, 
as pointed out in the first part of the report, any enforcement, to 
be effectual, would entail such detailed inspection by a foreign 
commission as to be intolerable to any nation. 

" 32. The third method of limitation, limitation of lift tonnage, 
may apply to : 

"(1) Total lift tonnage in assembled planes. 

"(2) Total lift tonnage in all planes assembled or not as- 
sembled. 

"(3) Lift tonnage of a single individual plane of a given type. 

"Any method must presumably be based on wing area and horse- 
power. It has been mentioned that the actual horsepower may be 
unknown, and it is likewise conceivable that a nation may discover 
a wing shape of extreme lifting efficiency and neglect to disclose 
the fact. Limitation of lift tonnage may therefore be wholly 
illusory, and the remarks as to inspection made in the last para- 
graph apply to this method also. 

" 33. The fourth method of limitation, whether of the total or 
organized personnel for war aircraft or only of pilots in the per- 
manent military establishment, fails by reason of the difference in 
organization between different states. A nation which has a sepa- 
rate air service has to include in its organized personnel those em- 
ployed in recruiting, supply, transport, administrative headquar- 
ters; etc. In the case of nations whose air forces are contained 
in their naval and military forces, supply, etc., personnel are in- 
cluded in naval and military establishments ; a fair comparison 
can not therefore be made. Moreover, the difference in terms of 
service, long or short, voluntary service or conscription, must 
introduce incalculable factors which directly affect the efficiency 
of organized air forces and the size and efficiency of the reserve. 

" 34. The fifth method of limitation, limitation by means of 
limiting the budget and thereby controlling the amount of money 
that may be expended annually for aviation, seems simple in 
theory, but it is difficult of application. The various methods of 



214 DIFFICULTIES. 

distributing budgets for material under different subheads make it 
impracticable to determine or compare the actual sums expended 
exclusively for aircraft, and the question is at present further 
complicated by the factor of the relative purchasing power of the 
currency of various nations. 

" 35. Of the five methods of limitation, limitation by lift ton- 
nage or horsepower appears to present the least objections ; but to 
make these or any other methods effective, it would be necessary, 
as previously pointed out, to organize a system of international 
inspections. Any system of international inspection would tie 
almost certain to arouse ill-feeling and would tend to cause fric- 
tion rather than to insure harmony and good feeling between 
friendly powers. 

" 36. Impracticability of limitation of number and character. — 
Objections in detail to each suggested method of limitation have 
been advanced above — there is one insuperable objection which is 
common to every method, namely, the close relationship which at 
present exists between civil or commercial aeronautics and air 
power. Unless civil and commercial aeronautics are strictly 
limited — and it has been shown in the early part, of this report 
that it is not practicable to limit them — a nation desiring air 
power in excess of the limit imposed or agreed to will develop its 
civil and commercial aeronautics to any extent desired. 

" Granting a flourishing aeronautical industry, the number of the 
present type of perishable military airplanes active on any given 
date is only one of the elements of air power. During the war a 
single American firm contracted to deliver 100 aircraft a day^ 
and the output of engines can be organized on a similar scale. 
A nation's air power can thus be multiplied not only by the actual 
number of civil and commercial aircraft in use but also by the 
capacity of the industry to turn to the manufacture of military 
aircraft in large quantities. Limitation of the number of horse- 
power and lift tonnage would under such conditions prove 
illusory. This commercial industry will further provide a great 
potential reserve of pilots and skilled technical personnel and will 
thus discount to a great extent any limitation of numbers of the 
personnel of military aviation. 

" 37. It is the opinion of this committee that the limitation 
of military air power (as regards heavier-than-air craft) is not 
practicable at the present time. Their reasons for this decision 
are as follows : 

" (I) The difficulty of finding a basis for the proportion of air- 
craft to be allotted to the various nations. 

• " (II) The difficulty of devising technical methods to impose 
such limitation. 

" (III) The difficulty of enforcing such methods. 



DIFFERENCES IN AIRCRAFT. " 215 

"(IV) The interdependence between air power and a com- 
mercial aircraft industry which it is not practicable to limit. 

" 38. Lighter-than-air craft. — Many of the remarks already 
made apply to lighter-than-air craft but, as in the case of com- 
mercial aircraft of this nature, limitation is both possible and 
practicable. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the argument that 
the military value of a dirigible is dependent on its size, and the 
size of dirigibles and the number maintained can be limited by 
agreement of a few simple rules. Infraction of such rules can 
be rapidly ascertained without detailed inspection. But such a 
limitation of lighter-than-air aviation forces would not effect a 
limitation of this kind of air power of a nation unless a limita- 
tion were also imposed on its lighter-than-air commercial activi- 
ties. The line of demarcation between the large commercial 
airship and the military airship is very slight, and a commercial 
dirigible would require little, if any, alteration in order to adapt 
it to military purposes. The objections to the limitation of the 
number or character of commercial lighter-than-air craft have 
already been remarked on. 

" The question of the use of military aircraft. 

" 39. It is necessary in the interests of humanity and to lessen 
the chances of international friction that the rules which should 
govern the use of aircraft in war should be codified and be made 
the subject of international agreement. 

" 40. The matter has been considered by this committee in con- 
nection with a draft code of " Rules for Aircraft in War " sub- 
mitted for remarks by the committee on the laws of war. The 
subject appears to the committee to be one of extreme importance 
and one which raises far-reaching problems, legal, political, com- 
mercial, and military; it requires, therefore, exhaustive discus- 
sion by a single committee in which experts on all these issues are 
assembled. 

" The representatives of the United States and Japan on this 
committee are prepared to discuss the rules submitted from a 
technical point of view as provided for in the agenda under para- 
graph on limitation of new types of military arms, but the repre- 
sentatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy are not so prepared. 
They state that the time between receipt of the agenda for the 
conference and their date of sailing has not permitted that ex- 
haustive discussion of the subject that would enable them to 
advance a national viewpoint on a matter which affects so many 
and varied interests. In some cases the national policy has not 
yet been determined. 

" 41. This committee recommends therefore that the question of 
the rules for aircraft in war be not considered at a conference 
in which all the members are not prepared to discuss so large 



216 SUMMARY. 

a subject, but that the matter be postponed to a further confer- 
ence which it is recommended be assembled for the purpose at a 
date and place to be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. 

" SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE COMMITTEE ON NUM- 
BER, CHARACTER, AND USE OF AIRCRAFT. 

" 42. The committee are agreed that among the more important 
elements which influence the power that a nation may exert by 
means of aircraft are the following : 

"(1) The adaptability of its people to aeronautics. 

"(2) Geographic location and characteristics of the territory 
occupied by the nation and its dependencies. 

"(3) The ability to produce and maintain aircraft and acces- 
sories. 

"(4) The amount and character of aeronautical activity outside 
the military establishment, such as commercial and civil aero- 
nautical activities, and sport and pleasure flying. 

"(5) The size and efficiency of its air establishment for 
military purposes, consisting of (a) the active establishment, 
including permanent headquarters, bureaus, squadrons, schools, 
technical establishments, depots of material and personnel, etc. ; 
(b) the reserve establishment, including organized and unor- 
ganized reserve personnel and war reserve of material. 

"43. (1) The adaptability of a nation to aeronautics. 

" Interest of the general public in aeronautics seems to be 
inherent in some nations; in others it is dormant or almost 
lacking. The confidence of a people in aeronautics in general is 
undoubtedly a factor worthy of serious consideration when 
estimating the air power of that country. It is possible that a 
far-seeing Government may stimulate the interest of its general 
public in aeronautics by exhibitions, general educational meas- 
ures, and by the encouragement in a financial way of individuals 
already interested, and thus increase the adaptability of its 
people to aeronautics. 

"44. (2) Geographic location and characteristics of the terri- 
tory occupied by the national and its dependencies. 

"This may be looked on as closely akin to (1). The physical 
characteristics of a country will have a considerable influence on 
the attitude taken by its inhabitants toward aviation. It is 
obvious that, while government action may improve the natural 
characteristics of a country to a certain degree, by making aero- 
domes, etc., it is not possible for any limitation of such action 
to be made except by limiting the total amount spent by the 
nation on aviation, a method which has already been shown 
to be largely ineffective. 

"45. (3) The ability to produce and maintain aircraft and 
accessories. «* 



POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT. 217 

" The maximum aeronautical industry possible for a nation to 
build up under ideal conditions is determined by (1) the extent to 
which manufacturing in general is carried on ; (2) by the character 
of articles manufactured; (3) by the manufacturing methods in 
general — that is, whether articles are manufactured by machinery 
or by hand; (4) the supply and availability of essential raw 
materials. In the manufacture of many articles the raw materials 
used and the manufacturing methods are similar to those em- 
ployed in the manufadkire of aircraft and accessories. The 
amount of this class of manufacturing carried on in any country 
is an essential factor in estimating the ability of a nation to 
produce aircraft. 

" The ability to expand an existing aeronautical industry rap- 
idly enough to meet war conditions is one of the most important 
elements of air power. This may be estimated by (1) the num- 
ber of individuals skilled in the manufacture of air craft and 
accessories; (2) the number of individuals whose training in 
industries similar to the aeronautical industry- forms a basis for 
learning readily and rapidly the special problems encountered in 
the manufacture of aircraft and accessories; (3) the size and 
condition of the existing aeronautical industries and the size 
and number of manufacturing concerns that can readily be con- 
verted to the manufacture of aircraft and accessories; (4) the 
existence of a definite program previously determined upon and 
the extent to which orders have been previously placed in an- 
ticipation of an emergency with a consequent perfection of plans ; 
(5) the amount and state of availability of the essential raw 
materials; (6) the quantity of available jigs, tools, dies, and pro- 
duction drawings for going into quantity production of standard 
equipment. 

" 46. (4) The amount and character of aeronautical activity 
outside the military establishment has been exhaustively dis- 
cussed under the limitation of civil and commercial aircraft. It 
has been shown that this is intimately bound up with (1) (2) 
and (3), as above, and that, with the exception of lighter-than- 
air craft of above a certain size, it is not practicable to limit it 
except perhaps by limiting the amount of subsidies to commercial 
aviation, a method which has been shown to be difficult of ap- 
plication and to be otherwise objectionable. It has also been 
shown that the limitation of lighter-than-air craft would have 
a disastrous effect on aviation. 

"47. (5) Existing establishment of aircraft used for military 
purposes and the reserve. 

" The size of the organized reserve will depend upon the size 
of the military establishment and the rate at which the mem- 
bers of the military establishment are trained and returned to 

25882—23—15 



218 FINAL CONCLUSION. 

civil pursuits. Any reduction in the permanent peace-time estab- 
lishment will carry with it a consequent reduction in organized 
and trained reserves. There is, however, a type of personnel 
whose civil pursuits fit them for immediate service in the air 
establishment. This class is made up by those engaged in com- 
mercial and civil aeronautics and industrial pursuits which re- 
quire the same trades and basic knowledge and experience as is 
required in the operation and maintenance of military aircraft. 
This class will not be seriously affected by any change in the 
military establishment. 

" 48. Technical considerations have led the committee to the 
conclusion that the limitation of the fifth element, namely, the 
size and efficiency of peace-time air establishments for military 
purposes (including the active establishment and the organized 
reserve), although theoretically possible, is not practicable. The 
committee also desires to lay stress on the fact that, even if such 
limitation was practicable, it would not prevent the use of air 
power in war, but^ould only operate to give greater comparative 
importance to the other elements of air power which can not be 
limited for the reasons given in the report. 

" FINAL CONCLUSION. • 

"Number and character. — The committee is of the opinion that 
it is not practicable to impose any effective limitations upon the 
numbers or characteristics of aircraft, either commercial or mili- 
tary, excepting in the single case of lighter-than-air craft. 

"Use. — The committee is of the opinion that the use of aircraft 
in war should be governed by the rules of warfare as adapted to 
aircraft by a further conference which should be held at a later 
date. 

" Respectfully submitted by committee on aircraft. 
" For the United States of America : 

" William A. Moffett, Chairman, 

" Rear Admiral, United States Navy. 
" Mason M. Patrick, 
" Major General, United States Army. 
" For the British Empire : 

" J. F. A, Higgins, 

" Air Vice Marshal, R. A. F. 



" For France 
" For Italy : 
" For Japan : 



" Albert Roper, Capitaine, 

" Pilot Aviateur, French Army. 

" Riccardo Moizo, 
" Colonel, R. I. A. 

" Osami Nagano, 
" Captain, I. J. N. 



CONSIDERATION OF REPORT. 219 

" Note. — The Italian representative believes and desires to 
place on record that one way in which it would be possible to 
limit the air power of a nation would be by placing a limit upon 
the number of pilots in the permanent military establishment and 
consequently agrees with the general reasoning of the report in 
so far as is not contrary to this opinion. ,. . 

"(Signed) Col. It. Moizo, 

" Riccardo Mozio, 
"Colonel, R. I. A." 

The chairman sa'd that the report was now before the com- 
mittee for such action as might be deemed advisable. 

Mr. Sarraut said that the report would have to be translated, 
and the reading of it alone would take some time ; the subject 
was not on the agenda. He believed that he voiced the opinion 
of his colleagues on the committee as well as his own in saying 
that under the conditions it would be advisable to afford time for 
the necessary examination of the contents of the report. 

The chairman said that, in view of the very short time there had 
been for the examination of the voluminous report, he thought 
that abundant time should be given for its consideration ; he had 
taken it up that morning merely because other subjects had been 
disposed of, and he thought that even a general statement might 
aid the committee in making progress with its work. He was 
not aware that the committee was prepared to take up another 
matter at that time, and he therefore suggested that, if that was 
agreeable to the committee, adjournment be taken until Monday. 

Lord Lee asked whether the chairman would give some indica- 
tion of what subject would be discussed after the report on air- 
craft ; from present indications the consideration of this report 
would take only a short time, and the British delegation would 
like to be prepared for what was to follow. 

The chairman said that three subcommittees had been appointed, 
one on gas, one on aircraft, and one on rules for the conduct of 
war. The committee had dealt with the report on gas and adopted 
a resolution ; it had had before it the report on aircraft. He 
understood that the subcommittee on rules of war believed that 
it would be impracticable, at this conference, to do more than 
suggest that these should be carefully examined and made the 
subject of consideration at another conference. If that was the 
sense of the conference, and no extended examination of the ques- 
tion was to be made, he supposed that the next order of business 
would be the consideration of the report of the details of the pro- 
posed naval treaty, with respect to all the matters which were 
then engaging the attention of the naval experts and the legal 
experts. He was unable to say whether that would be ready for 
the next session or not. He assumed that it was the next topic 



220 RULES OF WAR. 

to be taken up, if it was decided not to discuss rules for the con- 
duct of war. 

Mr. Balfour said that he had listened with great satisfaction to 
Mr. Hughes's observations on the report. As concerned a general 
revision of the rules of warfare, he said he was afraid he must dis- 
courage any attempt to deal with that tremendous subject. He 
was in some doubt as to whether it came within the list of sub- 
jects which his Government had authorized him to discuss ; but 
however this might be, he thought that all his colleagues would 
be wise to limit their ambitions in this direction as closely as 
he did. 

Sir Robert Borden said he had been much impressed with the 
suggestion of Lord Lee on a previous occasion that, should another 
great war break out, questions raised by the illegal use of subma- 
rines might arise concerning the use of aircraft in connection with 
the search, seizure, and capture of merchant vessels. Sir Robert 
Borden merely wished to remind his colleagues of this point with- 
out even suggesting that it should be considered by this conference. 
But the subject was, in one sense, connected with the conditions 
under which merchant ships might be ordered to stop and might 
be searched, seized, and eventually captured. This might be done 
by aircraft in the next war ; in the last war it had been governed 
by the rules as they were then understood, which had not been 
conformed to by one nation. If no principles were formulated, 
the powers might be confronted with the same problems with 
respect to aircraft. 

Lord Lee said that he was well aware of the importance of the 
point raised by Sir Robert Borden and that, in fact, it was the 
point he himself had brought to the notice of the conference. He 
supposed, however, that it would be in order for it to come under 
the second of the final conclusions of the report on the limitation 
of aircraft. If this conclusion should be accepted by the com- 
mittee, as Lord Lee assumed it probably would be, then the matter 
would go over to the further conference suggested therein — a 
course which he would not oppose. 

Senator Schanzer said he desired to add a few words in the 
same connection as those of Sir Robert Borden. The conclusion 
reached by the subcommittee of experts was that the conference 
should not attempt to fix rules for aircraft, and that this question 
should be referred to a future conference. He had at the present 
time no formal proposition to present, but he thought the matter 
ought to be discussed. He was entirely in accord with Mr. Bal- 
four, that the conference should not attempt to pass on the vast 
subject of the laws of war, as time did not permit of this ; but it 
was impossible not to consider the fact that certain laws previ- 
ously made — such as those contained in Mr. Root's resolutions re- 



EIGHTEENTH MEETING. 221 

garding submarines — had been reaffirmed at this conference ; in 
the same resolutions the powers represented on the committee had 
stigmatized the abuses of the submarine and had establ shed sanc- 
tions. It was impossible to forget the excesses committed by 
military means by the bombardment of open towns in Italy dur- 
ing the recent war. This had been forbidden by The Hague con- 
vention and, just as the committee had thought it necessary to 
condemn excesses committed in connection with submarine war- 
fare, would it not be helpful to condemn the excesses committed 
in connection with the bombing of open towns? He did not 
knew whether it was proper to suggest such a proposition at that 
time, but he thought that there should be a discussion of the 
matter for the purpose of ascertaining whether a resolution for- 
bidding the bombardment from the air of open towns and villages 
could not be formulated. 

The chairman said that if it were proposed to discuss the ques- 
tion of rules of war, except possibly in a very limited sphere, the 
committee would enter upon a field which, he assumed, would 
give it a great deal of concern and would require prolonged study 
and discussion. He did not suggest that the committee should 
not enter upon that field if the delegates desired that these sub- 
jects should be taken up. He supposed that the report on air- 
craft could be dealt w T ith, in its main features, in a comparatively 
short time. The report was voluminous, but that very fact led 
to an easy comprehension of the recommendations. If it was 
desired, in connection with the use of aircraft — for example, in 
relation to merchant ships and undefended towns — to bring for- 
ward specific resolutions, there would be opportunity to do so. 
He suggested, however, that the committee adjourn until Mon- 
day at 11 o'clock, and that it then proceed with the discussion 
of the aircraft report. If anything else was ready, when that 
had been disposed of, the committee would take it up. 

The committee then adjourned until Monday, January 9, 1922, 
at 11 o'clck a. m. 



EIGHTEENTH MEETING— MONDAY, JANUARY 9, 1922, 11 A. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by 
Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accom- 
panied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Air Marshal Higgins, Capt. Dom- 
vile, Mr. Malkin, Mr. Flint, Mr. Christie. 



222 NAVAL ARMAMENT TREATY. 

F,rance. — Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Admiral de Bon. Accom- 
panied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Mr. Ponson, Capt. 
Odend'hal, Capt. Roper. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral 
Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count 
Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral 
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Prof. Tachi, Mr. Sugimura, 
Mr. Shiratori, Mr. Ichihashi. 

The Secretary General, accompanied by Mr. Paul, Mr. Pierre- 
pont, and Mr. Wilson; Mr. Camerlynck and Mr t Talamon (inter- 
preters). 

1. The eighteenth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of 
Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American 
Building, at 11 a. m., January 9, 1922. 

2. There were present : For the United States, Mr. Hughes, 
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, 
Admiral Coontz ; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, 
Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert 
Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Mr. 
Sastri (for India) ; for France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Ad- 
miral de Bon ; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice 
Admiral Baron Acton ; for Japan, Admiral Baron Kato, Mr. Han- 
ihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. 

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were pres- 
ent : For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the 
British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Air Marshal Higgins, 
Capt. Domvile, Mr. Malkin, Mr. Flint, Mr. Christie; for France, 
Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Mr. Ponsot, Capt. Odend'hal, Capt. 
Roper ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Com- 
mander Prince Ruspoli ; for Japan, Prof. Tachi, Mr. Sugimura, 
Mr. Shiratori, Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary-general of the conference, assisted by Mr. Paul, 
Mr. Pierrepont, and Mr. Wilson, was present. Mr. Camerlynck 
and Mr. Talamon (interpreters) were also present. 

The chairman, Mr. Hughes, said that a draft of the proposed 
treaty relating to naval armament had been distributed, that 
morning. The advisers — that was to say, the naval experts and 
the legal experts — had been in consultation, and the draft rep- 
resented the points of their agreement. There were only one or 
two points upon which they had failed to agree. There was also 
a question as to form which he would not take up at this time. 

He had been in conference with the heads of the delegations 
who, in the interest of expedition, had agreed on this course of 
procedure. The heads of the delegations would call meetings 
that afternoon of their respective delegations and go over the 
provisions of this proposed treaty, to see whether there were any 



PROCEDURE. 223 

points upon which the naval experts had agreed which were not 
regarded as satisfactory to the delegations ; because, of course, 
it was submitted .by the experts for consideration, and their 
agreement was in no way binding upon the full committee. They 
would also take up with their respective delegations the matters 
which had been reserved by the experts for further consideration. 

On being advised that this work had been completed, the chiefs 
of delegations would meet and put the treaty into its final form 
for submission, in its entirety, to this committee, unless some 
question of broad policy of a distinctive character should be 
submitted which required special discussion in this committee. 
The reason for this procedure was, of course, that there were a 
multitude of details which had been thoroughly considered by 
naval experts and legal experts, and unless there was some broad 
question of policy it would serve no useful purpose to take up 
this treaty article by article in the full committee. There should, 
of course, be opportunity in each delegation for consideration of 
any points which it might be desired to present. 

The chairman merely announced this as a course of procedure 
agreed upon by the chiefs of delegations, which would postpone, 
for the time being, consideration of this proposed treaty. 

In the meantime, the chairman wished to suggest that this 
should be held in the strictest confidence. This was not a treaty. 
It was nothing but the agreement of the experts, and while it 
well might be found acceptable later, it was not in a shape to 
be communicated at this time to the public or to anyone outside 
those here responsible for its contents. 

The question next to come before the committee, the chairman 
went on to say, was raised by the subcommittee which had dealt 
with the matter of limitation of aircraft as to numbers, char- 
acter, and use. The committee would note the two recommenda- 
tions of the subcommittee or statements of its final conclusions. 

The first was as follows : 

" The committee is of the opinion that it is not practicable to 
impose any effective limitations upon the numbers or character- 
istics of aircraft, either commercial or military, excepting in the 
single case of lighter-than-air craft." 

The second was this : 

" The committee is of the opinion that the use of aircraft in 
war should be governed by the rules of warfare as adapted to 
aircraft by a further conference which should be held at a later 
date." 

It might be said that if it was the desire of this committee to 
adopt certain resolutions relating to the use of aircraft in war, 
as, for example, with respect to the bombardment of undefended 
towns and villages and the like, and also with respect to the 
limitation of the use of aircraft in connection with merchant 



224 LIMITATION OF AIRCRAFT. 

vessels under the rules of international law, as stated in the first 
resolution adopted with regard to submarines, those matters 
could be presented for consideration when • the second recom- 
mendation or conclusion of this report was taken up. 

The chairman suggested, therefore, that in the interest of speed 
the committee should confine itself, in the first instance, to the 
consideration of the first conclusion of the subcommittee, to wit, 
that it wa>s not practicable to impose any effective limitations 
upon the numbers or characteristics of aircraft, either com- 
mercial or military, except in the single case of lighter-than-air 
craft. 

He took the liberty of suggesting, further, that in consideration 
of this conclusion, discussion should at first be limited to heavier- 
than-air craft, in order not to deal with a matter which was 
treated as exceptional by the subcommittee, a matter, moreover, 
concerning which the subcommittee considered it practicable to 
impose effective limitation. 

If agreeable to the committee, in the interest of having the 
discussion directed to a precise point, the question presented was, 
that of the adoption of the conclusion of the subcommittee should 
now be considered, and that, aside from the case of lighter-than- 
air craft, it was not practicable to impose any effective limita- 
tions upon the numbers or characteristics of aircraft, either com- 
mercial or military. 

Senator Schanzer said that the subcommittee of experts had 
come to the conclusion that there was no practical method for 
limiting military and naval aviation. 

In the subcommittee the Italian member alone was of the 
opinion that such a limitation could be obtained by limiting the 
number of pilots of the permanent military organizations, and 
since the other powers were willing to accept the conclusions of 
the subcommittee and a proposal aiming at the limitation of air 
armaments would have no chance of being accepted at that time, 
the Italian delegation would limit themselves to expressing the 
desire that the future conference which would be called to study 
and define the laws of aerial warfare should take up again also 
the question of the limitation of aerial armament. 

The Italian delegation had always insisted on the limitati&n of 
armaments in all fields and would deem it regrettable that the 
competition which the conference had partially succeeded in 
excluding from naval armament, should be transferred to the 
domain of military and naval aviation; this would be a serious 
drawback to the work of the economical reconstruction of all 
the countries represented, which it was the duty of the delegates 
to have in view. 



DISCUSSION OF RULES. 



22 ;> 



Senator Underwood said that he had not expressed his views 
very much to the conference. He was in hearty accord with what 
they had done. He himself believed in real disarmament, look- 
ing to the permanent peace of the world, and he would be very 
glad to vote for the cutting out of any instrument of war if it 
really affected the situation; but heavier-than-air craft and 
lighter-than-air craft both were useful for land armament as well 
as sea armament. The man who was trained in one machine 
could fly in the other, and, in the main, the machine that might 
be used with land armies, with slight changes, could be used in' 
naval warfare. He personally would be very glad to see the 
question of limitation of land armament taken up, but he under- 
stood the conditions that confronted them and knew that it was 
not probable that it would come before this conference, for rea- 
sons that it was not necessary to go into, therefore it did not seem 
to him practicable to pass resolutions in reference to the limita- 
tion of aircraft at this time. For that reason, his view was in 
accord with the view of the technical subcommittee. 

Mr. Balfour said that it was impossible to resist the practical 
conclusions of the subcommittee on aircraft with regard to the 
limitation of heavier-than-air craft, which he understood was the 
point for immediate discussion. This was regrettable, because one 
must regret anything that restricted the power of the conference 
to limit armaments whether by land or sea or air. But the com- 
mittee had to accept the facts as they now appeared and leave it 
to some future time to deal with the subject, when the technical 
differentiation between war and peace aircraft should have become 
clearer. Senator Underwood had put with great force a further 
special obstacle that stood in the way at the moment. 

As he had shown, the conference was precluded from dealing 
with the larger problems of land armaments. Aircraft were a 
land arm as well as a naval arm. Accordingly, to deal with the 
limitation of aircraft at this time would be to deal with only a 
fraction of the subject of land armament and to leave wholly 
untouched the larger proportion of the great problems connected 
with it. There was another general argument pointing in the 
same direction. Unlike the case of submarines, in the case of air- 
craft military and civilian uses were not sharply divided. There 
was practically no commercial civil use for a submarine, but there 
were many who thought that the development of aerial invention 
was going to exert an immense influence upon the economic de- 
velopment of mankind and upon intercommunication of different 
peoples. In the present stage of their knowledge of air matters 
it seemed quite impossible to limit aircraft designed for military 
uses without also limiting aircraft designed for commercial uses; 



226 HEAVIER-THAN-AIR CRAFT. 

so that every restriction which could be put upon heavier-than-air 
craft would have a double reaction. It might, perhaps would, 
diminish the number of aircraft which could be used for military 
purposes, but it could not carry out that object without also 
diminishing the number of aircraft to be used for the peaceful 
purposes of international intercommunication. In those circum- 
stances he must admit with reluctance, but with a clear convic- 
tion, that probably the subcommittee were in the right when they 
said it would be quite hopeless, and not only hopeless but unde- 
sirable, to attempt at the present time and in the present stage 
of human knowledge to limit aircraft. He was therefore pre- 
pared to give his adhesion to the first part of the first resolution. 

Mr. Sarraut said that he had just listened to the presentation 
of a certain number of observations in consequence of which he 
desired to state that the French delegation gave its full assent 
to the first resolution proposed by the committee. 

The reasons adduced appeared to him excellent and the con- 
clusions reached by the impartial investigation of the exports 
was illuminating. 

If he might be permitted to express his personal point of view, 
lie would say that he still regarded with the greatest apprehension 
any act which might be of a nature to paralyze the progress of 
aviation. 

He had a profound belief in the beneficial effects to humanity 
of aviation. If it resulted in terrible engines of war, it might also 
be an instrument of the first importance in time of peace. 

Already indeed the airplane was used in the administration of 
those distant and desolate lands called great deserts by the 
experts, and where, more than anywhere else, suffering humanity 
had need of care and of assistance. In the French colonies, very 
serious efforts had been made to effect the long-distance trans- 
portation of essential articles and to bring medical and surgical 
assistance. Very important results had already been attained 
along these generous and humane lines. 

Under these conditions, it would be very wrong to do anything 
that might hamper the progress of aviation and it was with this 
understanding that the French delegation gave its full and entire 
adherence to the proposals of the committee. 

Admiral Baron Kato said that the question of aircraft did not 
demand elaborate discussion at present. He believed, however, 
that the time would come when it would be necessary to effect 
a limitation upon military aircraft. He agreed with the con- 
clusion of the subcommittee that it was impracticable at present 
to effect any limitation upon the use of " heavier-than-air " craft. 
He therefore accepted the proposal on behalf of the Japanese 
delegation. 



LIGHTER-THAN-AIR CRAFT. ' 227 

The chairman said that he thought that all felt a deep dis- 
appointment in being unable to suggest limitations on the use 
of aircraft in war or on the preparation of aircraft for mili- 
tary purposes. The committee knew full well that in aircraft 
there was probably the most formidable military weapon of the 
future. And yet, in addressing themselves as practical men, to 
the problem, the committee found no answer to the arguments 
which had been set forth succinctly, but most forcibly, by the 
technical subcommittee. 

The reason was, as had been well stated, that the committee 
was dealing in substance with facilities that were needed in the 
progress of civilization. It could not put a ban upon progress. 
The committee also knew, even if it prohibited all aircraft for 
military purposes and allowed the development of the art to 
meet the requirements of civil life, that in time of war the basis, 
of that development would be immediately available and within 
a short time provisions for any- possible military uses would be 
amply made. 

The question, therefore, reduced itself not to one of limitation 
of armament, but to a limitation of civil progress; and faced with 
that difficulty, there seemed to be no alternative but to adopt the 
first resolution so far as it applied, as it did apply, exclusively 
to heavier-than-air craft. 

This appeared to be the sense of the committee. 

The chairman then said that the next question was whether it 
would be deemed practicable to impose a limitation in the case of 
lighter- than-air craft. He called their attention to what the sub- 
committee had said with regard to this subject. The statement 
was very short, and it brought the point quite clearly before the 
committee and, with its permission, he would read it. The sub- 
committee said : 

" Many of the remarks already made apply to lighter-than-air 
craft but, as in the case of commercial aircraft of this nature, 
limitation is both possible and practicable. It is unnecessary to re- 
capitulate the argument that the military value of a dirigible is 
dependent on its size, and the size of dirigibles and the number 
maintained can be limited by agreement of a few simple rules. 
Infraction of such rules can be rapidly ascertained without de- 
tailed inspection. But such a limitation of lighter-than-air avi- 
ation forces would not effect a limitation of this kind of air power 
of a nation unless a limitation were also imposed on its lighter- 
than-air commercial activities. The line of demarcation between 
the large commercial airships and the military airship is very 
slight, and a commercial dirigible would require little, if any, al- 
teration in order to adopt it to military purposes. The objec- 
tions to the limitation of the number or character of commercial 
lighter-than-air craft have already been remarked on." 



228 CONSIDERATION OF RESOLUTION. 

That allusion was, apparently, to the fact previously empha- 
sized in the report as follows: 

"As regards the desirability of limitations, the committee has 
touched on those factors which must be understood before arriv- 
ing at a decision. It feels it to be a duty to lay great stress upon 
the following fact which will have a decided bearing upon any 
determination of the proper policy to be adopted ; any limitation 
as to the number and character of civil and commercial aircraft, 
heavier than air or lighter than air, which is efficacious to hinder 
their utility for war purposes, must interfere disastrously with 
the natural development of aeronautics for legitimate civil and 
commercial enterprises. To limit the science of aeronautics in its 
present state is to shut the door on progress. It is for the con- 
ference to decide whether the limitations which can with diffi- 
culty be devised and imposed are to be adopted at such a cost." 

It was, therefore, the chairman stated, practicable to impose a 
limitation, by agreement, upon the size of dirigibles. Questions as 
to limitations of number could be considered separately, but 
certainly it was practicable to impose a limitation upon size. The 
question was whether it was desirable to do so, in view of the 
fact that commercial dirigibles could be converted into military 
dirigibles ; and therefore the question was whether the advantage 
in the limitation of armament — that is, in having an agreed limit 
of the size of dirigibles, was so great that it offset the disadvan- 
tage of limiting the size of dirigibles for commercial purposes. 
The chairman presented that question for discussion. 

No one desired to discuss the matter. 

The chairman then asked whether it was the desire of the com- 
mittee to state as its conclusion, in view of the arguments pre- 
sented by the subcommittee, that it was not practicable to impose 
limitations upon lighter-than-air craft, or it was their desire to 
present a resolution containing such a limitation. 

Senator Sclianzer said that he only desired to ask the chairman 
if the first proposal, which made an exception for lighter-than-air 
craft, were approved, might it not seem that the exception were 
approved also. He suggested the elimination of the words " ex- 
cepting in the single case of lighter-than-air craft." 

The chairman said that the suggestion of Senator Schanzer was 
that it would accomplish the purpose, if it was not proposed to put 
a limitation upon lighter-than-air craft, to adopt the conclusion of 
the subcommittee, leaving out the last clause, so that the sense of 
this committee would be stated as follows : 

" The committee is of the opinion that it is not practicable to 
impose any effective limitations upon the numbers or charac- 
teristics of aircraft, either commercial or military." 

The chairman said that it was suggested by Mr. Balfour that 
the words " at present " should be inserted before " practicable." 



VOTE ON RESOLUTION. 229 

That seemed to be a very good suggestion ; because that was what 
they were doing — not indicating that in the future it would not 
become practicable. Then the resolution would read: 

" The committee is of the opinion that it is not at present 
practicable to impose any effective limitations upon the numbers 
or characteristics of aircraft, either commercial or military." 

He then asked for an assent to this, and it was unanimously 
adopted. 

The chairman then said that the next topic for discussion was 
the final recommendation or conclusion of the subcommittee, as 
follows : 

" The committee is of the opinion that the use of aircraft in war 
should be covered by the rules of warfare as adapted to aircraft, 
by a further conference which should be held at a later date." 

The subcommittee had taken occasion to review the difficulties, 
at the present conference, in adopting detailed rules of war. 

It was quite apparent, however, that the late war had revealed 
the imperative necessity for the adoption of new rules of warfare, 
and that these new rules of warfare should be framed so as to 
take into account the development of the science of aeronautics 
and its application to war. It would require, he assumed, a com- 
mittee of jurists, sitting for a considerable time, to develop de- 
tailed rules of war ; and in that sense this recommendation of the 
committee would commend itself. It did not follow, however, that 
it would not be practicable, as to certain simple cases of abuses, 
to indicate the opinion of this committee, and, indeed, to reach 
an agreement on the part of the nations represented, which would 
prevent the recurrence of atrocities which shocked mankind when 
committed during the late war. 

He might say that the advisory committee of the American dele- 
gation had adopted a report of a subcommittee, of which Gen. 
Pershing was the chairman, in the following words : 

" The use of aircraft in war should be in accordance with the 
rules of land warfare, by which the attack or bombardment by 
whatever means of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings that 
are undefended is prohibited. The bombardment of fortified 
places, or of munition factories, is legitimate, but cities and towns, 
unless defended, should be spared, and every safeguard should be 
invoked to protect noncombatants against attack from the air." 

He saw no reason why this conference, while recognizing the 
necessity of a deliberate consideration, by an appropriate com- 
mission of jurists, of detailed rules of land warfare, should not 
adopt a simple declaration of that kind. 

Senator Schanzer, he concluded, had stated that he desired to 
bring forward a resolution for that purpose. 

Senator Schanzer said that the Italian delegation approved the 
proposal which aimed at the convocation of a conference for the 



230 AIRCRAFT AND BOMBARDMENT. 

study of the rules of aerial warfare; but they believed that cer- 
tain principles of international law existed in relation to the use 
of aerial weapons, which deserved to be solemnly proclaimed by 
the present conference. 

Since the Italian delegation accepted, for humane reasons, 
the prohibition of the use of submarines for the destruction of 
merchant vessels, they felt it their duty now, consistent with 
principles of justice and coherence, to advance in their turn a 
proposal concerning the use of military airplanes and airships 
and of all other warlike weapons for the bombardment of open 
towns. 

Everybody recalled the horrors and atrocities perpetrated by 
the Germans and their allies during the last war, when open 
towns were bombarded with so large a sacrifice of lives of noncom- 
batants — women and children. ' In certain countries many towns 
suffered by such bombardments, which were a menace not only to 
the peaceful inhabitants, but also to historic buildings, to monu- 
ments, to immortal works of art which certain towns possessed, 
and which were the patrimony not only of the towns directly 
smitten, or of the nation to which the town belonged, but of the 
whole of humanity. 

Senator Schanzer then read the following draft resolution: 

"The signatory powers, desiring to secure the enforcement of 
the rules of international law tending to the prohibition of the 
bombardment of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, and build- 
ings by aircraft, declare that they consider the said prohibition 
as part of the existing international law, and agree to be bound 
thereby as between themselves and to invite all other civilized 
nations to adhere thereto." 

Admiral de Bon said he fully subscribed to the views expressed 
by Senator Schanzer. The French delegation considered that 
the conference which was to examine into the laws of aerial 
warfare might advantageously establish rules ; but Admiral de 
Bon wished to recall the fact that the matter of the bombardment 
of unfortified cities was provided for in The Hague convention of 
1907, which stated in article 25 : 

"It is forbidden to attack or to bombard by any means what- 
ever, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings that are not de- 
fended." 

What this conference was about to do was, therefore, already 
regulated by international law. During the late war unforti- 
fied cities were attacked not only by airplanes, but by land and 
naval artillery. Thus, in the first period of the war, the ports of 
northern Africa were bombarded by German cruisers. There al- 
ready existed, therefore, principles of international law to which 
appeal might be made. 



UNDEFENDED TOWNS. 231 

Mr. Root said that there was some uncertainty, or alleged uncer- 
tainty, in the application of The Hague rule regarding the bom- 
bardment of undefended towns to the action of aircraft. Of 
course, when the rule limited bombardment to defended towns, 
when it prohibited the bombardment of undefended towns, it had 
reference to military or naval operations against towns that 
afforded military obstacles to those operations, and as to those 
towns the provision was at the commander should notify the de- 
fended place, so that the civilians might have an opportunity to 
withdraw. As to the undefended towns, no one must bombard 
them at all. 

Now, those distinctions did not seem to fit bombardments from 
the sky. No town was defended against such bombardment. If 
the rule were strictly applied, it did not prohibit the bombardment 
of: Paris because of the fortifications surrounding Paris. It was a 
defended town. Most of the cities in Europe had somei sort of 
defenses. 

He fully sympathized with the view which Senator Schanzer 
took. If the committee were going to act, he wished Senator 
Schanzer would apply his very acute intellect toward making this 
rule more definitely applicable to the existing circumstances of 
aircraft and towns defended as against land attacks, but wholly 
undefended as against air attacks, and resolve the uncertainty that 
resulted from the fact that the rules were not made for air at- 
tacks. He thought the committee would render very useful serv- 
ice if it could do that, far beyond merely repeating a rule and 
leaving this uncertainty. 

When one considered these two rules, that a defended town 
must not be bombarded without notice sufficient to enable the 
innocent — the women and the children and noncombatants — to 
withdraw, and that an undefended town must not be bombarded at 
all, when one considered those two rules, the spirit of them could 
prevent aircraft from bombarding any town whatever. Bombard 
a railroad junction, a station crossing? Yes. Bombard a muni- 
tions factory? Yes. But the center of an innocent population? 
No ; not under any circumstances at all. For that reason, Mr. 
Root concluded, the rule was inadequate, and if the committee 
were going to speak they ought to make it adequate. 

Senator Schanzer said the question of the bombardment of open 
towns had been raised because the experiences of the last war had 
been such that it appeared desirable that the rules of international 
law concerning this matter should be newly reaffirmed. 

Since the draft resolution proposed had raised some doubts as to 
its interpretation, he did not insist on the formula he had pre- 
sented, as the committee on the rules of war would be able to 
study the argument more thoroughly. The important thing for 



232 FURTHER CONSIDERATION. 

him to record was that from the discussion which had taken place, 
the full adherence of all the delegations to the principle he had 
supported, appeared quite clearly. He noted with pleasure the 
statements made in this regard by Admiral de Bon and Mr. Root. 

Admiral de Bon stated that the French delegation agreed 
wholly with Senator Schanzer and shared his opinion that un- 
fortified cities should not be bombarded. 

Mr. Balfour said that he entirely agreed with the views ex- 
pressed by Senator Schanzer and Admiral de Bon. 

The chairman asked whether it was Senator Schanzer's desire 
that the resolution be put to a vote. 

Senator Schanzer said that he would not insist, as the com- 
mittee had fully expressed the sense of the proposal. 

The chairman said there seemed to be general acceptance of 
the spirit and purpose of the proposal made by Senator Schanzer. 
It was obvious from the discussion that in detail the matter was 
one which, like other rules relating to war, would require the 
most careful and probably protracted consideration of a commis- 
sion of jurists, in order that the new situations which had been 
developed should be carefully considered, and rules framed with 
precision to meet them. 

The chairman said that the committee was now considering the 
recommendation of the subcommittee that rules of warfare should 
be considered by a further conference. He suggested for the 
consideration of the committee that instead of taking that course, 
provision should be made for the creation through the action of 
the powers here represented, of a commission of jurists, which 
should, at an early date, take into consideration the question of 
rules of war which seemed to be demanded by new exigencies 
and revelations on the adaptation of new instruments of war- 
fare to the end that recommendations might be presented to the 
powers for their acceptance. The chairman feared that a future 
conference, for example, dealing with a question of this technical 
character — technical in the sense that it would require very close 
study by jurists — would find itself much in the same position 
that the committee was in ; it would have to wait until it was 
advised by legal experts. 

Perhaps the best form that this could be put in, and the most 
practical action, would be for the powers here to agree to desig- 
nate members of a commission of jurists, who should make a 
report and recommendations. 

Sir Robert Borden said that at the previous meeting he had 
made a suggestion on this subject. He was, however, quite con- 
tent that what he had said then should be left for the considera- 
tion of the proposed future conference or commission. Even a 



QUESTION OF REFERENCE. 233 

commission of jurists would find extreme difficulty in dealing 
with a question so complicated in its nature. It was obvious 
that the present conference could not deal with it satisfactorily. 
Senator Root had observed that a railway junction or a muni- 
tion factory might properly be subjected to bombardment. But 
inasmuch as modern warfare by its very nature involved all the 
energies of each nation engaged, it would be found that railway 
junctions, munition factories, and other such points of attack 
were everywhere scattered among the habitations of the innocent 
population. Accordingly, it would be necessary to consider how 
far and by what restrictions the bombardment of such points 
could be prevented ; and, on the other hand, to consider whether 
it would be feasible to prohibit absolutely any attacks on such 
war objectives. The subject was an entirely proper one for 
some future commission or tribunal, but it. should be considered 
whether or not the establishment of such a commission could be 
appropriately confined to the five powers here represented. 

The chairman replied that it was his idea that it should not be 
so confined, but that the representatives of the five nations should 
initiate the project. He said that he supposed that a resolution 
for the constitution of such a commission of jurists would have to 
be considered most carefully in order that it should be framed 
with precision and that it might well be committed to the com- 
mittee on drafting with instructions to bring in an appropriate 
resolution to the end sought. It might be sufficient now to de- 
clare the adherence of the committee in principle to this, that the 
nations here represented should provide for the appointment of 
a commission of jurists to consider the rules of war which were 
effected by the events of the late war, and also require investi- 
gation in the light of the development of new agencies of war- 
fare ; and he would ask if there was any objection to adherence 
to that principle, leaving the precise resolution to be formulated 
by the committee on drafting. 

Mr. Balfour said that he thought the chairman was well ad- 
vised in saying that this matter should probably be considered a 
little more closely than it was possible to consider it on an occa- 
sion like the present or in the present assembly. Therefore he 
welcomed the view that the matter should go before the drafting 
committee. He had, however, two suggestions to make which 
he hoped the drafting committee would consider. The first was 
that it would be most inadvisable, in his opinion, to limit the 
matter to jurists. That was a point which concerned not merely 
the framing of the law or the mode of fitting into the general 
t'ssue of our system of international law any new laws or rules 
that might he devised. For that purpose no doubt jurists were 
essential, and jurists should play a very great part in any inquiry 
such as that now proposed. But, after all, the people who had 

25882—23 10 



234 QUESTIONS FOR JURISTS. 

seen those instruments at work, who knew what those instru- 
ments had involved in the past and what they were likely to 
involve in the future, should have more to say in regard to the 
fram.ng of such rules than the most expert authority upon inter- 
national law. He thought that they should play a not less im- 
portant part in any inquiry which was made on the subject. 

He did not know whether his second suggestion would meet 
with general approval, but he would very much like to see the 
area of inquiry reasonably limited. International law, and espe- 
cially international law dealing with the laws of war, was ex- 
traordinarily complicated. He could not deny that it ought to 
be dealt with, and he could not see how anybody could deny it. 
For himself he could not refuse to accept the proposition that 
the mere fact of development of methods of warfare carried with 
it an almost inevitable corollary that the rules of warfare should 
be -revised. But that subject was so complex and so enormous 
and was so certain to lead to much difference of opinion within 
the committee of experts and jurists that he would like to divide 
such an inquiry into two parts. The part of the general inquiry 
in which they were most interested, which had most usefully 
occupied some of the attention of the conference, was really 
adequately described in the list on the agenda which the chair- 
man had brought forward on behalf of the Department of State 
at the beginning of their labors. Among the subdivisions on the 
subject of limitation of armaments there was the following sub- 
heading : " Rules for the control of new agencies of warfare." 
It seemed to him if that conference would limit, at all events in 
the first instance, the work of the mixed committee of experts 
and jurists to rules for the control of new agencies of warfare, 
they would be more likely to come to a speedy conclusion and 
much more likely to obtain a conclusion which would be unani- 
mously adopted. He therefore suggested for the consideration of 
all his colleagues around that table whether that humbler but 
still all-important subject would not be sufficiently wide in its 
scope to occupy the attention of even the most powerful com- 
mittee which they were able to provide for its investigation. 

The chairman said that there was great force in the suggestions 
made by Mr. Balfour, and he, personally, had not the slightest 
objection to their adoption. It was not at all the intention that 
this proposed commission should consist of jurists who would 
work in disregard of the recommendations of technical experts. 
He supposed that the jurist representing each country would be 
advised very fully of all technical matters by both military and 
naval experts, but that when it came to the point of formulating 
the legal rules which should be adopted it would require the 
special training of jurists in order that the information and 
advice and proposals furnished by military and naval experts 



NINETEENTH MEETING. 235 

could be adequately considered and those which were adopted 
suitably expressed. There was not, however, the slightest ob- 
jection to having the commission itself enlarged, if that would 
seem to be desirable. He had found, however, that when it came 
to a question of drafting rules, the fewer there were who were 
actually engaged in the work the better the prospect of success ; 
and while each one charged with the responsibility should have 
all the information available and the aid of all the experts who 
could possibly throw light upon the subject, a very few men 
competent in drafting, associated together for that purpose, 
could accomplish much more than a large committee. 

He also felt the force of the suggestion of limiting the scope 
of the inquiry. That was very carefully considered when the 
tentative agenda was suggested, and the proposal made to which 
Mr. Balfour had referred. 

It seemed to the chairman that the question of the method of 
constituting the commission and the scope of the inquiry to be 
intrusted to it could well be committed to the consideration of 
the committee on draft and the committee could await their 
recommendation. If that was agreeable to the delegates, he 
would simply assent in principle to the constitution of a commis- 
sion for the purpose of dealing with the subject of rules of war- 
fare in the light of the developments of the recent war. 

Mr. Balfour said that, while he was perfectly ready to have 
the matter referred to the drafting committee, he would like to 
have reservations limiting the scope of the drafting committee's 
work, and asked the chairman's advice as to Lew this result 
might be attained. 

The chairman assumed that both of the suggestions Mr. Bal- 
four had made should be deemed as referred to the subcommittee 
on drafting and that it would take those into consideration as 
well as others that might be advanced in the course of the dis- 
cussion, and that the committee should bring in a recommenda- 
tion, which could then be discussed in the light of the arguments 
advanced for its support. 

Mr. Balfour said that would be satisfactory. 

After a vote was taken the chairman announced that the sug- 
gestions as to the references to the drafting committee were 
unanimously approved. 

Thereupon, the committee adjourned until Tuesday, January 
10, 1922, at 11 o'clock a. m. 



NINETEENTH MEETING— FRIDAY, JANUARY 27, 1922, 4.15 P. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood. Accompanied by Mr. Wright. 



236 COMMISSION ON LAWS OF WARFARE. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes ; 
for Australia, Senator Pearee. Accompanied by Mr. Christie, Mr. 
Bajpai. 
- France. — Mr. Kammerer. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini. Accompanied by- 
Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano. 

Japan. — Baron Shidehara, Mr. Hanihara. Accompanied by Mr. 
Saburi, Mr. Tomita. 

The secretary general. Assisted by Mr. Pierrepont and Mr. 
Osborne. Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter. 

1. The Nineteenth Meeting of the Committee on the Limitation 
of Armament was held Friday, January 27, 1922, in the Columbus 
Room of the Pan American Building at 4.15 p. m. 

2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, 
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood; for the British 
Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Senator 
Pearee (for Australia) ; for France, Mr. Kammerer; for Italy, 
Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini ; for Japan, Baron Shidehara, 
Mr. Hanihara. 

Secretaries and advisers present included : For the United 
States, Mr. Wright ; for the British Empire, Mr. Christie, Mr. 
Bajpai ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano ; 
for Japan, Mr. Saburi, Mr. Tomita. 

The secretary general of the conference, assisted by Mr. Pierre- 
pont and Mr. Osborne, was present. Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter, 
was also present. 

3. The chairman (Mr. Hughes) called for any outstanding 
reports from subcommittees. 

Mr. Root said he was instructed by the subcommittee, the five- 
power drafting committee, to report that they had agreed upon 
the following resolution : 

" Resolution for a commission of jurists. — The United States of 
America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan have 
agreed : 

" I. That a commission composed of not more than two members 
representing each of the above-mentioned powers shall be con- 
stituted to consider the following questions : 

"(a) Do existing rules of international law adequately cover 
new methods of attack or defense resulting from the introduction 
or development, since the Hague Conference of 1907, of new 
agencies of warfare? 

"(&) If not so, what changes in the existing rules ought to be 
adopted in consequence thereof as a part of the law of nations? 

" II. That notices of appointment of the members of the com- 
mission shall be transmitted to the Government of the United 
States of America within three months after the adjournment of 
the present conference, which after consultation with the powers 



TWENTIETH MEETING. 



237 



concerned will fix the day and place for the meeting of the 
commission. 

" III. That the commission shall be at liberty to request as- 
sistance and advice from experts in international law and in land, 
naval, and aerial warfare. 

" IV. That the commission shall report its conclusions to each of 
the powers represented in its membership. 

" Those powers shall thereupon confer as to the acceptance of 
the report and the course to be followed to secure the considerar 
tion of its recommendations by the other civilized powers.' 

The chairman asked whether discussion of the resolution was 
desired. No discussion being desired, the delegations were polled, 
each voted affirmatively, and the chairman announced that the 
resolution had been unanimously adopted. 

The chairman then asked whether there was any further 
business. 

Mr. Kammerer asked whether it would not be advisable to em- 
body this resolution in the text of the agreement in regard to sub- 
marines and the use of poisonous gases in warfare. 

Mr. Root said he thought Mr. Kammerer's suggestion might in- 
volve a little difficulty in procedure. Under the provisions regard- 
ing submarines and gas, the adherence of other powers was to be 
immediately requested. He thought that it would be unwise to 
complicate that with this other provision, under which there would 
be no adherence called for until after a report of the commission 
and the acceptance of it by the five powers, after which the ad- 
herence of other powers would be called for. Provisions which 
called for no adherence by other powers would thus be put into 
the treaty, together with provisions which called for immediate 
adherence. 

The chairman said that, if there was nothing further to be done 
at the present time, and if agreeable to the committee, adjourn- 
ment might be taken. Of course, as soon as the Naval Treaty 
was in readiness, the chairman would call a meeting of the 
committee. 

The committee then adjourned, subject to the call of the chair. 



TWENTIETH MEETING— TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1922, 3.30 P. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. 
Clark. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden j[for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zp-h- 



238 PROPOSED NAVAL TREATY. 

land), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Mr. Christie, Mr. 
Malkin, Mr. Mousley. 

France. — Mr. Jusserand. Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. 
Ponsot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Alber- 
tini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Count Pagli- 
ano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Bruno Averardi. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Baron Shidehara, Mr. Hanihara. 
Accompanied by Capt. Uj^eda, Mr. Sugimura, Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general. Accompanied by Mr. Cresson, Mr. 
Pierrepont, Mr. Wilson. Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter. 

1. The twentieth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of 
Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American 
Building on Tuesday, January 31, 1922, at 3.30 p. m. 

2. There were present : For the United States, Mr. Hughes, Sen- 
ator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Admiral Coontz ; for 
the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New 
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, Mr. Jusserand; 
for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Al- 
bertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton ; for Japan, Admiral Baron 
Kato, Baron Shidehara, Mr. Hanihara. 

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were pres- 
ent : For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark ; for the Brit- 
ish Empire, Mr. Christie, Mr. Malkin, Mr. Mousley ; for France, 
Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Ponsot ; for Italy, Count Pagliano, Comman- 
der Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Bruno Averardi ; for Japan, Capt. Uyeda, 
Mr. Sugimura, Mr. Ichihashi. 

The secretary general of the conference, assisted by Mr. Cres- 
son, Mr. Pierrepont, "and Mr. Wilson, was present. Mr. Camer- 
lynck (interpreter) was also present. 

The chairman, Mr. Hughes, said he was glad to be able to re- 
port, from the subcommittee of fifteen which had had in charge 
the consideration of the proposals relating to the limitation of 
naval armament, that a conclusion had been reached unanimously 
and embodied in a proposed naval treaty. He presented the 
treaty to the committee. It was somewhat long, and he would not 
attempt to read it. He assumed that it had been considered by 
each delegation, as it had been passed upon by the chiefs of dele- 
gations, with their experts, meeting in the subcommittee of fifteen. 
Of course, if it was desired by any of the delegates that the treaty 
should be reviewed at this time, article by article, that course 
would be taken. If he was right in the assumption that each 
*hief of delegation had been over the treaty with his delegation, the 
chairman assumed that the committee could at once act upon it. 
The action he suggested was that the proposed form of treaty, as 



FRENCH OBSERVATIONS. 



239 



passed by the subcommittee of fifteen, which embodied the con- 
clusions reached with respect to the limitation of naval armament, 
be approved and reported to the conference at the plenary session 
which would be held the following day. The chairman asked if 
that course was agreeable. 

As all delegations assented, the chairman said it was so ordered. 

Mr. Jusserand said : 

" Mr. President, I beg leave to submit to the committee a few 
observations. I should have liked to have presented them some 
time ago, but circumstances did not permit. There were other 
questions that came up besides this one of naval disarmament, 
and it was moreover difficult to explain myself without getting the 
necessary documents which were not very easy to procure. 

" In the course of the last few weeks the country that I have 
represented in America for nearly 20 years has been censured with 
extreme severity, and I might use another word. The letters I 
have been receiving, the articles I have read, the conversations in 
which I have taken part, all this shows that a very grave misun- 
derstanding is persisting in the minds of many as to the ideas of 
France, her faith and her aspirations. Many people continue to 
believe that although we are poor — and we are poor for reasons 
of which we are not ashamed — although we are poor, that we 
wanted to establish a great navy composed of big warships. 
JN T othing of the kind. We are thinking only of the future time 
when that might be necessary, and when we might become less 
poor, in order that we might resume on the high seas the rank 
which we have ever held. 

" To which I shall add : Of the countries which we expected to 
approve this ambition, our great maritime neighbor was, in our 
opinion, to be the foremost, since there are so many chances that 
our fleet may prove of use to Great Britain, and none I think that 
it should be harmful to her. In the course of the last hundred 
\ ears three great wars have taken place in the world in which the 
British and French fleets have participated, and in these three 
wars they fought side by side for the same cause. Can anything 
different be imagined? We do not think so, we of France. And 
even if our English friends adopted a different opinion, we would 
not change ours. > 

" But the chief blame aimed at us has had for its cause the ques- 
tion of the submarines. People continue to be persuaded that we 
have a passion for these loathed machines and want to use them 
German fashion. All this is chiefly grounded on remarks made 
by the First Lord of the Admiralty at the sitting of December 30 ; 
they had an immense effect, still lasting, and were very hurtful to 
us. They were based on an article by Commander Castex, pub- 
lished in January, 1920, which is now famous but was not before, 
and I had trouble to find a copy to read. 



240 CAFE. CASTEX ON SUBMARINE. 

" I have done so and found that, as for the tone of the article, 
it is rather paradoxical. The author passes sweeping judgments 
on many men and problems, and there are a number of points on 
which I disagree with him. He obviously finds pleasure in upset- 
ting commonly prevailing ideas; he generously distributes blame 
to many, to the English, to the Germans, to the French. 

"As to the substance of the article, its purpose — which could not 
be suspected from the extracts read to this committee — is to show 
the uselessness of privateering and " guerre de course " under any 
form, unless the country that has recourse to it is in actual posses- 
sion of the high seas, through the number and force of her main 
ships. The author glances at the past, examines the fate of the 
great perturbers of the peace throughout ages, who thought 
they could win through their corsairs. But they lost the game. 
Whether they used wood or steel ships, sailing vessels or steam- 
ships, surface or submarine vessels, all under the same delusion, 
lacking a big fleet, they failed. He quotes the example of Louis 
XIV, of Napoleon the First, of the South in the Civil War, and 
lastly of the Germans in the great war, concluded by our common 
victory. 

" Such is the purpose of the article. The quotations made 
from it by Lord Lee had for their object, I take it, to prove 
against Commander Castex, and as a consequence against 'our 
naval authorities, not to say against France herself, four 
things : 

" First, that Capt. Castex is in favor of the hated submarine, 
the suppression of which is demanded by Great Britain from 
motives of humanity. Capt. Castex's belief is, as I have said, 
that the submarine may be useful to those who hold the mastery 
of the seas, an opinion which is not unfavorable to Great Brit- 
ain. He is not, moreover, the onty one to think that this device 
must continue to exist. In support of this assertion I beg to 
quote an authority which certainly our British friends will not 
decline to accept. 

"'To go to the other extreme, as was suggested in some quar- 
ters after the armistice, and prohibit submarines altogether, is 
an equally, unacceptable proposal. It is clear that, as in the 
case of mines, the weaker naval States would never consent to 
forego the right to employ such a useful defensive weapon as the 
submarine. Moreover, the idea of submersible warships is still 
comparatively new, and future developments may entirely change 
the aspect of this question. The only reasonable attitude to 
adopt is to insist that such vessels shall be subject to the same 
rules of warfare as any other type of warship.' 

" This is drawn from the Law of Naval Warfare by J. A. Hall, 
lecturer on international law to admirals' secretaries' course, 
Portsmouth, second edition, London, 1921, p. 77. 



BRITISH COMMENT ON CAPT. CASTEX. 241 

" Second, Commander Castex is charged witli seeing in the 
submarine a weapon for France — for ungrateful, therefore, and 
perfidious France — to smash the naval power of her present ally 
Great Britain. Lord Lee quoted a paragraph as follows : 

" ' Thanks to the submarine, after many centuries of effort, 
thanks to the ingenuity of man, the instrument, the system, the 
martingale is at hand which will overthrow for good, and all the 
naval power of the British Empire.' 
" Lord Lee then spoke as follows : 

" ' I have quoted this because, as I say, they are the utterances 
of a responsible member of the French naval staff, who at the 
time of writing was in a high position and was the actual head 
of a bureau. 

" ' These things are.kno-wn to our naval staff of course; indeed 
they were published to the world under the authority of the 
French naval staff.' 

" The words ' will overthrow for good and all the naval power 
of the British Empire,' are not the words of a Frenchman, nor 
words that any Frenchman would approve. The quotation as 
given by Lord Lee began by three words indispensable for the 
understanding of the whole, which he did not include. They 
were : ' This is the way the Germans are reasoning.' Commander 
Castex was citing the point of view of the Germans, not the 
point of view of the French. The mistake is the more difficult 
to understand since not once but twice Commander Castex took 
the same precaution, saying on the preceding page : - ' For our 
enemies these ships did represent, or at least they thought so, the 
new engine, the technical and material upsetting that was going 
to make every old teaching obsolete.' 

" More than that, the very title of the article leaves no doubt 
as to its purport. In its complete form, which had not been 
quoted, it reads, ' Synthesis of submarine warfare — Character- 
istics of the German submarine warfare.' If, therefore, on ac- 
count of those lines of Commander Castex cause for anxiety is 
found about something, it must be about the German enemies and 
not the French friends of Great Britain. 

" Third, Commander Castex has been represented as approving 
of the infamous use made of submarines by Germany. All 
should be at a loss to understand how this claim could, have been 
made, since the French officer expressed himself formally, clearly, 
and peremptorily in the opposite sense. After having said that 
the Germans could not be blamed simply because they used the 
submarine, he adds : ' The only reproach that can be set up 
against them is to have too frequently and in too many particular 
cases smeared their flag by conducting submarine warfare with 
barbarity and with an aggravation of odious acts. A useless 
and, moreover, a stupid cruelty, for it served in no way the pur- 



242 CONDEMNATION OF GERMAN WAR. 

pose of the war, and because in the end it turned against their 
own interest by raising against them the unanimous condemna- 
tion of the consc'ence of the civilized people of the world.' 

"Am I not entitled to maintain not only that Commander Cas- 
tex was not approving of these German ways and means but that 
he expressly condemned them? 

" Commander Castex was also stated by Lord Lee to have made 
his own the views of Admiral Aube ( a man of wild theories, whom 
I have well known, who, desiring the end of all wars, fancied 
that the ruthless use of torpedo boats would bring that to pass), 
but Commander Castex did not approve those views, he just 
blamed them, a difference worth noting. 

" Fourth, it has also been said that Commander Castex was 
probably teaching in the French naval schools the theories thus 
attributed to him ; and it has been said in such unkind and cruel 
words that my heart is still bleeding at the thought of them. 
Those words were as follows : 

" ' Now, this officer, who is appointed principal lecturer to the 
senior officers' course, will, no doubt, unless a change of policy 
takes place, be pouring what we regard as this infamy and this 
poison into the ears of the serving officers of the French navy.' 

" The answer to this," Mr. Jusserand continued, " is twofold 
and simple enough. There is no need for us to change our policy. 
Commander Castex can not teach what has been called that 
infamy, first, because he detests it ; second, because his course of 
lectures has nothing to do with submarines, his subject being the 
organization of the general, staff. 

"The subject is so grave that I want to let you know what is 
actually taught in French naval schools as to the submarine and 
the German way of using it. The following extract will enlighten 
you: 

" 'The submarine weapon has turned round against the raving- 
maniacs who employed it and Germany's misfortune came not 
only from the defeat of her land armies, but in a very large 
measure from the incomprehension of those who, in her camp, 
have ordered it. 

" 'The privateers' war is forbidden in the form which has been 
given it by the Germans. That the Germans may have consid- 
ered the most solemn engagements as scraps of paper is their 
business. But it does not behoove Frenchmen to follow such 
shameful examples. The life of human societies, like that of 
men, rests on good faith, and the French have too often shown 
other people how loyal one should be to give up now, under the 
effect of surprise caused by the submarine war, give up what has 
been their glory in the past and may be again, I am persuaded, 
their force in the future.' 



CONCLUSION OF FRENCH AMBASSADOR. 243 

"It has been said," continued Mr. Jusserand, "that the article 
of Commander Castex was well known to the British naval staff. 
May I express regret that such lessons as are being given by 
Capt. Laurent, the author of the passage I have just quoted, 
and the subject of whose lectures is naval strategy, have appar- 
ently remained unknown to the same staff. The lesson I quoted 
can not be supposed to have had anything to do with the present 
discussion, for it was taught on June 1, 1920, and appears in 
Commander Laurent's printed text, volume II, page 107. 

" In conclusion, I believe I am justified in saying that neither 
the infamy wrongly ascribed to Commander Castex nor any 
other is taught or ever shall be taught in any of those French 
naval schools from whence come the comrades of war that have 
fallen of late by the side of American and British officers and 
those of the other allied nations ; nothing of the kind has ever 
been taught and never shall be. 

" I beg to add one word. In the session of the 23d of December 
the chief of the British delegation — to whom I am bound by a 
friendship so ancient that since we began to know each other 
people were born who. had time to grow up and cover themselves 
with glory in the course of the last war — mentioned that Great 
Britain alone was sufficiently equipped to combat submarine war- 
fare, thanks to her gallant coast population, her fishermen, so 
expert in everything that concerns life at sea ; and he said that 
Great Britain had used 3,676 submarine chasers, to the immense 
advantage of France, who had only 257, and that should the 
necessity ever again arise Great Britain would have to protect 
France again. On this point I collected information and found 
that at the beginning of the war all who could bear a rifle were 
sent to the front, and a good many of our sailors and fisher- 
men are now sleeping their last sleep, not in the sea or along the 
coast, but in the trenches, facing north or east, facing Belgium 
and Alsace. 

"When the pitiless submarine war was started by Germany we 
set to work and did our best to meet this new danger, helping 
ourselves and the common cause. We are still filled with admira- 
tion for England's sailors. All the world knows of our feelings 
for those gallant and heroic men at home, on the sea ; a model of 
all nations. From common testimony, however, our population 
also, our Bretons and Normans, Gascons and Provencals did 
creditably, and they manned in the perilous waters of western or 
southern Europe not 257 ships but over 1,300. 

" Our British friends, who live in a country of fair play while 
we live in the country of ' franc jeu,' will not find it amiss if 
I have found it necessary to present these few remarks. It is 
because we attach so much value to the friendship and considera- 



244 BRITISH REPLY. 

tion of the great people that the British are that I have thought 
these rectifications indispensable." 

Lord Lee said he was not aware that the matter just discussed 
was to be raised at that time, and therefore he was not in a 
position to reply in the detailed way which might have been possi- 
ble if he had had with him the relevant papers or the actual 
articles to which Mr. Jusserand had referred. In any case, he 
did not think it would be necessary, in what he had to say, to 
take up point by point the various criticisms which Mr. Jusserand 
was good enough to make of his previous speech, and which Lord 
Lee took, if he might say so entirely in good part. He regarded 
Mr. Jusserand, of course, as fully justified in putting forward the 
opposite view. Still less had Lord Lee any desire to resurrect a 
controversy which could in any way impair the good relations 
which existed and which he hoped would always exist between 
their two countries. 

He had to confess, however, that he was a little surprised at 
what seemed to him the whole-hearted and almost vehement 
defense which Mr. Jusserand had undertaken of the article which 
had been written by Commander Castex. It was true that Mr. 
Jusserand had said, at the commencement of his remarks, that 
there were certain passages with which he did not agree, but 
Lord Lee thought Mr. Jusserand would also admit that the 
burden of his speech that afternoon had been substantially a 
defense of the theories and the attitudes taken up by Capt. 
Castex in his article. He did not know whether his colleagues 
had all had an opportunity to read the article as a whole, but 
whatever might be the opinion with regard to this or that indi- 
vidual passage— and he would come to that in a moment — there 
could be no question whatsoever that the main thesis of the article, 
that its main purpose was, in the first place, to point out that 
the characteristics of German submarine warfare, that is to say, 
" unlimited submarine warfare," were inevitable in the circum- 
stances of the late war and that the critics who denounced them 
were really taking up an unreasonable and almost absurd posi- 
tion. Capt. Castex ridiculed the objections to these methods of 
warfare, and even went so far as to claim that they had origi- 
nated on the French side of the Rhine, like, as he said, so many 
other good ideas which the Germans had adopted. That was the 
general tone and the whole tenor of the article. 

He could not believe, although his knowledge of French natu- 
rally did not equal that of M. Jusserand's, that there was any 
other possible interpretation of the whole spirit of the article, 
however full it might be of paradoxical observations. He sug- 
gested that it was a very dangerous thing to indulge quite so 
liberally in paradoxes on such a subject as this distinguished 



DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. 245 

naval authority appeared to have done. It led to ambiguities and 
to misunderstandings, possibly of a very serious character. 

His main point was — and he was prepared, of course, if he had 
misrepresented any particular passage or the bearing of any par- 
ticular passage — to withdraw any observation that he might have 
made upon it ; but he did not withdraw for one moment the gen- 
eral feeling of condemnation and horror which he thought anyone 
reading the article as a whole must have felt for the views which 
Capt. Castex there expressed and championed. He was glad to 
see, moreover, that they were condemned by no one in more vigor- 
ous terms than by Capt Castex's brother officer, Admiral de Bon, 
who described them as " monstrosities " — that was his phrase, if 
he recalled it aright ; and it was almost as promptly, at any rate 
on the first opportunity, repudiated in the most formal manner 
by M. Sarraut, speaking on behalf of the French Government. It 
was, therefore, expressly condemned in the first place by the great 
service to which Capt. Castex belonged, and secondly, by the ac- 
credited representative of the French Government. 

Directly that was done, Lord Lee took the first opportunity, 
here in this room, of accepting, in the most whole-hearted way, the 
repudiation by the French Government of the article and the senti- 
ments contained in it. He further expressed the hope that the 
incident would be regarded as satisfactorily closed; and was so 
given to understand in the reply which M. Sarraut was good 
enough to make on that occasion. 

Not having the article here, and not knowing the subject was 
coming up this afternoon, Lord Lee was not in a position to 
analyze the particular passages which M. Jusserand had just 
quoted, but his own view was that although some of them may 
possibly have been conceived in the spirit of paradox, they are 
also ambiguous, and that whatever might be M. Jusserand's view 
of them, from reading the article, Lord Lee could not conceive any 
doubt whatsoever as to what was in the mind of Capt. Castex, 
and that was that he was a whole-hearted supporter of the neces- 
sity of the German system of unlimited submarine warfare, which 
had been stigmatized as piracy by this conference in the formal 
resolutions proposed by Mr. Root. 

M. Jusserand made it a further cause of offense that he, Lord 
Lee, suggested that Capt. Castex might be teaching these views to 
the officers' course, of which he has been appointed a principal 
lecturer. Well, if an officer held views of that character, which 
Capt. Castex thought of sufficient importance, and which were 
deemed of sufficient importance to be published in the represen- 
tative service technical publication " under the authority of the 
general staff " — although they were careful in all such cases to 
say they did not necessarily take responsibility for what was 



246 FRANCE AND SUBMARINES. 

said — it was a fair assumption that, holding those views, and hav- 
ing expressed them so prominently, Capt. Castex should continue 
to expound them to the officers to whom he lectured in the course 
of his duty. Lord Lee was very glad to know that such was not 
to be the case, as it obviously could not now be the case, in view 
of both the professional and the political repudiation of those 
views by the Government under which Capt. Castex served. 

He said that M. Jusserand had then spoken of another matter. 
He had talked of the part that France had played in the late war 
on the seas. No one who had not, like Lord Lee, had the honor of 
representing the British Admiralty, could know what a great part 
France had played, to the utmost limit of her ability. Nothing, 
the speaker said, was further from his intention, or that of Mr. 
Balfour, than to suggest the smallest reproach of France for not 
having been able, with all her other obligations, to put forth a 
greater effort for the suppression of the submarine. All knew she 
did her utmost. But this must be said in regard to the late con- 
troversy on the submarine : The situation of the late war might 
occur again in years to come. In that war practically the whole 
burden of dealing with the submarine menace which had affected 
France, as it had affected Great Britain, was thrown upon the 
latter power. He remembered Admiral de Bon saying that no one 
could recall without profound emotion the sacrifices, burdens, and 
anxieties that were thrown upon Great Britain as the result of 
that submarine campaign. In these circumstances, and knowing 
how nearly that campaign had succeeded, he must remind France 
that Great Britain might not be in a position to do it again, 
and to put forth another effort sufficient to defend both France 
and herself. He had therefore ventured to urge, in the interest of 
both their countries, that submarines should be suppressed al- 
together, because without that suppression that perilous situation 
might recur. 

That was the main, and the stated, reason for the desire of the 
British to abolish submarines, and that was why the British Em- 
pire delegation regretted so deeply that France, knowing all the 
circumstances, should have refused their request and should have 
insisted upon forcing this intolerable burden upon them in a 
future war, if the circumstances should recur. 

Lord Lee did not want to embark upon what might be con- 
sidered a controversial reply to M. Jusserand about France's 
desire not to increase her naval armaments. He knew nothing 
of the desire or motives of France in that matter. All the British 
Empire delegation said was that as a matter of fact France was 
proposing to treble her existing fleet of submarines. They ob- 
jected strongly to that, and they had stated their objections, 
and they did not wish, on this occasion, to enlarge upon them 



DISCUSSION OF FRENCH POSITION. 247 

again. They, on the other hand, desired in every way to limit 
armament. They had reduced their own navy drastically, at this 
conference, and had gone further, since the commencement of the 
conference, to show their good will and their desire to assist 
France and to relieve her from these unnecessary burdens. They 
had offered her a guarantee by the whole of their armed forces 
by land, sea, and air, to protect her against any aggression on her 
coasts. They had done everything that was possible in that way 
to show their good will and good faith, and they had desired in 
all these matters to work with and to assist France. Therefore, 
he would say as a final word, and with an apology to his col- 
leagues for having detained them so long, that he des'red from the 
depths of his heart to see not only maintained but improved the 
good relations that existed between Great Britain and her great 
neighbor across the Channel, and it was the desire of his country, 
and certainly his own desire, that no word should be said that 
could in any way impair that good feeling. He hoped, just as 
his French friends and Allies hoped, that Great Britain and 
France should go forward together in these matters, not only 
as friends and Allies, but hand in hand for the reconstruction of 
Europe and civilization. 

Mr. Jusserand said " I shall say only one word. I note with 
profound satisfaction the last remark made by the First Lord of 
the Admiralty. With that I agree from my heart and I may 
assure him that all my compatriots will. But I can not admit 
the statement that if the submarine be preserved it is owing to 
France ; one more of those many unpleasant things reported as 
having been caused by France, when such is not the case. As a 
matter of fact the vote against the British proposal was unani- 
mous, including the United States, both through their delegation 
and their unanimous advisory committee. Lord Lee has again 
spoken of our intention of building a large number of submarines. 
We shall in reality build them or not in accordance with our 
needs and our means. That Commander Castex really condemned 
the submarine, German fashion, I can not better prove than by 
reading again the passage quoted a moment ago." 

Lord Lee interrupted to say : " I only say he cited those special 
occasions as having spoiled the German case, which he otherwise 
thought was a good one." 

Mr. Jusserand then remarked " I don't understand it that 
way," and continued with his speech : 

" What I said of the paradoxical disposition of Commander 
Castex referred chiefly to his sweeping historical remarks, like 
Those on ' perturbers ' being represented as always mystical. T do 
not believe Napoleon was, nor Julius Caesar. As for the con- 
demnation of Commander Castex by Mr. Sarraut and Admiral. 



248 DRAFT OF SUBMARINE TREATY. 

de Bon, both condemned what was unexpectedly quoted of him, 
neither knowing then the real text. But I do not desire to insist. 
With Lord Lee, I am ready to leave the question to the judgment 
of our colleagues when they have a chance of reading the whole 
article under discussion. Allow me to close by repeating that, 
of the words uttered in this controversy, the last pronounced 
by Lord Lee are the ones which I chiefly want to remember." 

The chairman called attention to the fact that there was still 
one matter which, perhaps, might be passed upon that afternoon. 
He brought this before the committee, knowing the general 
desire to conclude its work and hoping to assist, if possible, in 
attaining that end. This was a draft of a proposed treaty which 
embodied the resolutions previously adopted with respect to sub- 
marines and poison gas. He understood that the French text 
had received the approval of Mr. Kammerer of the French delega- 
tion. 

Inasmuch as this treaty contained nothing new, the substantive 
matter being the resolutions which had been adopted and the 
formal matters being conventional, he would, with the committee's 
consent, read it. If the committee should desire to take it under 
further consideration, that would be done. I# not, perhaps the 
committee would authorize its presentation at the plenary session 
the following day. 

The chairman then read the draft treaty, as follows : 

"The United States of America, the British Empire, France, 
Italy, and Japan, hereinafter referred to as signatory powers, 
desiring to make more effectively the rules adopted by civilized 
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncom- 
batants at sea in time of war, and to prevent the use in war of 
noxious gases and chemicals, have determined to conclude a 
treaty to this effect, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries 
(and so forth). 

" Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good 
and due form, have agreed as follows: 



" The signatory powers declare that among the rules adopted by 
civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and 
noncombatants at sea in time of war, the following are to be 
deemed an established part of international law: 

"(1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and 
search to determine its character before it can be seized. 

"A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to 
submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed 
after seizure. 



SUBMARINE AND GAS. 249 

"A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and 
passengers have been first placed in safety. 

"(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any«circumstances 
exempt from the universal rules above stated ; and if a submarine 
can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules 
the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and 
from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed 
unmolested. 

" II. 

" The signatory powers invite all other civilized powers to 
express their assent to the foregoing statement of established law 
so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout the 
world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of 
the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents. 

" III. 

" The signatory powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of 
the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to 
attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships, 
further declare that any person in the service of any power who 
shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is 
under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have 
violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punish- 
ment as if for an act of piracy and may be brought to trial before 
the civil or military authorities of any power within the jurisdic- 
tion of which he may be found. 

"IV. 

" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of 
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as 
they were violated in the recent war of 1914—1918, the require- 
ments universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection 
of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that 
the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers 
shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations they 
now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between 
themselves and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto. 

"V. 

" The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, 
and all analogous liqu : ds, materials, or devices, having been justly 
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a 
prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which 
n majority of the civilized powers are parties, 

25882 — 23 17 



250 ENACTING CLAUSES. 

" The signatory powers, to the end that this prohibition shall 
be universally accepted as a part of international law, binding 
alike the conscience and 'practice of nations, declare their assent 
to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between them- 
selves, and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto. 

"VI. 

" The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in ac- 
cordance with the constitutional methods of the signatory powers 
and shall take effect on the deposit of all the ratifications, which 
shall take place at Washington. 

" The Government of the United States of America will trans- 
mit to all the signatory powers a certified copy of the proces- 
verbal of the deposit of ratifications. 

" The present treaty, in French and in English, shall remain 
deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States 
of America, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted 
by that Government to each of the signatory powers. 

" VII. 

" The Government of the United States of America will further 
transmit to each of the nonsignatory powers a duly certified copy 
of the present treaty and invite its adherence thereto. 

"Any nonsignatory power may adhere to the present treaty by 
communicating an instrument of adherence to the Government of 
the United States of America, which will thereupon transmit to 
each of the signatory and adhering powers a certified copy of 
each instrument of adherence. 

" In faith whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present treaty. 

" Done at the city of Washington the day of February, 

1922." 

The chairman stated that this was not presented for discussion 
at this time. It had been drawn by Mr. Root, and the chairman 
understood that it followed the text of the resolutions precisely, 
except in conventional matters, such as the introduction and con- 
clusion. If any delegates desired this to be held over* it would 
be held over. If, however, the committee was ready to have it 
go in in that form, it would be presented at the next plenary ses- 
sion and that much more would be out of the way. 

He asked the pleasure of the committee. 

Mr. Balfour said that he was much embarrassed about this. 
He agreed, of course, to the substance of all the chairman had 
read. There was a question, however, that he would like to ask 



EFFECT OF TREATY. 251 

Mr. Root. He asked if that would be in order and was assured 
that it would. 

Continuing, Mr. Balfour said the question had been raised that 
morning at a meeting of the British delegation, and the point 
was this : The proposed treaty seemed to be perfectly clear and 
satisfactory as between the powers represented at this table. 
The difficulty was as follows : He was afraid it was very easy to 
conceive a case in which, for instance, one of the five powers 
represented around this table might be at war with another 
signatory power having as an ally some nation not agreeing to 
the treaty. An ambiguous and difficult situation would result. 
He would like Mr. Boot's opinion upon a point which seemed, 
at least to some of his friends, not to be without difficulty and 
embarrassment. The apparent difficulty would be almost un- 
thinkable. It would mean one of these countries represented at 
this table being at war with another power at the table, who 
had an ally not represented at the table. He did not mean to 
press the matter, but he was given to understand that that was a 
point that was in the minds of many. He did not think it had 
received much consideration, and as the treaty would have to run 
the gauntlet of many severe criticisms, like other treaties, he 
would like to know what Mr. Root's advice on the point was. 

Mr. Root said he thought that was one of the things which it 
was quite impossible to provide for in the treaty. No agreement 
could be made in the application of which questions would not 
arise in the future. If the members of the committee were to 
try to guard against all conceivable situations to which this 
agreement between them was to be applied, they would make a 
treaty as long as the moral law. Now, they were making this 
treaty between themselves and they must assume that it would 
be carried out in good faith. If another power that was not 
bound by the treaty should come along and create a situation 
to which the treaty did not apply, then it would not apply ; but 
that would have to be determine^ by the conditions and the facts 
as they arose. He could not believe that there would be any 
real embarrassment. 

Mr. Balfour said that he would not press the matter. 

Senator Schanzer stated that the Italian delegation shared the 
anxieties to which Mr. Balfour referred, and he thought that he 
had raised very opportunely the question concerning the execu- 
tion of the treaty in the case of war with a power which had 
neither signed nor adhered to the treaty itself. If one of the five 
great signatory powers should find itself in war with another 
of the five signatory powers and the latter should be allied with a 
nonsignatory or nonadherent power, it was clear that the first- 



252 VOTE ON TREATY. 

mentioned power could not afford to find itself bound by the 
dut : es imposed by the treaty. In effect, the nonsignatory or non- 
adherent powers would be free to make unlimited use of sub- 
marines, poisonous gases, etc., and would do it not only in its 
own interest, but also in the interest of the great powers to which - 
it was allied. He wished to repeat that in these conditions it was 
clear that the execution of the provisions of the treaty would 
cease to be effective. He could agree with Mr. Root that it was 
not absolutely indispensable to provide for this case by a special 
stipulation in the treaty, but it was nevertheless desirable that 
the interpretation given to-day should be registered in the min- 
utes of the committee. . 

The chairman stated that what had been said would be re- 
corded in the minutes. He asked if the committee was ready to 
act upon the treaty and to accept it for submission at the next 
plenary session. All assented, and he declared further that the 
treaty was accepted and that course would be taken. 

He then asked if the committee would consent to adjourn, so 
that a meeting of the Far Eastern committee might be held. 

Sir John Salmond said lie would like to raise one question 
before adjournment ; that was whether these two treaties were 
to be given any distinguishing title or name by the committee. 
There were to be a number of treaties, and there ought to be 
some method of referring to them in public and of distinguish- 
ing them. 

The chairman said that had been considered and it was thought 
inadvisable to put in the treaty anything like a popular name; 
but the treaties would be given names by the public just the 
same. Of course, already there was the name " The Four Power 
Treaty." There was the preamble which expressed the purpose 
of the treaty, to reduce the burdens of competition in naval 
armament. Of course, there would be the naval armament treaty 
and then the submarine treaty, as he supposed it would popularly 
he called. In other words, while it might not be just the thing 
for the committee to designate the treaties by any popular name, 
some appropriate riame for them would undoubtedly be adopted. 

He suggested that the committee might leave it to the public 
to name them. 

Sir John Salmond thought the committee should not leave it 
to the public to name the treaties, but should name them itself, 
and asked if there was any objection to adding a subclause giving 
them a recognized name, or to effecting the same purpose by a 
resolution of the committee, that this should be known as so- 
and-so ; for instance, the " Naval Treaty of Washington," and the 
second treaty as the " Declaration of Washington," not as the 



TWENTY-FIRST MEETING. 253 

submarine treaty, but as the " Declaration of Washington," cor- 
responding to the Declaration of Paris or the Declaration of 
London. In the same way the treaty with respect to the Pacific 
might be appropriately termed the Washington-Pacific treaty 
rather than the four power treaty or the four power pact, or 
some other popular name or misnomer that the newspapers might 
choose. He suggested that the committee itself ought to take 
the responsibility of naming and christening its work. 

The chairman said that to bring this to a point — and he did 
not desire to be considered as hurrying the committee, but he 
was under obligation to release certain delegates as soon as possi- 
ble — he would assume that Sir John Salmond had moved that the 
first treaty be regarded as the " Naval Treaty of Washington," 
and asked if the committee was ready to act upon it. 

Senator Schanzer stated that he did not agree with Sir John 
Salmond's view that it was a tradition to give a name to a treaty, 
but that a treaty was named by the place, the date, and the 
parties that took part. It seemed to him there was no necessity 
for christening them, or at least it was not done in other countries. 

The chairman said he understood that the Italian delegation 
voted " No " on the proposal of Sir John Salmon. (Senator Schan- 
zer indicated that the chairman's understanding was correct.) 
This was a tribunal — and he had in mind a legal friend who, he 
knew, would like to be a member of such a tribunal — where the 
dissenting opinion was the prevailing opinion. He declared the 
motion lost. He added that whether the committee resolved or 
did not resolve, these treaties would be named, and all the mem- 
bers of the committee could do, in his opinion, was to be as good 
prophets as possible in trying to hit the names that the public 
would adopt. 

The committee then adjourned subject to the call of the Chair, 
and the chairman asked the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern 
Questions to assemble. 



TWENTY-FIRST MEETING— FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1922, 5.40 P. M. 

PRESENT. 

United States. — Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood. Accompanied by Mr. Wright. 

British Empire. — Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), 
Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Satri (for India). 
Accompanied by Mr. Christie, Mr. Bajpai. 



254 SUBMARINE TREATY NOT TO BE REVISED. 

France. — Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand. Accompanied by Mr. 
Kammerer, Mr. Ponsot. 

Italy. — Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Al- 
hertini. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pag- 
liano. 

Japan. — Admiral Baron Kato, Baron Shidehara. Accompanied 
by Mr. Hanihara, Mr. Saburi. 

The secretary general. Accompanied by Mr. Cresson and Mr. 
Paul. 

Mr. Talamon and Mr. Camerlynck, interpreters. 

1. The twenty-first meeting of the committee on limitation of 
armament was held on Friday, February 3, 1922, in the Columbus 
Boom, Pan-American Building at 5.40 p. m. 

2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughe's, 
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood ; for the British 
Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Sir Robert 
Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John 
Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India) ; for France, 
Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand ; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Sena- 
tor Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini ; for Japan, Admiral Baron 
Kato, Baron Shidehara, Mr. Hanihara. 

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were pres- 
ent : For the United States, Mr. Wright ; for the British Empire, 
Mr. Christie, Mr. Bajpai ; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Ponsot ; 
for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano ; for Japan, 
Mr. Saburi. 

The secretary general, accompanied by Mr. Cresson and Mr. 
Paul, was present. Mr. Talamon and Mr. Camerlynck (inter- 
preters) were also present. 

The chairman, Mr. Hughes, said he had the following resolu- 
tion to propose : 

" Resolved, That it is not the intention of the powers agreeing to 
the appointment of a commission to consider and report upon the 
rules of international law respecting new agencies of warfare, 
that the commission shall review or report upon the rules or de- 
finitions relating to submarines or the use of noxious gases and 
chemicals already adopted by the powers in this conference." 

The chairman said that Mr. Root had drawn this resolution in 
order that the treaty which he (Mr. Root) had presented to the 
conference two days previously should not be deemed to be a sub- 
ject for revision in the committee to be appointed with regard to 
rules of warfare. 

He asked if there was any objection to this resolution, and 
added that the United States of America assented. The other 
delegations, being polled, each voted in the affirmative, and the 



APPROVAL OF MINUTES. 255 

chairman announced that the resolution had been unanimously 
adopted. 

The chairman asked if there was any other matter that any 
delegate desired to bring before the committee. If not, the last 
resolution to be adopted was one similar to that adopted in the 
committee on Pacific and Far Eastern questions. He proposed 
that the minutes which had been corrected on behalf of all the 
delegations should stand approved, and that each delegation 
should appoint a representative to make such corrections as 
might be necessary in the minutes which had not yet been cor- 
rected, and that, as thus finally corrected, the minutes of the com- 
mittee should all stand approved, and that the secretary general 
should arrange for their publication in permanent form. 

Senator Schanzer said he assumed that the minutes would be 
ready as soon as possible, because the delegates were preparing 
to leave. '• 

The chairman said he understood that the very point of this 
resolution was that several of the delegates were leaving on Mon- 
day, and that the minutes would not be ready by Monday, but 
that the delegations could appoint somebody, in their diplomatic 
missions in Washington, perhaps, to approve the minutes. 

Senator Schanzer said that it would be impossible for persons 
who were not present at the meetings to correct the speeches. 

The chairman said he had just been advised by the secretary 
general that all of the uncorrected minutes would have been dis- 
tributed by the following afternoon. 

Lord Lee said that he did not like the proceedings of the com- 
mittee to be closed without referring to how much they owed to 
the labors of one individual, a gentleman who was not present 
that afternoon, and of whom he, therefore, might speak more 
freely. He referred to the American chairman of the technical 
subcommittee which had prepared the ground for all the decisions 
of the committee. He referred to Col. Roosevelt. Perhaps he 
was entitled to speak of him especially because he had been con- 
tinuously associated with him in the arduous and most successful 
work he had undertaken in preparing the ground for the com- 
mittee, and he was able to testify at first hand and at short range 
to how much the committee owed to him. Perhaps he might be 
permitted to recall the fact that when he first came to Washing- 
ton, 25 years ago, seated in the same chair of the Assistant Sec- 
retary of the Navy, was another Theodore Roosevelt, then com- 
paratively unknown, who displayed the same zeal, enthusiasm, 
and technical knowledge of his duties that the present chairman 
of that committee had displayed. He could not help feeling that 
the ability and the success which Col. Roosevelt had shown in 



256 FINAL ADJOURNMENT. 

this, the first of his official tasks, in Washington, was of a charac- 
ter which would not only bring joy and pride to his father's heart, 
but a peculiar satisfaction to all his father's old friends. 

The chairman said that he was greatly pleased at the remarks 
of Lord Lee with regard to the work of Col. Roosevelt, and the 
high commendation which Lord Lee had given, he thought, was 
richly deserved. He wished to express personally his apprecia- 
tion of Col. Roosevelt's indefatigable and intelligent labors. 

Thereupon, at 6 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned sine die, 



REPORT OF THE AMERICAN DELEGA- 
TION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT 
FEBRUARY 9, 1922. 

[Names of personnel of conference,, etc., omitted.] 



FIRST. 
LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT. 

It was recognized at the outset that it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to provide at this Conference for the limitation of land 
forces. 

So far as the army of the United States is concerned, there was 
no question presented. It has always been the policy of the 
United States to have the regular military establishment upon the 
smallest possible basis. At the time of the Armistice there were 
in the field and in training in the American Army upwards of 
4,000,000 men. At once, upon the signing of the Armistice, de- 
mobilization began and it was practically completed in the course 
of the following year, and to-day our regular establishment num- 
bers less than 160,000 men. The British Empire has also reduced 
its land forces to a minimum. The situation on the Continent 
was vividly depicted in an eloquent address by M. Briand, speak- 
ing for the Government of France, in which he stated his con- 
clusions as follows : 

" The thought of reducing the armaments, which was the noble 
purpose of this conference, is not one from which we would 
feel disinterested from the point of view of land armaments. 
We have shown that already. Immediately after the armistice 
demobilization began, and demobilization began as rapidly and 
as completely as possible. According to the military laws of 
France there are to be three classes of men ; that is, three genera- 
tions of young men under the flag. That law is still extant ; 
that law is still valid. It has not been abrogated yet, and the 
Government has taken the responsibility to reduce to two years 
the time spent under the flag, and instead of three classes — 
three generations of young men — we have only two that are 
doing military service. It is therefore an immediate reduction 
by one-third that has already taken place in the effectives — and 
I am speaking of the normal effectives of the metropolis, leaving 
aside troops needed for colonial occupation or the obligation im- 
posed by the treaty in Rhineland or countries under plebescite. 

257 



258 LAND ARMAMENT. 

We did not think that endeavor was sufficient, and in the future 
we have plans in order to further restrict the extent of our army. 
In a few days it is certain that the proposals of the Government 
will be passed in the Chamber, and in order to further reduce 
the military service by half. That is to say, there will be only 
one class and a half actually serving. The metropolitan French 
army would be therefore reduced by half, but if anybody asks us 
to go further, to consent to other reductions, I should have to 
answer clearly and definitely that it would be impossible for us 
to do it without exposing ourselves to a most serious danger. 

" You might possibly come and tell us, ' This danger that you 
are exposed to, we see it, we realize it, and we are going to share 
it with you. We are going to offer you all means — put all means 
at your disposal in order to secure your safety.' Immediately, 
if we heard those words, of course we would strike upon another 
plan. We should be only too pleased to demonstrate the sin- 
cerity of our purpose. But we understand the difficulties and 
the necessities of the statesmen of other countries. We under- 
stand the position of other peoples who have also to face diffi- 
cult and troublous situations. We are not selfish enough to 
ask other people to give a part of their sovereign national inde- 
pendence in order to turn it to our benefit and come to our help. 
We do not expect it ; but here I am appealing to your con- 
sciences. If France is to remain alone, facing the situation such 
as I have described, and without any exaggeration, you must 
not deny her what she wants in order to insure her security. 
You must let her do what she has to do, if need arise and if the 
time comes." 

******* 

" If by direction given to the labors of the Conference it were 
possible somewhere over there in Europe — if it were possible 
to say that the outcome of this Conference is indirect blame and 
opprobrium cast upon France — if it was possible to point out 
France as the only country in the world that is still imperialistic, 
as the only country that opposes final disarmament, then, gentle- 
men, indeed this Conference would have dealt us a severe blow; 
but I am quite sure that nothing is further from your minds and 
from your intentions. If after listening to this argument, after 
weighing the reasons which you have just heard, you consider 
it then as valid, then, gentlemen, you will still be with us and 
you will agree with me in saying that France can not possibly 
do anything but what she has actually done." 

Senator Schanzer described the Italian situation as follows : 
" It is far from my mind to discuss what France considers 
indispensable for her national safety. That safety is as dear to 
us as it may be to them, and we are still morally by the side of 
our allies of yesterday and our friends of to day. 



ITALIAN AND JAPANESE COMMENT. 259 

" I wanted to say this. Only may I be allowed to express the 
wish and the hope that the general limitation of land armament 
may become a reality with:n the shortest possible space of time. 
Italy has fought the war for the highest aims which a country 
can seek, but Italy is in her soul a peace-loving nation. I shall 
not repeat what I had the honor to state at the first meeting of 
the Conference, hut I should like to emphasize again that Italy 
is one of the surest factors of the world's peace, that she has no 
reason whatsoever of conflict with any other country, that she 
is following and putting constantly into action a policy inspired 
by the principle of maintaining peace among all nations. 

" Italy has succeeded in coming to a direct understanding 
with the Serb, Croat, and Slovene people and in order to attain 
such an end had made considerable sacrifices for the interest of 
the peace of Europe. Italy has pursued toward the successor 
countries to her former enemies a policy not only of pacification, 
but of assistance. And when a conflict arose between Austria 
and Hungary, a conflict which might have dragged into war the 
Danubian peoples, has offered to the two countries in conflict her 
friendly help in order to settle the dispute. Italy has succeeded 
and in so doing has actively contributed to the peace of Europe. 

" Moreover, Italy has acted similarly within her own frontiers 
and has reduced her armed forces in the largest possible measure. 
She has considerably curtailed her navy expenditures in com- 
parison to the pre-war time. The total amount of her armed 
forces does not exceed 200,000 men and a further reduction to 
175,000 men is already planned, and 35,000 colored troops. 

" Our ordinary war budget for the present financial year 
amounts to $52,000,000, including $11,000,000 expenses for police 
forces ; the extraordinary part of the war budget, represent- 
ing expenses dependent for the liquidation of the war, expenses 
therefore of a purely transitory character, amounts to $62,000,000. 

" However, although we have all reduced our armaments to the 
greatest possible extent, we consider it necessary, for a complete 
solution of the problem of limitation of armaments in Europe, to 
take into consideration the armaments of the countries either 
created or transformed as a result of the war. The problem is 
not a simple one. It must be considered as a whole. It is a 
serious and urgent problem, for which a solution at no far distant 
day is necessary." 

Baron Kato spoke as follows: 

" I would like to say this morning just a few words on land 
armament limitation. Japan is quite ready to announce her 
hearty approval of the principle which aims to relieve a people of 
heavy burdens by limiting land armaments to those which are 
necessary for national security and the maintenance of order 
within the territory. 



260 LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT. 

" The size of the land armaments of each state should be de- 
termined by its peculiar geographical situation and other cir- 
cumstances, and these basic factors are so divergent and com- 
plicated that an effort to draw final comparisons is hardly pos- 
sible. If I may venture to say it, it is not an easy task to lay 
down a general scheme for the limitation of land armaments, as 
in the case of limitation of naval armaments. Nevertheless, 
Japan has not the slightest intention of maintaining land arma- 
ments which are in excess of those which are absolutely neces- 
sary for purely defensive purposes, necessitated by the Far East- 
ern situation." 

Further consideration made it quite clear that no agreement for 
the limitation of land forces could be had at this time. 

LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT. 

A different condition existed in relation to naval armament. It 
was believed by the Government of the United States that an 
agreement providing for a sweeping reduction and for an effective 
limitation for the future was entirely feasible. It was pointed 
out, after considering the failure of earlier endeavors for limita- 
tion of armaments that the Powers could no longer content them- 
selves with investigations, with statistics, with reports, with the 
circumlocution of inquiry ; that the time had come, and the Con- 
ference had been called, not for general resolutions or mutual 
advice, but for action. 

The following general considerations were deemed to be 
pertinent. 

" The first is that the core of the difficulty is to be found in 
the competition in naval programs, and that, in order appro- 
priately to limit naval armament, competition in its production 
must be abandoned. Competition will not be remedied by resolves 
with respect to the method of its continuance. One program 
inevitably leads to another, and if competition continues its 
regulation is impracticable. There is only one adequate way out 
and that is to end it now. 

" It is apparent that this can not be accomplished without 
serious sacrifices. Enormous sums have been expended upon 
ships under construction and building programs which are now 
under way can not be given up without heavy loss. Yet if the 
present construction of capital ships goes forward other ships 
will inevitably be built to rival them, and this will lead to still 
others. Thus the race will continue so long as ability to continue 
lasts. The effort .to escape sacrifices is futile. We must face 
them or yield our purpose. 

" It is also clear that no one of the naval Powers should be 
expected to make these sacrifices alone. The only hope of limita- 



AMERICAN PLAN. 261 

tion of naval armament is by agreement among the nations con- 
cerned, and this agreement should he entirely fair and reasonable 
in the extent of the sacrifices required of each of the Powers. 
In considering the basis of such an agreement, and the commen- 
surate sacrifices to be required, it is necessary to have regard 
to the existing naval strength of the great naval Powers, includ- 
ing the extent of construction already effected in the case of 
ships in process. This follows from the fact that one nation 
is as free to compete as another, and each may find grounds for 
its action. What one may do another may demand the oppor- 
tunity to rival, and we remain in the thrall of competitive effort." 
But it was necessary to go beyond general observations. It 
was apparent that, in this field of opportunity, it was essential 
that the American Government, as the convener of the Conference, 
should be prepared with a definite and practicable plan. After 
the most careful consideration and detailed examination of the 
problem, with the aid of the experts of the American Navy, a 
plan was prepared and, under instructions of the President, was 
presented to the Conference by the American Delegation. 

THE AMEEICAN PLAN. 

It was clear at the outset, and the negotiations during the Con- 
ference put it beyond doubt, that no agreement for the limita- 
tion of naval armament could be effected which did not embrace 
the navies of France and Italy. At the same time, it was recog- 
nized that neither of these nations, in view of the extraordinary 
conditions due to the World War, affecting their existing naval 
strength, could be expected to make the sacrifices which necessa- 
rily would lie at the basis of an agreement for limitation. These 
sacrifices could, however, be reasonably expected of the United 
States, the British Empire, and Japan, and these were the Powers 
then actually engaged in the competitive building of warships. 
The American plan, therefore, temporarily postponed the con- 
sideration of the navies of France and Italy and definitely pro- 
posed a program of limitation for the United States, British 
Empire, and Japan. The proposal was one of renunciation of 
building programs, of scrapping of existing ships, and of estab- 
lishing an agreed ratio of naval strength. It was a proposal of 
sacrifices, and the American Government, in making the proposal, 
at once stated the sacrifices which it was ready to make and 
upon the basis of which alone it asked commensurate sacrifices 
from others. 

The American plan rested upon the application of these four 
general principles: 

" (1) That all capital-shipbuilding programs, either actual or 
projected, should be abandoned ; 



262 CAPITAL SHIPS. 

" (2) That further reduction should be made through the 
scrapping of certain of the older ships; 

" (3) That in general regard should be had to the existing 
naval strength of the Powers concerned ; 

"(4) That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the 
measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allow- 
ance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed." 

More specifically, the plan in relation to capital ships was as 
follows : 

" CAPITAL SHIPS. 

" United States: 

" The United States is now completing its program of 1916 
calling for 10 new battleships and 6 battle cruisers. One battle- 
ship has been completed. The others are in various stages of 
construction ; in some cases from 60 to over 80 per cent of the 
construction has been done. On these 15 capital ships now being 
built over $330,000,000 have been spent. Still, the United States 
is willing in the interest of an immediate limitation of naval 
armament to scrap all these ships. 

" The United States proposes, if this plan is accepted— 

"(1) To scrap all capital ships now under construction. This 
includes 6 battle cruisers and 7 battleships on the ways and 
in course of building, and 2 battleships launched. 

"The total number of new capital ships thus to be scrapped 
is 15. The total tonnage of the new capital ships when com- 
pleted would be 618,000 tons. 

"(2) To scrap all of the older battleships up to, but not 
including, the Delaware and North Dakota. The number of these 
old battleships to be scrapped is 15. Their total tonnage is 
227,740 tons. 

"Thus the number of capital ships to be scrapped by the 
United States, if this plan is accepted, is 30, with an aggregate 
tonnage (including that of ships in construction, if completed) 
of 845,740 tons. 

" Great Britain: 

" The plan contemplates that Great Britain and Japan shall 
take action which is fairly commensurate with this action on the 
part of the United States. 

" It is proposed that Great Britain — 

"(1) Shall stop further construction of the four new Hoods, 
the new capital ships not laid down but upon which money 
has been spent. These 4 ships, if completed, would have tonnage 
displacement of 172,000 tons. 

"(2) Shall, in addition, scrap her predreadnaughts, second- 
line battleships, and first-line battleships up to, but not includ- 
ing, the King George V class. 



JAPANESE NAVY. 263 

"These, with certain predreadnaughts which it is understood 
have already been scrapped, would amount to 19 capital ships 
and a tonnage reduction of 411,375 tons. 

"The total tonnage of ships thus to be scrapped by Great 
Britain (including the tonnage of the 4 Hoods, if completed) 
would be 583,375 tons. 

"Japan: 

"It is proposed that Japan — 

"(1) Shall abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, 
viz, the Kii, Owari, No. 7, and No. 8 battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 
7, and 8, battle cruisers. 

"It should be observed that this does not involve the stopping 
of construction, as the construction of none of these ships has 
been begun. 

"(2) Shall scrap 3 capital ships (the Mutsu launched, the 
Tosa and Kago in course of building) and 4 battle cruisers 
(the Amagi and Akagi in course of building, and the Atoga 
and Takao not yet laid down, but for which certain material 
has been assembled). 

"The total number of new capital ships to be scrapped under 
this paragraph is seven. The total tonnage of these new capital 
ships when completed would be 289,100 tons. 

"(3) Shall scrap all predreadnaughts and battleships of the 
second line. This would include the scrapping of all ships up 
to but not including the Settsu; that is, the scrapping of 10 older 
ships, with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons. 

" The total reduction of tonnage on vessels existing, laid down, 
or for which material has been assembled (taking the tonnnage 
of the new ships when completed), would be 448,928 tons. 

" Thus under this plan there would be immediately destroyed, 
of the navies of the three Powers, 66 capital fighting ships, built 
and building, with a total tonnage of 1,878,043. 

" It is proposed that it should be agreed by the United States, 
Great Britain, and Japan that their navies, with respect to 
capital ships, within three months after the making of the agree- 
ment, shall consist of certain ships designated in the proposal and 
numbering for the United States 18, for Great Britain 22, for 
Japan 10. 

" The tonnage of these ships would be as follows : Of the United 
States, 500,650 ; of Great Britain, 604,450 ; of Japan, 299,700. In 
reaching this result, the age factor in the case of the respective 
navies has received appropriate consideration. 

" Replacement : 

" With respect to replacement, the United States proposes : 
"(1) That it be agreed that the first replacement tonnage shall 
not be laid down until 10 years from the date of the agreement; 



264 CAPITAL SHIP RATIO. 

"(2) That replacement be limited by an agreed maximum of 
capital ship tonnage as follows : 

For the United States _ 500, 000 

For Great Britain 1 500, 000 

For Japan 300, 000 

"(3) That subject to the 10-year limitation above fixed and the 
maximum standard, capital ships may be replaced when they are 
20 years old by new capital ship construction ; 

"(4) That no capital ship shall be built in replacement with a 
tonnage displacement of more than 35,000 tons." 

This proposal was presented on behalf of the American Delega- 
tion at the first session of the Conference, and at once evoked from 
the other delegates expressions of assent in principle. The ques- 
tion of a definite agreement, however, presented many difficulties 
requiring protracted negotiations, in which a conclusion was not 
finally reached until January 31, 1922, when the draft of the pro- 
posed Naval Treaty was adopted in the Committee on Limitation 
of Armament. 

CAPITAL SHIP EATIO. 

It was obvious that no agreement for limitation was possible if 
the three Powers were not content to take as a basis their actual 
existing naval strength. General considerations of national need, 
aspirations and expectations, policy and program, could be 
brought forward by each Power in justification of some hypo- 
thetical relation of naval strength with no result but profitless 
and interminable discussion. The solution was to take what 
the Powers actually had, as it was manifest that neither could 
better its relative position unless it won in the race which it 
was the object of the Conference to end. It was impossible to 
terminate competition in naval armament if the Powers were to 
condition their agreement upon the advantages they hoped to 
gain in the competition itself. Accordingly, when the argument 
was presented by Japan that a better ratio — that is, one more 
favorable to Japan than that assigned by the American plan — 
should be adopted and emphasis was placed upon the asserted 
needs of Japan, the answer was made that if Japan was entitled 
to a better ratio upon the basis of actual existing naval strength, 
it should be, but otherwise it could not be, accepted. The Ameri- 
can plan fixed the ratio between the United States, the British 
Empire, and Japan as 5-5-3 or 10-10-6; Great Britain at once 
agreed, but the Japanese Government desired a ratio of 10-10-7. 

There was general agreement that the American rule for deter- 
mining existing naval strength was correct ; that is, that it 
should be determined according to capital ship tonnage. There 
was, however, a further question and that was as to what should 



ACCEPTANCE OF RATIO. 265 

be embraced for that purpose within the capital ship tonnage of 
each nation. It was the position of the American Government 
that paper programs should not be counted, but only ships laid 
down or upon which money had been spent. It was also the po- 
sition of the American Government that ships in course of con- 
struction should be counted to the extent to which construction 
had already progressed at the time of the convening of the Con- 
ference. The latter position was strongly contested by Japan 
upon the ground that a ship was not a ship unless it was com- 
pleted and ready to fight. It was pointed out, however, that in 
case of an emergency a warship which was 90 per cent com- 
pleted was to that extent ready and that only the remaining 10 
per cent of construction was necessary ; and, similarly, in the 
case of a ship 70 per cent or 50 per cent or other per cent com- 
pleted, the work done was so much of naval strength in hand. 
It was also pointed out that it did not follow that because a ship 
had been completed that it was ready for action ; it might be 
out of repair ; its engines, boilers, apparatus, armament, might 
need replacement. It was idle to attempt to determine naval 
strength on supposed readiness for action at a' given day. Ob- 
jections could be made to any standard of measurement, but the 
most practicable standard was to take the existing capital ship 
tonnage, including the percentage of construction already effected 
in the case of ships which were being built. It was added that 
the American Government, while ready to sacrifice, in accordance 
with the terms of its proposal, its battleships and battle cruisers 
in course of construction, was not willing to ignore the percentage 
of naval strength represented by over $300,000,000 expended on 
the unfinished ships. 

The American Government submitted to the British and Jap- 
anese naval experts its records with respect to the extent of the 
work which had been done on the ships under construction, and 
the negotiations resulted in an acceptance by both Great Britain 
and Japan of the ratio which the American Government had pro- 
posed. 

FORTIFICATIONS IN THE PACIFIC. 

Before assenting to this ratio the Japanese Government de- 
sired assurances with regard to the increase of fortifications and 
naval bases in the Pacific Ocean. It was insisted that while the 
capital ship ratio proposed by the American Government might 
be acceptable under existing conditions, it could not be regarded 
as acceptable by the Japanese Government if the Government of 
the United States should fortify or establish additional naval 
bases in the Pacific Ocean. 

The American Government took the position that it could not 
entertain any question as to the fortifications of its own coasts 

25882—23 18 



266 FORTIFICATIONS IN PACIFIC. 

or of the Hawaiian Islands, with respect to which it must remain 
entirely unrestricted. Despite the fact that the American Govern- 
ment did not entertain any aggressive purpose whatever, it was 
recognized that the fortification of other insular possessions in the 
Pacific might be regarded from the Japanese standpoint as creat- 
ing a new naval situation, and as constituting a menace to Japan, 
and hence the American Delegation expressed itself as willing to 
maintain the status quo as to fortifications and naval bases in its 
insular possessions in the Pacific, except as above stated, if Japan 
and the British Empire would do the like. It was recognized that 
no limitation should be made with respect to the main islands 
of Japan or Australia and New Zealand, with their adjacent is- 
lands, any more than with respect to the insular possessions ad- 
jacent to the coast of the United States, including Alaska and the 
Panama Canal Zone, or the Hawaiian Islands. The case of the 
Aleutian Islands, stretching out toward Japan, was a special one 
and had its counterpart in that of the Kurile Islands belonging 
to Japan and reaching out to the northeast toward the Aleutians. 
It was finally agreed that the status quo should be maintained as 
to both these groups. 

After prolonged negotiations, the three Powers — the United 
States, the British Empire and Japan — made an agreement that 
the status quo at the time of the signing of the Naval Treaty, with 
regard to fortifications and naval bases, should be maintained in 
their respective territories and possessions, which were specified 
as follows (Naval Treaty, Article XIX) ; "" 

"(1) The insular possessions which the United States now 
holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) 
those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska, and the 
Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and ( o ) 
the Hawaiian Islands ; 

"(2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British 
Empire now holds or may, hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean 
e{ist of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adja- 
cent to the coast of Canada, (&) the Commonwealth of Australia 
and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand; 

"(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan 
in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: The Kurile Islands, the Bonin 
Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa, and the 
Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific 
Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire." 

The same article of the treaty also contains the following pro- 
vision with respect to the meaning of the maintenance of the 
status quo: 

"The maintenance' of the status quo under the foregoing pro- 
visions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall 



" MUTSU." 



267 



be established in tbe territories and possessions specified ; that 
no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facili- 
ties for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no 
increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and 
possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not 
preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and 
equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments 
in time of peace." 

THE CASE OF THE " MUTSU." 

Among the ships which the American Government proposed 
should be scrapped by Japan was the Mutsu. It was the under- 
standing of the American Government that this ship was still 
incomplete at the time of the meeting of the Conference, although 
it was nearly completed ; that is, to the extent of about 98 per 
cent. It was proposed to be scrapped as all other ships which 
were in course of construction ; thus the Government of the 
United States included among its own ships which were to be 
scrapped two ships which were about 90 per cent completed. 

The Japanese Delegation, however, insisted that the Mutsu had 
actually been finished, was commissioned and fully manned before 
the Conference met. Apart from this point, this latest accession 
to the Japanese Navy was the especial pride of the Japanese 
people. It was their finest war vessel and, it is understood, had 
been built, in part at least, through popular subscriptions and in 
circumstances evoking patriotic pride in the highest degree. 

It was deemed by the Japanese Delegation to be quite impos- 
sible to induce the consent of their Government to any proposal 
of limitation which would involve the scrapping of the Mutsu. 
Its retention, however, created serious difficulties because of the 
disproportion of advantage that would accrue to Japan through 
the possession of such a ship. Japan offered to scrap the Settsu, 
one of the older ships that was to have been retained by Japan 
under the American plan, and also recognized that the ga"n to 
Japan through the Mutsu should be offset by the completion on 
the part of the United States of two of her battleships under con- 
struction and by the construction on the part of Great Britain of 
two new ships. 

It was accordingly agreed that the Government of the United 
States should finish two ships of the West Virginia class that 
were under construction, and on their completion should scrap 
the "North Dakota and the Delaware, which under the original 
plan were to have been retained. Great Britain on her part was 
to be permitted to build two new ships, and upon the'r comple- 
tion was to scrap four (4) of the older ships which would other- 
wise have been retained. In this way the balance of the three 
navies was kept. Nor was there any serious change in the final 



268 FRANCE AND ITALY. 

agreement establishing the maximum limits of the capital ship 
replacement tonnage. The original American plan had called 
for the following: 

United States, 500,000 tons. 
British Empire, 500,000 tons. 
Japan, 300,000 tons. 
The plan as modified became: 

United States, 525,000 tons. 
British Empire, 525,000 tons. 
Japan, 315,000 tons. 
Thus maintaining the ratio of 5-5-3. 

An important concession was made by Great Britain with 
respect to the two new ships which she was permitted to build. 
Great Britain, as stated in the American proposal, had already 
planned four (4) new Hoods. These ships had been designed 
and considerable time would have been saved in proceeding to 
build the two new ships according to the existing plans, but the 
new ships were designed greatly to exceed in tonnage any existing 
ship ; their tonnage displacement, it is understood, was to be 
about 49,000 tons. Great Britain agreed not only to abandon her 
program for the four (4) new Hoods, but in building the two 
new ships that they should not exceed 35,000 tons standard dis- 
placement, respectively. 

Thus with respect to capital ships the United States, the British 
Empire, and Japan were able to reach an agreement, but this was 
tentative and depended upon a suitable agreement being reached 
with Prance and Italy. 

FEANCE AND ITALY. 

The scheme of reduction accepted by the United States, Great 
Britain, and Japan involved the scrapping of capital ships to the 
extent of approximately 40 per cent of the existing strength. It 
was realized that no such reduction could be asked of either 
France or Italy and that the case of their navies required special 
consideration. 

France had seven (7) dreadnaughts with a tonnage of 164,500 
tons, and three (3) predreadnaughts, making a total of about 
221,000 tons. In the case of the United States, Great Britain, and 
Japan it was provided that their predreadnaughts should be 
scrapped without any provision for replacement, and there was 
to be, in addition, a reduction of about 40 per cent of the naval 
strength represented by dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts. 
Reducing in the same proportion as the United States has reduced, 
France's tonnage of capital ships would be fixed at 102,000 tons, 
or, if the predreadnaughts of France were taken into the calcula- 
tion on her side although omitted on the side of the United States, 



AUXILIARY CRAFT. 269 

the total tonnage of France's capital ships being taken at 221,000 
tons, a reduction on the same basis would leave France with only 
136,000 tons. This was deemed to be impracticable. It was 
thought entirely fair, however, that France, in the replacement 
schedule, should be allowed a maximum tonnage equivalent to 
the existing tonnage of her seven (7) dreadnaughts with a slight 
increase ; that is, that the maximum limit of capital ships, for 
the purpose of replacement, should be fixed at 175,000 tons. 

Italy sought parity with France, and this principle having been 
accepted in the course of the discussion, it was likewise proposed 
that Italy should be allowed 175,000 tons of capital ships in re- 
placement. The present tonnage of Italy is about 182,800 tons. 
The proposed maximum limit of 175,000 tons was at once accepted 
by Italy. 

France expressed the desire to be allowed 10 capital ships, 
which, at a tonnage of 35,000 tons each, would have given her 
350,000 tons. This was deemed to be excessive as a part of a plan 
for the limitation of armament, and, had it been insisted upon, 
would probably have made impossible an agreement for an effective 
limitation of capital ship tonnage. But , after discussion, France 
consented to the maximum limit of 175,000 tons for capital ships. 

AUXILIARY CRAFT. 

In the original American proposal it was stated that the 
allowance of auxiliary combatant craft to each Power should be 
in proportion to the capital ship tonnage. The proposal for the 
three Powers — the United States, Great Britain, and Japan — was 
that the total tonnage of cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers 
allowed each Power should be as follows : 

United States, 450,000 tons. 

Great Britain, 450,000 tons. 

Japan, 270,000 tons. 
And that the total tonnage of submarines allowed each of these 
Powers should be : 

United States, 90,000 tons. 

Great Britain, 90,000 tons. 

Japan, 54,000 tons. 
In the same proportion as the capital ship tonnage, this would 
have left for France and Italy, in the case of cruisers, flotilla 
leaders and destroyers, a maximum of 150,000 tons for each of 
these Powers ; and, in the case of submarines, a maximum of 
30,000 tons each. 

The American Delegation felt that the original proposal for 
submarines was too high, and, aided by the advice of our naval 
experts, proposed that the maximum limit for the United States 
and Great Britain in submarine tonnage should be 60,000 tons 
each ; and that France, Japan, and Italy should retain the tonnage 



270 SUBMARINES. 

in submarines that they now have; that is, should maintain the 
status quo as regards submarine tonnage. It was understood that 
the present submarine tonnage of France was 31,391 tons; of 
Japan 31,452 tons, and of Italy somewhat less, about 21,000 tons. 
This proposition was not accepted, being opposed both by Japan 
and France. Japan stated her willingness to adhere to the 
original proposal, which allowed her 54,000 tons in submarines. 

In accepting the allowance for capital ships, France had made 
a distinct reservation. It was said that it would be impossible 
for the French Government to accept reductions for light cruisers, 
torpedo boats, and submarines corresponding to those which were 
accepted for capital ships. Accordingly, France maintained that 
her necessities required that she should be allowed 330,000 tons 
for cruisers, etc., and 90,000 tons for submarines. 

M. Sarraut thus stated the position of the French Government : 

" After examining, on the other hand, the composition of the 
forces needed by France in auxiliary craft and submarines, 
which are specially intended for the protection of her territory 
and its communications, the Cabinet and the Supreme Council 
of National Defense have reached the conclusion that it is im- 
possible to accept a limitation below that of 330,000 tons for 
auxiliary craft and 90,000 tons for submarines, without imperil- 
ing the vital interests of the country and of its colonies and the 
safety of their naval life. 

" The French Delegation has been instructed to consent to no 
concession on the above figures. 

" To sum up, France accepts, as regards capital ships, the sac- 
rifice which she must face in order to meet the views of the Con- 
ference and which represents an important reduction of her 
normal sea power. She limits the program of the future establish- 
ment of her fleet to 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and to 90,000 
tons for submarines." 

In view of the insistence on the part of the French Delegation 
that they could not abate their requirements as to auxiliary craft 
and submarines, the British Delegation stated that they were 
unable to consent to a limitation of auxiliary craft adapted to 
meet submarines. 

For this reason it was found to be impossible to carry out the 
American plan so far as limitation of auxiliary craft and sub- 
marines was concerned. 

THE NAVAL TREATY. 

The agreement finally reached was set forth in the Naval 
Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922. 

With respect to capital ships, while there are certain changes in 
detail, the integrity of the plan proposed on behalf of the American 
Government has been maintained, and the spirit in which that 



THE NAVAL TREATY. 



271 



proposal was made, and in which it was received, dominated the 
entire negotiations and brought them to a successful conclusion. 
The treaty is in three chapters : 

(1) A chapter containing the general principles or provisions 
relating to the limitation of naval armament. 

(2) A chapter containing rules for the execution of the agree- 
ment. 

(3) A chapter containing certain miscellaneous provisions. 
Without following the order of this arrangement, the substance 

of the treaty may be thus stated : 

The first subject with which the treaty deals is that of the limi- 
tations as to capital ships, which are defined as follows : 

"A capital ship, in the case of ships hereafter built, is defined 
as a vessel of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement 
exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement 
or which carries a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches (203 
millimeters)." (Ch. II, Pt. 4.) 

The treaty specifies the capital ships which each of the five 
Powers may retain. Thus, the United States of America is to 
retain 18 capital ships, with a tonnage of 500,650' tons ; the British 
Empire 22 capital ships, with a tonnage of 580,450 tons ; France 
10 ships, of 221,170 tons ; Italy 10 ship? of 182,800 tons ; Japan 10 
ships, of 301,320 tons. (Ch. II, Pt. 1.) 

In reaching this result, the age factor in the case of the respec- 
tive navies has received consideration. 

The treaty provides that all other capital ships of these Powers, 
either built or building, are to be scrapped or disposed of as pro- 
vided in the treaty. (Art. II.) 

It is provided that the present building programs are to be 
abandoned and that there is to be no building of capital ships 
hereafter except in replacement and as the treaty provides. 
(Art. III.) 

It may be useful to make a comparison of this result with the 
proposal which was made at the beginning of the Conference on 
behalf of the American Delegation. That proposal set forth that 
18 ships were to be retained by the United States with a tonnage 
of 500,650 tons. In this treaty the same ships are to be retained. 

In that proposal there were set forth 22 capital ships to be 
retained by the British Empire. Under the treaty the same 
number of ships is to be retained, in fact, the same ships, with 
the single exception of the substitution of the Thunderer for the 
Erin, with a total tonnage of 580,450, as against the calculation 
in the original proposal of 604,450 tons for ships retained. 

In the case of Japan, the proposal set forth 10 ships to be re- 
tained. By the treaty, the same number of ships is to be re- 
tained, the difference being that the Mutsu is to be retained and 
the Settsu (which was to have been retained) is to be scrapped. 



272 RETAINED TONNAGE. 

The tonnage retained by Japan, as calculated in the original 
proposal, was 299,700 tons. The tonnage retained under the 
treaty is 301,320. 

The effect of the retention of the Mutsu by Japan was to make 
necessary certain changes to which reference has already been 
made, and for which the treaty provides. These changes are : 

In the case of the United States, it is provided that two ships 
of the West Virginia class, now under construction, may be com- 
pleted, and that on their completion two of the ships which were 
to have been retained, the North Dakota, and the Delaware, are 
to be scrapped. 

In the case of the British Empire, two new ships may be built, 
not exceeding 35,000 tons each ; and on completion of these two 
ships, four ships, the Thunderer, King George V, the Ajax, and 
the Centurion, are to be scrapped. 

In the case of Japan, as has been said, the difference is that the 
Mutsu is retained and the Settsu scrapped. 

Aside from these changes, the principles set forth in the Amer- 
ican proposal in relation to capital ships have been applied, and 
the capital ship program is in its essence carried out. 

A further comparison may be made with respect to ships to 
be scrapped. 

In the case of the United States, it was proposed to scrap all 
capital ships now under construction, that is to say 15 ships, in 
various stages of construction. Instead, 13 of these ships are to 
be scrapped or disposed of. The total number of capital ships 
which were to be scrapped by the United States, or disposed of, 
was stated to be 30. Under the treaty, the number is 28, with a 
very slight difference in total tonnage. 

In the case of Great Britain, the construction of the 4 great 
Hoods has been abandoned, and while Great Britain is to have 2 
new ships, limited to 35,000 tons each, 4 of the retained ships are 
to be scrapped, as already stated, when these 2 ships are com- 
pleted. 

It was also provided in the original proposal that Great Britain 
should scrap her predreadnaughts, second line battleships and 
first line battleships, up to and not including the King George V. 
These ships, with certain predreadnaughts which it was under- 
stood had already been scrapped, would amount to 19 capital 
ships, with a tonnage reduction on this account of 411,375 tons. 
This provision is substantially unaffected by the treaty, the fact 
being that under the treaty 20 ships are to be scrapped instead 
of 19 that were mentioned in the proposal. 

In the case of Japan, the proposal was that Japan — 

"(1) Shall abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, 
viz, the Kii, Owari, No. 7 and No. 8, battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7, 
and 8, battle cruisers." 



SCRAPPING. 278 

This proposal has been carried out and the program has been 
abandoned by Japan. 

"(2) Shall scrap 3 capital ships (the Mutsu, launched; the 
Tosa and Kago, in course of building) and 4 battle cruisers (the 
Amagi and Akagi in course of building, and the Atoga and 
Takao not yet laid down, but for which certain material has been 
assembled). The total number of new capital ships to be 
scrapped under this program is 7. The total tonnage of these 
capital ships when completed would be 289,100 tons." 

Under the treaty Japan is to scrap all the ships mentioned with 
the exception of the Mutsu. 

"(3) Shall scrap all predreadnaughts and battleships of the 
second line. This would include the scrapping of all ships up 
to but not including the Settsu; that is, the scrapping of 10 older 
ships with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons." 

Under the treaty 10 ships are scrapped, including the Settsu in- 
stead of excluding it. 

There are certain special provisions with regard to capital 
ships which should be mentioned in order that there may be no 
misapprehension, although the matter itself is' insignificant. In 
the tables in Section II of Chapter II, Part 3, it is provided that 
the United States may retain the Oregon and Illinois for noncom- 
batant purposes after they have been emasculated in accordance 
with certain provisions of the treaty. There is a sentimental 
reason for the retention of the Oregon, which it is understood 
the State of Oregon desires to possess. 

The British Empire is permitted to retain the Colossus and the 
Collingsivood for noncombatant purposes after they have been 
emasculated. These have already been withdrawn from com- 
batant use. 

There is also a provision in the case of Japan that 2 of her 
older ships, over 20 years old, the Shikashima and the Asahi, 
which were to be scrapped, may be retained for noncombatant 
purposes after they have been emasculated, as stated. 

The matter of scrapping is not left to conjecture or to the de- 
cision of each of the Powers taken separately, but is carefully 
defined by the treaty in Part 2 of Chapter II, as follows : 

" RULES FOE SCRAPPING VESSELS OF WAR. 

" I. A vessel to be scrapped must be placed in such a condi- 
tion that can not be put to combatant use. 

" II. This result must be finally effected in any one of the 
following ways : 

"(a) Permanent sinking of the vessel; 

"(b) Breaking the vessel up. This shall always involve the 
destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers, and armor, and 
all deck, side, and bottom plating; 



274 DISPOSITION OF SHIPS. 

"(c) Converting the vessel to target use, exclusively * * * 
JS T ot more than one capital ship may be retained for this purpose 
at one time by any of the Contracting Powers." 

There is a special provision in the case of France and Italy 
that they may severally retain two seagoing vessels for training 
purposes exclusively ; that is, as gunnery or torpedo schools. 
The treaty describes the vessels, or the class to which they be- 
long, and France and Italy undertake to remove and destroy 
their conning towers and not to use them as vessels of war. 

There is also provision as to the two stages of scrapping The 
first stage is intended to render the ship incapable of further 
warlike service and is to be immediately undertaken. The process 
is set forth in great detail in respect to removal of guns or 
machinery for working hydraulic or electric mountings, or fire- 
control instruments and range finders, or ammunition, explosives, 
and mines, or torpedoes, war-heads and torpedo tubes, or wire- 
less telegraphy installations, the conning tower and all side 
armor, etc. (Ch. II, Pt. 2, Sec. Ill, Subdivision A.) 

In the case of vessels that are to be immediately scrapped, the 
work of rendering them incapable of further warlike service is to 
he completed within six months from the time of the coming into 
force of the treaty and the scrapping is to be finally effected within 
18 months from that time. In the case of vessels which are to be 
scrapped after the completion of the new ships which may be built 
by the United States and the British Empire, respectively, the 
work of rendering the vessel incapable of further warlike service 
is to be commenced not later than the date of the completion of 
its successor and is to be finished within six months from that 
time. The vessel is to be finally scrapped within 18 months from 
that date. 

The treaty provides the maximum replacement limits as follows : 

United States 525, 000 tons. 

British Empire 525, 000 tons. 

France - 175,000 tons. 

Italy 175, 000 tons. 

Japan 315, 000 tons. 

The size of each of the capital ships is limited to 35,000 tons ; it 
is also provided that no capital ship shall carry a gun of a calibre 
in excess of 16 inches. The provisions for replacements of capital 
ships are set forth in charts, which form Section II of Part 3 of 
Chapter II of the treaty. 

In the case of the United States, the British Empire and Japan, 
aside from the two ships that may be completed by the United 
States and the two which may be built by the British Empire, the 
first replacement is to begin with the laying down of ships in the 
year 1931, for completion in 1934, and replacement takes place 
thereafter according to the age of the ships. 



AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. 275 

In the case of France and Italy, the first replacement is per- 
mitted for laying down in 1927 for completion in 1930 in the case 
of France and in 1931 in the case of Italy. 

The treaty also deals with aircraft carriers. 

"An aircraft carrier is defined as a vessel of war with a dis- 
placement in excess of 10,000 tons "(10,160 metric tons) standard 
displacement designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of 
carrying aircraft. It must be so constructed that aircraft can 
be launched therefrom and landed thereon, and not designed and 
constructed for carrying a more powerful armament than that 
allowed to it under Article IX or Article X as the case may be." 
(Ch. II, Pt. 4.) 

The total tonnage allowed for aircraft carriers is limited as 
follows: (Art. VII.) 

For the United States 135, 000 tons. 

British Empire 135, 000 tons. 

France 60,000 tons. 

Italy 60, 000 tons. 

Japan 81, 000 tons. 

In v:"ew of the experimental nature of the existence of aircraft 
carriers, that fact is recognized and there is provision for replace- 
ment without regard to age. (Art. VIII.) 

The maximum limit of each aircraft carrier is 27,000 tons. 
There is, however, a special exception which permits Contracting 
Powers to build not more than two aircraft carriers, each of a 
tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons. 

What has been said with regard to the disposition of existing 
capital ships and their scrapping is to be qualified by the state- 
ment that in order to effect economy any of the Contracting* 
Powers may use, for the purpose of constructing aircraft carriers 
as defined, any two of their ships, whether constructed or in 
course of construction, which would otherwise be scrapped under 
the treaty, and these may be of a tonnage of not more than 
33,000 tons. (Art. IX. ) 

The general provision as to the armament of aircraft carriers 
is that if it has guns exceeding six inches, the total number of 
guns shall not exceed 10. It can not carry a gun in excess of 8 
inches. It may carry without limit 5-inch guns and antiaircraft 
guns. (Art. X.) 

In the case of a'rcraft carriers of 33,000 tons, the total number 
of guns to be carried, in case any of such guns are of caliber 
exceeding 6 inches, except antiaircraft guns and guns not exceed- 
ing five inches, can not number more than 8. (Art. IX.) 

With respect to auxiliary craft, the treaty provides that no 
vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons, other than capital ships or 
aircraft carriers, shall be acquired by or constructed by, for, or 
within the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers. Ves- 



276 LIMITATIONS ON BUILDING. 

sels not specially built as fighting ships nor taken in time of 
peace under Government control for fighting purposes which are 
employed on fleet duties, or as troop transports, or in some other 
way for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of hostilities 
otherwise than as fighting ships, are not within this limitation. 
(Art. XL) 

The treaty contains certain provisions of a protective nature; 
that is, for the purpose of securing the faithful execution of the 
agreement. 

Thus it is provided that no vessel of war of any of the Con- 
tracting Powers hereafter laid down, except a capital ship, shall 
carry a gun in excess of 8 inches (Art. XII) ; that no ship desig- 
nated in the treaty to be scrapped may be reconverted into a 
vessel of war (Art. XIII) ; that no preparations shall be made 
in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of war- 
like armament for the purpose of converting such ships into 
vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of the decks 
for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6 inches. (Art. XIV.) 

There are also provisions with respect to the building of vessels 
for foreign powers. Thus, no vessel of war constructed within the 
jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers, for a noncontract- 
ing power, shall exceed the limits as to displacement and arma- 
ment prescribed by the treaty for vessels of a similar type, con- 
structed by or for any of the Contracting Powers ; provided, how- 
ever, that the displacement for aircraft carriers constructed for a 
noncontracting power shall not exceed 27,000 tons. (Art. XV.) 

It is provided that a Contracting Power, within the jurisdic- 
tion of which a vessel of war is constructed for a noncontracting 
power, shall give suitable information to the other Contracting 
Powers. (Art. XVI.) 

Further, in the event of a Contracting Power being engaged in 
war, such Power is not to use as a vessel of war any vessel of war 
which many be under construction within its jurisdiction for any 
other power or which may have been constructed within its juris- 
diction for another power and not delivered. (Art. XVII.) 

Each of the Contracting Powers undertakes not to dispose, by 
gift, sale, or any mode of transfer, of any vessel of war in such a 
manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the navy 
of any foreign power (Art. XVIII). It is recorded in the pro- 
ceedings of the Conference that this undertaking is regarded as 
binding as a matter of honor upon the Powers from the date of 
the signing of the treaty. 

Reference has already been made to the provision relating to 
the maintenance of the status quo as to fortifications and naval 
bases in the Pacific Ocean. 



POSSIBLE REVISION. 277 

If, during the term of the treaty, which is 15 years, the require- 
ments of the national security of any of the Contracting Powers, 
in respect of naval defence are, in the opinion of that Power, 
materially affected by any change of circumstances, the Con- 
tracting Powers agree, at the request of such Power, to meet in 
conference with a view to the reconsideration of the provisions 
of the treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement. (Art. 
XXI.) 

It is further provided that in view of possible technical and 
scientific developments the United States, after consultation with 
the other Contracting Powers, shall arrange for a Conference of 
all the Contracting Powers, which shall convene as soon as possible 
after the expiration of 8 years from the coming into force of 
the treaty, to consider what changes, if any, may be necessary 
to meet such developments. (Art. XXI.) 

There is a special provision as to the effect of an outbreak of 
war. The mere fact that one of the Contracting Powers becomes 
engaged in war does not affect the obligations of the treaty. But 
if a Contracting Power becomes engaged in a war which, in its 
opinion, affects the naval defence of its national security, such 
Power may, after notice to the other Contracting Powers, sus- 
pend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present 
treaty, other than certain specified obligations, provided that such 
Power shall notify the other Contracting Powers that the emer- 
gency is of such a character as to require such suspension. In 
such a case the remaining Contracting Powers agree to consult 
together and ascertain what temporary modifications may be 
required. If such consultation does not produce an agreement, 
duly made in accordance with the constitutional methods of the 
respective Powers, any one of the Contracting Powers may, by 
giving notice to the other Contracting Powers, suspend for the 
period of hostilities its obligations under the present treaty, ex- 
cept as specified. On the cessation of hostilities the Contracting 
Powers agree to meet in Conference to consider what modifications, 
if any, should be made in the provisions of the treaty. (Art. 
XXII.) 

The treaty is to remain in force until December 31, 1936, and in 
case none of the Contracting Powers shall have given notice two 
years before that date of its intention to terminate the treaty, it is 
to continue in force until the expiration of two years from the date 
on which notice of termination shall be given by one of the Con- 
tracting Powers ; whereupon the treaty shall terminate as regards 
all the Contracting Powers. (Art. XXIII.) 

This is a summary of the engagements of the Naval Treaty. 
Probably no more significant treaty was ever made. Instead of 
discussing the desirability of diminishing the burdens of naval 



278 NEW AGENCIES OF WAR. 

armament, the Conference has succeeded in limiting them to an 
important degree. 

It is obvious that this agreement means ultimately an enormous 
saving of money and the lifting of a heavy and unnecessary 
burden. The treaty absolutely stops the race in competition in 
naval armament. At the same time it leaves the relative security 
of the great naval powers unimpaired. No national interest has 
been sacrificed ; a wasteful production of unnecessary armament 
has been ended. 

While it was desired that an agreement should be reached for 
the limitation of auxiliary craft and submarines, its importance 
should not be overestimated. Limitation has been effected where 
it was most needed, both with respect to the avoidance of the 
heaviest outlays and with reference to the promptings to war, 
which may be found in excessive preparation. Moreover, it is far 
from probable that the absence of limitation, in the other field, 
will lead to production of either auxiliary craft or submarines in 
excess of their normal relation to capital ships. Peoples are not 
in a mood for unnecessary naval expenditures. 

The limitation of capital ships, in itself, substantially meets the 
existing need, and its indirect effect will be to stop the inordinate 
production of any sort of naval craft. 

EULES FOE CONTEOL OF NEW AGENCIES OF WAEFAEE. 
SUBxMARINES. 

The British Delegation submitted a proposition for the abolition 
of submarines. This proposal was put upon the records in the 
following form : 

" The British Empire Delegation desired formally to place on 
record this opinion that the use of submarines, whilst of small 
value for defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which are 
inconsistent with the laws of war and the dictates of humanity, 
and the delegation desires that united action should be taken by 
all nations to forbid their maintenance, construction, or employ- 
ment." 

The proposal was discussed at length, the British Delegation 
bringing forward in its support arguments of great force based 
upon the experience of Great Britain in the recent war. It met 
with opposition from France, Italy, and Japan. 

The American Delegation not only had the opinion of their 
naval advisers in opposition to the proposal, but also had received 
a careful report upon the subject from the Advisory Committee of 
Twenty-One appointed by the President. This report was pre- 
sented by the American Delegation as setting forth in a succinct 
manner the position of their Government. In this report it was 
stated : 



V 



USE OF SUBMARINE. 279 

"Unlimited submarine warfare should be outlawed. Laws 
should be drawn up prescribing the methods of procedure of sub- 
marines against merchant vessels both neutral and belligerent. 
These rules should accord with the rules observed by surface 
craft. Laws should also be made which prohibit the use of false 
flags and offensive arming of merchant vessels. The use of false 
flags has already ceased in land warfare. No one can prevent 
an enemy from running ' amuck,' but immediately he does he 
outlaws himself and invites sure defeat by bringing down the 
wrath of the world upon his head. If the submarine is required 
to operate under the same rule as combatant surface vessels no 
objection can be raised as to its use against merchant vessels. 
The individual captains of submarines are no more likely to violate 
instructions from their government upon this point than are 
captains of any other type of ship acting independently. 

" SUBMARINES AGAINST COMBATANT SHIPS. 

" Against enemy men of war the submarine may be likened 
to the advance guard on land which hides in a tree or uses 
underbrush to conceal itself. If the infantry iri its advance en- 
counters an ambuscade, it suffers greatly even if it is not totally 
annihilated. However, an ambuscade is entirely legitimate. In 
the same fashion a submarine strikes the advancing enemy from 
concealment and no nation cries out against this form of attack 
as illegal. Its Navy simply becomes more vigilant, moves faster 
and uses its surface scouts to protect itself. 

'' The submarine carries the same weapons as surface vessels, 
i. e., torpedoes, mines, and guns. There is no prohibition of 
their use on. surface craft and there can be none on submarines. 
Submarines are particularly well adapted to use mines and tor- 
pedoes. They can approach to the desired spot without being 
seen, lay their mines or discharge their torpedoes, and make their 
escape. 

" The best defense against them is eternal vigilance and high 
speed. This causes added fatigue to the personnel and greater 
wear to the machinery. The continued menace of submarines in 
the vicinity may so wear down a fleet that when it meets the 
enemy it will be so exhausted as to make its defeat a simple 
matter. 

" The submarine as a man-of-war has a very vital part to play. 
It has come to stay. It may strike without warning against com- 
batant vessels, as surface ships may do also, but must be re- 
quired to observe the prescribed rules of surface craft when op- 
posing merchantmen, as at other times. 

" THE SUBMARINE AS A SCOUT. 

" As a scout the submarine has great possibilities — it is the one 
type of vessel able to proceed unsupported into distant enemy 



280 ILLEGAL WARFARE. 

waters and maintain itself to observe and report enemy move- 
ments. At present its principal handicaps are poor habitability 
and lack of radio power to transmit its information. However, 
these may be overcome in some degree in the future. Here, again, 
the submarine has come to stay — it has great value, a legitimate 
use, and no nation can decry its employment in this fashion. 
***** 

" The submarine is particularly an instrument of weak naval 
powers. The business of the world is carried on upon the sur- 
face of the sea. Any navy which is dominant on the surface pre- 
fers to rely on that superiority ; while navi<es comparatively 
weak may but threaten that dominance by developing a new 
form of attack to attain success through surprise. Hence sub- 
marines have offered and secured advantages until the method 
of successful counterattack has been developed. 

" The United States Navy lacks a proper number of cruisers. 
The few we have would be unable to cover the necessary area to 
obtain information. Submarines could greatly assist them as 
they can not be driven in by enemy scouts. 

" The cost per annum of maintaining 100,000 tons of sub- 
marines fully manned and ready is about thirty million dollars. 
For the work which will be required of them in an emergency, 
this cost is small when taken in connection with the entire Navy. 
The retention of a large submarine force may at some future 
time result in the United States holding its outlying possessions. 
If these colonies once fall the expenditure of men necessary to 
recapture them will be tremendous and may result in a drawn 
war which would really be a United States defeat. The United 
States needs a large submarine force to protect its interests. 

" The Committee is therefore of the opinion that unlimited 
warfare by submarines on commerce should be outlawed. The 
right of visit and search must be exercised by submarines under 
the same rules as for surface vessels. It does not approve limita- 
tion in size of submarines." 

Illegal Submarine Warfare — Use of Submarines Against Merchant 

Ships — Poison (}as. 

While the Conference was unable either to abolish or to limit 
submarines, it stated, with clarity and force, the existing rules 
of international law which condemned the abhorrent practices 
followed in the recent war in the use of submarines against 
merchant vessels. The resolutions adopted by the Conference 
as to the use of submarines against merchant vessels, and with 
respect to the use of poison gas, were put in the form of a treaty 



RULES TOR SUBMARINES. 281 

Which was signed on February 6, 1922. The substantive portions 
of this treaty are as follows : 



/ 

" The Signatory Powers declare that among the rules adopted 
by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and 
noncombatants at sea in time of war, the following are to be 
deemed an established part of international law: 

"(1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit 
and search to determine its character before it can be seized. 

"A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to 
submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed 
after seizure. 

"A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew 
and passengers have been first placed in safety. 

"(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances 
exempt from the universal rules above stated ; and if a submarine 
can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules 
the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and 
from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed un- 
molested. 

"II. 

" The Signatory Powers invite all other civilized Powers to 
express their assent to the foregoing statement of established 
law so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout 
the world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion 
of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents. 

" III. 

" The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of 
the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect 
to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant 
ships, further declare that any person in the service of any 
Power who shall'violate any of these rules, whether or not such 
person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be 
deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to 
trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may be 
brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any 
Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found. 

"IV. 

" The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility 
of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, 

25882—23 19 



282 RULES AS TO GAS. 

as they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the re- 
quirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the 
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to 
the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as com- 
merce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a part of the 
law of nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth 
binding as between themselves and they invite all other nations 
to adhere thereto. 

" The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, 
and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly 
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a 
prohibition of such use having been declared 'in treaties, to which 
a majority of the civilized Powers are parties. 

" The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall 
be universally accepted as a part of international law binding 
alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent 
to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between them- 
selves, and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto." 

Mr. Root, in presenting this treaty for the approval of the 
Conference, said : 

" You will observe that this treaty does not undertake to 
codify international law in respect of visit, search, or seizure of 
merchant vessels. What it does undertake to do is to state the 
most important and effective provisions of the law of nations 
in regard to the treatment of merchant vessels by belligerent 
warships, and to declare that submarines are, under no circum- 
stances, exempt from these humane rules for the protection of 
the life of innocent noncombatants. 

"It undertakes further to stigmatize violation of these rules, 
and the doing to death of women and children and noncom- 
batants by the wanton destruction of merchant vessels upon 
which they are passengers and by a violation of the laws of war, 
which as between these five great powers and all other civilized 
nations who shall give their adherence shall be henceforth pun- 
ished as an act of piracy. 

" It undertakes further to prevent temptation to the violation 
of these rules by the use of submarines for the capture of mer- 
chant vessels and to prohibit that use altogether. It under- 
takes further to denounce the use of poisonous gases and chemi- 
cals in war, as they were used to the horror of all civilization in 
the war of 1914-1918. 

" Cynics have said that in the stress of war these rules will be 
violated. Cynics are always near-sighted, and often and usually 
the decisive facts lie beyond the range of their vision. 



COMMISSION ON RULES OF WAR, 283 

" We may grant that rules limiting the use of implements of 
warfare made between diplomatists will be violated in the stress 
of conflict. We may grant that the most solemn obligation 
assumed by governments in respect of the use of implements of 
war will be violated in the stress of conflict; but beyond diplo- 
matists and beyond governments there rests the public opinion 
of the civilized world, and the public opinion of the world, can 
punish. It can bring its sanction to the support of a prohibition 
with as terrible consequences as any criminal statute of Congress 
or of Parliament. 

" We may grant that in matters which are complicated and 
difficult, where the facts are disputed and the argument is 
sophistic, public opinion may be confused and ineffective, yet 
when a rule of action, clear and simple, is based upon the funda- 
mental ideas of humanity and right conduct, and the public 
opinion of the world has reached a decisive judgment upon it, 
that rule will be enforced by the greatest power known to human 
history, the power that is the hope of the world, will be a hope 
justified." 

COMMISSION TO KEVISE RULES OF WAE. 

The Conference adopted the following resolution for the ap- 
pointment of a commission to examine the rules made necessary 
by recent experience with respect to new agencies of warfare : 
" I. That a commission composed of not more than two mem- 
bers representing each of the above-mentioned Powers 
shall be constituted to consider the following questions : 
"(a) Do existing rules of International Law adequately 
cover new methods of attack or defense result- 
ing from the introduction or development since 
the Hague Conference of 1907 of new agencies 
of warfare? 
"(b) If not so, what changes in the existing rules ought 
to be adopted in consequence thereof as a part 
of the law of nations? 
" II. That notices of appointment of the members of the com- 
mission shall be transmitted to the Government of the 
United States of America within three months after the 
adjournment of the present Conference, which, after 
consultation with the Powers concerned, will fix the day 
and place for the meeting of the commission. 
" III. That the commission shall be at liberty to request assist- 
ance and advice from experts in International Law and 
in land, naval, and aerial warfare, 
" IV. That the commission shall report its conclusions to each 
of the Powers represented in its membership. 



'284 AIRCKAFT. 

• " Those Powers shall thereupon confer as to the acceptance of 
the report and the course to be followed to secure the considera- 
tion of its recommendations by the other civilized Powers." 
A further resolution was adopted at the same time, as follows : 
"Resolved, That it is not the intention of the Powers agreeing 
to the appointment of a Commission to consider and report upon 
the rules of International Law respecting new agencies of war- 
fare that the Commission shall review or report upon the rules 
or declarations relating to submarines or the use of noxious 
gases and chemicals already adopted by the Powers in this 
Conference." 

AIRCRAFT. 

It was found to be impracticable to adopt rules for the limita- 
tion of aircraft in number, size, or character, in view of the fact 
that such rules would be of little or no value unless the produc- 
tion of commercial aircraft were similarly restricted. It was 
deemed to be inadvisable thus to hamper the development of a 
facility which could not fail to be important in the progress of 
civilization. 



SECOND. 

PACIFIC AND FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS. 

. [This part of the Report of the American Delegation is omitted, 
except the reference to Mandated Islands and the General Sum- 
mary. The full report is in Senate Document No. 126, 67th Con- 
gress, 2d session, pp. 819-868.] 

MANDATED ISLANDS. 

For some time there have been negotiations between the United 
States and Japan in relation to the so-called mandated islands in 
the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator. While the Conference 
was in session these negotiations resulted in an agreement between 
the American Government and the Japanese Government, which 
is to be embodied in a treaty. The points of agreement are as 
follows : 

1. It is agreed that the United States shall have free access to 
the Island of Yap on the footing of entire equality with Japan 
or any other nation in all that relates to the landing and opera- 
tion of the existing Yap-Guam cable or of any cable which may 
hereafter be laid by the United States or its nationals. 

'2. It is also agreed that the United States and its nationals are 
to be accorded the same rights and privileges with respect to 
radiotelegraphic service as with regard to cables. It is provided 
that so long as the Japanese Government shall maintain on the 
Island of Yap an adequate radiotelegraphic station, cooperating 
effectively with the cables and with other radio stations on ships 
and shore, without discriminatory exactions or preferences, the 
exercise of the right to establish radiotelegraphic stations at Yap 
by the United States or its nationals shall be suspended. 

3. It is further agreed that the United States shall enjoy in the 
Island of Yap the following rights, privileges, and exemptions 
in relation to electrical communications : 

(a) Rights of residence without restriction; and rights of ac- 
quisition and enjoyment and undisturbed possession, upon a foot- 
ing of entire equality with Japan or any other nations or their 
respective nationals of all property and interests, both personal 
and real, including lands, buildings, residences, offices, works, 
and appurtenances. 

(h) No permit or license to be required for the enjoyment of 
any of these rights and privileges. 

285 



286 MANDATED ISLANDS. 

(c) Each country to be. free to operate both ends of its cables 
either directly or through its nationals, including corporations or 
associations. 

(d) No cable censorship or supervision of operation or mes- 
sages. 

(e) Free entry and exit for persons and property. 

(f) No taxes, port, harbor, or landing charges, or exactions, 
either with respect to operation of cables or to property, persons, 
or vessels. 

(g) No discriminatory police regulations. 

4. Japan agrees that it will use its power of expropriation to 
secure to the United States needed property and facilities for the 
purpose of electrical communication in the Island, if such prop- 
erty or facilities can not otherwise be obtained. It is understood 
that the location and area of land to be so expropriated shall be 
arranged each time between the two Governments, according to 
the requirements of each case. American property and facilities 
for the purpose of electrical communication in the Island are to 
be exempt from the process of expropriation. 

5. The United States consents to the administration by Japan of 
the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator 
subjected to the above provisions with respect to the Island of 
Yap, and also subject to the following conditions : 

"(a) The United States is to have the benefit of the engage- 
ments of Japan set forth in the mandate, particularly those as 
follows : 

"Article 3. 

" The Mandatory shall see that the slave trade is prohibited 
and that no forced labour is permitted, except for essential pub- 
lic work and services, and then only for adequate remuneration. 

" The Mandatory shall also see that the traffic in arms and 
ammunition is controlled in accordance with principles analogous 
to those laid down in the Convention relating to the control 
of the arms traffic, signed on September 10th, 1919, or in any 
convention amending same. 

" The supply of intoxicating spirts and beverages to the 
natives shall be prohibited." 

"Article 4. 

" The military training of the natives, otherwise than for pur- 
poses of internal police and the local defense of the territory, 
shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases 
shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory." 

"(&) With respect to missionaries, it is agreed that Japan shall 
ensure complete freedom on conscience and the free exercise of 
all forms of worship, which are consonant with public order and 



GENERAL SUMMARY. 



287 



morality, and that missionaries of all such religions shall he 
free to enter the territory, and to travel and reside therein, to 
acquire and possess property, to erect religious buildings, and to 
open schools throughout the territory. Japan shall, however, 
have the right to exercise such control as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of public order and good government, and to take 
all measures required for such control. 

"(c) Japan agrees that vested American property rights will 
be maintained and respected. 

"(d) It is agreed that the treaties between the United States 
and Japan now in force shall apply to the mandated islands. 

"(e) It is agreed that any modifications in the Mandate are to 
be subject to the consent of the United States, and, further, that 
Japan will address to the United States a duplicate report on the 
administration of the Mandate." 

No agreement has yet been made with respect to the so-called 
mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean south of the Equator. The 
assent of the United States to these mandates has not yet been 
given, and the subject is left to negotiations beween the United 
States and Great Britain. 

No action was taken with respect to electrical communications 
in the Pacific. The allocation of the former German cables are 
matters to be dealt with by the five Principal Allied and Associ- 
ated Powers and will be the subject of diplomatic negotiations. 

GENEEAL SUMMARY. 

To estimate correctly the character and value of these several 
treaties, resolutions, and formal declarations, they should be con- 
sidered as a whole. Each one contributes its part in combination 
with the others toward the establishment of conditions in which 
peaceful security will take the place of competitive preparation 
for war . 

The declared object was, in the naval aspect, to stop the race of 
competitive building of warships which was in process and which 
was so distressingly like the competition that immediately pre- 
ceded the war of 1914. Competitive armament, however, is the 
result of a state of mind in which a national expectation of attack 
by some other country causes preparation to meet the attack. To 
stop competition it was necessary to deal with the state of mind 
from which it results. A belief in the pacific intentions of other 
powers must be substituted for suspicion and apprehension. 

The negotiations which led to the Four Power Treaty were the 
process of attaining that new state of mind, and the Four Power 
Treaty itself was the expression of that new state of mind. It 
terminated the Anglo-Japanese alliance and substituted friendly 
conference in place of war as the first reaction from any contro- 



288 FOUR POWER TREATY. 

versies which might arise in the region of the Pacific ; it would 
not have been possible except as part of a plan including a limita- 
tion and a reduction of naval armaments, but that limitation and 
reduction would not have been possible without the new relations 
established by the Four Power Treaty or something equivalent 
to it. 

The new relations declared in the Four Power Treaty could 
not, however, inspire confidence or be reasonably assured of con- 
tinuance without a specific understanding as to the relations of 
the powers to China. Such an understanding had two aspects. 
One related to securing fairer treatment of China, and the other 
related to the competition for trade and industrial advantages in 
China between the outside powers. 

An agreement covering both of these grounds in a rather funda- 
mental way was embodied in the first article of the general Nine 
Power Treaty regarding China. In order, however, to bring the 
rules set out in that article out of the realm of mere abstract 
propositions and make them practical rules of conduct it was 
necessary to provide for applying them so far as the present con- 
ditions of government and social order in China permit. This 
was done by the remaining provisions of the general Nine Power 
Treaty and Chinese Customs Treaty and the series of formal 
resolutions adopted by the Conference in its Plenary Sessions and 
the formal declarations made a part of the record^ of the Con- 
ference. 

The scope of action by the Conference in dealing with Chinese 
affairs was much limited by the disturbed conditions of govern- 
ment in China which have existed since the revolution of 1911, 
and which still exist, and which render effective action by that 
government exceedingly difficult and in some directions imprac- 
ticable. In every case the action of the Conference was taken 
with primary reference to giving the greatest help possible to the 
Chinese people in developing a stable and effective government 
really representative of the people of China. Much was accom- 
plished in that direction, and the rules of conduct set forth in 
the first article of the General Treaty regarding China have not 
merely received the assent of the Powers but have been accepted 
and applied to concrete cases. 

The sum total of the action taken in the Conference regarding 
China, together with the return of Shantung by direct agreement 
between China and Japan, the withdrawal of the most unsatis- 
factory of the so-called " twenty-one demands," and the explicit 
declaration of Japan regarding the closely connected territory of 
Eastern Siberia, justify the relation of confidence and good will 
expressed in the Four Power Treaty and upon which the reduction 
of armament provided in the Naval Treaty may be contemplated 
with a sense of security. 



president's estimate. 280 

In conclusion, we may be permitted to quote the words of the 
President in closing the Conference : 

" This Conference has wrought a truly great achievement. It 
is hazardous sometimes to speak in superlatives, and I will be 
restrained. But I will say, with every confidence, that the faith 
plighted here to-day, kept in national honor, will mark the 
beginning of a new and better epoch in human progress. 

" Stripped to the simplest fact, what is the spectacle which has 
inspired a new hope for the world? Gathered about this table 
nine great nations of the world — not all, to be sure, but those 
most directly concerned with the problems at hand — have met 
and have conferred on questions of great import and common 
concern, on problems menacing their peaceful relationship, on 
burdens threatening a common peril. In the revealing light of 
the public opinion of the world, without surrender of sovereignty, 
without impaired nationality or affronted national pride, a 
solution has been found in unanimity, and to-day's adjournment 
is marked by rejoicing in the things accomplished. If the world 
has hungered for new assurance, it may feast at the banquet 
which the Conference has spread. 

" I am sure the people of the United States are supremely 
gratified, and yet there is scant appreciation how marvelously 
you have wrought. When the days were dragging and agree- 
ments were delayed, when there were obstacles within and 
hindrances without, few stopped to realize that here was a con- 
ference of sovereign powers where only unanimous agreement 
could be made the rule. Majorities could not decide without 
impinging national rights. There were no victors to command, 
no vanquished to yield. All had voluntarily to agree in trans- 
lating the conscience of our civilization and give concrete 
expression to world opinion. 

" And you have agreed in spite of all difficulties, and the agree- 
ments are proclaimed to the world. No new standards of national 
honor have been sought, but the indictments of national dishonor 
have been drawn, and the world is ready to proclaim the odious- 
ness of perfidy or infamy. 

***** 

" It has been the fortune of this Conference to sit in a day far 
enough removed from war's bitterness, yet near enough to war's 
horrors, to gain the benefit of both the hatred of war and the 
yearning for peace. Too often, heretofore, the decades following 
such gatherings have been marked by the difficult undoing of 
their decisions. But your achievement is supreme because no 
seed of conflict has been sown, no reaction in regret or resent- 
ment ever can justify resort to arms. 

" It little matters what we appraise as the outstanding ac- 
complishments. Any one of them alone would have justified 



290 CONCLUSION. 

the Conference. But the whole achievement has so cleared the 
atmosphere that it will seem like breathing the refreshing air of 
a new morn of promise. 

" You have written the first deliberate and effective expression 
of great powers, in the consciousness of peace, of war's utter 
futility, and challenged the sanity of competitive preparation 
for each other's destruction. You have halted folly and lifted 
burdens, and revealed to the world that the one sure way to re- 
cover from the sorrow and ruin and staggering obligations of a 
world war is to end the strife in preparation for more of it, and 
turn human energies to the constructiveness of peace. 

" Not all the world is yet tranquillized. But here is the ex- 
ample, to imbue with new hope all who dwell in apprehension. 
At this table came understanding, and understanding brands 
armed conflict as abominable in the eyes of enlightened civiliza- 
tion." 

" No intrigue, no offensive or defensive alliances, no involve- 
ments have wrought your agreements, but reasoning with each 
other to common understanding . has made new relationships 
among Governments and peoples, new securities for peace, and 
new opportunities for achievement and attending happiness. 

" Here have been established the contracts of reason, here has 
come the inevitable understandings of face-to-face exchanges 
when passion does not inflame. The very atmosphere shamed, 
national selfishness into retreat. Viewpoints were exchanged, 
differences composed, and you came to understand how common, 
after all, are human aspirations ; how alike, indeed, and how 
easily reconcilable are our national aspirations ; how sane and 
simple and satisfying to seek the relationships of peace and 
security. 

" When you first met, I told you of our American's thought to 
seek less of armament and none of war ; that we sought nothing 
which is another's, and we were unafraid, but that we wished 
to join you in doing that finer and nobler thing which no nation 
con do alone. We rejoice in that accomplishment. * * *" 
Respectfully submitted. 

Charles E. Hughes. 

Henry Cabot Lodge. 

Oscar W. Underwood. 

Elihu Root. 
Washington, D. C, February 9, 1922. 



TREATIES AND RESOLUTIONS APPROVED AND 
ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE ON THE 
LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT. 



TREATIES. 

(1) A treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, 

France, Italy, and Japan, limiting naval armament. 

(2) A treaty between the same Powers, in relation to the use of sub- 

marines and noxious gases in warfare. 

(3) A treaty between the United States of America, the" British Empire, 

France, and Japan, signed December 13, 1921, relating to their 
insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean. 

(4) Declaration accompanying the above Four-Power Treaty. 

(5) A treaty between the same Four Powers, supplementary to the above, 

signed February 6, 1922, 

(6) A treaty between all. Nine Powers relating to principles and policies 

to be followed in matters concerning China. 

(7) A treaty between the Nine Powers relating to Chinese customs tariff. 



RESOLUTIONS. 



No. 



No. 
No. 
No. 



1. Resolution for a Commission of Jurists to consider amendment. of 

LaAvs of War. 
No. 2. Resolution limiting jurisdiction of Commission of Jurists provided 

in Resolution No. 1. 
No. 3. Resolution regarding the sale of ships before the ratification of 

the treaty limiting naval armament. 
No. 4. Resolution regarding a Board of Reference for Far Eastern 

Questions. 

5. Resolution regarding Extraterritoriality in China. 

6. Resolution regardhig Foreign Postal Agencies in China. 

7. Resolution regarding Armed Forces in China. 

No. 8. Resolution regarding Radio Stations in China and accompanying 
Declarations. 

No 9. Resolution regarding unification of railways in China and accom- 
panying Declaration by China. 

No. 10. Resolution regarding the reduction of Chinese Military Forces. 

No. 11. Resolution regarding existing commitments of China or with 
respect to China. 

No. 12. Resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, approved by 
all the Powers, including China. 

No. 13. Resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, approved by 
all the Powers, other than China. 



TREATIES. 

(1) A TREATY BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, 
ITALY, AND JAPAN, LIMITING 
NAVAL ARMAMENT. 

The United States of America, 
the British Empire, France, 
Italy and Japan ; 



TRAITES. 

(1) TRAITE ENTRE LES ETATS-UNIS 
D'AMERIQUE, L'EMPIRE BRITAN- 
NIQUE, LA FRANCE, L'lTALIE ET 
LE JAPON LIMITANT LES ARME- 
MENTS NAVALS. 

Les Etats-Unis d Amerique, 
l'Empire Britannique, la France, 
l'ltalie et le Japon; 

291 



292 



NAMES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



Desiring to contribute to the 
maintenance of the general 
peace, and to reduce the bur- 
dens of competition in arma- 
ment ; 

Have resolved, with a v.'ew to 
accomplishing these purposes, to 
conclude a treaty to limit their 
respective naval armament, and 
to that end have appointed as 
their Plenipotentiaries ; 

The President of the United 
States of America ; 
Charles Evans Hughes, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Oscar W. Underwood, 
Elihu Root, 

Citizens of the 
United States ; 
His Majesty the King of the 
United Kingdom of Great Brit- 
ain and Ireland and of the 
British Dominions beyond the 
Seas, Emperor of India": 

The Right Honourable 
Arthur James Balfour, 
O. M., M. P., Lord 
President of His Privy 
Council ; 
The Right Honourable 
Baron Lee of Pareham, 
G. B. E., K. C. B., First 
Lord of His Admiralty ; 
The Right Honourable 
Sir Auckland Campbell 
Geddes, K. C. B., His 
Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Plenipotenti- 
ary to the United 
States of America ; 
and 

for the Dominion of Canada : 

The Right Honourable 

Sir Robert Laird 

Borden, G. C. M. G., 

K. O. ; 



Desireux de contribuer au 
maintien de la paix general e et 
de reduire le fardeau impose par 
la competition en matiere d'ar- 
mement; 

Ont resolu, pour atteindre ce 
but, de conclure un traite limi- 
tant leur armement naval. 

A cet effet, les Puissances Con- 
tractantes ont designe pour leurs 
Plenipotentiaires : 

Le President des Etats-Unis 
d'Amerique: 

Charles Evans Hughes, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Oscar W. Underwood, 
Elihu Root, 

citoyens des Etats-Unis; 

Sa Majeste le Roi du Royaume- 
Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'L> 
lande et des Territoires britan- 
niques au dela des mers, Empe- 
reur des Indes: 

Le Tres-Honorable Arthur 
James Balfour, O. M., 
M. P., Lord Preesident 
du Conseil du Roi; 

Le Tres-Honorable Baron 
Lee of Fareham, G. B. 
E., K. C. B., Premier 
Lord de l'Amiraute; 

Le Tres-Honorable Sir 
Auckland Campbell Ged- 
des, K. C. B., Son Am- 
bassadeur Extraordinaire 
et Plenipotentiaire aux 
Etats-Unis d'Amerique; 



et 



pour le Dominion du Canada: 

Le Tres-Honorable Sir 
Robert Laird Borden, 
G. CM. G., K. C; 



NAMES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



293 



for the Commonwealth of 
Australia : 

Senator the Right Hon- 
ourable George Fos- 
ter Pearce, Minister 
for Home and Terri- 
tories ; 
for the Dominion of New 
Zealand : 

The Honourable Sir 
John William Sal- 
moncl, K. C, Judge of 
the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand ; 
for the Union of South Af- 
rica : 

The Right Honourable 
Arthur James Bal- 
four, O. M., M. P. ; 
for India : 

The Right Honourable 
Valingman Sanka- 
ranarayana Srinlvasa 
Sastri, member of 
the Indian Council of 
State ; 
The President of the French 
Republic : 

Mr. Albert Sarraut, 
Deputy, Minister of 
the Colonies; 
Mr. Jules J. Jusserand, 
Ambassador Extraor- 
dinary and Plenipo- 
tentiary to the United 
States of America. 
Grand Cross of the 
National Order of the 
Legion of Honour ; 
His Majesty the King of 
Italy : 

The Honourable Carlo 
Schanzer, Senator of 
the Kingdom ; 
The Honourable Vittorio 
Rolandi Ricci, Senator 
of the Kingdom, His 



pour le Commonwealth d' Aus- 
tralia : 

Le Tres-Honorable George 
Foster Pearce, Sena- 
teur, Ministre de l'lnte- 
rieur et des Territoires; 

pour le Dominion de la 
Nouvelle-Zelande : 

L'Honorable Sir John 
William Salmond, K. 
C, Juge a la Cour Su- 
preme de Nouvelle- 
Zelande; 

pour l'Union Sud-Africaine: 

Le Tres-Honorable Arthur 
James Balfour, O. M., 
M. P.;, 
pour l'lnde: 

Le Tres-Honorable Va- 
lingman Sankaranaray- 
ana Srinivasa Sastri, 
Membre du Conseil 
d'Etat de l'lnde; 

Le President de la Republique 
Francaise : 

M. Albert Sarraut, De- 
pute, Ministre des Co- 
lonies ; 
M. Jules J. Jusserand, Am- 
bassadeur Extraordi- 
naire et Plenipoten- 
tiaire pres le President 
des Etats-Unis d'Ame- 
rique, Grand Croix de 
POrdre National de la 
Legion d' II onneur; 
Sa Majeste le Roi d'ltalie: 

L'Honorable Carlo Schan- 
zer, Senateur du Roy- 
aume; 

L'Honorable Vittorio Ro- 
landi Ricci, Senateur 
du Royaume, Son Am- 



294 



GENERAL PROVISIONS. 



Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Plenipotenti- 
ary at Washington ; 
The Honourable Luigi 
Albertini, Senator of 
the Kingdom ; 
His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan : 

Baron Tomosaburo Kato, 
Minister for the Navy, 
Junii, a member of the 
First Class of the Im- 
perial Order of the 
Grand Cordon of the 
Rising Sun with the 
Paulownia Flower ; 
Baron Kijuro Shidehara, 
His Ambassador Ex- 
traordinary and Pleni- 
potentiary at Wash- 
ington, Joshii, a mem- 
ber of the First Class 
of the Imperial Order 
of the Rising Sun ; 
Mr. Masanao Hanihara, 
Vice Minister for For- 
eign Affairs, Jushii, a 
member of the Second 
Class of the Imperial 
Order of the Rising 
Sun; 
Who, have communicated to 
each other their respective full 
powers, found to be in good and 
due form, have agreed as fol- 
lows: 

CHAPTER I. 

General Provisions Relating- to the 
Limitation of Naval Armament. 

Akticle I. 

The Contracting Powers agree 
to limit their respective naval 
armament as provided in the 
present Treaty. 



bassadeur Extraordi- 
naire et Plenipoten- 
tiaire a Washington; 

L'Honorable Luigi Alber- 
tini, Senateur du Roy- 
aume ; 
Sa Majeste l'Empereur du 
Jap on: 

Le Baron Tomosaburo 
Kato, Ministre de la 
Marine, Junii, Membre 
de la Premiere Classe 
de l'Ordre Imperial du 
Grand Cordon du Soleil 

- Levant avec la Fleur de 
Paulonia; 

Le Baron Kijuro Shide- 
hara, Son Ambassadeur 
Extraordinaire et Pleni- 
potentiaire a Washing- 
ton, Joshii, Membre de 
la Premiere Classe de 
l'Ordre Imperial du 
Soleil Levant; 

M. Masanao Hanihara, 
Vice-Ministre des Af- 
faires Etrangeres, Jus- 
hii, Membre de la Se- 
conde Classe de l'Ordre 
Imperial du Soleil Le- 
vant; 
lesquels, apres avoir echange 
leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en 
bonne et due forme, ont convenu 
des dispositions suivantes: 

CHAPITRE I. 

Dispositions Generates Relatives a^Ia 
Limitation de FArmement Naval. 

Article I. 

Les Puissances Contractantes 
conviennent de limiter leur^arme- 
ment naval ainsi qu'il est prevu 
au present traite. 



RETAINED SHIPS. 



295 



Article II. 

The Contracting Powers may 
retain respectively the capital 
ships which are specified in 
Chapter II, Part 1. On the com- 
ing into force of the present 
Treaty, but subject to the fol- 
lowing provisions of this Article, 
all other capital ships, built or 
building, of the United States, 
the British Empire and Japan 
shall be disposed of as pre- 
scribed in Chapter II, Part 2. 

In addition to the capital ships 
specified in Chapter II, Part 1, 
the United States may complete 
and retain two ships of the West 
Virginia class now under con- 
struction. On the completion of 
these two ships the Worth Da- 
kota and DeJaicare shall be dis- 
posed of as prescribed in Chap- 
ter II, Part 2. 

The P>ritish Empire may, in 
accordance with the replace- 
ment table in Chapter II, Part 
3, construct two new capital 
ships not exceeding 35,000 tons 
(35,560 metric tons) standard 
displacement each. On the com- 
pletion of the said two ships the 
Thunderer, King George Y,Ajax 
and Centurion shall be disposed 
of as prescribed in Chapter II, 
Part 2. 

Article III. 

Subject to the provisions of 
Article II, the Contracting 
Powers shall abandon their re- 
spective capital ship building 
programs, and no new capital 
ships shall be constructed or ac- 
quired by any of the Contract- 
ing Powers except replacement 
tonnage which may be con- 



Article II. 

Les Puissances Contractantes 
pourront conserver respective- 
ment les navires du ligne enu- 
meres au chapitre II, partie 1. A 
la mise en vigueur du present 
Traite et sous reserve des disposi- 
tions ci-dessous du present article, 
il sera dispose comme il est pres- 
ent au chapitre II, partie 2, de 
tous les autres navires de ligne des 
Etats-Unis, de PEmpire Britan- 
nique et du Japon, construits ou 
en construction. 

En sus des navires de ligne 
enumeres au chapitre II, partie 1, 
les Etats-Unis pourront achever 
et conserver deux navires actuel- 
lement en construction de la classe 
West Virginia. A l'achevement 
de ces deux navires, il sera dispose 
du North Dakota et du Delaware 
comme il est prescrit au chapitre 
II. partie 2. 

L'Empire Britannique pourra, 
conformement au tableau de rem- 
placement du chapitre II, partie 
3, construire deux nouveaux na- 
vires de ligne ayant chacun un 
deplacement type maximum de 
35.000 tonnes (35.560 tonnes me- 
triques). A l'achevement de ces 
deux navires, il sera dispose du 
Thunderer, du King George V, de 
VAjcx et du Centurion comme il 
est prescrit au chapitre II, partie 2. 

Article III. 

Sous reserves des dispositions de 
l'article II, les Puissances Con- 
tractantes abandonneront leur 
programme de construction de 
navires de ligne et ne construiront 
ou n'acquerront aucun nouveau 
navire de ligne, a 1' exception du 
tonnage de remplacement qui 
pourra etre construit ou acquis 



296 



TONNAGE AND CALIBER PROVISIONS. 



structed or acquired as specified 
in Chapter II, Part 3. 

Ships which are replaced in 
accordance with Chapter II, 
Part 3, shall be disposed of as 
prescribed in Part 2 of that 
Chapter. 

Article IV. 

The total capital ship replace- 
ment tonnage of each of the 
Contracting Powers shall not 
v exceed in standard displace- 
ment, for the United States 
525,000 tons (533,400- metric 
tons) ; for the British Empire 
525,000 tons (533,400 metric 
tons) ; for France 175,000 tons 
(177,800 metric tons) ; for Italy 
175,000 tons (177,800 metric 
tons) ; for Japan 315,000 tons 
(320,040 metric tons). 



Article V. 

No capital ship exceeding 
35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) 
standard displacement shall be 
acquired by, or constructed by, 
for, or within the jurisdiction 
of, any of the Contracting 
Powers. 



Article VI. 

No capital ship of any of the 
Contracting Powers shall carry 
a gun with a calibre in excess of 
1G inches (406 millimetres). 

Article VII. 

The total tonnage for aircraft 
carriers of each of the Contract- 
ing Powers shall not exceed in 
standard displacement, for the 



comme il est specifie au chapitre 
II, partie 3. 

II sera dispose selon les pres- 
criptions du chapitre II, partie 2, 
des navires remplaces conforme- 
ment au chapitre II, partie 3. 

Article IV. 

Le tonnage total des navires de 
ligne de remplacement, calcule 
d'apres le deplacement type, ne 
depassera pas, pour chacune des 
Puissances Contractantes, savoir: 
pour les Etats-Unis, 525.000 ton- 
nes (533.400 tonnes metriques); 
pour l'Empire Britannique 525.- 
000 tonnes (533.400 tonnes me- 
triques); pour la France 175.000 
tonnes (177.800 tonnes metriques); 
pour ritalie 175.000 tonnes (177,- 
800 tonnes metriques); pour le Ja« 
pon 315.000 tonnes (320.040 tonnes 
metriques). 

Article V. 

Les Puissances Contractantes 
s'engagent a ne pas acquerir, a ne 
pas construire et a ne pas faire 
construire de navire de ligne d'un 
deplacement type superieur a 
35.000 tonnes (35.560 tonnes me- 
triques), et a ne pas en permettre 
la construction dans le ressort de 
leur autorite. 

Article VI. 

Aucun navire de ligne de l'une 
quelconque des Puissances Con- 
tractantes ne portera de canon d'un 
calibre superieur a 16 pouces (406 
millimetres). 

Article VII. 

Le tonnage total des navires 
porte-aeronefs, calcule d'apres le 
deplacement type, ne depassera 
pas, pour chacune des Puissances 



AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. 



297 



United States 135,000 tons 
(137,160 metric tons) ; for the 
British Empire 135,000 tons 
(137,160 metric tons) ; for 
France 60,000 tons (60,960 met- 
ric tons) ; for Italy 60,000 tons 
(60,960 metric tons) ; for Japan 
81,000 tons (82,296 metric tons). 



Article VIII. 
The replacement of aircraft 
carriers shall be effected only as 
prescribed in Chapter II, Part 
3, provided, however, that all 
aircraft carrier tonnage in ex- 
istence or building on November 
12, 1921, shall be considered ex- 
perimental, and may be re- 
placed, within the total tonnage 
limit prescribed in Article VII, 
without regard to its age. 

Article IX. 
No aircraft carrier exceeding 
27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) 
standard displacement shall be 
acquired by, or constructed by, 
for or within the jurisdiction 
of, any of the Contracting 
Powers. 



However, any of the Con- 
tracting Powers may, provided 
that its total tonnage allow- 
ance of aircraft carriers is not 
thereby exceeded, build not 
more than two aircraft car- 
riers, each of a tonnage, of not 
more than 33,000 tons (33,528 
metric tons) standard displace- 
ment, and in order to effect 
economy any of the Contracting 
Powers may use for this pur- 
pose any two of their ships, 

25882—23 20 



Contractantes, savoir: pour les 
Etats-Unis 135.000 tonnes (137.160 
tonnes metriques); pour l'Empire 
Britannique 135 .000 tonne3(137 .160 
tonnes metriques) ; pour la France 
60.000 tonnes (60.960 tonnes metri- 
ques); pour l'ltalie 60.000 tonnes 
(60.960 tonnes metriques); pour le 
Japon 81.000 tonnes (82.296 tonnes 
metriques). 

Article VIII. 

Le remplacement des navires 
porte-aeronefs n'aura lieu que 
selon les prescriptions du Chapitre 
II, partie 3; toutefois il est en- 
tendu que tous les navires porte- 
aeronefs construits ou en cons- 
truction a la date du 12 novembre 
1921 sont consideres comme na- 
vires d' experience et pourront 
etre remplaces, quel que soit leur 
age, dans les limites de tonnage 
total prevues a 1' article VII. 

Article IX. 

Les Puissances Contractantes 
s'engagent a ne pas acquerir, a ne 
pas construire et a ne pas faire 
construire de navire porte-aero- 
nefs, d'un deplacement type supe- 
rieur a 27.000 tonnes (27.432 
tonnes metriques), et a ne pas en 
permettre la construction dans le 
ressort de leur autorite. 

Toutefois chacune des Puis- 
sances Contractantes pourra, 
pourvu qu'elle ne depasse pas son 
tonnage total alloue de navires 
porte-aeronefs, construire au plus 
deux navires porte-aeronefs, cha- 
cun d'un deplacement type maxi- 
mum de 33.000 tonnes (33.528 
tonnes metriques); a cet effet et 
pour des raisons d'economie, cha- 
cune des Puissances Contractan- 
tes pourra utiliser deux de ses 
navires, termines ou non ter- 



298 



AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. 



whether constructed or in 
course of construction, which 
would otherwise be scrapped 
under the provisions of Article 
II. The armament of any air- 
craft carriers exceeding 27,000 
tons (27,432 metric tons) stand- 
ard displacement shall be in 
accordance with the require- 
ments of Article X, except that 
the total number of guns to be 
carried in case any of such 
guns be of a calibre exceeding 
6 inches (152 millimetres), ex- 
cept anti-aircraft guns and 
guns not exceeding 5 inches, 
(127 millimetres), shall not ex- 
ceed eight. 

Aeticle X. 

No aircraft carrier of any of 
the Contracting Powers shall 
carry a gun with a calibre in 
excess of 8 inches (203 milli- 
metres). Without prejudice to 
the provisions of Article IX, if 
the armament carried includes 
guns exceeding 6 inches (152 
millimetres) In calibre the total 
number of guns carried, except 
anti-aircraft guns and guns not 
exceeding 5 inches (127 milli- 
metres), shall not exceed ten. 
If alternatively the armament 
contains no guns exceeding 6 
inches (152 millimetres) in cal- 
ibre, the number of guns is not 
limited. In either case the 
number of anti-aircraft guns 
and of guns not exceeding 5 
inches (127 millimetres) is not 
limited. 



Article XI. 
No vessel of war exceeding 
10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) 
standard displacement, other 



mines, pris a son choix parmi ceux 
qui, sans cela, devraient etre mis 
hors d'etat de servir pour le com- 
bat aux termes de Particle II. 
L'armement d'un navire porte- 
aeronefs ayant un deplacement 
type superieur a 27.000 tonnes 
(27.432 tonnes metriques) sera 
sou mis aux dispositions de Parti- 
cle X, avec cette restriction que r 
si cet armement comporte un seul 
canon d'un calibre superieur a 6 
pouces (152 millimetres), le nom- 
bre total des canons ne pourra 
depasser huit, non compris les 
canons contre aeronefs et les 
canons d'un calibre ne depassant 
pas 5 pouces (127 millimetres) . 

Article X. 

Aucun navire porte-aeronefs de 
l'une quelconque des Puissances 
Contractantes ne portera de canon 
d'un calibre superieur a 8 pouces 
(203 millimetres). Sous reserve 
de 1' exception prevue a 1' article 
IX, si l'armement comprend des 
canons d'un calibre superieur a 
6 pouces (152 millimetres), le 
nombre total des canons pourra 
etre de dix au maximum, non 
compris les canons contre aeronefs 
et les canons d'un calibre ne 
depassant pas 5 pouces (127 milli- 
metres). Si, au contraire, l'arme- 
ment ne comprend pas de canon 
d'un calibre superieur a 6 pouces 
(152 millimetres), le nombre des 
canons n'est pas limite. Dans 
les deux cas, le nombre des 
canons contre aeronefs et des 
canons d'un calibre ne depassant 
pas 5 pouces (127 millimetres) 
n'est pas limite. 

Article XI. 

Les Puissances Contractantes 
s'engagent a ne pas acquerir, a ne 
pas construire et a ne pas faire 



CALIBER OF GUNS. 



299 



than a capital ship or aircraft 
carrier, shall be acquired by, or 
constructed by, for, or within the 
jurisdiction of, any of the Con- 
tracting Powers. Vessels not 
specifically built as fighting- 
ships nor taken in time of peace 
under government control for 
fighting purposes, which are em- 
ployed on fleet duties or as 
troop transports or in some 
other way for the purpose of 
assisting in the prosecution of 
hostilities otherwise than as 
fighting ships, shall not be with- 
in the limitations of this Ar- 
ticle. 



Article XII. 
Xo vessel of war of any of the 
Contracting Powers, hereafter 
laid down, other than a capital 
ship, shall carry a gun with a 
calibre in excess of 8 inches 
(203 millimetres). 

Article XIII. 

Except as provided in Article 
IX. no ship designated in the 
present Treaty to be scrapped 
may be reconverted into a ves- 
sel of war. 

Article XIV. 

Xo preparations shall be 
made in merchant ships in time 
of peace for the installation of 
warlike armaments for the pur- 
pose of converting such ships 
into vessels of war, other than 
the necessary stiffening of decks 
for the mounting of guns not 
exceeding 6 inch (152 milli- 
metres) calibre. 



construire, en dehors des navires 
de ligne ou des navires porte- 
aeronefs, de navires de combat 
d'un d emplacement t,pe superieur 
a 10.000 tonnes (10.160 tonnes 
metriques), et a ne pas en per- 
mettre la construction dans le 
ressort de leur autorite. Ne sont 
pas soumis aux limitations du 
present article les batiments em- 
ployes soit a des services de la 
flotte, soit a des transports de 
troupes, soit a toute autre par- 
ticipation a des hostilites qui ne 
serait pas celle d'un navire com- 
battant, pourvu qu'ils ne soient 
pas specifiquement construits 
comme navires combattants cu 
places en temps de paix sous 
1' autorite du Gouvernement dans 
un but de combat. 

Article XII. 

En dehors des navires de ligne, 
aucun navire de combat de l'une 
quelconque des Puissances Con- 
tractantes, mis en chantier a 
l'avenir, ne portera de canon d'un 
calibre superieur a 8 pouces (203 
millimetres). 

Article XIII. 

Sous reserve de ^exception 
prevue a Particle IX, aucun 
navire a declasser par application 
du present Traite ne pourra rede- 
venir navire de guerre. 

Article XIV. 

II ne sera fait, en temps de paix, 
aucune installation preparatoire 
sur les navires de commerce en 
vue de les armer pour les con- 
vertir en navire de guerre; toute- 
fois, il sera permis de renfprcer 
les ponts pour pouvoir y monter 
des canons d'un calibre ne de- 
passant pas 6 pouces (152 milli- 
metres). 



300 



LIMITATION ON CONSTRUCTION. 



Article XV. 

No vessel of war constructed 
within the jurisdiction of any of 
the Contracting Powers for a 
non-Contracting Power shall ex- 
ceed the limitations as to dis- 
placement and armament pre- 
scribed by the present Treaty 
for vessels of a similar type 
which may be constructed by or 
for any of the Contracting Pow- 
ers ; provided, however, that the 
displacement for aircraft car- 
riers constructed for a non- 
Contracting Power shall in no 
case exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 
metric tons) standard displace- 
ment. 

Article XVI. 

If the construction of any 
vessel of war for a non-Con- 
tracting Power is undertaken 
within the jurisdiction of any 
of the Contracting Powers, such 
Power shall promptly inform 
the other Contracting Powers 
of the date of the signing of the 
contract and the date on which 
the keel of the ship is laid ; and 
shall also communicate to them 
the particulars relating to the 
ship prescribed in Chapter II, 
Part 3, Section I (b), (4) and 
(5). 

Article XVII. 

In the event of a Contracting 
Power being engaged in war, 
such Power shall not use as a 
vessel of war any vessel of war 
which may be under construc- 
tion within its jurisdiction for 
any other Power, or which may 
have been constructed within 
its jurisdiction for another 
Power and not delivered. 



Article XV. 

Aucun navire de guerre cons- 
truit pour une Puissance non 
contractante dans le ressort de 
l'autorite d'une Puissance Con- 
tractante ne devra depasser les 
limites de deplacement et d'arme- 
ment prevues au present Traite 
pour les navires similaires a cons- 
truire par ou pour les Puissances 
Contractantes. Toutefois la limite 
du deplacement type des navires 
porte-aeronefs construits pour une 
Puissance non contractante ne 
devra en aucun cas depasser 27.000 
tonnes (27.432 tonnes metriques). 



Article XVI. 

Si un navire de guerre, quel 
qu'il soit, est mis en construction 
pour le compte d'une Puissance 
non Contractante dans le ressort 
de l'autorite d'une Puissance Con- 
tractante, cette dernier e fera con- 
naitre, aussi rapidement que pos- 
sible, aux autres Puissances Con- 
tractantes la date de signature du 
contrat de construction et celle de 
mise sur cale du navire; elle leur 
communiquera egalement les ca- 
racteristiques du navire, en se 
conformant au Chapitre II, par- 
tie 3, section I (b), (4) et (5). 

Article XVII. 

Si l'une des Puissances Con- 
tractantes vient a etre engagee 
dans une guerre, elle n'emploiera 
pas comme tels les navires de 
guerre quels qu'ils soient, en cons- 
truction ou construits mais non 
livres, dans le ressort de son 
autorite, pour le compte de toute 
autre Puissance. 



MAINTENANCE OF STATUS QUO. 



301 



Article XVIII. 

Each of the Contracting Pow- 
ers undertakes not to dispose 
by gift, sale or any mode of 
transfer of any vessel of war 
in such a manner that such ves- 
sel may become a vessel of war 
in the Navy of any foreign 
Power. 

Article XIX. 

The United States, the Brit- 
ish Empire and Japan agree 
that the status quo at the time 
of the signing of the present 
Treaty, with regard to fortifica- 
tions and naval bases, shall be 
maintained in their respective 
territories and possessions spec- 
ified hereunder. 

(1) The insular possessions 
which the United States now 
holds or may hereafter acquire 
in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) 
those adjacent to the coast of 
the United States, Alaska and 
the Panama Canal Zone, not in- 
cluding the Aleutian Islands, 
and (b) the Hawaiian Islands; 

(2) Hongkong and the insu- 
lar possessions which the Brit- 
ish Empire now holds or may 
hereafter acquire in the Pacific 
Ocean, east of the meridian of 
110° east longitude, except (a) 
those adjacent to the coast of 
Canada, (b) the Commonwealth 
of Australia and its Territories, 
and (c) New Zealand; 

(3) The following insular ter- 
ritories and possessions of 
Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to 
wit : the Kurile Islands, the 
Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, 
the Loochoo Islands, Formosa 
and the Pescadores, and any in- 



Article XVIII. 

Les Puissances Contractantes 
s'engagent a ne disposer ni a titre 
gratuit, ni a titre onereux, ni au- 
trement, de leurs navires de 
guerre, quels qu'ils soient, dans 
des conditions permettant a. une 
Puissance etrangere de les em- 
ployer comme tels. 

Article XIX. 

Les Etats-Unis, 1' Empire Bri- 
tannique et le Japon conviennent 
de maintenir, en matiere de forti- 
fications et de bases navales, le 
s tatu quo tel qu'il existe au jour 
de la signature du present traite 
dans leurs territoires et posses- 
sions respectifs ci-apres designes: 

(1) Les possessions insulaires, 
soit actuelles, soit futures, des 
Etats-Unis dans 1' Ocean Paci- 
fique, a l'exception: (a) de celles 
avoisinant la cote des Etats-Unis, 
de l'Alaska et de la zone du Canal 
de Panama, non compris les lies 
Aleoutiennes; (b) des lies Hawai; 

(2) Hong-Kong et les posses- 
sions insulaires, soit actuelles, 
soit futures, de 1' Empire Britan- 
nique dans 1' Ocean Pacifique, 
situees a Test du meridien de 110° 
est de Greenwich, a 1' exception: 
(a) de celles avoisinant la cote du 
Canada; (6) du Commonwealth 
d'Australie et de ses Territoires; 
(c) de la Nouvelle-Zelande; 

(3) Les territoires et posses- 
sions insulaires du Japon dans 
1' Ocean Pacifique, ci-apres de- 
signes: lies Kouriles, lies Bonin, 
Amami-Oshima, lies Liou-Kiou, 
Formose et Pescadores, ainsi que 
tous territoires ou possessions in- 



302 



EXECUTION OF TREATY. 



sular territories or possessions 
in the Pacific Ocean which 
Japan may hereafter acquire. 

The maintenance of the 
status quo under the foregoing 
provisions implies that no new 
fortifications or naval bases 
shall be established in the ter- 
ritories and possessions speci- 
fied that no measures shall be 
taken to increase the existing 
naval facilities for the repair 
and maintenance of naval 
forces, and that no increase 
shall be made in the coast de- 
fences of the territories and pos- 
sessions above specified. This 
restriction, however, does not 
preclude such repair and re- 
placement of worn-out weapons 
and equipment as is customary 
in naval and military establish- 
ments in time of peace. 

Article XX. 

The rules for determining ton- 
nage displacement prescribed .in 
Chapter II, Part 4, shall apply 
to the ships of each of the Con- 
tracting Powers. 

CHAPTER II. 

Rules Relating to the Execution of 
the Treaty — Definition of Terms. 

Part l! 

CAPITAL SHIPS WHICH MAY BE 
RETAINED BY THE CONTRACTING 
POWERS. 

In accordance with Article II 
ships may be retained by each 
of the Contracting Powers as 
specified in this Part. 



sulaires futurs du Japon dans 
1' Ocean Pacifique. 

Le maintien du statu quo vise 
ci-dessus implique : 

qu'il ne sera etabli dans les ter- 
ritoires et possessions ci-dessus 
vises ni bases navales, ni fortifi- 
cations nouvelles; qu'il ne sera 
pris aucune mesure de nature a 
accroitre les ressources navales 
existant actuellement pour la 
reparation et l'entretien des 
forces navales; et qu'il ne sera 
procede a aucun renforcement des 
defenses cotieres des territoires 
et possessions ci-dessus vises. 
Toutefois, cette restriction n'em- 
pechera pas la reparation et le 
remplacement de I'armement et 
des installations deteriores, selon 
la pratique des etabUssements 
navals et militaires en temps de 
paix. 

Article XX. 

Les regies de determination du 
deplacement, telles qu'elles sont 
posees au Chapitre II, partie 4, 
s'appliqueront aux na vires de 
chacune des Puissances Contrac- 
tantes. 

CHAPITRE II. 

Regies Concernant FExeeution du 
Traite — Definition des Termes Em- 
ployes. 

Partie 1. 

NAVIRES de ligne qui peuvent 

ETRE CONSERVES PAR LES PUIS- 
SANCES CONTRACTANTES. 

Pourront etre conserves par 
chacune des Puissances Contrac- 
tantes, conformement a Particle 
II, les navires enumeresdans la 
presente partie. 



RETAINED SHIPS. 



303 



Ships which may be retained by 
the United States. 

Name : Tonnage. 

Maryland 32,600 

California 32, 300 

Tennessee 32, 300 

Idaho 32,000 

New Mexico 32. 000 

Mississippi 32, 000 

Arizona 31,400 

Pennsylvania 31, 400 

Oklahoma 27,500 

Nevada 27,500 

New York 27, 000 

Texas 27, 000 

Arkansas 26, 000 

Wyoming 26,000 

Florida 21,825 

Utah 21,825 

North Dakota 20, 000 

Delaware 20, 000 

Total tonnage 500, 650 

On the completion of the two 
ships of the West Virginia class 
and the scrapping of the frorth 
Dakota and Delaware, as pro- 
vided in Article II, the total 
tonnage to be retained by the 
United States will be 525,850 
tons. 

Ships which may be retained by 
the British Empire. 

Name : Tonnage. 

Roval Sovereign 25, 750 

Royal Oak 25, 750 

Revenge 25,750 

Resolution 25, 750 

Ramillies 25, 750 

Malaya 27,500 

Valiant 27, 500 

Barham 27,500 

Queen Elizabeth 27, 500 

Warspite 27, 500 

Benbow 25, 000 

Emperor of India 25, 000 

Iron Duke 25, 000 

Marlborough 25, 000 

Hood 41, 200 

Renown 26, 500 

Repulse 26,500 

Tiger 28,500 

Thunderer 22, 500 

King George V 23, 000 

Ajax 23, 000 

Centurion 23, 000 

Total tonnage 580, 450 

On the completion of the two 
new ships to be constructed and 
the scrapping of the Thunderer, 
King George V, Ajax and Cen- 



Navires qui peuvent etre conserves 
par les Etats- Unis. 

Nom: Tonnage. 

Maryland 32. 600 

California 32. 300 

Tennessee 32. 300 

Idaho 32. 000 

New Mexico 32.000 

Mississippi 32. 000 

Arizona 31. 400 

Pennsylvania 31. 400 

■ Oklahoma 27. 500 

Nevada 27. 500 

New York 27. 000 

Texas 27. 000 

Arkansas 26. 000 

Wyoming 26. 000 

Florida 21. 825 

Utah 21. 825 

North Dakota 20. 000 

Delaware 20. 000 

Total tonnage 500. 650 

Quand les deux unites de la 
classe West Virginia seront ache- 
vees et quand de North Dakota et 
le Delaware seront declasses, ainsi 
qu'il est indique a Particle II, le 
tonnage total a conserver par les 
Etats-Unis sera de 525.850 tonnes. 



Navires qui peuvent etre conserves 
par V Empire Britannique. 

Nom: Tonnage. 

Royal Sovereign 25. 750 

Royal Oak 25.750 

Revenge 25. 750 

Resolution 25. 750 

Ramillies 25. 750 

Malaya 27. 500 

Valiant 27. 000 

■ Barham 27. 000 

Queen Elizabeth 27. 000 

Warspite 27. 000 

Benbow 25. 000 

Emperor of India 25. 000 

Iron Duke 25.000 

Marlborough 25. 000 

Hood 41 . 200 

Renown 26. 500 

Repulse 26. 500 

Tiger 28. 500 

Thunderer 22. 500 

King George V 23. 000 

Ajax : 23. 000 

Centurion , 23. 000 

Tonnage total 580. 450 



Quand les deux unites nouvelles 
a construire seront achevees, et 
quand le Thunderer, le King 
George V, V Ajax et le Genturion 



304 



RETAINED SJIII'S. 



ivrion, as provided in Article II, 
the total tonnage to be retained 
by the British Empire will be 
558,950 tons. 

Ships which may be retained by 

France. 

Tonnage 
Name: (metric tons). 

Bretagne 23,500 

Lorraine 23, 500 

Provence 23,500 

Paris 23,500 

France 23,500 

Jean Bart 23, 500 

Courbet 23,500 

Condorcet 18, 890 

Diderot 18, 890 

Voltaire 18, 890 

Total tonnage 221, 170 

France may lay down new 
tonnage in the years 1927, 1929, 
and 1931, as provided in Part 3, 
Section II. 

Ships which may be retained by 
Italy. 

Tonnage 
Name: (metric tons) 

Andrea Doria 22, 700 

Cai Duilio 22, 700 

Conte Di Cavour 22, 500 

Giulio Cesare 22, 500 

Leonardo Da Vinci 22, 500 

Dante Alighieri 19, 500 

Roma 1 2, 600 

Napoli : 12, 600 

Vittorio Emanuele 12, 600 

Regina Elena 12, 600 

Total tonnage 182, 800 

Italy may lay down new ton- 
nage in the years 1927, 1929, 
and 1931, as provided in Part 3, 
Section II. 

Ships which may be retained by 

Japan. 

Name : Tonnaee. 

Mutsu 33,800 

Nagato 33, 800 

Hiuga 31,260 

Ise 31, 260 

Yamashiro 30,600 

Fu-So 30, 600 

Kirishima 27, 500 

Haruna . 27, 500 

Hiyei 27, 500 

Kongo 27, 500 

Total tonnage 301, 320 



seront declassed, ainsi qu'il est 
indique a l'article II, le tonnage 
total a conserver par l'Empire Bri- 
tannique sera de 558,950 tonnes. 

Navires qui peuvent etre conserves 

par la France. 

Tonnage 
(tonnes 
Norn: metriques). 

Bretagne 23. 500 

Lorraine 23. 500 

Provence 23. 500 

Paris 23. 500 

France •_ 23 . 500 

Jean Bart. 23. 500 

C ourbet 23. 500 

Condorcet 18. 890 

Diderot 18. 890 

Voltaire 18. 890 

Tonnage total 221.170 

La France pourra mettre en 
chantier des navires neufs en 
1927, 1929 et 1931, ainsi qu'il est 
prevu a la partie 3, section II. 

Navires qui peuvent etre conserves 

par Vltalie. 

Tonnage 
(tonnes 
Nom: metriques). 

Andrea Doria 22. 700 

Caio Duilio 22. 700 

Conte Di Cavour 22. 500 

Guilio Cesare 22. 500 

Leonardo Da Vinci 22. 500 

Dante Alighieri 19. 500 

Roma 12. 600 

Napoli 12. 600 

Vittorio Emanuele 12. 600 

Regina Elena* 12. 600 

Tonnage total ; . . . 182. 800 

L'ltalie pourra mettre en chan- 
tier des navires neufs en 1927, 1929 
et 1931, ainsi qu'il est prevu a la' 
partie 3, section II. 

Navires qui peuvent etre conserves 
par le Japon. 

Nom: Tonnage. 

Mutsu 33. 800 

Nagato 33. 800 

Hiuga 31. 260 

Ise 31.260 

Yamashiro 30. 600 

Fu-So 30. 600 

Kirishima 27.500 

Haruna 27. 500 

Hiyei 27. 500 

Kongo. 27. 500 

Tonnage total 301.320 



RULES FOR SCRAPPING. 
Part 2. Partie 2. 



305 



RULES FOR SCRAPPING VESSELS OF 
WAR. 

The following rules shall be 
observed for the scrapping of 
vessels of war which are to be 
disposed of in accordance with 
Articles II and III. 

I. A vessel to be scrapped 

must be placed in such 
condition that it cannot 
be put to combatant use. 

II. This result must be finally 

effected in any one of the 
following ways : 

(a) Permanent sinking of 
the vessel ; 

(b) Breaking the vessel 
up. This shall always 
involve the destruction 
or removal of all ma- 
chinery, boilers and 
armour, and all deck, 
side and bottom plat- 
ing; 

(c) Converting the vessel 
to target use exclu- 
sively. In such case 
all the provisions of 
paragraph III of this 
Part, except subpara- 
graph (6), in so far 
as may be necessary to 
enable the ship to be 
used as a mobile tar- 
get, and except sub- 
paragraph ( 7 ) , must 
be previously complied 
with. Not more than 
one capital ship may be 
retained for this pur- 
pose at one time by 
any of the Contracting 
Powers. 



REGLES APPLICABLES AU DECLAS- 

SEMENT J : DES NAVIRES DE 
GUERRE. 

Les regies suivantes devront 
etre observees pour le declasse- 
ment des navires de guerre dont 
on doit disposer comme il est 
present aux articles II et III. 

I. Un navire pour etre declasse 

doit etre mis hors d'etat 
de servir pour le combat. 

II. Pour obtenir ce resultat 

d'une maniere definitive, 
on devra employer l'un 
des moyens suivants: 

(a) submersion du navire 
sans possibilite de ren- 
flouement; 

(b) demolition. Cette ope- 
ration devra tou jours 
comprendre la destruc- 
tion ou V enlevement de 
toutes machines, chau- 
dieres, cuirasses, ainsi 
que de tout le borde de 
pont, deflanc etdefond; 

(c) transformation pour l'u- 
sage exclusif de cible. 
Dans ce cas, on devra 
observer au prealable 
toutes les dispositions 
du paragraphe III de la 
presente partie, a 1' ex- 
ception du sous-para- 
graphe (6), (dans la 
mesure necessaire pour 
utiliser le navire com- 
me cible mobile), et 
du sous-paragraphe (7). 
Aucune des Puissances 
Contractantes ne pourra 
conserver, pour s'en 
servir comme de cible, 
plus d'un navire de 
ligne a la fois. 



306 



FIRST STAGE OF SCRAPPING. 



(d) Of the capital ships 
which would otherwise 
be scrapped under the 
present Treaty in or 
after the year 1931, 
France and Italy may 
each retain two seago- 
ing vessels for training 
purposes exclusively, 
that is, as gunnery or 
torpedo schools. The 
two vessels retained by 
France shall be of the 
Jean Bart class, and of 
those retained by Italy 
one shall be the Dante 
Aligliieri, the other, of 
the Giulio Gesare class. 
On retaining these 
ships for the purpose 
above stated, France 
and Italy respectively 
undertake to remove 
and destroy their con- 
ning-towers, and not to 
use the said ships as 
vessels of war. 
III. (a) Subject to the spe- 
cial exceptions contained 
in Article IX, when a 
vessel is due for scrap- 
ping, the first stage of 
scrapping, which consists 
in rendering a ship in- 
capable of further war- 
like service, shall be im- 
mediately undertaken. 

(b) A vessel shall be con- 
sidered incapable of 
further warlike service 
when there shall have 
been removed and 
landed, or else de- 
stroyed in the ship : 



(d) Parmi les navires de 
ligne arrivant a partir 
de 1931 a 1'epoque de 
leur declassement, la 
France et l'ltalie sont 
autorisees a conserver 
chacune deux batiments 
navigants, qui seront 
affectes exclusivement 
aux ecoles de canonnage 
ou de torpilles. Pour la 
France, ces deux na- 
vires seront du type 
JeanBart. Pour l'ltalie, 
l'un d'euxserale Dante 
Alighieri, le second sera 
du type Giulio Gesare. 
La France et l'ltalie 
s'engagent a ne plus uti- 
liser comme navires de 
guerre les navires ainsi 
conserves dont les 
blockhaus devront alors 
etre enleves et detruits. 



III. (a) Sous reserves des ex- 
ceptions speciales de l'Ar- 
ticle IX, quand un navire 
doit etre declasse, la pre- 
miere operation du 
declassement, qui consiste 
a mettre le navire hors 
d' etat de remplir ulterieu- 
rement un service de com- 
bat, doit etre immediate- 
ment commencee. 
(b) Un navire sera consider e 
comme mis hors d'etat 
de remplir ulterieure- 
ment un service de com- 
bat quand on aura en- 
leve et mis a terre ou 
detruit a bord du 
navire: 



SCRAPPING PERIODS. 



307 



(1) All guns and es- 
sential portions of 
guns, fire-control 
tops and revolving 
parts of all bar- 
bettes and turrets ; 

(2) All machinery 
for working hy- 
draulic or electric 
mountings ; 

(3) All fire-control 
instruments and 
range-finders ; 

(4) All ammunition, 
explosives and 
mines ; 

(5) All torpedoes, 
war-heads and tor- 
pedo tubes; 

(6) All wireless 
telegraphy instal- 
lations ; 

(7) The conning 
tower and all side 
armour, or alter- 
natively all main 
propelling machin- 
ery; and 

. (8) All landing and 
flying-off platforms 
and all other avia- 
tion accessories. 

IV. The periods in which 
scrapping of vessels is to 
be effected are as follows : 



(a) In the case of vessels 
to be scrapped under 
the first paragraph of 
Article II, the work of 
rendering the vessels in- 
capable of further war- 
like service, in accord- 
ance with paragraph 



IV. 



(1) tous les canons et 
parties essentielles de 
canons, les hunes de 
direction de tir et les 
parties tournantes de 
toutes les tourelles 
barbettes et fermees; 

(2) toute la machinerie 
hydraulique ou elec- 
trique de manoeuvre 
des affuts; 

(3) tous les instruments 
et les telemetres de 
direction de tir; 

(4) toutes les muni- 
tions, les explosifs et 
les mines; 

(5) toutes les torpilles, 
cones de charge et 
tubes lance-torpilles; 

(6) toutes les installa- 
tions de telegraphie 
sans fil; 

(7) le blockhaus et 
toute la cuirasse de 
flanc, ou, si Ton pre- 
fere, tout l'appareil 
moteur principal ; 

(8) toutes les platefor- 
mes d'atterrissage et 
d' envoi et tous autres 
accessoires d' avia- 
tion. 

Les delais dans lesquels les 
operations de declasse- 
ment des navires devront 
etre accomplies sont les 
suivants : 
(a) S'il s'agit de navires a 
declasser d'apres le pre- 
mier alinea de 1' article 
II, les operations neces- 
saires pour mettre ces 
navires hors d'etat de 
remplir ulterieurement 
un service de combat, 



308 



COMPLETION OF SCRAPPING. 



Ill of this Part, shall 
be completed within six 
months from the com- 
ing into force of the 
present Treaty, and the 
scrapping shall be 
finally effected within 
eighteen months from 
such coming into force. 



(b) In the case of vessels 
to be scrapped under the 
second and third para- 
graphs of Article II, or 
under Article III, the 
work of rendering the 
vessel incapable of fur- 
ther warlike service in 
accordance with para- 
graph III of this Part 
shall be commenced not 
later than the date of 
completion of its suc- 
cessor, and shall be fin- 
ished within six months 
from the date of such 
completion. The vessel 
shall be finally 
scrapped, in accordance 
with paragraph II of 
this Part, within eight- 
een months from the 
date of completion of 
its successor. If, how- 
ever, the completion of 
the new vessel be de- 
layed, then the work of 
rendering the old ves- 
sel incapable of further 
warlike service in ac- 
cordance with para- 
grap III of this Part 
shall be commenced 
within four years from 



en observant les pres- 
criptions du paragraphe 
III de la presente 
Partie, devront etre 
acheves dans un delai 
de six mois et le d6- 
classement devra etre 
completement termine 
dans un delai de dix- 
huit mois , 1' un et 1' autre 
a dater de la mise en 
vigueur du present 
traite. 

(b) S'il s'agit de navires a 
declasser d'apres les 
alineas 2 et 3 de l'Arti- 
cle II ou d'apres l'Arti- 
cle III, les operations 
necessaires pour mettre 
chacun de ces navires 
hors d'etat de remplir 
ulterieurement un ser- 
vice de combat, en ob- 
servant les prescriptions 
du paragraphe III de la 
j)resente Partie, devront 
etre commencees au 
pins tard a la date de 
l'achevement du navire 
de remplacement et de- 
vront etre " terminees 
dans les six mois qui 
suivront cette date. Le 
declassement, opere 
conformement au para- 
graphe II de la presente 
Partie, devra etre ter- 
mine dans les dix-huit 
mois qui suivront 
l'achevement du navire 
de remplacement. Si, 
cependant, l'acheve- 
ment du nouveau 
navire est retarde, on 
devra commencer, au 
plus tard quatre ans 
apres sa mise sur cale, 



REPLACEMENT. 



309 



the laying of the keel of 
the new vessel, and shall 
be finished within six 
months from the date 
on which such work was 
commenced, and the old 
vessel shall be finally 
scrapped in accordance 
with paragraph II of 
this Part within eight- 
een months from the 
date when the work of 
rendering it incapable 
of further warlike serv- 
ice was commenced. 



Part 3. 
replacement. 

The replacement of capital 
ships and aircraft carriers shall 
take place according to the rules 
in Section I and the tables in 
Section II of this Part. 
Section I. 

RULES FOR REPLACEMENT. 

(a) Capital ships and air- 
craft carriers twenty years after 
the date of their completion 
may, except as otherwise pro- 
vided in Article VIII and in the 
tables in Section II of this 
Part, be replaced by new con- 
struction, but within the limits 
prescribed in Article IV and Ar- 
ticle VII. The keels of such 
new construction may, except as 
otherwise provided in Article 
VIII and in the tables in Sec- 
II of this Part, be laid down not 
earlier than seventeen years 
from the date of completion of 
the tonnage to be replaced, pro- 
vided, however, that no capital 



les operations neces- 
saires pour mettre le 
vieux navire hors d'etat 
de remplir ulterieure- 
ment un service de 
combat, conformement 
au paragraphe III de la 
presente Partie, et ce 
travail devra etre ter- 
mine en six mois. Le 
vieux navire devra etre 
definitivement declasse, 
dans les conditions du 
paragraphe II de la pre- 
sente partie, dix-huit 
mois apres le com- 
mencement des travaux 
de ladite mise hors 
d'etat. 

Partie 3. 
remplacements* 

Le remplacement des navires 
de ligne et des navires porte- 
aeronefs se fera selon les regies 
de la section I et des tableaux de 
la section II de la presente Partie. 
Section I. 

REGLES DE REPLACEMENTS. 

(a) £ous reserve des cas prevus 
a Particle VIII et aux tableaux 
de la section II de la presente 
partie, les navires de ligne et les 
navires porte-aeronefs pourront 
etre remplaces, vingt ans apres 
le jour de leur achievement, par 
des constructions neuves, mais 
seulement dans les limites prevues 
aux articles IV et VII. Sous 
reserve des exceptions prevues 
a 1' article VIII et aux tableaux 
de la section II de la presente 
partie. les nouveaux navires ne 
pourront etre mis sur cale que 
dix-sept ans apres l'achevement 
de l'unite a remplacer. Toute- 
foisil est entendu qu' al'exception 



310 



PRELIMINARIES TO REPLACEMENT. 



ship tonnage, with the exception 
of the ships referred to in the 
third paragraph of Article II, 
and the replacement tonnage 
specifically mentioned in Section 
II of this Part, shall be laid 
down until ten years from No- 
vember 12, 1921. 

(b) Each of the Contracting 
Powers shall communicate 
promptly to each of the other 
Contracting Powers the follow- 
ing information : 

(1) The names of the capital 
ships and aircraft carriers 
to be replaced by new 
construction ; 

(2) The date of governmental 
authorization of replace- 
ment tonnage ; 

(3) The date of laying the 
keels of replacement ton- 
nage. 

(4) The standard displace- 
ment in tons and metric 
tons of each new ship to 
be laid down, and the 
principal dimensions, 
namely, length at water- 
line, extreme beam at or 
below waterline, mean 
draft at standard dis- 
placement ; 



(5) The date of completion of 
each new ship and its 
standard displacement in 
tons and metric tons, and 
the principal dimensions, 
namely, length at water- 
line, extreme beam at or 
below waterline, mean 
draft at standard dis- 



des navires vises au troisieme 
alinea de l'article II et a l'excep- 
tion du tonnage de remplacement 
specifie a la section II de la 
presente partie, aucun navire de 
ligne ne sera mis sur cale avant 
1' expiration d'une periode de dix 
ans a partir du 12 novembre 1921. 
(b) Chacune des Puissances 
Contractantes communiquera aassi 
rapidement que possible aux au- 
tres les informations suivantes: 

(1) les noms des navires de 
ligne et des navires porte- 
aeronefs qui doivent etre 
remplaces par des cons- 
tructions neuves; 

(2) la date de l'autorisation 
gouvernementale donnee 
pour la construction de3 
navires de remplacement; 

(3) la date de mise sur cale de 

chaque navire de rem- 
placement; 

(4) le deplacement type en 
tonnes et en tonnes metri- 
ques de chaque unite nou- 
velle a mettre sur cale, 
ainsi que ses princupales 
dimensions, a savoir: lon- 
gueur a la flottaison; 
largeur maximum a ou 
sous la ligne de flottaison; 
tirant d'eau moyen corres- 
pondant au deplacement 
type; 

(5) la date d 'achievement de 
chaque nouvelle unite et 
son deplacement type en 
tonnes et en tonnes metri- 
ques, ainsi que ses prin- 
cipales dimensions a l'epo- 
que de 1' achievement, a 
savoir: longueur a la ligne 
de flottaison; largeur maxi- 



DEFENSIVE ADDITIONS. 



31 1 



placement, at time of 
completion. 



(c) In case of loss or acci- 
dental destruction of capital 
ships or aircraft carriers, they 
may immediately be replaced by 
new construction subject to the 
tonnage limits prescribed in Ar- 
ticles IV and VII and in con- 
formity with the other pro- 
visions of the present Treaty, 
the regular replacement pro- 
gram being deemed to be ad- 
vanced to that extent. 



(d) No retained capital ships 
or aircraft carriers shall be re- 
constructed except for the pur- 
pose of providing means of de- 
fense against air and subma- 
rine attack, and subject to the 
following rules : The Contract- 
ing Powers may, for that pur- 
pose, equip existing tonnage 
with bulge or blister or anti- 
air attack deck protection, pro- 
viding the increase of displace- 
ment thus effected does not ex- 
ceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric 
tons) displacement for each 
ship. No alterations in side 
armor, in calibre, number or 
general type of mounting of 
main armament shall be per- 
mitted except : 



(1) in the case of France and 
Italy, which countries 
within the limits allowed 



mum a ou sous la flottai- 
son; tirant d'eau moyen 
correspondant au deplaee- 
ment type. 

(c) Les navires de ligne et les 
navires porte-aeronefs pourront, 
en cas de perte ou de destruction 
accidentelle, etre remplaces im- 
mediatement, dans les limites de 
tonnage gpecifiees aux articles IV 
et VII, par des constructions 
neuves effectuees conformement 
aux dispositions du present 
Traite; le programme de rem- 
placement prevu pour la Puis- 
sance interessee sera considere 
comme ayant ete avance en ce 
qui concerne le navire perdu ou 
detruit. 

(d) La seule refonte autorisee 
pour les navires de ligne et les 
navires porte-aeronefs conserves 
consistera a munir ces unites de 
moyens de defense contre les at- 
taques aeriennes et sous-marines 
dans les conditions suivantes: les 
Puissances Contractantes pour- 
ront, dans ce but, ajouter aux 
navires existants des soufflages 
et caissons, ainsi que des ponts 
de protection contre les attaques 
aeriennes, pourvu que 1' augmen- 
tation de deplacement qui en 
resultera pour les navires ne 
depasse pas 3.000 tonnes (3.048 
tonnes metriques) pour chaque 
navire. Sera inter dit tout change- 
ment dans la cuirasse de flanc, le 
calibre et le nombre des canons de 
l'armement principal, ainsi que 
tout changement dans son plan 
general d'installation. II est fait 
exception: 

(1) pour la France et l'ltalie, 
qui pourront, dans les 
limites de l'augmentation 



312 



ALTERATIONS. 



for bulge may increase 
their armor protection 
and the calibre of the 
guns now carried on their 
existing capital ships so 
as not to exceed 16 inches 
(406 millimeters) and 



(2) the British Empire shall 
be permitted to complete, 
in the case of the Re- 
nown, the alterations to 
armor that have already 
been commenced but tem- 
porarily suspended. 



de deplacement accordee 
pour le soufrlage, accroitre 
les cuirassements de pro- 
tection ainsi que le calibre 
des canons portes par leurs 
navires de ligne existants, 
a la condition que ce calibre 
ne depasse pas 16 pouces 
(406 millimetres); 
(2) pour 1' Empire Britannique> 
qui sera autorise a achever 
sur le Renown, les modifi- 
cations de cnirassement 
deja commencees et pro- 
visoirement arretees. 



25882—23 21 



314 



REPLACEMENT TABLES. 
Section II. 

REPLACEMENT AND SCRAPPING OP CAPITAL SHIPS. 

UNITED STATES. 











Ships retained. 




Ships 


Ships 


Ships scrapped (age in 


Summary. 


Year. 






laid down. 


completed. 


parentheses). 


Pre- 


Post- 










Jutland. 








Maine (20), Missouri (20), Vir- 


17 


1. 








ginia (17), Nebraska (17), 












Georgia (17), New Jersey (17), 












Rhoie Island (17), Connecti- 












cut (17), Louisiana (17), Ver- 












mont (16), Kansas (16), Min- 












nesota (16), New Hampshire 












(15), South Carolina (13), 












Michigan (13), Washington 












(0), South Dakota (0), Indi- 












ana (0), Montana (0), North 












Carolina (0), Iowa (0), Massa- 












chusetts (0), Lexington (0), 












Constitution (0), Constellation 












(0), Saratoga (0), Ranger (0), 












United States (0).* 






1922... 




A,B# 


Delaware (12), North Dakota 
(12). 


15 


3 








1923 . . . 








15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
12 


3 


1924... 








3 


1925 . . . 








3 


1926... 








3- 


1927... 








3 


1928 . . . 








3 


1929... 








3 


1930 . . . 








3 


1931 . . . 


C, D 






3 


1932... 


E, F 






3 


1933 . . . 


G 






3 


1934... 


H, I 


C, D 


Florida (23), Utah (23), Wyo- 
ming (22). 
Arkansas (23), Texas (21), New 


5 


1935 . . . 


J 


E, F 


9 


7 








York (21). 






1936 . . . 


K, L 


G 


Nevada (20), Oklahoma (20) 


7 


8 


1937 . . . 


M 


H, I 


Arizona (21), Pennsylvania (21). 


5 


10 


1938 . . 


N, 


J... 


Mississippi (21) 


4 


11 


1939... 


P,Q 


K, L 


New Mexico (21), Idaho (20) 


2 


13 


1940 . . . 




M... 


Tennessee (20) 


1 


14 


1011... 




N, 


California (20), Marvland (20)... 





15 


1942... 




p,Q--: 


2 ships West V irginia class 





15 


1 





* The United States may retain the Oregon and Illinois, for noncombatant purposes,, 
after complying with the provisions of Part 2, III, (b). 

# Two West Virginia class. 

Note. — A, B, C, D, etc., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 tons .standard dis- 
placement, laid down and completed in the years specified. 



REPLACEMENT TABLES. 
Section II. 

REMPLACEMENT ET DECLASSEMENT DES NAVIRES DE LIGNE. 

ETATS-UNIS. 



315 











Navires 










conserves. 

Nombre 

total. 


Annee. 


Navires mis 
sur cale. 


Navires 
acheves. 


Navires a declasser (age entre 
parent hese). 


Pre- 


Post- 








/ 


Jutland. 


1922 




A. B 


Maine (20), Missouri (20), Virginia 
(17), Nebraska (17), Georgia (17), 
New Jersey (17), Rhode Island 
(17), Connecticut (17), Louisiana 
(17), Vermont (16), Kansas (16), 
Minnesota (16), New Hamp- 
shire (15), South Carolina (13), 
Michigan (13), Washington (0), 
South Dakota (0), Indiana (0), 
Montana (0), North Carolina (0), 
Iowa (0), Massachusetts (0), 
Lexington (0), Constitution (0), 
Constellation (0), Saratoga (0), 
Ranger (0), United States (0).* 

Delaware (12), North Dakota (12). 


17 

15 

15 

15 

15 • 

15 

15 

15 

15 

15 

15 

15 

15 

12 


1 

3' 


1923 . 




3 


1924... 








3 


1925. . 








3 


1926... 








3 


1927. . 








3 


1928. . 








3 


1929... 








3 


1930... 








3 


1931 . 


CD 






3 


1932... 


E. F 






3 


1933 


G 






3 


193i 


H, I... 


C, D 


Florida (23), Utah (23), Wyoming 


5 


1935 


J 


E, F 

G 


(22). 
Arkansas (23), Texas (21), New 

York (21). 

Nevada (20), Oklahoma (20) 

Arizona (21), Pennsylvania (21) . . . 
Mississippi (21) 


9 

7 
5 
4 
2 
1 




7 


1936 


K, L 

M 


8 


1937 


H,I 


10 


1938 


N, 

P,Q 


J 


11 


1939 

1940 


K, L 

M 


New Mexico (21), Idaho (20) 

Tennessee (20) 


13 

14 


1941 




N, 

P,Q 


California (20), Maryland (20) 
2 Navires de la classe "West Vir- 
ginia." 


15 


1942 




15 









* Les Etats-Unis pourront conserver VOregon et V Illinois pour des destinations autres 
que le combat en se conformant aux dispositions de la Partie 2, III, (b). 

# 2 de la classe "West Virginia." 

Note.— Lfes lettres A, B, C, D, etc., repressntent chacune un navire de ligne de 35.000 
tonnes de deplacement type, mis sur cale et acheve dans les annees indiquees. 



316 



REPLACEMENT TABLES. 

BRITISH EMPIRE. 





Ships 
laid down. 


Ships 
completed. 


Ships scrapped (age in 
parentheses). 


Ships retained. 
Summary. 


Year. 


Pre- Post- 
Jutland. 


1922 . . . 


A,B# 




Commonwealth (16), Agamem- 
non (13), Dreadnought (15), 
Bellerophon (12), St. Vincent 
(11), Inflexible (13}, Superb 
(12), Neptune (10), Hercules 
(10), Indomitable (13), Teme- 
raire (12), New Zealand (9), 
Lion (9), Princess Royal (9), 
Conquerer (9), Monarch (9), 
Orion (9), Australia (8), Agin- 
court (7), Erin (7), 4 building 
or protected.* . 


21 

21 
21 
21 
17 

17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
13 

9 

7 

5 
4 
2 
1 




1 
1 


1923 . . . 








1 


1924... 








1 


1925 . . . 




A,B 


King George V (13), Ajax (12), 
Centuiion (12), Thunderer (13). 


3 


1926... 




3 


1927 . . . 








3 


1928... 








3 


1929... 








3 


1930... 








3 


1931 . . . 


C, D 


- 




3 


1932 . . . 


E, F 






3 


1933 . . . 


g'. 






3 


1934... 


H,I 


C,D 

E, F 

G 


Iron Duke (20), Marlborough 

(20), Emperor of India (20), 

Benbow (20). 
Tiger (21), Queen Elizabeth (20), 

Warspite (20), Barham (20). 
Malaya (20), Royal Sovereign 

(20). 
Revenge (21), Resolution (21) . . . 
Royal Oak (22) 


5 


1935... 


J 


7 


1936 


K, L 

M 


8 


1937 


H.I 


10 


1938 


N, 

P,Q 


J 


11 


1939... 
1940. 


K,L 

M 


Valiant (23), Repulse (23) 

Renown (24) *. . '. 


13 
14 


1941 . . . 




N, 

P,Q 


Ramillies (24), Hood"(21) 

A (17), B (17) 


15 


1942. 




15 











* The British Empire may retain the Colossus and Collingwood for noncombatant 
purposes, after complying with the provisions of Part 2, III (b). 

# Two 35,000-ton ships, standard displacement. 

Note. — A, B, C, D, etc., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 tons standard 
displacement laid down and completed in the years specified. 



REPLACEMENT TABLES. 317 

REMPLACEMENT ET DECLASSEMENT DES NAVIRES DE LIONE. 
EMPIRE BRITANNIQUE. 



Ann^e. 


Navires mis 
sur cale. 


Navires 
archeves. 


Navires a declasser (age entre 
parenthese). 


Navires 

conserves. 

Nombre 

total. 


Pre- Post- 
Jutland. 


1922 


A, B# 




Common wealth (16), Agamemnon 
(13), Dreadnought (15), Bellero- 
phon (12), St. Vincent (11), In- 
flexible (13), Superb (12), Nep- 
tune (10), Hercules (10), Indom- 
itable (13), Temeraire (12), New 
Zealand (9), Lion (9), Princess 
Royal (9), Conqueror (9), Mon- 
arch (9), Orion (9), Australia (8), 
Agincourt (7), Erin (7), 4 en con- 
struction ou en projet.* 


21 

21 
21 
21 
17 

17 

17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
13 

9 

5 
4 
2 
1 




1 
1 


1923... . 








1 


1924 






i 


1 


1925 




A, B 


King George V (13), Ajax (12), 
Centurion (12), Thunderer (13). 


3 


1926 




' 3 


1927 








3 


1928 








3 


1929 








3 


1930 








3 


1931 


C, D 






3 


1932 


E, F 






3 


1933 


Q 






3 


1934 


H, I 


C, D 

E, F 

G 


Iron Duke (20), Marlborough (20), 
Emperor of India (20), Benbow 
(20). 

Tiger (21), Queen Elizabeth (20), 
Warspite (20), Barham (20). 

Malaya (20), Royal Sovereign (20). 

Revenge (21), Resolution (21) 

Royal "Oak (22) 


5 


1935 


J 


7 


1936 


K,L 

M 


8 


1937 


H, I.... 


10 


1938 


N, 

P,Q 


J. 


11 


1939 

1940 


K, L 

M... 


Valiant (23), Repulse (23) ■ 

Renown (24) 


13 
14 


1941 




N, 

P,Q 


Ramillies (24), Hood (21) 


15 


1942 




A (17), B (17) 


15 











* L'Empire Britannique pourra conservar le Colossus et le Collinqwood pour des desti- 
nations autres que le combat en se conformant aux dispositions de la Partie 2, III, (b). 

# 2 navires de 35.000 tonnes de deplacement type. 

Note.— Les lettres A, B, C. D, etc., representent chacune un navire de ligne de 35.000 
tonnes de deplacement type, mis sur cale et acheve dans les annees indiquees. 



318 



REPLACEMENT TABLES. 

FRANCE. 





Ships 
laid down. 


Ships 
completed. 


Ships scrapped (age in 
parentheses). 


Ships retained. 
Summary. 


Year. 


Pre- Post- 
Jutland. 


1922... 








7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
5 
5 
4 
4 
2 
1 












1923... 









1924... 


i 







1925... 











1926... 













1927... 


35,000 tons. . 









1928... 











1929... 


35,000 tons. . 









1930... 




35,000 tons.. 


Jean Bart (17), Courbet (17) 


(*) 


1931... 


35,000 tons . . 


(*) 


1932... 


35,000 tons. . 
35,000 tons . . 


35,000 tons.. 


France (18) 


(*) 


1933... 




(*) 


1934... 




35,000 tons. . 
35,000 tons.. 
35,000 tons . . 


Paris (20), Bretagne (20) 

Provence (20) 


(*) 


1935... 




(*) 


1936... 




Lorraine (20) 


(*) 


1937... 






(*) 


1938... 








(*) 


1939... 








(*) 


1940... 








(*) 


1941... 








(*) 


1942. . . 








(*) 













* Within tonnage limitations; number not fixed. 

Note. — France expressly reserves the right of employing the capital ship tonnage 
allotment as she may consider advisable, subject solely to the limitations that the dis- 
placement of individual ships should not surpass 35,000 tons, and that the total capital 
ship tonnage should keep within the limits imposed by the present Treaty. 

ITALY. 



Year. 



1922.. 
1923.. 
1924.. 
1925.. 
1926.. 
1927.. 
1928.. 
1929.. 
1930.. 
1931.. 
1932.. 
1933.. 
1934.. 
1935 . . 
1936.. 
1937.. 



Ships 
laid down. 



35,000 tons . 



35,000 tons. 



35,000 tons. 
45,000 tons . 
25,000 tons. 



. Ships . 
completed. 



35,000 tons . 



35,000 tons . 



35,000 tons. 
45,000 tons. 
25,000 tons . 



Ships scrapped (age in 
parentheses). 



Dante Alighieri ( 19). 



Leonardo da Vinci (19). 



Guilio Cesare (21) 

Conte di Cavour (21), Duilio (21) 
Andrea Doria (21) 



Ships retained. 
Summary. 



Pre- 



Post- 



Jutland. 



6 





6 





6 





6 





6 





6 





6 





6 





6 





5 


(*) 





(*) 


4 


(*) 


4 


(*) 


3 


(*) 


1 


(*) 





(*) 



* Within tonnage limitations; number not fixed. 

Note. — Italy expressly reserves the right of employing the capital ship tonnage allot- 
ment as she may consider advisable, subject solely to the limitations that the displace- 
ment of individual ships should not surpass 35,000 tons, and the total capital ship 
tonnage should keep within the limits imposed by the present Treaty. 



REPLACEMENT TABLES. 



319 



REMPLACEMENT ET DECLASSEMENT DES NAVIRES DE LIGNE. 

FRANCE. 



Annee. 


Navires mis 
sur cale. 


Navires 
acheves. 


Navires a declasser (age entre pa- 
renthese). 


Navires 

conserves. 

Nombre 

total. 




Pre- Post- 
Jutland. 


1922. 








7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
5 
5 
4 
4 
2 
1 












1923 . 











1924. 











1925. 











1926. 











1927 


35.000 tonnes 









1928. 









1929 


35.000 tonnes 









1930... 


35.000 tonnes 


Jean Bart (17), Courbet (17) 


(*) 
(*) 


1931 


35.000 tonnes 
35 000 tonnes 
35.000 tonnes 


1932 


35.000 tonnes 


France (18) 


1933. 




(*) 


1934 . . . 


35.000 tonnes 
35.000 tonnes 
35.000 tonnes 


Paris (20), Bretagne (20) 


(*) 


1935 




Provence (20) 


• (*) 


1936. 




Lorraine (20) 


(*) 


1937 






(*) 


1938. . 








(*) 


1939. 








(*) 


1940. 






r 


(*) 


1941... 








(*) 


1942. 








(*) 









* Dans les limites du tonnage total; nombre non fixe. 

Note. — La France reserve expressement son droit d'employer son allocation de ton- 
nage de navires de ligne comme elle le jugera bon, pourvu que le deplacement de chaque 
navire ne depasse pas 35.000 tonnes et que le tonnage total de navires de ligner este dans 
les limites imposees par le present Traite. 

REMPLACEMENT ET DECLASSEMENT DES NAVIRES DE LIGNE. 

ITALIE. 



Annee. 


Navires mis 
sur cale. 


Navires 
acheves. 


Navires a declasser (age entre pa- 
renthese). 


Navires 

conserves. 

Nombre 

total. 




Pre- I Post- 
Jutland. 


1922 








6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
1 






1923 . . . 











1924 











1925 











1926 











1927 


35.000 tonnes 









1928... 









1929 


35.000 tonnes 









1930 









1931 


35.000 tonnes 
45.000 tonnes 
25.000 tonnes 


35.000 tonnes 


Dante Alighieri (19). . . 


(*) 


1932 




(*) 


1933 


35.000 tonnes 


Leonardo da Vinci (19) 


(*) 


1934 




(*) 

(*) 
(*) 
(*) 


1935 




35.000 tonnes 
45.030 tonnes 
25.000 tonnes 


Giulio Cesare (21).. 


1936 




Conte di Cavour (21), Duilio (21).. 
Andrea Doria (21)... 


1937 













* Dans les limites du tonnage total; nombre non fixe. 

Note.— L'ltalie reserve expressement son droit d'employer son allocation de tonnage 
de navires de ligne comme elle le jugera bon, pourvu que le deplacement de chaque 
navire ne depasse pas 35,000 tonnes, et que le tonnage total de navires de ligner este dans 
les limites imposees par le present Traite. 



320 



REPLACEMENT TABLES. 

JAPAN. 





Ships 
laid down. 


Ships 
completed. 


Ships scrapped (age in 
parentheses). 


Ships retained. 
Summary. 


Year. 


Pre- Post- 
Jutland. 


1922... 






Hizen (20), Mikasa (20), Kashi- 
ma (16), Katori (16), Satsuma 
(12), AM (11), Settsu (10), 
Ikoma (14), Ibuki (12), Kura- 
ma (11), Amagi (0),Akagi (0), 
Kaga (0), Tosa (0), Takao (0), 
Atago (0) . Projected program 
8 ships not laid down.* 


8 

8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
7 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 





2 


1923 . . . 








2 


1924... 








2 


1925... 








2 


1926... 








2 


1927 . . . 








2 


1928... 








2 


1929.. 








2 


1930... 








2 


1931 . . . 


A 






2 


1932... 


B 






2 


1933 . . . 


C 






2 


1934... 


D 


A 


Kongo (21) 


3 


1935 . . . 


E 


B 


Hiyei (21), Haruma (20) 

Kinshima (21) 


4 


1936 . . . 


F 


C 


5 


1937 . . . 


G 


D 


Fuso (22) 


6 


1938... 


H 


E 


Yamashiro (21) 


7 


1939 . . . 


I 


F 


Ise (22) 


8 


1940... 




G 


Hiuga (22) 


9 


1941 . . . 




H 


Nagato (21) 


9 


1942 . . . 




I 


Mutsu (21) 


9 













*Japan may retain the SMkishima and AsaM for noncombatant purposes, after com- 
plying with the provisions of Part 2, III, (b) . 

Note. — A, B, C, D, etc., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 tons standard 
displacement, laid down and completed in the years specified. 



REPLACEMENT TABLES. 



321 



REMPLACEMENT ET DECLASSE ME NT DE NAVIRES DE LIGNE 

JAPON. 



Annee. 


Navires mis 
sur cale. 


Navires 
acheves. 


Navires a declasser (age entre pa- 
renthese). 


Navires 

conserves. 

Nombre 

total. 


Pre- Post- 
Jutland. 


1922 






Hizen (20), Mikasa (20), Kashima 
(16), Katori (16), Satsuma (12), 
Aki (11), Settsu (10), Ikoma (14), 
Ibuki (12), Kurama (11), Amagi 
(0), Akagi (0), Kaga (0), Tosa (0), 
Takao (0), Atago (0), Projet de 
programme 8 navires non sur 
cale.* . 


8 

8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
7 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 







2 

SI 


1923 








?, 


1924 








9 


1925 








?, 


1926 








9, 


1927 






' 


9, 


1928 








fl 


1929 








?, 


1930 








9, 


1931 


A 






9 


1932 


B 






fl 


1933 


C 






8 


1934 


D 


A 


Kongo (21) 


3 


1935 


E 


B 


Hiyei (21), Haruna (20) 


4 


1936 


F 


C 


Kirishima (21) 


5 


1937 


G 


D 


Fuso (22) 


fi 


1938 


H 


E 


Yamashiro (21) 


7 


1939 


I 


F 


Ise (22) 


s 


1940 




G 


Hiuga (22) 


Q 


1941 




H 


Nagato (21) 


fl 


1942 




I.... 


Mutsu (21) 


R 













* Le Japon pourra CDnservar le Shikishimo et VAsahi pour des destinations autre* 
que le combat, en se conformant aux dispositions de la partie 2, III, (b). 

Note.— Les lettres A, B, C, D, etc., representent chacune un navire de ligne de 35.000 
tonnes de deplacement type, mis sur cale et acheve dans les annees indiquees. 



322 



DEFINITIONS. 



NOTE APPLICABLE TO ALL THE 
TABLES IN SECTION II. 

The order above prescribed in 
which ships are to be scrapped 
is in accordance with their age. 
It is understood that when re- 
placement begins according to 
the above tables the order of 
scrapping in the case of the 
ships of each of the Contracting 
Powers may be varied at its op- 
tion ; provided, however, that 
such Power shall scrap in each 
year the number of ships above 
stated. 

Part 4. 

definitions. 

For the purposes of the pres- 
ent Treaty, the following ex- 
pressions are to be understood 
in the sense defined in this Part. 

Capital Ship. 

A capital ship, in the case of 
ships hereafter built, is defined 
as a vessel of war, not an air- 
craft carrier, whose displace- 
ment exceeds 10,000 tons (10,- 
160 metric tons) standard dis- 
placement, or which carries a 
gun with a calibre exceeding 8 
inches (203 millimetres). 

Aircraft Carrier. 

An aircraft carrier is defined 
as a vessel of war with a dis- 
placement in excess of 10,000 
tons (10,160 metric tons) stand- 
ard displacement designed for 
the specific and exclusive pur- 
pose of carrying aircraft. It 
must be so constructed that air- 
craft can be launched therefrom 
and landed thereon, and not de- 
signed and constructed for car- 



NOTE VISANT TOUS LES TABLEAUX 
DE LA SECTION II. 

Dans les tableaux precedents, 
l'ordre suivant l'equel sont inscrits 
les navires a declasser est celui 
de leur age. II est entendu que, 
quand les remplacements com- 
menceront conformement aux dits 
tableaux, l'ordre de declassement 
des navires de chaque Puissance 
Contractante pourra etre change 
au gre de cette Puissance, pourvu 
qu'elle declasse chaque annee le 
nombre de navires indique par 
ces tableaux. 

Partie 4. 

definitions. 

Dans le present Traite, les ex- 
pressions suivantes doivent s' en- 
tendre respectivement avec le 
sens ci-apres. 

Navire de Ligne. 

Un navire de ligne, en ce qui 
concerne les navires a construire 
dans l'avenir, est un navire de 
guerre autre qu'un navire porte- 
aeronefs, dont le deplacement 
type est superieur a 10.000 tonnes 
(10.160 tonnes metriques), ou 
qui porte un canon d'un calibre 
superieur a 8 pouces (203 milli- 
metres). 

Navire Porte-Aeronefs. 

Un navire porte-aeronefs est 
un navire de guerre d'un deplace- 
ment type superieur a 10.000 
tonnes (10.160 tonnes metriques), 
specifiquement et exclusivement 
destine a porter des aeronefs. 
II doit etre construit de maniere 
qu'un aeronef puisse y prendre 
son vol ou s'y poser. Son plan 
et sa construction ne doivent pas 
lui permettre de* porter un arme- 



STANDARD DISPLACEMENT. 



323 



rying a more powerful arma- 
ment than that allowed to it un- 
der Article IX or Article X as 
the case may be. 

Standard Displacement. 

The standard displacement of 
a ship is the displacement of the 
ship complete, fully manned, en- 
gined, and equipped ready for 
sea, including all armament and 
ammunition, equipment, outfit, 
provisions and fresh water for 
crew, miscellaneous stores and 
implements of every description 
that are intended to be carried 
In war, but without fuel or re- 
serve feed water on board. 



The word " ton " in the pres- 
ent Treaty, except in the ex- 
pression " metric tons," shall be 
understood to mean the ton of 
2240 pounds (1016 kilos). 

Vessels now completed shall 
retain their present ratings of 
displacement tonnage in accord- 
ance with their national system 
of measurement. However, a 
Power expressing displacement 
in metric tons shall be consid- 
ered for the application of the 
present Treaty as owning only 
the equivalent displacement in 
tons of 2240 pounds. 

A vessel completed hereafter 
shall be rated at its displace- 
ment tonnage when in the stand- 
ard condition defined herein. 



ment plus puissant que celui 
autorise soit par l'article IX, soit 
par l'article X, selon le cas. 

Deplacement Type. 

Le deplacement type d'un na- 
vire est le deplacement du navire 
acheve, avec son equipage com- 
plet, ses machines et chaudieres, 
pret a prendre la mer, ayant tout 
son armement et toutes ses muni- 
tions, ses installations, equipe- 
ments, vivres, eau douce pour 
l'equipage, approvisionnements 
divers, ou tillages et rechanges de 
toute nature qu'il doit emporter 
en temps de guerre, mais sans 
combustible et sans eau de reserve 
pour l'alimentation des machines 
et chaudieres. 

Le mot tonne employe dans le 
present traite sans la qualifica- 
tion de "metrique" designe une 
tonne de 2.240 lbs. ou 1.016 kilo- 
grammes. 

Les navires actuellement ache- 
ves continueront a figurer avec le 
deplacement qui leur est attribue 
selon leur systeme national d' eva- 
luation. Toutefois, lorsqu'une 
Puissance compte le deplacement 
de ses navires en tonnes metri- 
ques, elle sera consideree, pour 
1' application du present Traite, 
comme ne possedant que le ton- 
nage equivalent en tonnes de 
2.240 lbs. 

Les navires acheves par la suite 
seront comptes pour leur deplace- 
ment type tel qu'il est def'ni au 
l cr alinea de la presente defini- 
tion. 



324 



MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. 



CHAPTER III. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. 

Article XXI. 

If during the term of the 
present Treaty the require- 
ments of the national security 
of any Contracting Power in re- 
spect of naval defence are, in 
the opinion of that Power, ma- 
terially affected by any change 
of circumstances, the Con- 
tracting Powers will, at the re- 
quest of such Power, meet in 
conference with a view to the 
reconsideration of the provi- 
sions of the Treaty and its 
amendment by mutual agree- 
ment. 

In view of possible technical 
and scientific developments, the 
United States, after consulta- 
tion with the other Contracting 
Powers, shall arrange for a con- 
ference of all the Contracting 
Powers which shall convene as 
soon as possible after the expi- 
ration of eight years from the 
coming into force of the pres- 
ent Treaty to consider what 
changes, if any, in the Treaty 
may be necessary to meet such 
developments. 

Article XXII. 

Whenever any Contracting 
Power shall become engaged in 
a war which in its opinion 
affects the naval defence of its 
national security, such Power 
may after notice to the other 
Contracting Powers suspend for 
the period of hostilities its ob- 
ligations under the present 
Treaty other^ than those under 
Articles XIII and XVII, pro- 
vided that such Power shall 



CHAPITRE III. 

DISPOSITIONS DIVERSES. 

Article XXI. 

Si, pendant la duree du present 
traite, une Puissance contrac- 
tante estime que les exigences 
de sa securite nationale, en ce qui 
touche la defense navale, se trou- 
vent materiellement affectees par 
des circonstances nouvelles, les 
Puissances Contractantes se re- 
uniront en Conference sur sa 
demande pour examiner a nou- 
veau les dispositions du present 
traite et s' entendre sur les amende- 
ments a y apporter. 



En raison des possibilites de 
progres dans l'ordre technique et 
scientirlque, les Etats-Unis pro- 
voqueront la reunion d'une Con- 
ference de toutes les Puissances 
Contractantes apres les avoir con- 
sultees. Cette Conference se tien- 
dra aussitot que possible apres 
1' expiration d'une periode de huit 
ans a dater de la mise en vigueur 
du present traite et examinera les 
changements a y apporter, s'il y a 
lieu, pour faire face a ces progres. 

Article XXII. 

Si l'une des Puissances Contrac- 
tantes se trouve engagee dans une 
guerre qui, dans son opinion, af- 
fecte sa securite nationale du cote 
de la mer, cette Puissance pourra, 
sur avis prealable donne aux 
autres Puissances Contractantes, 
se degager, pour la duree des hos- 
tilites, de ses obligations resultant 
du present traite, a 1' exception de 
celles qui sont prevues aux arti- 
cles XIII et XVII. Toutefois, 



DURATION OF TREATY. 



325 



notify the other Contracting 
Powers that the emergency is 
of such a character as to re- 
quire such suspension. 

The remaining Contracting 
Powers shall in such case con- 
sult together with a view to 
agreement as to what tempo- 
rary modifications if any should 
be made in the Treaty as be- 
tween themselves. Should such 
consultation not produce agree- 
ment, duly made in accordance 
with the constitutional methods 
of the respective Powers, any 
one of said Contracting Powers 
may, by giving notice to the 
other Contracting Powers, sus- 
pend for the period of hostili- 
ties its obligations under the 
present Treaty, other than those 
under Articles XIII and XVII. 

On the cessation of hostilities 
the Contracting Powers will 
meet in conference to consider 
what modifications, if any, 
should be made in the pro- 
visions of the present Treaty. 

Article XXIII. 

The present Treaty shall re- 
main in force until December 
31st, 1936, and in case none of 
the Contracting Powers shall 
have given notice two years 
before that date of its intention 
to terminate the Treaty, it shall 
continue in force until the ex- 
piration of two years from the 
date on which notice of termi- 
nation shall be given by one of 
the Contracting Powers, where- 
upon the Treaty shall terminate 
as regards all the Contracting 
Powers. Such notice shall be 
communicated in writing to the 



cette Puissance devra notifier aux 
autres Puissances Contractantes 
que la situation est d'un caractere 
assez critique pour exiger cette 
mesure. 

Dans ce cas, les autres Puis- 
sances Contractantes echangeront 
leurs vues pour arriver a un ac- 
cord sur les derogations tempo- 
raires que 1' execution du traite 
devrait comporter, s'il y a lieu, en 
ce qui les concerne. Si cet 
echange de vues ne conduit pas a 
un accord, conclu regulierement 
selon les procedures constitution- 
nelles auxquelles elles sont respec- 
tivement tenues, chacune d'entre 
elles pourra, apres en avoir donne 
notification aux, autres, se dega- 
ger, pour la duree des hostilites, 
des obligations resultant du pre- 
sent traite, a 1' exception de celles 
qui sont pre vues aux articles 
XIII et XVII. 

A la cessation des hostilites les 
Puissances Contractantes se re- 
uniront en Conference pour exa- 
miner les modifications a appor- 
ter, s'il y a lieu, au present Traite. 

Article XXIII. 

Le present traite restera en 
vigueur jusqu'au 31 decembre 
1936. S'il n'est fait notification 
deux ans avant cette date par 
aucune des Puissances Contrac- 
tantes de son intention de mettre 
fin au traite, ce dernier restera en 
vigueur jusqu'a l'expiration d'un 
delai de deux ans a dater du jour 
ou l'une des Puissances Contrac- 
tantes notifiera son intention de 
mettre fin au traite. En ce cas 
le traite prendra fin pour toutes 
les Puissances Contractantes. La 
notification devra etre faite par 
ecrit au Gouvernement des Etats- 



326 



RATIFICATION OF TREATY. 



Government of the United 
States, which shall immediately 
transmit a certified copy of the 
notification to the other Powers 
and inform them of the date on 
which it was received. The no- 
tice shall be deemed to have 
been given and shall take effect 
on that date. In the event of 
notice of termination being- 
given by the Government of the 
United States, such notice shall 
be given to the diplomatic rep- 
resentatives at Washington of 
the other Contracting Powers, 
and the notice shall be deemed 
to have been given and shall 
take effect on the date of the 
communication made to the said 
diplomatic representatives. 

Within one year of the date 
on which a notice of termina- 
tion by any Power has taken 
effect, all the Contracting Pow- 
ers shall meet in conference. 

Article XXIV. 

The present Treaty shall be 
ratified by the Contracting Pow- 
ers in accordance with their re- 
spective constitutional methods 
and shall take effect on the date 
of the deposit of all the ratifi- 
cations, which shall take place 
at Washington as soon as pos- 
sible. The Government of the 
United States will transmit to 
the other Contracting Powers a 
certified copy of the proces-ver- 
bal of the deposit of ratifica- 
tions. 

The present Treaty, of which 
the French and English texts 
are both authentic, shall remain 
deposited in the archives of the 
Government of the United 
States, and duly certified copies 



Unis, qui devra immediatement 
en transmettre aux autres Puis- 
sances une copie authentique avec 
l'indication de la date de recep- 
tion. La notification sera con- 
sidered comme faite a cette date, 
a partir de laquelle elle produira 
son effet. Dans le cas oil le 
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis no- 
tifierait son intention de mettre 
fin au Traite, cette notification 
sera remise aux representants 
diplomatiques a Washington des 
autres Puissances Contractantes ; 
la notification sera considered 
comme faite et prendra effet a la 
date de la communication aux 
dits representants diplomatiques. 
Toutes les Puissances Contrac- 
tantes devront se reunir en Con- 
ference dans le delai d'un an a 
partir de la date a laquelle aura 
pris effet la notification, par une 
des Puissances, de son intention 
de mettre fin au Traite. 

Article XXIV. 

Le present traite sera ratifie 
par les Puissances Contractantes 
selon les procedures constitu- 
tionnelles auxquelles elles sont 
respectivement tenues. II pren- 
dra effet a la date du depot de 
toutes les ratifications, depot qui 
sera effectue a Washington, le 
plus tot qu'il sera possible. Le 
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis re- 
mettra aux autres Puissances Con- 
tractantes une copie authentique 
du proces verbal de depot des 
ratifications. 

Le present traite, dont les textes 
francais et anglais feront foi ; 
restera depose dans les archives 
du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis; 
des expeditions authentiques en 
seront remises par ce Gouverne- 



TREATY ON SUBMARINES AND GASES. 



327 



thereof shall be transmitted by 
that Government to the other 
Contracting Powers. 

In faith whereof the above- 
named Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present Treaty. 

Done at the City of Washing- 
ton the sixth day of February, 
One Thousand Nine Hundred 
and Twenty-Two. 



ment aux autres Puissances Con- 
tractantes. 

En foi de quoi les Plenipoten- 
tiaires sus-nommes ont signe le 
present Traite. 

Fait a Washington le six f evrier 
mil-neuf-cent-vingt-deux. 



Charles Evans Hughes 

Henry Cabot Lodge 

Oscar W. Underwood 

Elihu Root. 

Arthur James Balfour 

Lee of Fareham 

A. C. Geddes 

R. L. Borden 

G. F. Pearce 

John W. Salmond 

Arthur James Balfour 

V. S. Srinivasa Sastri 

A. Sarraut 

jusserand 

Carlo Schanzer 

V. ROLANDI RlCCI 

Luigi Albertini 
T. Kato 
K. Shidehara 
M. Hanihara. 



(2) A TREATY BETWEEN THE 
SAME POWERS, IN RELATION 
TO THE USE OF SUBMARINES 
AND NOXIOUS GASES IN WAR- 
FARE. 

The United States of America, 
the British Empire, France, 
Italy and Japan, hereinafter re- 
ferred to as the Signatory 
Powers, desiring to make more 
effective the rules adopted by 
civilized nations for the protec- 
tion of the lives of neutrals and 
noncombatants at sea in time of 
war, and to prevent the use in 
war of noxious gases and chem- 



(2) TRAITE ENTRE LES NEUF 
POUVOIRS, RELATIVEMENT A 
EMPLOI DES SOUS-MARINS ET 
DES GAZ ASPHYXIANTS EN 
TEMPS DE GUERRE. 

Les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, 
I'Empire Britannique, la France, 
l'ltalie et le Japon, ci-apres 
designes les Puissances Signa- 
taires, desireux de rendre plus 
efficaces les regies adoptees par 
les nations civilisees pour la pro- 
tection de la vie des neutres et 
des non-combattants sur la mer 
en temps de guerre et d'empecher 
l'emploi dans la guerre des gaz et 



328 



NAMES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



icals, have determined to con- 
clude a Treaty to this effect, and 
have appointed as their Pleni- 
potentiaries : 

The President of the United 
States of America : 

Charles Evans Hughes, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Oscar W. Underwood, 
Elihu Root, 

citizens of the United 
States ; 
His Majesty the King of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland and of the British 
Dominions beyond the Seas, Em- 
peror of India : 

The Right Honourable 
Arthur James Balfour, 
O. M., M. P., Lord Presi- 
dent of His Privy Coun- 
cil; 
The Right Honourable 
Baron Lee of Fareham, 
G. B. E., K. C. B., First 
Lord of His Admiralty ; 
The Right Honourable Sir 
Auckland Campbell 
Geddes, K. C. B,, His 
Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Plenipoten- 
tiary to the United 
States of America ; 
and 

for the Dominion of Canada: 
The Right Honourable Sir 
Robert Laird Borden, 
G. C. M. G., K. C. ; 
for the Commonwealth of Aus- 
tralia : 

Senator, the Right Hon- 
ourable George Foster 
Pearce, Minister for 
Home and Territories; 



des produits chimiques nuisibles, 
ont decide de conclure un traite a 
cet effet et ont nomme pour leurs 
Plenipotentiaires, savoir: 

Le President des Etats-Unis 
d'Amerique: 

Charles Evans Hughes; 

Henry Cabot Lodge; 

Oscar W. Underwood; 

Elihu Root, 

citoyens des Etats-Unis; 

Sa Majeste le Roi du Royaume- 
Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'lr- 
lande et des Territoires britanni- 
ques au-dela des mers, Empereur 
des Indes: 

Le Tres-Honorable Arthur 
James Balfour, O. M., 
M. P., Lord President du 
Conseil du Roi; 

Le Tres-Honorable Baron 
Lee of Fareham, G. B. 
E., K. C. B., Premier 
Lord de l'Amiraute; 

Le Tres - Honorable Sir 
Auckland Campbell 
Geddes, K. C. B., Son 
Ambassadeur Extraor- 
dinaire et Plenipotentiaire 
aux Etats-Unis d'Ameri- 
que; 



et 



pour le Dominion du Canada: 
Le Tres-Honorable Sir Rob- 
ert Laird Borden, G. C. M. 
G., K. C; 
pour le Commonwealth 
d'Australie: 
Le Tres-Honorable 
George Foster Pearce, Se- 
nate ur, Ministre de l'lnte- 
rieur et des Territoires; 



NAMES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



329 



for the Dominion of New 
Zealand : 
The Honourable Sir John 
William Salmond, K. C, 
Judge of the Supreme 
Court of New Zealand ; 
for the Union of South Africa : 
The Right Honourable 
Arthur James Balfour, 
O. M., M. P. ; 
for India : 

The Right Honourable 
Valingman Sankarana- 
rayana Srinivasa Sas- 
tri, Member of the In- 
dian Council of State ; 
The President of the French 
Republic : 

Mr. Albert Sarraut, Dep- 
uty, Minister of the 
Colonies ; 
Mr. Jules J. Jusserand, 
Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Plenipoten- 
tiary to the United 
States of America, 
Grand Cross of the Na- 
tional Order of the Le- 
gion of Honour ; 
His Majesty the King of Italy : 
The Honourable Carlo 
Schanzer, Senator of the 
Kingdom ; 
The Honourable Vittorio 
Rolandi Ricci, Senator 
of the Kingdom, His 
Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Plenipoten- 
tiary at Washington ; 
The Honourable Luigi Al- 
bertini, Senator of the 
Kingdom ; 
His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan : 

Baron Tomosaburo Kato, 
Minister for the Navy, 

25882 — 23 22 



pour le Dominion de la Nou- 
velle-Zelande: 

L 'Honorable Sir John Wil- 
liam Salmond, K. C, Juge 
a la Cour Supreme de 
Nouvelle-Zelande ; 
pour 1' Union Sud-Africaine: 
Le Tres-Honorable Arthur 
James Balfour, O. M., 
M. P.; 
pour l'lnde: 

Le Tres-Honorable Valing- 
man Sankanranarayana 
Srinivasa Sustri, Membre 
du Conseil d'Etat de 
Flnde; 
Le President de la Republique 
francaise: 
M. Albert Sarraut, Depute, 
Ministre des Colonies; 

M. Jules J. Jusserand, Am- 
bassadeur Extraordi- 
naire et Plenipoten- 
tiaire pres le President 
des Etats-Unis d'Ame- 
rique, Grand Croix de 
FOrdre National de la 
Legion d'Honneur; 
Sa Majeste le Roi d'Ttalie: 

L' Honorable Carlo Schanzer, 
Senateur du Royaume; 

L'Honorable Vittorio Ro- 
landi Ricci, Senateur du 
Royaume, Son Ambassa- 
deur Extraordinaire et Ple- 
nipotentiare a Washing- 
ton; 

L'Honorable Luigi Alber- 
tini, Senateur du Roy- 
aume; 
Sa Majeste l'Empereur du 
Japon: 

Le Baron Tomosaburo 
Kato, Ministre de la 



330 



VISIT AND SEARCH. 



Junii, a member of the 
First Class of the Im- 
perial Order of the 
Grand Cordon of the 
Rising Sun with the 
Paulownia Flower; 
Baron Kijuro Shidehara, 
His Ambassador Extra- 
ordinary and Plenipo- 
tentiary at Washington, 
Joshii, a member of the 
First Class of the Im- 
perial Order of the Ris- 
ing Sun ; 
Mr. Masanao Hanihara, 
Vice Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Jushii, a member 
of the Second Class of the 
Imperial Order of the 
Rising Sun ; 
Who, having communicated 
their Full Powers, found in 
good and due form, have agreed 
as follows : 

Article I. 

The Signatory Powers declare 
that among the rules adopted 
by civilized nations for the pro- 
tection of the lives of neutrals 
and noncombatants at sea in 
time of war, the following are 
to be deemed an established 
part of international law; 

(1) A merchant vessel must 
be ordered to submit to visit 
and search to determine its 
character before it can be 
seized. 

A merchant vessel must not 
be attacked unless it refuse to 
submit to visit and search after 
warning, or to proceed as di- 
rected after seizure. 



Marine, Junii, Membre 
de la Premiere Classe 
de l'Ordre Imperial du 
Grand Cordon du Soleil 
Levant avec la Fleur de 
Paulonia; 
Le Baron Kijuro Shidehara, 
Son Ambassadeur Extra- 
ordinaire et Plenipotenti- 
aire a Washington, Joshii, 
Membre de la Premiere 
Clase de l'Ordre Imperial 
du Soleil Levant; 

M. Masanao Hanihara, Vice- 
Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres, Jushii, Mem- 
bre de la Seconde Classe < 
de l'Ordre Imperial du 
Soleil Levant; 
Lesquels, apres avoir echange 
leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus 
en bonne et due forme, ont con- 
venu des dispositions suivantes: 

Article I. 

Les Puissances signataires de- 
clarent qu'au nombre des regies 
adoptees par les nations civilisees 
pour la protection de la vie des 
neutres et des non combattants 
en mer en temps de guerre les 
regies suivantes doivent etre con- 
siderees comme faisant deja par- 
tie du droit international: 

(1) Un navire de commerce ne 
peut etre saisi avant d 'avoir recu 
l'ordre, en vue de determiner son 
caractere, de se soumettre a la 
visite et a la perquisition. 

Un navire de commerce ne peut 
etre attaque que si, apres mise en 
demeure, il refuse de s'arreter 
pour se soumettre a la visite et a 
la perquisieion, ou si, apres saisie, 
il refuse de suivre la route qui lui 
est indiquee. 



ENFORCEMENT OF TREATY. 



331 



A merchant vessel must not 
be destroyed unless the crew 
and passengers have been first 
placed 1 in safety. 

(2) Belligerent submarines 
are not under any circum- 
stances exempt from the univer- 
sal rules above stated ; and if a 
submarine can not capture a 
merchant vessel in conformity 
with these rules the existing 
law of nations requires it to 
desist from attack and from 
seizure and to permit the mer- 
chant vessel to proceed unmo- 
lested. 

Article II. 

The Signatory Powers invite 
all other civilized Powers to 
express their assent to the fore- 
going statement of established 
law so that there may be a 
clear public understanding 
throughout the world of the 
standards of conduct by which 
the public opinion of the world 
is, to pass judgment upon future 
belligerents. 

Article III. 

The Signatory Powers, desir- 
ing to insure the enforcement 
of the humane rules of existing 
law declared by them with re- 
spect to attacks upon and the 
seizure and destruction of mer- 
chant ships, further declare 
that any person in the service 
of any Power who shall violate 
any of those rules, whether or 
not such person is under orders 
of a governmental superior, 
shall be deemed to have vio- 
lated the laws of war and shall 
be liable to trial and punish- 
ment as if for an act of piracy 



Un navire de commerce ne peut 
etre detruit que lorsque 1' equipage 
et les passagers ont 6te prealable- 
ment mis en surete. 

(2) Les sous-marins belligerants 
ne sont, en aucune circonstance, 
dispenses des regies universelles 
ci-dessus rappelees; au cas ou un 
sous-marin ne serait pas en mesure 
de capturer un navire de com- 
merce en respectant lesdites regies, 
il doit d'apres le droit des gens 
reconnu, renoncer a l'attaque ainsi 
qu'a la saisie et laisser le navire de 
commerce continuer sa route sans 
etre moleste\ 

Article II. 

Les Puissances signataires in- 
vitent toutes les autres Puissances 
civilisees a adherer a la reconnais- 
sance de ce droit etabli, de sorte 
qu'il y ait une entente publique 
universelle bien definie quant aux 
regies de conduite selon lesquelles 
l'opinion publique du monde ju- 
gera les belligerants de l'avenir. 



Article III. 

Les Puissances signataires, desi- 
reuses d'assurer l'execution des 
lois d'humanite deja reconnues et 
confirmees par elles relativement 
a l'attaque, a la saisie et a la des- 
truction des navires de commerce, 
declarent en outre que tout indi- 
vidu au service de quelque puis- 
sance que ce soit, agissant ou non 
sur l'ordre d'un superieur hierar- 
chique, qui violera l'une ou l'autre 
desdites regies, sera repute avoir 
viole les lois de la guerre et sera 
susceptible d'etre juge et puni 
comme s'il avait commis un acte 
de piraterie. II pourra etre mis 



332 



USE OF GAS. 



and may be brought to trial be- 
fore the civil or military au- 
thorities of any Power within 
the jurisdiction of which he 
may be found. 

Article IV. 

The Signatory Powers recog- 
nize the practical impossibility 
of using submarines as com- 
merce destroyers without vio- 
lating, as they were violated in 
the recent war of 1914^-1918, the 
requirements universally ac- 
cepted by civilized nations for 
the protection of the lives of 
neutrals and noncombatants, 
and to the end that the prohi- 
bition of the use of submarines 
as commerce destroyers shall 
be universally accepted as a 
part of the law of nations they 
now accept that prohibition as 
henceforth binding as between 
themselves and they invite all 
other nations to adhere thereto. 

Article V. 

The use in war of asphyxiat- 
ing, poisonous or other gases, 
and all analogous liquids, ma- 
terials or devices, having been 
justly condemned by the gen- 
eral opinion of the civilized 
world and a prohibition of such 
use having been declared in 
treaties to which a majority of 
the civilized Powers are 
parties. 

The Signatory Powers, to the 
end that this prohibition shall 
be universally accepted as a 
part of international law bind- 
ing alike the conscience and 
practice of nations, declare 
their assent to such prohibition, 



en jugement devant les autorites 
civiles et militaires de toute Puis- 
sance dans le ressort de 1'autorite 
de laquelle il sera trouve. 

Article IV. 

Les Puissances signataires recon- 
naissent qu'il est pratiquement 
impossible d'utiliser les sous- 
marins a la destruction du com- 
merce sans violer, ainsi qu'il a ete 
fait au cours de la guerre de 1914- 
1918, les principes universellement 
acceptes par les nations civilisees 
pour la protection- de la vie des 
neutres et des non combattants, 
et, dans le dessein de faire uni- 
versellement reconnaitre comme 
incorporee au droit des gens l'inter- 
diction d' employer les sous-marins 
a la destruction du commerce, con- 
viennent de se considerer comme 
jiees desormais entre elles par cette 
interdiction et invitent toutes les 
autres nations a adherer au present 
accord. 

Article V. 

L'emploi en temps de guerre des 
gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou simi- 
laires, ainsi que de tous liquides, 
matieres ou procedes analogues, 
ayant ete condamne a juste titre 
par 1' opinion universelle du monde 
civilise, et l'interdiction de cet 
emploi ayant ete formulee dans 
des traites auxquels le plus grand 
nombre des Puissances civilisees 
sont parties: 

Les Puissances signataires, dans 
le dessein de faire universellement 
reconnaitre comme incoiporee au 
droit des gens cette interdiction, 
qui s'impose egalement a la con- 
science et a la pratique des nations, 
declarent reconnaitre cette pro- 



RATIFICATION OF TREATY. 



333 



agree to be bound thereby as 
between themselves and invite 
all other civilized nations to ad- 
here thereto. 

Article VI. 

The present Treaty shall be 
ratified as soon as possible in 
accordance with the constitu- 
tional methods of the Signatory 
Powers and shall take effect on 
the deposit of all the ratifica- 
tions, which shall take place at 
Washington. 

The Government of the 
United States will transmit to 
all the Signatory Powers a cer- 
tified copy of the proces-verbal 
of the deposit of ratifications. 

The present Treaty, of which 
the French and English texts 
are both authentic, shall re- 
main deposited in the Archives 
of the Government of the 
United States, and duly certi- 
fied copies thereof will be trans- 
mitted by that Government to 
each of the Signatory Powers. 

Article VII. 

The Government of the 
United States will further 
transmit to each of the Non- 
Signatory Powers a duly certi- 
fied copy of the present Treaty 
and invite its adherence thereto. 

Any Non-Signatory Power 
may adhere to the present 
Treaty by communicating an 
Instrument of Adherence to the 
Government of the United 
States, which will thereupon 
transmit to each of the Signa- 
tory and Adhering Powers a 
certified copy of each Instru- 
ment of Adherence. 



hibition, conviennent de se con- 
siderer comme liees entre elles a 
cet egard et invitent toutes lea 
autres nations civilisees a adherer 
au present accord. 

Article VI. 

Le present Traite sera ratifle 
aussitot que possible par les Puis- 
sances signataires selon les pro- 
cedures constitutionnelles aux- 
quelles elles sont respectivement 
tenues. II prendra effet a la date 
du depot de toutes les ratifica- 
tions, depot qui sera effectue a 
Washington. Le Gouvernement 
des Etats-Unis remettra a toutes 
les Puissances signataires une ex- 
pedition authentique du proces- 
verbal de depot des ratifications. 

Le present Traite, dont les 
^extes francais et anglais feront foi, 
r estera depose dans les archives 
du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis; 
des expeditions authentiques en 
seront remises par ce Gouverne- 
ment a chacune des Puissances 
signataires. 

Article VII. 

Le Gouvernement des Etats- 
Unis fera parvenir ulterieurement 
a toutes les Puissances non signa- 
taires une expedition authen- 
tique du present Traite et les in- 
vitera a y donner leur adhesion. 

Toute Puissance non signataire 
pourra adherer au present Traite 
en faisant parvenir l'Instrument 
portant adhesion au Gouverne- 
ment des Etats-Unis, qui en trans- 
mettra une expedition authen- 
tique a chacune des Puissances 
signataires ou adherentee. 



334 



TREATY ON INSULAR DOMINIONS. 



In faith whereof, the above 
named Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present Treaty. 

Done at the City of Wash- 
ington, the sixth day of Feb- 
ruary, one thousand nine hun- 
dred and twenty-two. 



En foi de quoi les Plenipoten- 
tiaires sus-nommes ont signe le 
present traite. 

Fait a Washington, le six fevrier 
mil neuf cent vingt-deux. 



[L. S.] 


Chaeles Evans Hughes 






[L. S.] 


Henry Cabot Lodge 






[L. S.] 


Oscar W Underwood 






[L. S.] 


Elihu Root 






[L. S.] 


Arthur James Balfour 






[L. S.] 


Lee of Fareham. 






[L. S.] 


A. C. Geddes 








It. L. Borden. 


{L- 


S.] 




G. F. Pearce 


[L. 


S.] 




John W Salmond 


[L. 


S.] 




Arthur James Balfour 


[L. 


s.] 




V S Srinivasa Sastri 


[L. 


s.] 




A Saeraut 


[L. 


s.] 




Jusserand 


[L. 


s.] 




Carlo Schanzer 


[L- 


s.] 


[L. S.] 


V. Rolandi Ricci 






[L.S.] 


Luigi Albertini 






[L. S.] 


T. Kato 






[L.S.] 


K. Shidehara 






[L. S.] 


M. Hanihara 







(3) A TREATY BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, 
AND JAPAN, SIGNED DECEM- 
BER 13, 1921, RELATING TO 
THEIR INSULAR POSSESSIONS 
AND INSULAR DOMINIONS IN 
THE PACIFIC OCEAN. 



The United States of America, 
the British Empire, France and 
Japan, 

With a view to the preserva- 
tion of the general peace and 
the maintenance of their rights 
in relation to their insular pos- 
sessions and insular dominions 
in the region of the Pacific 
Ocean, 



(3) TRAITE ENTRE LES ETATS- 
UNIS D'AMERIQUE, L'EMPIRE 
BRITANNIQUE, LA FRANCE ET 
LE JAPON, SIGNE LE 13 DECEM- 
BRE 1921, RELATIVEMENT A 
LEURS POSSESSIONS INSULAIRES 
ET LEURS DOMINIONS INSU- 
LAIRES DANS LA REGION DE 
L'OCEAN PACIFIQUE. 

Les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, 
l'Empire Britannique, la France 
et le Japon, 

En vue de preserver la paix 
generale et de maintenir leurs 
droits touchant leurs possessions 
insulaires ainsi que leurs domi- 
nions insulaires dans la zone de 
TOcean Pacifique, 



NAMES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



335 



Have determined to conclude 
a Treaty to this effect and have 
appointed as their Plenipoten- 
tiaries : | 
The President of the United 
States of America : 

Charles Evans Hughes, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Oscar W. Underwood and 
Elihu Root, citizens of 
the United States ; 
His Majesty the King of the 
United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland and of the 
British Dominions beyond the 
Seas, Emperor of India : 

The Right Honourable 
Arthur James Balfour, 
O. M., M. P., Lord 
President of His Privy 
Council ; 
The Right Honourable 
Baron Lee of Fareham, 
G. B. E, K. C. B., First 
Lord of His Admiralty ; 
The Right Honourable 
Sir Auckland Campbell 
Geddes, K. C. B., His 
Ambassador Extraor- 
dinary and Plenipoten- 
tiary to the United 
States of America ; 
And 

for the Dominion of Canada : 
The Right Honourable 
Robert Laird Borden, 
G. C. M. G., K. G. ; 
for the Commonwealth of Aus- 
tralia : 

The Honourable George 
Foster Pearce, Minister 
of Defence ; 
for the Dominion of New Zea- 
land : 

Sir John William Sal- 
raond, K. C, Judge of 



Ont decide de conclure un traite 
a cet effet et ont designe pour 
leurs Plenipotentiaires, savoir: 

Le President des Etats-Unis 
d'Amerique: 

Charles Evans Hughes, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Oscar W. Underwood, 
Elihu Root, citoyens des 
Etats-Unis, 
Sa Majeste le Roi de Royaume- 
Uni de Grand e-Bretagne et d'lr- 
lande et des territoires britan- 
niques au-dela des mers, Empe- 
eur des Indes: 

Le Tres-Honorable Arthur 
James Balfour, 0. M., 
M. P., Lord President du 
Conseil du Roi; 

Le Tres-Honorable Baron 
Lee of Fareham, G. B. E., 
K. C. B., Premier Lord 
de l'Amiraute; 
^ Le Tres-Honorable Sir Auck - 
land Campbell Geddes, 
K. C. B., son Ambassa- 
deur Extraordinaire et 
Plenipotentiaire aux 
Etats-Unis d'Amerique; 



Et 



pour le Dominion du Canada: 
Le Tres-Honorable Robert 
Laird Borden, G. C. M. 
G., K. C; 
pour le Commonwealth d'Aus- 
tralie : 

L' Honorable George Fos- 
ter Pearce, Ministre de 
la Defense; 
pour le Dominion de la Nou- 
velle-Zelande: 

Sir John William Salmond, 
K. C, Juge a la Cour 



336 



NAMES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand ; 
for the Union of South Africa : 

The Right Honourable Ar- 
thur James Balfour, O. 
M., M. P.; 
for India : 

The Right Honourable 
Valingman Sankarana- 
rayana Srinivasa Sas- 
tri, Member of the In- 
dian Council of State ; 
The President of the French 
Republic : 

Mr. Rene Viviani, Dep- 
uty, Former President 
of the Council of Minis- 
ters ; 

Mr. Albert Sarraut, Dep- 
uty, Minister of the 
Colonies ; 

Mr. Jules J. Jusserand, 
Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Plenipotenti- 
ary to the United States 
of America, Grand 
Cross of the National 
Order of the Legion of 
Honour ; 
His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan : 

Baron Tomosaburo Kato, 
Minister for the Navy, 
Junii, a member of the 
First Class of the Im- 
perial Order of the 
Grand Cordon of the 
Rising Sun with the 
Paulownia Flower ; 

Baron Kijuro Shidehara, 
His Ambassador Extra- 
ordinary and Plenipo- 
tentiary at Washington, 
Joshii, a member of the 
First Class of the Im- 
perial Order of the Ris- 
ing Sun ; 



Supreme de Nouvelle- 
Z eland e; 
pour l'Union Sud-Africaine : 
Le Tres-Honorable Arthur 
James Balfour, O. M., 
M. P. 

pour l'lnde: 

Le Tres-Honorable Valing- 
man Sankaranarayana 
Srinivasa Sastri, Mem- 
bre du Conseil d'Etat de 
l'lnde; 
Le President de la Republique 
francaise : 
M. Rene Viviani, Depute, 
ancien President du Con- 
seil des Ministres, 

M. Albert Sarraut, De 
pute, Ministre des Colo- 
nies, 

M. Jules J. Jusserand, Am- 
bassadeur Extraordinaire 
et Plenipotentiaire pres le 
President des Etats-Unis 
d'Amerique, Grand'croix 
de l'Ordre National de la 
Legion d'honneur; 

Sa Majeste FEmpereur du Ja- 
pon: 

Le Baron Tomosaburo Kato, 
Ministre de la Marine, 
Junii, Membre de la Pre- 
miere Classe de l'Ordre 
Imperial du Grand Cordon 
du Soleil Levant avec la 
Fleur de Paulonia; 

Le Baron Kijuro Shidehara, 
Son Ambassadeur Extraor- 
dinaire etPlenipotentiaire 
a Washington, Joshii, Mem- 
bre de la Premiere Classe 
de l'Ordre Imperial du So- 
leil Levant; 



SCOPE OF TREATY. 



337 



Prince Iyesato Tokugawa, 
Junii, a member of the 
First Class of the Im- 
perial Order of the Ris- 
ing Sun ; 
Mr. Masanao Hanihara, 
Vice-Minister for For- 
eign Affairs, Jushii, a 
member of the Second 
Class of the Imperial 
Order of the Rising 
Sun ; 
Who, having communicated 
their Full Powers, found in good 
and due form, have agreed as 
follows : 

I. 

The High Contracting Parties 
agree as between themselves to 
respect their rights in relation 
to their insular possessions and 
insular dominions in the region 
of the Pacific Ocean. 

If there should develop be- 
tween any of the High Contract- 
ing Parties a controversy aris- 
ing out of any Pacific question 
and involving their said rights 
which is not satisfactorily set- 
tled by diplomacy and is likely 
to affect the harmonious accord 
now happily subsisting between 
them, they shall invite the other 
High Contracting Parties to a 
joint conference to which the 
whole subject will be referred 
for consideration and adjust- 
ment. 



II. 

If the said rights are threat- 
ened by the aggressive action of 
any other Power, the High Con- 



Le Prince Iyesato Toku- 
gawa, Junii, Membre de la 
Premiere Classe de l'Ordre 
Imperial duSoleil Levant; 

M. Masanao Hanihara, 
Vice-Ministre des Af- 
faires Etrangeres, Jushii, 
Membre de la Seconde 
Classe de l'Ordre Im- 
perial du Soleil Levant; 

Lesquels, apres avoir exchange 
leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en 
bonne et due forme, ont convenu 
des dispositions suivantes: 

I. 

Les Hautes Parties Contrac- 
tantes conviennent, en ce qui les 
concerne, de respecter leurs droits 
touchant leurs possessions insu- 
laires ainsi que leurs dominions 
insulaires dans la zone de 1' Ocean 
Pacifique. 

S'il venait a surgir entre cer- 
taines des Hautes Parties Con- 
tractantes un differend issu d'une 
question quelconque concernant 
le Pacifique et mettant en cause 
leurs droits ci-dessus vises, diffe- 
rend qui ne serait pas regie d'une 
facon satisfaisante par la voie 
diplomatique et qui risquerait de 
compromettre l'heureuse harmo- 
nie existant actuellement entre 
elles, ces Puissances devront in- 
viter les autres Parties Contrac- 
tantes a reunir dans une Con- 
ference qui sera saisie de 1'ensem- 
ble de la question aux fins d'exa- 
men et reglement. 

II. 

Au cas oil les droits ci-dessus 
vises seraient menaces par la con- 
duite agressive de toute autre 



338 



DURATION AND RATIFICATION 



tracting Parties shall communi- 
cate with one another fully and 
frankly in order to arrive at an 
understanding as to the most 
efficient measures to be taken, 
jointly or separately, to meet 
the exigencies of the particular 
situation. 

III. 

This Treaty shall remain in 
force for ten years from the 
time it shall take effect, and 
after the expiration of said 
period it shall continue to be in 
force subject to the right of any 
of the High Contracting Parties 
to terminate it upon twelve 
months' notice. 

IV. 

This Treaty shall be ratified 
as soon as possible in accord- 
ance with the constitutional 
methods of the High Contract- 
ing Parties and shall take effect 
on the deposit of ratifications, 
which shall take place at 
Washington, and thereupon the 
agreement between Great 
Britain and Japan, which was 
concluded at London on July 
13, 1911, shall terminate. The 
Government of the United 
States will transmit to all the 
Signatory Powers a certified 
copy of the proces-verbal of the 
deposit of ratifications. 

The present Treaty, in French 
and in English, shall remain de- 
posited in the Archives of the 
Government of the United 
States, and duly certified copies 
thereof will be transmitted by 
that Government to each of the 
Signatory Powers. 



Puissance, les Hautes Parties Con- 
tractantes devront entrer en com- 
munication entre elles de la 
maniere la plus complete et la 
plus franche, afin d'arriver a une 
entente sur les mesures les plus 
efficaces a prendre, conjointement 
ou separement, pour faire face 
aux necessites de la situation. 

III. 

Le present Traite produira ses 
effets pendant une duree de dix 
annees a dater du jour de sa mise 
en vigueur, et, a 1' expiration de 
la dite periode, continuera a pro- 
duire ses effets sous reserve du 
droit de chacune des Hautes 
Parties Contractantes d'y mettre 
fin sur preavis de douze mois. 

IV. 

Le present Traite sera ratifie 
aussitot que faire se pourra, con- 
formement aux methodes cons- 
titutionnelles des Hautes Parties 
contractantes; il entrera en vi- 
gueur des le depot des ratifications 
qui sera effectue a Washington; 
sur quoi, la Convention entre la 
Grande Bretagne et le Japon, con- 
clue a Londres le 13 Juillet 1911, 
prendra fin. Le Gouvernement 
des Etats-Unis remettra a chacune 
des Puissances signataires une 
copie certifiee conforme du proces- 
verbal de depot des ratifications. 



Le present Traite, en francais et 
en anglais, restera depose dans les 
archives du Gouvernement des 
Etats-Unis et des copies certifies 
conformes en seront remises par ce 
Gouvernement a chacune des 
Puissances Signataires. 



DECLARATION ON FOUR-POWER TREATY. 



339 



In faith whereof the above 
named Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present Treaty. 

Done at the City of Washing- 
ton, the thirteenth day of De- 
cember, One Thousand Nine 
Hundred and Twenty-One. 



En foi de quoi les Plenipoten- 
tiaires sus-nommes ont sign 6 le 
present Traite. 

Fait a Washington, le treize 
Decembre mil neuf cent vingt et 
un. 





Charles Evans Hughes 


[L. 


S.] 




Henry Cabot Lodge. 


[L. 


S.] 




Oscar W Underwood 


tL. 


S.] 




Elihu Root 


[L. 


S.J 




A M James Balfour 


[L. 


s.] 




Lee of Fare ham. 


[L. 


s.] 




A. C. Geddes 


[L- 


s.] 


[l. s/ 


R. L. Borden. 






[l. s/ 


G. F. Pearce 






[L. S. 


| John W Salmond 




' 


[L. s/ 


i A M James Balfour 






[l. s.; 


V S Srinivasa Sastri 




• 


[l. s. 


| Rene Viviani 






[l. s/ 


| A. Sarraut 






[l. s/ 


I Jusserand 






[l. s/ 


I T. Kato 






[l. s. 


| K. Shidehara. 






[l.js. 


| TOKUGAWA IYESATO 






[l. s. 


1 M. Hanihara 







(4) DECLARATION ACCOMPANY- 
ING THE ABOVE FOUR-POWER 
TREATY. 

In signing the Treaty this day 
between The United States of 
America, The British Empire, 
France and Japan, it is de- 
and intent of the Signatory 
clared to be the understanding 
Powers : 

1. That the Treaty shall apply 
to the Mandated Islands in the 
Pacific Ocean ; provided, how- 
ever, that the making of the 
Treaty shall not be deemed to 
be an assent on the part of The 
United States of America to the 
mandates and shall not preclude 
agreements between The United 



(4) DECLARATION ANNEXEE AU 
TRAITE CI-DESSUS DES QUATRE 
POUVOIRS. 

II est declare, au moment de 
signer ce jour le traite entre les 
Etats-Unis d'Amerique, l'Empire 
Britannique, la France et le 
Japon, que c'est la volonte et 
1 'intention des Puissances signa- 
taires: 

1. Que le traite s'appliquera 
aux lies sous mandat situees dans 
l'Ocean Pacifique; sous reserve 
cependant que la conclusion du 
traite ne pourra etre consideree 
comme impliquant l'assentiment, 
de la part des Etats-Unis d'Ame- 
rique, ~ aux mandats et n'em- 
pechera pas la conclusion, entre 



34-0 



SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY. 



States of America and the Man- 
datory Powers respectively in 
relation to the mandated islands. 



2. That the controversies to 
which the second paragraph of 
Article I refers shall not be 
taken to embrace questions 
which according to principles of 
international law lie exclusively 
within the domestic jurisdiction 
of the respective Powers. 

Washington, D. C, December 
13, 1921. 



les Etats-Unis d'Amerique et les 
Puissances mandataires respec- 
tivement, d'accords ayant trait 
aux lies sous mandat. 

2. Que ne seront pas comprises 
parmi les contestations visees au 
second paragraphe de Particle 
premier les questions qui, d'appres 
les principes du droit interna- 
tional, relevent exclusivement de 
la souverainete des Puissances 
respectives. 

Washington, le treize Decem- 
bre, dix-neuf cent vingt et un. 

Charles Evans Hughes 

Heney Cabot Lodge 

Oscar W Underwood 

Elihu Root 

A M James Balfour 

Lee of Fareham 

A. C. Geddes 

R. L. Borden. 

G. F. Pearce 

John W Salmond 

A M James Balfour 

V S Srinivasa Sastri 

Rene Viviani 

A Sarraut 

JUSSERAND 

T. Kato 

K. Shidehara 

TOKUGAWA IYESATO 

M. Hanihara 



(5) A TREATY BETWEEN THE 
SAME FOUR POWERS, SUPPLE- 
MENTARY TO THE ABOVE, 
SIGNED FEBRUARY 6, 1922. 



The United States of America, 
the British Empire, France and 
Japan have, through their re- 
spective Plenipotentiaries, 
agreed upon the following stipu- 
lations supplementary to the 
Quadruple Treaty signed at 
Washington on December 13, 
1921: 



(5) TRAITE ENTRE LES MEMES 
QUATRE POUVOIRS, SUPPLE- 
MENTAIRE AU TRAITE CI- 
DESSUS, SIGNfi LE 6 FFYRIER 
1922. 

Les Etats-Unis d'Amerique^ 
l'Empire Britannique, la France 
et le Japon ont convenu, par 
l'entremise de leurs Plenipoten- 
tiaires respectifs, d'ajouter la 
clause suivante au Traite signe 
entre les quatre Puissances a 
Washington le 13 decembre 1921. 



DEFINITION OF TERMS. 



341 



The term " insular posses- 
sions and insular dominions " 
used in the aforesaid Treaty 
shall, in its application to 
Japan, include only Karafuto 
(or the Southern portion of the 
island of Sakhalin), Formosa 
and the Pescadores, and the 
. islands under the mandate of 
Japan. 

The present agreement shall 
have the same force and effect 
as the said Treaty to which it 
is supplementary. 

The provisions of Article IV 
of the aforesaid Treaty of De- 
cember 13, 1921, relating to rati- 
fication shall be applicable to 
the present Agreement, which 
in French and English shall 
remain deposited in the Ar- 
chives of the Government of the 
United States, and duly certi- 
fied copies thereof shall be 
transmitted by that Govern- 
ment to each of the other Con- 
tracting Powers. 

In faith whereof the respec- 
tive Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present Agreement. 

Done at the City of Washing- 
ton, the sixth day of February, 
One Thousand Nine Hundred 
and Twenty-two. 



Les expressions "possessions 
insulaires" et "dominions insu- 
laires" employees dans le dit 
Traite ne s'appliquera, en ce qui 
concerne le Japon, qu'au Kara- 
futo (c'est-a-dire a la partie sud 
de l'ile de Sakhaline), a Formose 
et aux Pescadores, ainsi qu'aux 
iles placees sous le mandat du 
Japon . 

Le present accord aura meme 
force et valeur que le dit Traite 
dont il forme une clause supple- 
mentaire. 

Les dispositions touchant les 
ratifications, contenues dans Par- 
ticle IV du dit Traite du 13 de- 
cembre 1921, seront applicables' 
au present accord. Le texte, 
redige en francais et en anglais 
restera depose dans les archives 
du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis. 
Une expedition authentique en 
sera remise par ce Gouvernement 
a chacune des autres Puissances 
Contractantes. 

En foi de quoi, les Plenipo 
tentiaires des Puissances sus- 
nommees ont signe au present 
accord. 

Fait a Washington le six fe. 
vrier, mil nenf cent vingt-deux- 



Charles Evans Hughes 
Henry Cabot Lodge 
Oscar W Underwood 

[l. s.] Elihu Root 

[l. s.] Arthur James Balfour 

[l. s.] Lee of Fareham. 

[l. s.] A. C. Geddes 

[l. s.] R. L. Borden. 

[l. s.] G. F. Pearce 

[l. s.] John W S almond 



[L. S.] 
[L. S.] 

[r„ s.] 



342 



NINE-POWER TREATY. 



[l. s.] Aethtje James Balfoue 




[l. s.] V S Seinivasa 


Sastei 




A Saeeaut 




[l. s.] 


JUSSEBAND 




[l. s.] 


T. Kato 




[l. s.] 


K. Shidehaea 




[l. s.] 


M. Hanihaea 




[l. s.] 



(6) A TREATY BETWEEN ALL 
NINE POWERS RELATING TO 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES TO 
BE FOLLOWED IN MATTERS 
CONCERNING CHINA. 

The United States of Amer- 
ica, Belgium, the British Em- 
pire, China, France, Italy, Ja- 
pan, the Netherlands and Portu- 
gal : 

Desiring to adopt a policy 
designed to stabilize conditions 
in the Far East, to safeguard 
the rights and interests of 
China, and to promote inter- 
course between China and the 
other Powers upon the basis of 
equality of opportunity ; 

Have resolved to conclude a 
treaty for that purpose and to 
that end have appointed as 
their respective Plenipoten- 
tiaries : 

The President of the United 
States of America : 

Charles Evans Hughes, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Oscar W. Underwood, 
Elihu Root, 

citizens of the United 
States. 
His Majesty the King of the 
Belgians : 

Baron de Cartier de Mar- 
chienne, Commander of 
the Order of Leopold 
and of the Order of the 
Crown, His Ambassa- 



(6) TRAITfi ENTRE LES NEUF POU- 
VOIRS SIGNATAIRES, RELATIVE- 
MENT AUX PRINCIPES ET A LA 
POLITIQUE A SUIVRE CONCER- 
NANT LA CHINE. 

Les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, la 
Belgique, l'Empire Britannique, 
la Chine, la France, l'ltalie, le 
Japon, les Pays-Bas et le Por- 
tugal: 

Desireux d 'adopter une poli- 
tique de nature e stabiliser les 
conditions de l'Extreme Orient, 
a sauvegarder les droits et in- 
terets de la Chine et a developper 
les relations entre la Chine et les 
autres Puissances sur la base de 
Pegalite des chances; 

Ont decide de conclure un 
traite a cet effet et ont designe 
pour leurs plenipotentiaries res- 
pectifs: 

Le President des Etats-Unis 
d'Amerique: 

Charles Evans Hughes, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Oscar W. Underwood, 
Elihu Root, 

citoyens des Etats- 
Unis; 
Sa Majeste le Roi des Beiges: 

Le baron de Cartier de 
Marchienne, Comman- 
deur de l'Ordre de Leo- 
pold et de l'Ordre de la 
Couronne, Son Ambas- 



NA&ES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



343 



dor Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary at 
Washington ; 
His Majesty the King of the 
United Kingdom of Great Brit- 
ain and Ireland and of the 
British Dominions beyond the 
Seas, Emperor of India : 

The Right Honourable 
Arthur James Balfour, 
O. M., M. P., Lord Pres- 
ident of His Privy 
Council ; 
The Right Honourable 
Baron Lee of Fareham, 
G. B. E., K. C. B., First 
Lord of His Admiralty ; 
The Right Honourable 
Sir Auckland Camp- 
bell Geddes, K. C. B., 
His Ambassador Ex- 
traordinary and Pleni- 
potentiary to the 
United States of 
America ; 
and 

for the Dominion of Canada : 

The Right Honourable Sir 

Robert Laird Borden, 

G. C. M. G., K. C. ; 

for the Commonwealth of 

Australia : 

Senator the Right Hon- 
ourable George Foster 
Pearce, Minister for 
Home and Territories ; 
for the Dominion of New Zea- 
land : 

The Honourable Sir John 
William Salmond, K. C, 
Judge of the Supreme 
Court of New Zealand ; 
for the Union of South Africa : 
The Right Honourable 
Arthur James Balfour, 
O. M., M. P.; 



eadeur Extraordinaire et 
Plenipotentiaire k Wash- 
ington; 
Sa Majeste le Roi du Royaume- 
Uni de Grande-Bretagne et 
d'Irlande et des territoires britan- 
niques au dela des mers, Empe- 
reur des Indes: 

Le Tres-Honorable Arthur 
James Balfour, O. M., 
M. P., Lord President 
du Conseil du Roi; 

Le Tres-Honorable Baron 
Lee of Fareham, G. B. 
E., K. C. B., Premier 
Lord de l'Amiraute. 

Le Tres-Honorable Sir 
Auckland Campbell 

Geddes, K. C. B., Son 
Ambassadeur Extraor- 
dinaire et Plenipoten- 
tiaire aux Etats-Unis 
d'Amerique; 



et 



pour le Dominion du Canada: 
Le Tres-Honorable Sir Rob- 
ert Laird Borden, G. C. M. 
G.,K. C; 
pour le Commonwealth d'Aus- 
tralie: 

Le Tres-Honorable George 
Foster Pearce, Senateur, 
Ministre de l'lnterieur et 
des Territoires; 
pour le Dominion de la Nou- 
velle-Zelande: 
L'Honorable Sir John Wil- 
liam Salmond, K. C, 
Juge a la Cour Supreme 
de Nouvelle-Zelande; 
pour l'Union Sud-Africaine: 

Le Tres-Honorable Arthur 
James Balfour, 0. M. r 
M. P.; 



844 



NAMES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



for India: 

The Right Honourable 
Valingman Sankarana- 
rayana Srinivasa Sas- 
tri, Member of the In- 
dian Council of State; 
The President of the Republic 
of China : 

Mr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, 
Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipo- 
tentiary at Washing- 
ton ; 

Mr. V. K. Wellington Koo, 
Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipo- 
tentiary at London ; 

Mr. Chung - Hui Wang, 
former Minister of Jus- 
tice. 
The President of the French 
Republic : 

Mr. Albert Sarraut, Dep- 
uty, Minister of the 
Colonies ; 

Mr. Jules J. Jusserand, 
Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Plenipotenti- 
ary to the United 
States of America, 
Grand Cross of the Na- 
tional Order of the 
Legion of Honour ; 
His Majesty the King of 
Italy : 

The Honourable Carlo 
Schanzer, Senator of 
the Kingdom ; 

The Honourable Vittorio 
Rolandi Ricci, Senator 
of the Kingdom, His 
Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Plenipoten- 
tiary at Washington ; 

The Honourable Luigi Al- 
bertini, Senator of the 
Kingdom ; 



pour l'lnde: 

Le Tres-Honorable Valing- 
man Sankaranarayana 
Srinivasa Sastri, Membre 
du Conseil d'Etat de 
l'lnde: 
Le President de la Republique 
Chinoise : 

M. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, En- 
voye Extraordinaire et 
Ministre Plenipotentiaire 
a Washington; 

M. V. K. Wellington Koo, 
Envoye Extraordinaire et 
Ministre Plenipotentiaire 
a Londres; 

M. Chung-Hui Wang, An- 
cien Ministre de la Jus- 
tice; 
Le President de la Republique 
Francaise: 

M. Albert Sarraut, Depute, 
Ministre des Colonies; 

M. Jules J. Jusserand, Am- 
bassadeur Extraordinaire 
et Plenipotentiaire pres le 
President des Etats-Unis 
d'Amerique, Grand 
Croix de l'Ordre National 
de la Legion d'Honneur; 

Sa Majeste le Roi d'ltalie: 

L' Honorable Carlo Schanzer, 
Senateur du Royaume; 

L' Honorable Vittorio Ro- 
landi Ricci, Senateur du 
Royaume, Son Ambas- 
sadeur Extraordinaire et 
Plenipotentiaire a Wash- 
ington ; 

L'Honorable Luigi Alber- 
tini, Senateur du Roy- 
aume: 



NAMES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



345 



His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan : 

Baron Tomosaburo Kato, 
Minister for the Navy, 
Junii, a member of the 
First Class of the Im- 
perial Order of the 
Grand Cordon of the 
Rising Sun with the 
Paulownia Flower ; 

Baron Kijuro Shidehara, 
His Ambassador Ex- 
traordinary and Pleni- 
potentiary at Washing- 
ton, Joshii, a member 
of the First Class of 
the Imperial Order of 
the Rising Sun; 

Mr. Masanao Hanihara, 
Vice Minister for For- 
eign Affairs, Jushii, a 
member of the Second 
Class of the Imperial 
Order of the Rising 
Sun; 
Her Majesty the Queen of 
The Netherlands; 

Jonkheer Frans Beelaerts 
van Blokland, Her En- 
voy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipoten- 
tiary ; 

Jonkheer Willem Hen- 
drik de Beaufort, Min- 
i s t e r Plenipotentiary, 
Charge d' Affaires at 
Washington ; 
The President of the Portu- 
guese Republic: 

Mr. Jose Francisco de 
Horta Machado da 
Franca, Viscount d'Alte, 
Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipo- 
tentiary at Washington ; 



Sa Majesto PEmpereur du Ja- 
pon: 
Le Baron Tomosaburo Kato, 
Ministre de la Marine, 
Junii, Membre de la Pre- 
miere Classe de POrdre 
Imperial du Grand Cor- 
don du Soleil Levant avec 
la Fleur de Paulonia; 

Le Baron Kijuro Shidehara, 
Son Ambassadeur Extra- 
ordinaire et Plenipoten- 
tiaire a Washington, 
Joshii, Membre de la Pre- 
miere Classe de POrdre 
Imperial du Soleil Levant ; 

M. Masanao Hanihara, Vice- 
Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres, Jushii, Mem- 
bre de la Seconde Classe 
de POrdre Imperial du 
Soleil Levant; 

Sa Majeste la Reine des Pays- 
Bas: 

Le Jonkheer Frans Bee- 
laerts van Blokland, Son 
Envoye Extraordinaire et 
Ministre Plenipotentiaire ; 

Le Jonkheer Willem Hen- 
drik de Beaufort, Ministre 
Plenipotentiaire, Charge 
d' Affaires a Washington; 

Le President de la Republique 
Portugaise: 

M. Jose Francisco de Horta 
Machado da Franca, Vi- 
comte d'Alte, Envoye Ex- 
traordinaire et Ministre 
Plenipotentiaire a Wash- 
ington; 



25882—23- 



-23 



346 



PURPOSES OF TREATY. 



Mr. Ernesto Julio do Car- 
valho e Vasconcelos, 
Captain of the Portu- 
guese Navy, Technical 
Director of the Colonial 
Office. 
Who, having communicated 
to each other their full powers, 
found to be in good and due 
form, have agreed as follows : 

Article I. 

The Contracting Powers, other 
than China, agree: 

(1) To respect the sover- 
eignty, the independence, and 
the territorial and administra- 
tive integrity of China ; 

(2) To provide the fullest and 
most unembarrassed opportu- 
nity to China to develop and 
maintain for herself an effective 
and stable government ; 

(3) To use their influence for 
the purpose of effectually estab- 
lishing and maintaining the 
principle of equal opportunity 
for the commerce and industry 
of all nations throughout the 
territory of China ; 

(4) To refrain from taking 
advantage of conditions in China 
in order to seek special rights or 
privileges which would abridge 
the rights of subjects or citizens 
of friendly States, and from 
countenancing action inimical to 
the security of such States. 



Article II. 

The Contracting Powers agree 
not to enter into any treaty, 
agreement, arrangement, or un- 
derstanding, either with one 



M. Ernesto Julio de Car- 

valho e Vasconcelos, 

Capitaine de Vaisseau, 

Directeur Technique du 

Ministere des Colonies. 

lesquels, apres avoir echange 

leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en 

bonne et due forme, ont convenu 

des dispositions suivantes: 

Article I. 

Les Puissances Contractantes, 
autres que la Chine, conviennent: 

1) de respecter la souverainete 
et l'independance ainsi que l'in- 
tegrite territoriale et administra- 
tive de la Chine; 

2) d'offrir a la Chine, de la 
maniere la plus complete et la 
plus libre d'entraves, la possi- 
bilite de s'assurer les avantages 
permanents d'un Gouvernement 
stable et efficace; 

3) d'user de leur influence en 
vue d'etablir effectivement et de 
maintenir en application sur tout 
le territoire de la Chine Je principe 
de la chance egale pour le com- 
merce et i Industrie de toutes les 
nations; 

4) de s'abstenir de tirer avan- 
tage des circonstances en Chine 
pour rechercher des droits ou 
privileges speciaux susceptibles 
de porter atteinte aux droits des 
ressortissants d'Etats amis; elles 
s'abstiendront egalement de fa- 
voriser toute action constituant 
une menace pour la securite des 
dits Etats amis. 

Article II. 

Les Puissances Contractantes 
conviennenent de ne participer a 
aucun traite, accord, arrangement 
ou entente soit conclus entre elles, 



OPEN DOOR POLICY. 



347 



another, or, individually or col- 
lectively, with any Power or 
Powers, which would infringe or 
impair the principles stated in 
Article I. 

Article III. 

With a view to applying more 
effectually the principles of the 
Open Door or equality of oppor- 
tunity in China for the trade 
and industry of all nations, the 
Contracting Powers, other than 
China, agree that they will not 
seek, nor support their respec- 
tive nationals in seeking. 

(a) any arrangement which 
might purport to establish in 
favour of their interests any 
general superiority of rights 
with respect to commercial or 
economic development in any 
designated region of China ; 

(b) any such monopoly or 
preference as would deprive the 
nationals of any other Power of 
the right of undertaking any 
legitimate trade or industry In 
China, or of participating with 
the Chinese Government, or with 
any local authority, in any cate- 
gory of public enterprise, or 
which by reason of its scope, 
duration or geographical extent 
is calculated to frustrate the 
practical application of the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunity. 

It is understood that the fore- 
going stipulations of this Article 
are not to be so construed as to 
prohibit the acquisition of such 
properties or rights as may be 
necessary to the conduct of a 
particular commercial, indus- 
trial, or financial undertaking or 



soit conclus separement ou col- 
Icctivement avec une ou plusieurs 
Puissances, qui porterait atteinte 
ou contreviendrait aux principes 
declares dans F Article I. 

Article III. 

En vue d'appliquer avec plus 
d'efficacite les principes de la 
porte ouverte ou de la chance 
egale pour le commerce et 1'indus- 
trie de toutes les nations en Chine, 
les Puissances Contractantes au- 
tres que la Chine, conviennent de 
ne pas rechercher, ni aider leurs 
ressortissants a rechercher: 

a) la conclusion d'accords qui 
tendraient a etablir en faveur de 
leurs interets des droits generaux 
superieurs a ceux des autres tou- 
ch ant le developpement commer- 
cial ou economique dans une 
region determinee de la Chine; 

b) l'obtention de monopoles ou 
traitements preferentiels de na- 
ture a priver les ressortissants 
d' autres puissances du droit d'en- 
treprendre en Chine toute fcrme 
legitime de commerce ou d'indus- 
trie, ou de participer, soit avec le 
Gouvernement chinois, soit avec 
des autorites locales, a toute cate- 
gorie d'entreprises ayant un carac- 
tere public, ou de monopoles ou 
traitements preferentiels qui, en 
raison de leur portee, de leur 
duree ou de leur 6tendue terri- 
toriale, seraient de nature a cons- 
tituer en pratique une violation 
du principe de la chance egale. 
Toutefois le present accord ne 
devra pas etre interprets comme 
interdisant l'acquisition de tels 
biens ou droits qui pourraient etre 
necessaires soit a la conduite 
d'entreprises particulieres com- 
merciales, industrielles ou finan- 



348 



SPHERES OF INFLUENCE. 



to the encouragement of inven- 
tion and research. 

China undertakes to be guided 
by the principles stated in the 
foregoing stipulations of this 
Article in dealing with applica- 
tions for economic rights and 
privileges from Governments 
and nationals of all foreign 
countries, whether parties to the 
present Treaty or not. 

Article IV. 

The Contracting Powers agree 
not to support any agreements 
by their respective nationals 
with each other designed to 
create Spheres of Influence or 
to provide for the enjoyment 
of mutually exclusive oppor- 
tunities in designated parts of 
Chinese territory. 

Article V. 

China agrees that, throughout 
the whole of the railways in 
China, she will not exercise or 
permit unfair discrimination of 
any kind. In particular there 
shall be no discrimination what- 
ever, direct or indirect, in re- 
spect of charges or of facilities 
on the ground of the nation- 
ality of passengers or the coun- 
tries from which or to which 
they are proceeding, or the ori- 
gin or ownership of goods or 
the country from which or to 
which they are consigned, or 
the nationality or ownership of 
the ship or other means of 
conveying such passengers or 
goods before or after their 
transport on the Chinese Rail- 
ways. 



cieres, soit a 1' encouragement des 
inventions et recherches. 

La Chine s* engage a adopter les 
principes ci-dessus comme guides 
en ce qui concerne la suite a don- 
ner aux demandes de droits et 
privileges economiques de la part 
de Gouvernements ou ressortis- 
sants de tous pays etrangers, qu'ils 
soient ou non parties au present 
Traite. 

Article IV. 

Les Puissances Contractantes 
conviennent de ne pas donner leur 
appui a des accords, qui seraient 
conclus entre leurs ressortissants 
respectifs avec 1'intention d'eta- 
blir au profit de ces derniers des 
spheres d'influence ou de leur 
assurer des avantages exclusifs 
dans des regions determinees du 
territoire chinois. 

Article V. 

La Chine s' engage -a n'appli- 
quer ni permettre, sur aucun 
chemin de fer chinois, aucune 
discrimination injuste d' aucune 
sorte. En particulier il ne devra 
pas y avoir de discrimination 
directe ou indirecte, quelle qu'elle 
soit, en matiere de tarifs ou de 
facilites de transports, qui soit 
basee: soit sur la nationalite des 
voyageurs, soit sur le pays dont ils 
viennent, soit sur celui de leur 
destination, soit sur l'origine des 
marchandises, le caractere des 
proprietaries, ou le pays de prove- 
nance ou de destination; soit sur la 
nationalite du navire ou sur le 
caractere du proprietaire du navire 
ou de tout autre moyen de trans- 
port a l'usage des voyageurs ou des 
marchandises, employe* avant ou 
apres le transport par un chemin 
de fer chinois. 



TO RESPECT CHINA'S RIGHTS. 



349 



The Contracting Powers, other 
than China, assume a corre- 
sponding obligation in respect 
of any of the aforesaid rail- 
ways over which they or their 
nationals are in a position to 
exercise any control in virtue of 
any concession, special agree- 
ment or otherwise. 

Aeticle VI. 

The Contracting Powers, 
other than China, agree fully to 
respect China's rights as a neu- 
tral in time of war to which 
China is not a party; and 
China declares that when she is 
a neutral she will observe the 
obligations of neutrality. 



Aeticle VII. 

The Contracting Powers agree 
that, whenever a situation 
arises which in the opinion of 
any one of them involves the 
application of the stipulations 
of the present Treaty, and ren- 
ders desirable discussion of such 
application, there shall be full 
and frank communication be- 
tween the Contracting Powers 
concerned. 

Aeticle VIII. 

Powers not signatory to the 
present Treaty, which have 
Governments recognized by the 
Signatory Powers and which 
have treaty relations with 
China, shall be invited to ad- 
here to the present Treaty. To 
this end the Government of the 
United States will make the 
necessary communications to 



Les autres Puissances Contrac- 
tantes prennent de leur cote* un 
engagement similaire concernant 
les lignes chinoises de chemin de 
fer sur lesquelles soit elles-m&nes, 
soit leurs ressortissants seraient en 
mesure d'exercer le controle en 
vertu d'une concession, d'un 
accord special ou autrement. 

Aeticle VI. 

Les Puissances Contractantes, 
autres que la Chine, conviennent 
de respecter pleinement, au cours 
des guerres auxquelles la Chine ne 
participerait pas, les droits de 
cette derniere en tant que puis 
sance neutre; la Chine, d'autre 
part, declare que lorsqu'elle sera 
neutre, elle observera les regies 
de la neutralite. 

Aeticle VII. 

Les Puissances Contractantes 
conviennent que, dans le cas ou 
une situation se produirait qui 
dans l'opinion de l'une ou l'autre 
d'entre elles, comporterait l'ap- 
plication des stipulations du pre- 
sent Traite et en rendrait la dis- 
cussion desirable, les Puissances 
Contractantes en cause echange- 
ront a cet egard de franches et 
completes communications. 

Aeticle VIII. 

Les Puissances non-signataires 
au present traite, dont le Gouver- 
nement est reconnu par les Puis- 
sances signataires et qui ont des 
relations par traites avec la Chine, 
eeront invitees a adherer audit 
present traite\ Dans ce but le 
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis 
fera aux Puissances non-signa- 
taires les communications neces- 



350 



RATIFICATION PROVISIONS. 



nonsignatory Powers and will 
inform the Contracting Powers 
of the replies received. Ad- 
herence by any Power shall 
become effective on receipt of 
notice thereof by the Govern- 
ment of the United States. 

Abticle IX. 

The present Treaty shall be 
ratified by the Contracting 
Powers in accordance with their 
respective constitutional meth- 
ods and shall take effect on the 
date of the deposit of all the 
ratifications, which shall take 
place at Washington as soon as 
possible. The Government of 
the United States will transmit 
to the other Contracting Powers 
a certified copy of the proces- 
verbal of the deposit of ratifica- 
tions. 

The present Treaty, of which 
the French and English texts 
are both authentic, shall remain 
deposited in the archives of the 
Government of the United 
States, and duly certified copies 
thereof shall be transmitted by 
that Government to the other 
Contracting Powers. 

In faith whereof the above- 
named Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present Treaty. 

Done at the City of Washing- 
ton the Sixth day of February 
One Thousand Nine Hundred 
and Twenty-two. 



saires; il informera les Puissances 
Contractantes des reponses re- 
vues. L'adhesion de toute Puis- 
sance deviendra effective des re- 
ception des notifications faites a 
eet egard par le Gouvernement 
des Etats-Unis. 

Article IX. 

Le present Traite fiera ratine 
par les Puissances Contractantes 
selon les procedures constitution- 
nelles auxquelles ell9s snt res- 
pectivement tenues. II prendra 
effet a la date du despot de toutes 
les ratifications, depdt qui sera 
effectue a Washington, le plus 
tot qu'il sera possible. Le Gou- 
vernement des Etats-Unis remet- 
tra aux autres Puissances Con- 
tractantes une copie authentique 
du proces-verbal de depot des 
ratifications. 

Le present Traite, dont les 
textes francais et anglais feront 
foi, restera depose dans les ar- 
chives du Gouvernement des 
Etats-Unis; des expeditions au- 
thentiques en seront remises par 
ce Gouvernement aux autres Puis- 
sances Contractantes. 

En foi de quoi, les Plenipoten- 
tiaries sus-nommes ont signe le 
present Traite. 

Fait a Was&ington le six fevrier 
mil neuf cent vingt-deux. 



Charles Evans Hughes [l. s.] 

Henry Cabot Lodge [e. s.] 

Oscar W. Underwood. [e. s.] 

Elihu Root [i* s.] 
Baron de Cartier de Marchienne [l. s.] 

Arthur James Balfour [l- s.] 

Lee or Fairham [J- s.] 



CHINESE CUSTOMS TREATY. 



351 







A. C. Geddes 


[L. 


s.] 






R. L. Borden 


[L- 


s.] 






G. F. Pearce 


[L. 


s.] 






John W. Salmond 


[L. 


s.] 






Arthur James Balfour 


[L. 


s.] 






V. S. Srinivasa Sastri 


[L. 


s.] 


[L. 


s.] 


Sao-Ke Alfred Sze 






[L. 


s.] 


V. K. Wellington Koo 






[I.. 


s.] 


Chung-Hui Wang 






[L- 


s.] 


A. Sarraut 






[L- 


s.] 


JUSSERAND 






[L- 


s.] 


C\RLO SCHANZER 






[L. 


s.] 


V. ROLANDI RlCCT 






[L. 


s.] 


Luigi Albertini 










T. Kato 


[L. 


s.] 






K. Shidehara 


[L. 


s.] 






M. Hanihara 


[L. 


s.] 






Beelaerts van Blokland 


[L- 


s.] 






W. de Beaufort 


[L. 


s.] 






Alte 


[L. 


s.] 






Ernestino de Vasconcellos 


[L. 


s.] 



(7) A TREATY BETWEEN THE 
NINE POWERS RELATING TO 
CHINESE CUSTOMS TARIFFS. 

The United States of Amer- 
ica, Belgium, the British Em- 
pire, China, France, Italy, Ja- 
pan, The Netherlands and Por- 
tugal : 

With a view to increasing the 
revenues of the Chinese Gov- 
ernment, have resolved to con- 
clude a treaty relating to the 
revision of the Chinese customs 
tariff and cognate matters, and 
to that end have appointed as 
their Plenipotentiaries : 

The President of the United 
States of America: 

Charles Evans Hughes, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Oscar W. Underwood, 
Elihu Root, 

citizens of the United 
States ; 



(7) TRAITE ENTRE les NEUF 
POUVOIRS RELATIVEMENT au 
TARIF DES DOUANES CHI- 
NOISES. 

Les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, la 
Belgique, l'Empire Britannique, 
la Chine, la France, l'ltalie, le 
Japon, les Pays-Bas et le Portugal: 

Dans le but d'accroitre les re- 
venus du Gouvernement chinois, 
ont convenu de conclure un traite 
touchant la revision du tarif des 
douanes chinoises et autres ma- 
tieres connexes, et ont designe 
pour leurs plenipotentiaires: 

Le President des Etats-Unis 
d'Amerique: 

Charles Evans Hughes, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Oscar W. Underwood, 
Elihu Root, 

citoyens des Etats- 
Unis; 



352 



NAMES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



His Majesty the King of the 
Belgians : 

Baron de Cartier de Mar- 
chienne, Commander of 
the Order of Leopold 
and of the Order of the 
Crown, His Ambassa- 
dor Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary at 
Washington ; 
His Majesty the King of the 
United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland and of the 
British Dominions beyond the 
Seas, Emperor of India: 

The Right Honourable 
Arthur James Balfour, 
O. M., M. P., Lord 
President of His Privy 
Council ; 
The Right Honourable 
Baron Lee of Fareham, 
G. B. E., K. C. B., First 
Lord of His Admiralty ; 
The Right Honourable 
Sir Auckland Campbell 
Geddes, K. C. B., His 
Ambassador Extraor- 
dinary and Plenipoten- 
tiary to the United 
States of America ; 
and 

for the Dominion of Canada : 
The Right Honourable 
Sir Robert Laird Bor- 
den, G. C. M. G., K. C. ; 
for the Commonwealth of 
Australia : 

Senator the Right Hon- 
ourable George Foster 
Pearce, Minister for 
Home and Territories; 
for the Dominion of New Zea- 
land: 

The Honourable Sir John 
William Salmond, K. 0., 



Sa Majeste le Roi des Beiges: 

Le Baron de Cartier de 
Marchienne, Comman- 
deur de l'Ordre de Leo- 
pold et de l'Ordre de la 
Couronne, Son Ambassa- 
deur Extraordinaire et 
Plenipotentaire a Wash- 
ington; 

Sa Majeste le Roi du Royaume- 
Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'lr- 
lande et des territoires britan- 
niques au dela des mers, Em- 
pereur des Indes: 

Le Tres-Honorable Arthur 
James Balfour, 0. M., 
M. P., Lord President 
du Conseil du Roi; 

Le Tres-Honorable Baron 
Lee of Fareham, G. B. E., 
K. C. B., Premier Lord de 
l'Amiraute. 

Le Tres-Honorable Sir Auck- 
land Campbell Geddes, 
K.C.B., Son Ambassadeur 
Extraordinaire et Pleni- 
potentiaire aux Etats- 
Unis d'Amerique; 



et 



pour le Dominion du Canada: 
Le Tres-Honorable Sir Rob- 
ert Laird Borden, G. C. M. 
G., K. (p.; 
pour le Commonwealth d'Aus- 
tralie: 
Le Tres-Honorable George 
Foster Pearce, Senateur, 
Ministre de l'lnterieur et 
des Territoires; 
pour le Dominion de la Nou- 
velle-Zelande: 

L'Honorable Sir John Wil- 
liam Salmond, K. C, Juge 



NAMES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



353 



Judge of the Supreme 
Court of New Zealand ; 
for the Union of South Af- 
rica: 

The Right Honourable 
Arthur James Balfour, 
O. M., M. P. ; 
for India : 

The Right Honourable 
Valingman Sankarana- 
rayana Srinivasa Sas- 
tri, Member of the In- 
dian Council of State; 
The President of the Republic 
of China: 

Mr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, 
Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipo- 
tentiary at Washing- 
ton; 

Mr. V. K. Wellington 
Koo, Envoy Extraor- 
dinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary at Lon- 
don; 

Mr. Chung-Hui Wang, 
former Minister of Jus- 
tice; 
The President of the French 
Republic : 

Mr. Albert Sarraut, Dep- 
uty, Minister of the 
Colonies ; 

Mr. Jules J. Jusserand, 
Ambassador Extraor- 
dinary and Plenipoten- 
tiary to the United 
States of America, 
Grand Cross of the Na- 
tional Order of the Le- 
gion of Honour ; 
His Majesty the King of 
Italy: 

The Honourable Carlo 
Schanzer, Senator of 
the Kingdom; 



h, la Cour Supreme de 
Nouvelle Zelande; 
pour l'Union Sud-Africaine: 

Le Tres-Honorable Arthur 
James Balfour, 0. M., 
M. P.; 
pour l'lnde: 

Le Tres-Honorable Valing- 
man Sankaranarayana Sri- 
nivasa Sastri, Membre du 
* Conseil d'Etat de l'lnde; 

Le President de la Republique 
Chinoise: 

M. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, En- 
voye Extraordinaire et 
Ministre Plenipotentiaire 
a Washington; 

M. V. K. Wellington Koo, 
Envoye Extraordinaire et 
Ministre Plenipotentiaire 
a Londres; 

M. Chung-Hui Wang, ancien 
Ministre de la Justice; 

Le President de la Republique 
Francaise: 

M. Albert Sarraut, Depute, 
Ministre des Colonies; 

M. Jules J. Jusserand, Am- 
bassadeur Extraordinaire 
et Plenipotentiaire pres 
le President des Etats- 
Unis d'Amerique, Grand 
Croix de l'Ordre National 
de la Legion d'Honneur; 

Sa Majeste le Roi d'ltalie: 

L'Honorable Carlo Schan- 
zer, Senateur du Roy- 
aume; 



354 



NAMES OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 



The Honourable Vittorio 
Rolandi Ricci, Senator 
of the Kingdom, His 
Ambassador Extraor- 
dinary and Plenipoten- 
tiary at Washington ; 

The Honourable Luigi 
Albertini, Senator of 
the Kingdom ; 
His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan : 

Baron Tomosaburo Kato, 
Minister for the Navy, 
Junii, a member of the 
First Class of the Im- 
perial Order of the 
Grand Cordon of the 
Rising Sun with the 
Paulownia Flower; 

Baron Kijuro Shidehara, 
His Ambassador Ex- 
traordinary and Pleni- 
potentiary at Washing- 
ton Joshii, a member of 
the First Class of the 
Imperial Order of the 
Rising Sun ; 

Mr. Masanao Hanihara, 
Vice Minister for For- 
eign Affairs, Jushii, a 
member of the Second 
Class of the Imperial 
Order of the Rising Sun ; 
Her Majesty the Queen of The 
Netherlands : 

Jonkheer Frans Beelaerts 
van Blokland, Her En- 
voy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotenti- 
ary; 

Jonkheer Willem Hendrik 
de Beaufort, Minister 
Plenipotentiary, Charge 
d'Affaires at Washing- 
ton; 



L'Honorable Vittorio Ro- 
landi Ricci, Senateur du 
Royaume, Son Ambassa- 
deur Extraordinaire et 
Plenipotentiaire a Wash- 
ington; 

L'Honorable Luigi Alber- 
tini, Senateur du Roy- 
aume; 
Sa Majeste l'Empereur du 
Japon: 

Le Baron Tomosaburo Kato, 
Ministre de la Marine, 
Junii, Membre de la Pre- 
miere Classe de l'Ordre 
Imperial du Grand Cordon 
du Soleil Levant avec la 
Fleur de Paulonia; 

Le Baron Kijuro Shidehara, 
Son Ambassadeur Extra- 
ordinaire et Plenipoten- 
tiaire a Washington, 
Joshii, Membre de la Pre- 
miere Classe de l'Ordre 
Imperial du Soleil Levant; 

M. Massanao Hanihara, 
Vice-Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres, Jushii, Mem- 
bre de la Seconde Classe 
de l'Ordre Imperial du 
Soleil Levant; 
Sa Majeste la Reine des Pays- 
Bas: 

Le Jonkheer Frans Bee- 
laerts van Blokiand, Son 
Envoye Extraordinaire et 
Ministre Plenipotentiaire; 

Le Jonkheer Willem Hen- 
drik de Beaufort, Ministre 
Plenipotentiaire Charge 
d'Affaires a Washington; 



REVISION OF DUTIES. 



355 



The President of the Portu- 
guese Republic: 

Mr. Jose Francisco de 
Horta Machado da 
Franca, Viscount d'Alte, 
Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipo- 
tentiary at Washington ; 
Mr. Ernesto Julio de Car- 
valho e Vasconcelos, 
Captain of the Portu- 
guese Navy, Technical 
Director of the Colonial 
Office; 
Who, having communicated to 
each other their full powers, 
found to be in good and due 
form, have agreed as follows : 

Article I. 

The representatives of the Con- 
tracting Powers having adopted, 
on the fourth day of February, 
1922, in the City of Washington, 
a Resolution, which is appended 
as an Annex to this Article, with 
respect to the revision of Chin- 
ese Customs duties, for the pur- 
pose of making such duties 
equivalent to an effective 5 per 
centum ad valorem, in accord- 
ance with existing treaties con- 
cluded by China with other na- 
tions, the Contracting Powers 
hereby confirm the said Resolu- 
tion and undertake to accept the 
tariff rates fixed as a result of 
such revision. The said tariff 
rates shall become effective as 
soon as possible but not earlier 
than two months after publica- 
tion thereof. 

ANNEX. 

With a view to providing ad- 
ditional revenue to meet the 
Deeds of the Chinese Govern- 



Le President de la Republique 
Portugaise: 

M. Jose Francisco de Horta 
Machado da Franca, 
Vicomte d'Alte, Envoye 
Extraordinaire et Minis- 
tre Plenipotentiaire a 
Washington ; 
M. Ernesto Julio de Car- 
valho e Vasconcelos, Capi- 
taine de Vaisseau, Direo 
teur Technique du Minis- 
tere des Colonies; 

lesquels, apres avoir echange 
leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en 
bonne et due forme, ont convenu 
des dispositions suivantes: 

Article I. 

Les representants des Puissan- 
ces Contractantes ayant adopte" 
le 4 fevrier 1922 a Washington la 
resolution annexee au present 
article au sujet de la revision du 
tarif des douanes chinoises, afin 
que le taux des droits soit equi- 
valent a 5% effectif ad valorem, 
comme il est prevu dans les 
traites existant entre la Chine et 
les autres pays, les Puissances 
Contractantes declarent confirmer 
ladite resolution et s'engagent a 
accepter les taux resultant de 
cette revision qui entreront en 
vigueur aussitot que possible 
apres l'expiration d'un delai de 
deux mois apres leur publication* 



ANNEXE. 

En vue de creer des revenue 
additionnels destines & faire face 
aux besoins du Gouvernement 



356 



REVISION COMMISSION. 



rnent, the Powers represented 
at this Conference, namely the 
United States of America, Bel- 
gium, the British Empire, China, 
France, Italy, Japan, The Neth- 
erlands, and Portugal agree : 

That the customs schedule of 
duties on imports into China 
adopted by the Tariff Revision 
Commission at Shanghai on De- 
cember 19, 1918, shall forthwith 
be revised so that the rates of 
duty shall be equivalent to 5 per 
cent, effective, as provided for in 
the several commercial treaties 
to which China is a party. 

A Revision Commission shall 
meet at Shanghai, at the earliest 
practicable date, to effect this 
revision forthwith and on the 
general lines of the last revision. 

This Commission shall be com- 
posed of representatives of the 
Powers above named and of rep- 
resentatives of any additional 
Powers having Governments at 
present recognized by the Powers 
represented at this Conference 
and who have treaties with 
China providing for a tariff on 
imports and exports not to ex- 
ceed 5 per cent, ad valorem and 
who desire to participate 
therein. 

The revision shall proceed as 
rapidly as possible with a view 
to its completion within four 
months from the date of the 
adoption of this Resolution by 
the Conference on the Limita- 
tion of Armament and Pacific 
and Far Eastern Questions. 

The revised tariff shall be- 
come effective as soon as pos- 
sible but not earlier than two 



chinois, les Puissances represen- 
tees a la Conference, a savoir: les 
Etats-Unis d'Amerique, la Bel- 
gique, FEmpire Britannique, la 
Chine, la France, Fltalie, leJapon, 
les Pays-Bas et le Portugal sont 
convenues de ce qui suit: 

Le tarif des droits de douane a 
importation en Chine adopte le 
19 decembre 1918 a Shanghai par 
la Commission de Revision du 
Tarif sera immediatement revise 
afin que le taux des droits soit 
equivalent a 5% effectif ad va- 
lorem, comme il est prevu dans 
divers traites commerciaux aux- 
quels la Chine est partie. 

Une Commission de revision se 
reunira a Shanghai a une date 
aussi rapproehee que possible 
pour effectuer cette revision sans 
retard et suivant les lignes gene- 
rates de la derniere revision. 

Cette Commission se composera 
de representants des Puissances 
precitees et de representants de 
toutes autres Puissances desirant 
sieger dans cette Commission dont 
le Gouvernement est actuelle- 
ment reconnu par les Puissances 
participant a la presente Con- 
ference et dont les traites avec 
la Chine comportent un tarif 
d'importation et d'exportation 
ne devant pas depasser b% ad 
valorem. 

La revision se fera aussi rapide- 
ment que possible de maniere a 
etre terminee dans les quatre 
mois qui suivront la date de 
l'adoption de la dite resolution 
par la Conference de Washington. 

Le tarif revise entrera en vi- 
gueur aussitot que possible apres 
1' expiration d'un delai de deux 
mois consecutifs a la publication 



SPECIAL CONFERENCE. 



357 



months after its publication by 
the Revision Commission. 

The Government of the United 
States, as convener of the pres- 
ent Conference, is requested 
forthwith to communicate the 
terms of this Resolution to the 
Governments of Powers not 
represented at this Conference 
but who participated in the Re- 
vision of 1918, aforesaid. 

Abticle II. 

Immediate steps shall be 
taken, through a Special Con- 
ference, to prepare the way for 
the speedy abolition of likin and 
for the fulfillment of the other 
conditions laid down in Article 
VIII of the Treaty of Septem- 
ber 5th, 1902, between Great 
Britain and China, in Articles 
IV and V of the Treaty of Oc- 
tober 8th, 1903, between the 
United States and China, and 
in Article I of the Supplemen- 
tary Treaty of October 8th, 
1903, between Japan and China, 
with a view to levying the sur- 
taxes provided for in those 
articles. 

The Special Conference shall 
be composed of representatives 
of the Signatory Powers, and of 
such other Powers as may de- 
sire to participate and may ad- 
here to the present Treaty, in 
accordance with the provisions 
of Article VIII, in sufficient 
time to allow their representa- 
tives to take part. It shall 
meet in China within three 
months after the coming into 
force of the present Treaty, on 
a day and at a place to be desig- 
nated by the Chinese Govern- 
ment. 



dudit tarif par la Commission de 
Revision. 

Le Gouvernement des Etats- 
Unis qui a convoque la presente 
Conference est invite en cette 
qualite a communiquer imme- 
diatement les termes de la pre- 
sente resolution aux Gouverne- 
ments des Puissances qui, quoi- 
que non representees a la dite 
Conference, ont participe a la 
revision du tarif de 1918. 

Article II. 

Une Conference speciale sera 
chargee de prendre immediate- 
ment les mesures necessaires en 
vue de preparer l'abolition, dans 
le plus bref delai, des likins, ainsi 
que la realisation des autres con- 
ditions raises par l'article VIII idu 
traite entre la Grande-Bretagne 
et la Chine du 5 septembre 1902 
et par les articles IV et V du traite 
du 8 octobre 1903 entre les Etats- 
Unis et la Chine et par l'article I 
du traite supplementaire du 8 
octobre 1903 entre le Japon et la 
Chine, a la perception des sur- 
taxes prevues auxdits articles. 



La Conference speciale sera 
composee de representants tant 
des Puissances signataires que de 
celles qui, desirant participer aux 
travaux de cette Conference, ad- 
hereraient au present Traite con- 
formement aux dispositions de 
l'article VIII en temps utile pour 
que leurs representants soient en 
mesure de prendre part & ces tra- 
vaux. Elle se reunira en Chine 
dans les trois mois apres 1' entree 
en vigueur du present Traite, au 
lieu et a la date qui seront fixes 
par le Gouvernement chinois. 



358 



FURTHER REVISIONS. 



Article III. 

The Special Conference pro- 
vided for in Article II shall con- 
sider the interim provisions to 
be applied prior to the abolition 
of likin and the fulfillment of 
the other conditions laid down 
in the articles of the treaties 
mentioned in Article II; and it 
shall authorize the levying of a 
surtax on dutiable imports as 
from such date, for such pur- 
poses, and subject to such con- 
ditions as it may determine. 

The surtax shall be at a uni- 
form rate of 2\ per centum ad 
valorem, provided, that in case 
of certain articles of luxury 
which, in the opinion of the 
Special Conference, can bear a 
greater increase without unduly 
impeding trade, the total sur- 
tax may be increased but may 
not exceed 5 per centum ad 
valorem. 

Article IV. 

Following the immediate re- 
vision of the customs schedule 
of duties on imports into China, 
mentioned in Article I, there 
shall be a further revision 
thereof to take effect at the 
expiration of four years fol- 
lowing the completion of the 
aforesaid immediate revision, 
in order to ensure that the cus- 
toms duties shall correspond to 
the ad valorem rates fixed by 
the Special Conference provided 
for in Article II. 

Following this further revi- 
sion there shall be, for the same 
purpose, periodical revisions of 
the customs schedule of duties 
on imports into China every 



Article III. 

La Conference speeiale prevue 
a l'article II etudiera les dispo- 
sitions provisoires a appliquer 
jusqu'a l'abolition des likins et 
la realisation des autres conditions 
stipulees aux articles des traites 
mentionnes a Particle II; elle au- 
torisera la perception d'une sur- 
taxe sur les importations soumises 
aux droits. La Conference de- 
cidera a partir de quelle date ; 
pour quelles destinations et dans 
quelles conditions cette surtaxe 
sera percue. 

La surtaxe sera fixee a un taux 
uniforme de 2^% ad valorem, 
sauf pour certains articles de luxe 
susceptibles, d'apres la Confe- 
rence speeiale, de supporter sans 
que cela constitue une entrave 
serieuse au commerce une aug- 
mentation plus elevee. Dans ce 
dernier cas, la surtaxe pourra etre 
plus elevee sans depasser toute 
fois 5% ad valorem. 

Article IV. 

La revision immediate du tarif 
des droits de douane a l'importa- 
tion en Chine, prevue a l'article I 
sera suivie d'une nouvelle revision 
qui portera effet a 1' expiration 
d'une periode de 4 annees a partir 
de l'achevement de la revision 
immediate prevue ci-dessus, de 
facon a assurer que les droits de 
douane correspondront effective- 
ment aux taux ad valorem fixe 
par la Conference speeiale prevue 
a l'article II. 

Apres cette nouvelle revision et 
dans le meme but defini ci-dessus, 
des revisions periodiques du tarif 
des droits de douane a l'importa- 
tion en Chine auront lieu tous les 



UNIFORMITY OF RATES. 



359 



seven years, in lieu of the de- 
cennial revision authorized by 
existing treaties with China. 

In order to prevent delay, any 
revision made in pursuance of 
this Article shaU be effected in 
accordance with rules to be pre- 
scribed by the Special Confer- 
ence provided for in Article II. 

Article V. 

In all matters relating to cus- 
toms duties there shall be effec- 
tive equality of treatment and 
of opportunity for all the Con- 
tracting Powers. 

Article VI. 

The principle of uniformity 
in the rates of customs duties 
levied at all the land and mari- 
time frontiers of China is here- 
by recognized. The Special 
Conference provided for in Ar- 
ticle II shall make arrange- 
ments to give practical effect to 
this principle ; and it is author- 
ized to make equitable adjust- 
ments in those cases in which a 
customs privilege to be abol- 
ished was granted in return for 
some local economic advantage. 



In the meantime, any increase 
in the rates of customs duties 
resulting from tariff revision, 
or any surtax hereafter imposed 
in pursuance of the present 
Treaty, shall be levied at a uni- 
form rate ad valorem at all 
land and maritime frontiers of 
China. 

Article VII. 

The charge for transit passes 
shall be at the rate of 1\ per 
centum ad valorem until the 



sept ans. Ces revisions remplace- 
ront les revisions decennales pre- 
vues par les traites actuels avec 
la Chine. 

En vue d'eviter des retards, les 
revisions prevues au present arti- 
cle seront effectuees selon des 
regies a determiner par la Con- 
ference speciale de Particle II. 

Article V. 

Pour toutes questions relatives 
aux droits de douane, il y aura 
egalite absolue de traitement et 
de chances pour toutes les Puis- 
sances Contractantes. 

Article VI. 

Le principe de l'uniformite des 
droits de douane percus sur toutes 
les frontieres terrestres ou mari- 
times de la Chine est reconnu. 
La Conference speciale prevue a 
l'article II sera chargee d'arreter 
les dispositions necessaires a la 
mise en application de ce prin- 
cipe. Elle aura le pouvoir d'auto- 
riser tels ajustements qui pa- 
raitraient equitables dans les cas 
ou le droit preferential a abolir 
avait ete consenti comme con- 
trepartie de quelque avantage 
economique se referant a des 
considerations locales. 

Dans l'intervalle tous releve- 
ments du taux des droits de 
douane ou surtaxes imposees a 
l'avenir en application du present 
traite, seront percus a, un taux 
uniforme ad valorem sur toutes 
frontieres terrestres ou maritimes 
de la Chine. 

Article VII. 

Jusqu'au moment ou les me- 
sures visees a l'article II seront 
entrees en vigueur, le taux des 



360 



ADHESION OF OTHER POWERS. 



arrangements provided for by 
Article II come into force. 

Article VIII. 

Powers not signatory to the 
present Treaty whose Govern- 
ments are at present recognized 
by the Signatory Powers, and 
whose present treaties with 
China provide for a tariff on 
imports and exports not to ex- 
ceed 5 per centum ad valorem, 
shall be invited to adfiere to 
the present Treaty. 

The Government of the United 
States undertakes to make the 
necessary communications for 
this purpose and to inform the 
Governments of the Contracting 
Powers of the replies received. 
Adherence by any Power shall 
become effective on receipt of 
notice thereof by the Govern- 
ment of the United States. 

Article IX. 

The provisions of the present 
Treaty shall override all stipu- 
lations of treaties between 
China and the respective Con- 
tracting Powers which are in- 
consistent therewith, other than 
stipulations according most 
favored nation treatment. 

Article X. 

The present Treaty shall be 
ratified by the Contracting 
Powers in accordance with their 
respective constitutional meth- 
ods and shall take effect on the 
date of the deposit of all the 
ratifications, which shall take 
place at Washington as soon as 
possible. The Government of 
the United States will transmit 
to the other Contracting Powers 



permis de transit sera fixe a 2\% 
ad valorem. 

Article VIII. 

Les Puissances non signataires 
au present Traite, dont le Gou- 
vernement est actuellement re- 
connu par les Puissances signa- 
taires et dont les traites actuels 
avec la Chine prevoient un tarif a 
l'importation et a l'exportation ne 
depassant pas 5% ad valorem, 
seront invites a adherer au dit 
traite. 

Le Gouvernement des Etats- 
Unis s' engage a faire les com- 
munications necessaires a cet 
effet et a informer les Gouverne- 
ments des Puissances Contrac- 
tantes des reponses rescues. L'ad- 
hesion des Puissances deviendra 
effective des reception des noti- 
fications par le Gouvernement 
des Etats-Unis. 

Article IX. 

Les dispositions du present 
traite prevaudront sur toutes 
stipulations contraires des traites 
entre la Chine et les Puissances 
Contractantes, a l'exception des 
stipulations comportant le bene- 
fice du traitement de la nation la 
plus favorisee. 

Article X. 

Le present traite sera ratifie 
par les Puissances Contractantes 
selon les procedures constitution- 
nelles auxquelles elles sont res- 
pectivement tenues. II prendra 
effet a la date du depot de toutes 
les ratifications, depot qui sera 
effectue a Washington le plus tot 
qu'il sera possible. Le Gouverne- 
ment des Etats-Unis remettra aux 
autres Puissances Contractantes 



SIGKATORIES. 



361 



a certified copy of the proces- 
verbal of the deposit of ratifica- 
tions. 

The present Treaty, of which 
the French and English texts 
are both authentic, shall remain 
deposited in the archives of the 
Government of the United 
States, and duly certified copies 
thereof shall be transmitted by 
that Government to the other 
Contracting Powers. 

In faith whereof the above- 
named Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present Treaty. 

Done at the City of Washing- 
ton the sixth day of February, 
One Thousand Nine Hundred 
and Twenty-two. 



une copie authentique du proces 
verbal de depot des ratifications. 

Le present traite, dont les 
textes francais et anglais feront 
foi, restera depose dans les 
archives du Gouvernement des 
Etats-Unis; des expeditions au- 
thentiques en seront remises "par 
ce Gouvernement aux autres 
Puissances Contractantes. 

En foi de quoi les Plenipoten- 
tiaries sus-nommes ont signe le 
present Traite. 

Fait a Washington le six fe 
vrier mil neuf cent vingt-deux. 



[l. s. 
[l. s. 
[l. s. 
[l. s. 
[l. s. 
[l. s. 
[l. s. 
[l. s. 



[l. s. 
[l. s. 
[l. s. 
[l. s. 
[l. s. 
[l. s. 
[l. s. 
25882 



Charles Evans Hughes 
Henry Cabot Lodge : "■':■■' 
Oscar W. Underwood 
Elihu Root 

Baron de Carter de Marchienne 
Arthur James-3alfour 
Lee of Fareham 
A. C. Geddes 
R. L. Borden 
G. F. Pearce 
John W. Salmond 
Arthur James Balfour 
V. S. Srinivasa Sastri 
Sao-Ke Alfred. Sze 
V. K. Wellington Koo 
Chung-Hui Wang 
A. Sarraut 
Jusserand 
Carlo Schanzer 
V. Rolandi Ricci 
Luigi Albertini 
T. Kato 
K. Shidehara 
M. Hanihara 
Beelaerts van Blokland 
W. de Beaufort 
Alte 

Ernesto de Vasconcellos 
-23 24 



[L. 


S.] 


[L. 


S.] 


[L. 


s.] 


[L. 


s.] 


[L. 


s.] 



[l. s 
[l. s 
[l. s 
[l. s 
[l. s. 
[l. s 
[l. s 
[l. s 



■' ■ . • 



362 



RESOLUTIONS. 



RESOLUTIONS. 



NO. 1. RESOLUTION FOR A COM- 
MISSION OF JURISTS TO CON- 
SIDER AMENDMENT OF LAWS 
OF WAR. 

The United States of America, 
the British Empire, France, 
Italy and Japan have agreed : — 

I. That a Commission com- 

posed of not more than, 
two members represent- 
ing each of the above- 
mentioned Powers shall 
be constituted to con- 
sider the following ques- 
tions : — 

(a) Do existing rules of 
International Law ade- 
quately cover new 
methods of attack or 
defense resulting from 
the introduction or de- 
velopment, since the 
Hague Conference of 
1907, of new agencies of 
warfare? 

(b) If not so, what changes 
in the existing rules 
ought to be adopted in 
consequence thereof as 
a part of the law of 
nations? 

II. That notices of appoint- 

ment of the members of 
the Commission shall be 
transmitted to the Gov- 
ernment of the United 
States of America within 
three months after the 
adjournment of the pres- 
ent Conference, which 
after consultation with 
the Powers concerned 
will fix the day and place 
for the meeting of the 
Commission. 



RESOLUTIONS. 

NO. 1. RESOLUTION ETABLISSANT 
UNE COMMISSION DE JURISTES 
POUR ETUDIER LES MODIFI- 
CATIONS 1 APPORTER AUX LOIS 
DE LA GUERRE. 

Les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, 

l'Empire Britannique, la France, 

l'ltalie et le Japon, ont decide que: 

I. Une Commission, composee 

au plus de deux membres 

repre sentant chacune des 

Puissances precitees, sera 

institute pour etudier les ques- 

tionssuivantes: 



(a) Les lots actuelles du droit 
international regissent- 
elles d'une facon ade- 
quate les nouvelles me- 
thodes d'attaque ou de de- 
fense resultant de Intro- 
duction ou du developpe- 
ment de nouveaux engins 
de guerre, depuis la Con- 
ference de la Paix de 1907? 
(6) Dans le cas contraire, 
quels changements aux 
lois actuelles doivent etre 
.adoptes en consequence, 
comme une partie du 
droit des gens? 
II. Les notifications de nomina- 
tion des membres de la Com- 
mission seront transmises, 
dans les trois mois qui sui- 
vront rajournement de la pre- 
sente Conference, au Gou- 
vernement des Etats - Unis 
d'Amerique qui, apres Con- 
sultation avec les Puissances 
int^ressees, fixera le lieu et la 
date de la reunion de la Com- 
mission. 



COMMISSION OF JURISTS. 



363 



III. That the Commission 
shall be at liberty to re- 
quest assistance and ad- 
vice from experts in In- 
ternational Law and in 
land, naval and aerial 
warfare. 

IV. That the Commission 
shall report its conclu- 
sions to each of the Pow- 
ers represented in its 
membership. 

Those Powers shall there- 
upon confer as to the accept- 
ance of the report and the 
course to be followed to secure 
the consideration of its recom- 
mendations by the other civil- 
ized Powers. 

Adppted by the Conference on 
the Limitation of Armament, at 
the Sixth Plenary Session, 
February 4th, 1922. 

NO. 2. RESOLUTION LIMITING 
JURISDICTION OF COMMISSION 
OF JURISTS PROVIDED IN 
RESOLUTION NO. 1. 

Resolved, That it is not the 
intention of the Powers agree- 
ing to the appointment of a 
Commission to consider and re- 
port upon the rules of Inter- 
national Law respecting new 
agencies of warfare that the 
Commission shall review or re- 
port upon the rules or declara- 
tions relating to submarines or 
the use of noxious gases and 
chemicals already adopted by 
the Powers in this conference. 



Adopted by the Conference on 
the Limitation of Armament at 
the Sixth Plenary Session, Feb- 
ruary 4th, 1922. 



III. La Commission sera Ubre 
de demander aide et conseil 
aux experts en droit interna- 
tional et en guerre terrestre, 
naval et aerveime. 



IV. La Commission adressera un 
rapport de ses decisions a cha- 
cune des Puissances qui en 
sont membres. 

Ces Puissances se concerteront 
ensuite sur 1' acceptation du rap- 
port et sur la methode a suivre 
pour assurer 1' etude de ses recom- 
mandations par les autres Puis- 
sances civilisees. 

Adoptee, par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
sixieme seance pleniera, le 4 i&~ 
vrier 1922. 

NO. 2. RESOLUTION LIMITANT LA 
JURISDICTION DE LA COMMIS- 
SION DE JURISTES COMPRISE 
DANS LA RESOLUTION NO. 1. 

II est decide qu'en convenant de 
nommer une Commission charged 
d'examiner et de faire rapport sur 
les lois inter nationales de la guerre 
applicables aux nouveaux pro- 
cedes de guerre, les Puissances 
n'ont pas eu l'intention de charger 
cette Commission de soumettre a 
son examen et de faire rapport sur 
les regies ou declarations visant les 
sous-marins ou l'emploi des gaz et 
produits chimiques, telles qu'elles 
ont deja ete adoptees par lesdites 
Puissances au cours de la presente 
Conference. ' 

Adoptee par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
sixieme stance pleniere, le 4 fe* 
vrier 1922. 



364 



SALES OF SHIPS. 



NO. 3. RESOLUTION REGARDING 
THE SALE OF SHIPS BEFORE 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
TREATY LIMITING NAVAL AR- 
MAMENT. 

It should therefore be re- 
corded in the minutes of the 
Subcommittee and of the full 
conference that the Powers sig- 
natory of the Treaty of Naval 
Limitation regard themselves 
in honor bound not to sell any 
ships between the present date 
and the ratification of the 
Treaty, when such sale would 
be a breach of Article XVIII. 



Adopted by the Conference 
on Limitation of Armament at 
the Sixth Plenary Session, Feb- 
ruary 4, 1922. 

NO. 4. RESOLUTION REGARDING 
A BOARD OF REFERENCE FOR 
FAR EASTERN QUESTION. 

The representatives of the 
Powers assembled at the present 
Conference at Washington, to- 
wit; 

The United States of America, 
Belgium, the British Empire, 
China, France, Italy, Japan, The 
Netherlands and Portugal: 

Desiring to provide a proced- 
ure for dealing with questions 
that may arise in connection 
with the execution of the provi- 
sions of Articles III and V of 
the Treaty to be signed at Wash- 
ington on February 6th, 1922, 
with reference to their general 
policy designed to stabilize con- 
ditions in the Far East, to safe- 
guard the rights and interests 
of China, and to promote inter- 



NO, 3. RESOLUTION CONCERNANT 
LA VEN1E DE NAVIRES AVANT 
LA RATIFICATION DU TRAlTlS 
LIMITANT LES ARMEMENTS 
NAVALS. 

II faut done consigner dans le 
compte rendu de la Sous-Commis- 
sion et dans le proces- verbal de la 
Conference Pleniere, la declara- 
tion que les Puissances Signataiies 
du Traite de Limitation Navale 
se considerent engagees sur l'hon- 
neur a ne pas vendre de navires 
dans la periode qui s'ecoulera 
entre la presente date et celle de 
la ratification du Traite, durant 
laquelle une telle vente serait une 
infraction a l'article XVIII. 

Adoptee par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
sixieme seance pleniere, le 4 
fevrier 1922. 

NO. 4. RESOLUTION ETABLISSANT 
UN COMITE CONSULTATIF POUR 
LES QUESTIONS D'EXTREME 
ORIENT. 

Les representants des Puissances 
assembles a la Conference de 
Washington, a savoir: Les Etats- 
Unis d'Amerique, la Belgique, 
1' Empire Britannique, la Chine, 
la France, l'ltalie, le Japon, les 
Pays-Bas et le Portugal: 

Desireux d'instituer une pro- 
cedure pour traiter des questions 
soulevees par 1' execution des dis- 
positions des articles III et V du 
Traite qui doit etre signe a Wash- 
ington, le 6 fevrier 1922, sur la 
politique generale de ces Puis- 
sances touchant la stabilisation des 
conditions de l'Extreme Orient, 
la sauvegarde des droits et interets 
de la Chine et le developpement 
des relations entre cette derniere 



EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA. 



365 



course between China and the 
other Powers upon the basis of 
equality of opportunity ; 

Resolve that there shall be 
established in China a Board of 
Reference to which any ques- 
tions arising in connection with 
the execution of the aforesaid 
Articles may be referred for In- 
vestigation and report. 

The Special Conference pro- 
vided for in Article II of the 
Treaty to be signed at Washing- 
ton on February 6th, 1922, with 
reference to the Chinese Cus- 
toms Tariff, shall formulate for 
the approval of the Powers con- 
cerned a detailed plan for the 
constitution of the Board. 

Adopted by the Conference on 
the Limitation of Armament at 
the Sixth Plenary Session Febru- 
ary 4th, 1922. 

NO. 5. RESOLUTION REGARDING 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
IN CHINA. 

The representatives of the 
Powers hereinafter named, par- 
ticipating in the discussion of 
Pacific and Far Eastern ques- 
tions in the Conference on the 
Limitation of Armament, to wit, 
the United States of America, 
Belgium, the British Empire, 
France, Italy, Japan, the Neth- 
erlands, and Portugal, — 

Having taken note of the fact 
that in the Treaty between 
Great Britain and China dated 
September 5, 1902, in the Treaty 
between the United States of 
America and China dated Octo- 
ber 8, 1903, and in the Treaty 
between Japan and China dated 
October 8, 1903, these several 
Powers have agreed to give every 



et les autres Puissances sur la base 
de Pegalit6 des chances; 

Conviennent qu'il sera cree' en 
Chine un Comite Consultatif au- 
quel pourront etre renvoyees, a 
fins d'enquete et de rapport, 
toutes questions touchant l'exe- 
cution des articles precites. 

La Conference speciale preVue 
a Particle II du Traite qui doit 
etre signe le 6 fevrier 1922 sur le 
tarif des douanes chinoises, sera 
chargee de presenter a l'approba- 
tion des Puissances interessees un 
projet detaille d' organisation dudit 
Comite Consultatif. 

Adoptee par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
sixieme seance pleniere, le 4 
fevrier 1922. 

NO. 5. RESOLUTIONS CONCER- 
NANT L'EXTERRITORIALITE EN 
CHINE. 

Les representants des Puissances 
ci-apres mentionnees, qui pren- 
nent part a la discussion des ques- 
tions du Pacifique et de 1' Ex- 
treme Orient a la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements, a 
savoir: les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, 
la Belgique, l'Empire Britan- 
nique, la France, l'ltalie, le 
Japon, les Pays-Bas et le Portugal: 

Considerant que par le Traite* 
entre la Grande-Bretagne et la 
Chine en date du 5 septembre 1902, 
par le Traite entre les Etats-Unis 
et la Chine en date du 8 octobre 
1903, et par le Traite entre le Japon 
et la Chine de la meme date, ces 
diverses Puissances se sont en- 
gagers a accorder toute assistance 
au Gouvernement chinois pour 



366 



COMMISSION ON EXTRATERRITORIALITY. 



assistance towards the • attain- 
ment by the Chinese Govern- 
ment of its expressed desire to 
reform its judicial system and 
to bring it into accord with that 
of Western nations, and have 
declared that they are also 
" prepared to relinquish extra- 
territorial rights when satisfied 
that the state of the Chinese 
laws, the arrangements for their 
administration, and other con- 
siderations warrant " them in so 
doing; 

Being sympathetically dis- 
posed towards furthering in this 
regard the aspiration to which 
the Chinese delegation gave ex- 
pression on November 16, 1921, 
to the effect that " immediately, 
or as soon as circumstances will 
permit, existing limitations upon 
China's political, jurisdictional 
and administrative freedom of 
action are to be removed " ; 

Considering that any determi- 
nation in regard to such action 
as might be appropriate to this 
end must depend upon the as- 
certainment and appreciation of 
complicated states of fact in 
regard to the laws and the judi- 
cial system and the methods of 
judicial administration of China, 
which this Conference is not in 
a position to determine ; 

Have resolved 

That the Governments of the 
Powers above named shall es- 
tablish a Commission (to which 
each of such Governments shall 
appoint one member) to inquire 
into the present practice of ex- 
traterritorial jurisdiction in 
China, and into the laws and 
the judicial system and the 
methods of judicial administra- 



qu'il puisse realiser le desir par 
lui exprime de reformer son organi- 
sation judiciaire et de la mettre en 
harmonie avec celle des nations 
occidentals, et que les Puissances 
se sont declarers egalemenf'pretes 
a renoncer a leurs droits d'exterri- 
torialite aussitot qu'elles seront 
convaincues que Fetat de la legis- 
lation chinoise, les mesures d' ap- 
plication administrative et autres 
considerations leur permettent de 
le faire " ; 

Disposees dans un esprit de 
sympathie a satisfaire a cet egard 
\ea aspirations exprimees, le 16 
novembre 1921, par la Delegation 
chinoise a l'effet que "immediate- 
ment ou des que les circonstances 
le permettront, les restrictions 
actuellement apportees a la liberte 
d'action de la Chine en matiere 
politique, juridictionnelle et admi- 
nistrative seront supprimees " ; 

Estimant que toute decision a 
prendre au sujet des mesures qui 
seraient de nature a atteindre ce 
but doit dependre de la verifica- 
tion et de l'appreciation d'un etat 
de faits complexes, en ce qui con- 
cerne la legislation, l'organisation 
et les methodes d' administration 
judiciaire en Chine, que la Con- 
ference n'est pas en mesure de 
determiner; 

Ont decide ce qui suit: 

Les Gouvernements des Puis- 
sances precitees institueront une 
Commission (pour laquelle chaque 
Puissance designera un repre- 
sentant) pour ouvrir une enquete 
sur les pratiques actuelles de juri- 
diction exterritoriale en Chine, sur 
la legislation, l'organisation judi- 
ciaire et les methodes d' adminis- 
tration judiciaire en Chine, en vue 



WORK OF COMMISSION. 



367 



tion of China, with a view to 
reporting to the Governments of 
the several Powers above named 
their findings of fact in regard 
to these matters, and their 
recommendations as to such 
means as they may find suit- 
able to improve the existing 
conditions of the administration 
of justice in China, and to as- 
sist and further the efforts of 
the Chinese Government to 
effect such legislation and judi- 
cial reforms as would warrant 
the several Powers iu relin- 
quishing, either progressively 
or otherwise, their respective 
rights of extraterritoriality; 

That the Commission herein 
contemplated shall be consti- 
tuted within three months after 
the adjournment of the Confer- 
ence in accordance with de- 
tailed arrangements to be here- 
after agreed upon by the Gov- 
ernments of the Powers above 
named, and shall be instructed 
to submit its report and recom- 
mendations within one year 
after the first meeting of the 
Commission ; 

That each of the Powers 
above named shall be deemed 
free to accept or to reject all 
or any portion of the recommen- 
dations of the Commission here- 
in contemplated, but that in 
no case shall any of the said 
Powers make its acceptance of 
all or any portion of such 
recommendations either directly 
or indirectly dependent on the 
granting by China of any spe- 
cial concession, favor, benefit or 
immunity, whether political or 
economic. 



de signaler aux Gouvernements 
des xli verses Puissances precipes 
leurs constatations de fait en ces 
matieres, et de leur rGcommander 
les moyens que la Commission 
pourrait juger convenables pour 
ameliorer les conditions actuelles 
de 1' administration de la justice 
en Chine, pour aider et encourager 
les efforts par le Gouvernement 
chinois en vue d'introduire des 
mesures legislatives et des refor- 
mes judiciaires qui justifieraient 
1' abandon, soit progresSif, soit sous 
toute autre forme, par les diverses 
Puissances, de leurs droits respec- 
tifs d'exterritorialite; 

La Commission dont il s'agit 
devra etre constitute dans les trois 
mois qui suivront la cloture de la 
Conference, en conformite avec les 
arrangements de detail a etre ulte- 
rieurement arretes d'accord entre 
les Gouvernements des Puissances 
precitees, et elle recevra pour 
instruction d' avoir a deposer son 
rapport et ses recommandations 
dans l'annee qui suivra la pre- 
miere seance de la Commission; 

Chacune des Puissances pre- 
citees sera considered comme libre 
d' accepter ou de rejeter tout ou 
partie des conclusions de la Com- 
mission envisagee, mais dans au- 
cun cas une quelconque desdites 
Puissances ne pourra faire de- 
pendre son acceptation de tout ou 
partie de ces conclusions, soit 
directement, , soit indirectement, 
de 1' octroi par la Chine de conces- 
sions speciales, traitement de 
faveur, privileges ou immunites 
quelconques, dans l'ordre poli- 
tique ou economique. 



368 



ADDITIONAL RESOLUTIONS. 






ADDITIONAL RESOLUTION. 

That the non-signatory Pow- 
ers, having by treaty extrater- 
ritorial rights in China* may 
accede to the resolution affect- 
ing extraterritoriality and the 
administration of justice in 
China by depositing within 
three months after the adjourn- 
ment of the Conference a writ- 
ten notice of accession with 
the Government of the United 
States for communication by it 
to each of the signatory Powers. 



ADDITIONAL RESOLUTION. 

That China, having taken 
note of the resolutions affect- 
ing the establishment of a Com- 
mission to investigate and, re- 
port upon extraterritoriality 
and the administration of jus- 
tice in China, expresses its 
satisfaction with the sympa- 
thetic disposition of the Powers 
hereinbefore named in regard 
to the aspiration of the Chinese 
Government to secure the abo- 
lition of extraterritoriality in 
China, and declares its inten- 
tion to appoint a representa- 
tive who shall have the right to 
sit as a member of the said 
Commission, it being understood 
that China shall be deemed free 
to accept or to reject any or all 
of the recommendations of the 
Commission. Furthermore, 
China is prepared to cooperate 
in the work of this Commission 
and to afford to it every pos- 
sible facility for the successful 
accomplishment of its tasks. 



RESOLUTION SUPPLEMENTAIRE. 

Les Puissances non-signataires 
ayant, par traite, des droits 
d'exterritorialite en Chine pour- 
ront acceder a la Resolution con- 
eernant le regime d'exterritorialite 
et 1' administration de la justice en 
Chine, en notifiant par ecrit au 
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis leur 
accession dans un delai de trois 
mois a dater de la cloture de cette 
Conference. II appartiendra au 
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d' A- 
merique de communiquer cette 
accession a chacune des Puissances 
signataires. 

RESOLUTION SUPPLEMENTAIRE. 

La Chine, ayant pris note des 
Resolutions en vue de la creation 
d'une Commission chargee de 
proceder a une enquete et de 
presenter un rapport sur le regime 
d'exterritorialite et 1' administra- 
tion de la justice en Chine, ex- 
prime sa satisfaction des disposi- 
tions sympathiques des Puissances 
interessees touchant le desir du 
Gouvernement chinois d'obtenir 
1' abolition des droits d'exterri- 
torialite en Chine, declare son in- 
tention de nommer un represen- 
tant qui aura le droit de sieger en 
qualite de membre de la Commis- 
sion, etant entendu que la Chine 
sera libre d' accepter ou de rejeter, 
tout ou partie des recommanda- 
tions de ladite Commission. La 
Chine est pr6te en outre, a cooperer 
aux travaux de cette Commission 
et a faciliter, par tous les moyens 
possibles, le succes de sa tache. 



POSTAL AGENCIES IN CHINA. 



369 



Adopted by the Conference on 
the Limitaflttti of Armament at 
the Fourth Plenary Session, De- 
cember 10, 1921. 

NO. 6. RESOLUTION REGARDING 
FOREIGN POSTAL AGENCIES 
IN CHINA. 

A. Recognizing the justice of 
the desire expressed by the Chi- 
nese Government to secure the 
abolition of foreign postal agen- 
cies in China, save or except in 
leased territories or as other- 
wise specifically provided by 
treaty, it is resolved : . 

(1) The four Powers having 

such postal agencies 
agree to their abandon- 
ment subject to the fol- 
lowing conditions : 

(a) That an efficient Chi- 

nese postal service is 
maintained ; 

(b) That an assurance is 

given by the Chinese 
Government that 
they contemplate no 
change in the present 
postal administration 
so far as the status 
of the foreign Co- 
Director General is 
concerned. 

(2) To enable China and the 

Powers concerned to 
make the necessary dis- 
positions, this arrange- 
ment shall come into 
force and effect not 
later than January 1, 
1923. 

B. Pending the complete 
withdrawal of foreign postal 
agencies, the four Powers con- 



Adoptee par la Conference de al 
Limitation des Armemenis, a la 
quatrieme seance pleniere,. le 10 
decembre 1921. 

NO. 6. RESOLUTION CONCERNANT 
LES BUREAUX DE POSTE ETRAN- 
GERS EN CHINE. 

A. Reconnaissant la legitimite 
du desir exprime par le Gouverne- 
ment chinois de voir supprimer 
les bureaux de poste etrangers en 
Chine, exception faite pour les 
bureaux des territoires a bail ou 
pour ceux qui auraient fait Fob jet 
de dispositions expresses de traites, 
il est decide que: 

(1) Les quatre Puissances posse- 
dant des bureaux de poste 
de cet ordre donneront 
leur assentiment a leur 
suppression a condition: 
(a) que le service des postes 
chinois continue a fonc- 
tionner d'une maniere 
satisfaisante; 
(6) que l'assurance soit don- 
nee par le Gouverne- 
ment chinois qu'il n' en- 
visage aucun change- 
ment dans 1' adminis- 
tration postale actuelle 
ni dans la situation 
du codirecteur general 
etranger. 

(2) En vue de permettre a la 
Chine et aux Puissances 
interessees de prendre les 
dispositions necessaires, le 
present arrangement en- 
trera en vigueur et portera 
effet au plus tard le l er 
Janvier 1923. 

B. En attendant la suppression 
complete des bureaux de poste 
etrangers, les quatre Puissances 



370 



ARMED FORCES IN CHINA. 



cerned severally undertake to 
afford full facilities to the Chi- 
nese customs authorities to ex- 
amine in those agencies all pos- 
tal matter (excepting ordinary 
letters, whether registered or 
not, which upon external exami- 
nation appear plainly to con- 
tain only written matter) pass- 
ing through them, with a view 
to ascertaining whether they 
contain articles which are duti- 
able or contraband or which 
otherwise contravene the cus- 
toms regulations or laws of 
China. 



Adopted by the Conference of 
the Limitation of Armament at 
the Fifth Plenary Session Feb- 
ruary 1st, 1922. 

NO. 7. RESOLUTION REGARDING 
ARMED FORCES IN CHINA. 

Whereas 

The Powers have from time 
to time stationed armed forces, 
including police and railway 
guards, in China to protect the 
lives and property of foreigners 
lawfully in China ; 
And whereas 

It appears that certain of 
these armed forces are main- 
tained in China without the 
authority of any treaty or 
agreement ; 
And whereas 

The Powers have declared 
their intention to withdraw 
their armed forces now on duty 
in China without the authority 
of any treaty or agreement, 
whenever China shall assure 



interessees s'engagent, chacune en 
ce qui la concerne, Conner toutes 
facilites aux autorites des douanes 
chinoises pour examiner dans, ces 
bureaux, tous les envois postaux 
qui y passeront (exception faite 
pour les lettres ordinaires recom- 
mandees ou non, dont l'examen 
exterieur fera clairement appa- 
raitre qu'elles ne renferment que 
des documents ecrits), arm de 
s'assurer qu'ils ne contiennent pas 
des articles soumis soit aux droits 
de douane, soit constituant de la 
contrebande, soit contrevenant de 
quelque autre maniere aux regle- 
ments douaniers ou aux lois de? la 
Chine. 

Adoptee par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
cinquieme seance pleniere, le l er 
fevrier 1922. 

NO. 7. RESOLUTION CONCERNANT 
LES FORCES ARMEES ETRAN- 
GERES EN CHINE. 

Attendu : 

Que les Puissances ont, a cer- 
taines epoques, maintenu en Chine 
des forces armees y compris des 
forces de police et des gardes de 
voies ferrees pour la protection de 
la vie et des biens des etrangers y 
residant en vertu des traites, 

Attendu qu'il apparait que cer- 
taines de ces forces armees sont 
maintenues en Chine sans autori- 
g ation a ces fins resultant de traites 
ou accords, 

Attendu que les Puissances ont 
declare leur intention de retirer 
leurs forces armees actuellement 
maintenues en Chine sans autorisa- 
tion a ces fins resultant des traites 
ou accords, des que la Chine aura 



INQUIRIES AS TO ISSUES. 



371 



the protection of the lives and 
property of foreigners in China ; 
And whereas 

China has declared her inten- 
tion and capacity to assure the 
protection of the lives and 
property of foreigners in China ; 
Now 

To the end that there may be 
clear understanding of the con- 
ditions upon which in each case 
the practical execution of those 
intentions must depend; 
It is resolved: 

That the Diplomatic Repre- 
sentatives in Pekin of the Pow- 
ers now in Conference at Wash- 
ington, to wit, the United States 
of America, Belgium, the Brit- 
ish Empire, France, Italy, 
Japan, The Netherlands and 
Portugal, will be instructed by 
their respective Governments, 
whenever China shall so re- 
quest, to associate themselves 
with three representatives of 
the Chinese Government to con- 
duct collectively a full and im- 
partial inquiry into the issues 
raised by the foregoing declara- 
tions of intention made by the 
Powers and by China and shall 
thereafter prepare a full and 
comprehensive report setting 
out without reservation their 
findings of fact and their opin- 
ion with regard to the matter 
hereby referred for inquiry, 
and shall furnish a copy of 
their report to each of the nine 
Governments concerned which 
shall severally make public 
the report with such comment 
as each may deem appropriate. 
The representatives of any of 
the Powers may make or join 



assure la protection de la vie et 
des biens des etrangers, 

Attendu que la Chine a declare 
avoir l'intention et etre en mesure 
d'assurer la protection de la vie et 
des biens desdits etrangers en 
Chine, 

Et afin.qu'il y ait un accord ex- 
plicite quant aux conditions des- 
quelles doit dependre en chaque 
cas l'execution pratique desdites 
intentions, 

II est decide: 

Que les Representants diplo- 
matiques a Pekin des Puissances 
representees a la Conference de 
Washington, c'est-a-dire, les Etats- 
Unis, la Belgique, PEmpire Bri- 
tannique, la France, l'ltalie, le 
Japon, les Pays-Bas et le Portugal, 
seront charges par leurs Gouverne- 
ments respectifs, des que la Chine 
en fera la demande, de s'associer 
avec trois representants duGouver- 
nement chinois pour mener con- 
jointement avec eux une enquete 
complete et impartiale quant aux 
problemes souleves par les declara- 
tions d'ihtentions ci-dessus mani- 
festoes par les Puissances et la 
Chine; ils prepareront un rapport 
complet et detaille exposant sans 
reserves leurs constatations de 
fait et leurs opinions touchant les 
questions soumises par la Con- 
ference a leur enquete; ils adres- 
seront un exemplaire de leur rap- 
port a chacun des neuf Gouver- 
nements interesses, lesquels pu- 
blieront en commun ledit rapport 
avec telles observations que cha- 
cun d'entre eux trouvera appro- 
priees. Les representants de cha- 
cune desdites Puissances pourront 
faire soit isolement, soit a plusieurs 






372 



RADIO STATIONS IN CHINA. 



in minority reports stating their 
differences, if any, from the 
majority report. 

That each of the Powers 
above named shall be deemed 
free to accept or reject all or 
any of the findings of fact or 
opinions expressed in the report 
but that in no case shall any 
of the said Powers make its ac- 
ceptance of all or any of the 
findings of fact or opinions 
either directly or indirectly de- 
pendent on the granting by 
China of any special concession, 
favor, benefit or immunity, 
whether political or economic. 

Adopted by the Conference on 
the Limitation of Armament at 
the Fifth Plenary Session, Feb- 
ruary 1st, 1922. 

NO. 8. RESOLUTION REGARDING 
RADIO STATIONS IN CHINA 
AND ACCOMPANYING DECLA- 
RATIONS. 

The representatives of the 
Powers hereinafter named par- 
ticipating in the discussion of 
Pacific and Far Eastern ques- 
tions in the Conference on the 
Limitation of Armament— to 
wit : The United States of 
America, Belgium, The British 
Empire, China, France, Italy, 
Japan, The Netherlands and 
Portugal, 

Have resolved 

1. That all radio stations in 
China whether maintained un- 
der the provisions of the inter- 
national protocol of September 
7, 1901, or in fact maintained in 
the grounds of any of the for- 
eign legations in China, shall 
be limited in their use to send- 



des rapports de minorite declarant 
leurs divergences de vues, s'il 
s'en produit, quant au rapport de 
la majorite. 

Que chacune des Puissances 
precitees sera libre d 'accepter ou 
de rejeter tout ou partie des cons- 
tatations de fait ou opinions ex- 
primees dans le rapport; toutefois 
aucune desdites Puissances ne 
pourra, en aucun cas, faire depen- 
dre soit directement, soit indi- 
rectement son acceptation de tout 
ou partie desdites constatations de 
fait ou opinions, de l'octroi par la 
Chine d'une concession, faveur, 
benefice ou immunite quelconque 
soit d'ordre politique, soit d'ordre 
economique. 

Adoptee par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
cinquieme seance pleniere. le 
l <r fevrier 1922. 

NO. 8. RESOLUTION CONCERNANT 
LES STATIONS RADIOTELlSGRA- 
PHIQUES EN CHINE AVEC L'AD 
JONCTION DE DECLARATIONS. 

Les representants des Puissances 
enumerees ci-apres prenant part 
a la discussion des questions du 
Pacifique et de 1' Extreme Orient 
dans la Conference de la Limita- 
tion des Armements, a savoir: les 
Etats-Unis d'Amerique, la Belgi- 
que, 1' Empire Britannique, la 
Chine, la France, l'ltalie, le 
Japon, les Pays-Bas et le Portugal, 

Ont decide que: 

1. Toutes les stations radio- 
telegraphiques en Chine, soit 
etablies en vertu des stipulations 
du Protocole International du 7 
septembre 1901, soit etablies en 
fait sur les terrains des Legations 
etrangeres en Chine, ne devront 
etre utilisees que pour la reception 
et l'expedition des messages 



OPERATION OF STATIONS. 



373 



ing and receiving government 
messages and shall not receive 
or send commercial or personal 
or unofficial messages, including 
press matter: Provided, how- 
ever, that in case all other tele- 
graphic communication is in- 
terrupted, then, upon official 
notification accompanied by 
proof of such interruption to 
the Chinese Ministry of Com- 
munications, such stations may 
afford temporary facilities for 
commercial, personal or un- 
official messages, including 
press matter, until the Chinese 
Government has given notice of 
the termination of the inter- 
ruption ; 

2. All radio stations operated 
within the territory of China by 
a foreign government or the 
citizens or subjects thereof un- 
der treaties or concessions of 
the Government of China, shall 
limit the messages sent and re- 
ceived by the terms of the 
treaties or concessions under 
which the respective stations 
ore maintained ; 

3. In case there be any radio 
station maintained in the terri- 
tory of China by a foreign gov- 
ernment or citizens or subjects 
thereof without the authority of 
the Chinese Government, such 
station and all the plant, appa- 
ratus and material thereof shall 
be transferred to and taken over 
by the Government of China, to 
be operated under the direction 
of the Chinese Ministry of Com- 
munications upon fair and full 
compensation to the owners for 
the value of the installation, as 
soon as the Chinese Ministry of 
Communications is prepared to 



d'Etat. Elles ne devront ni re- 
cevoir ni expedier des messages 
commerciaux, personnels ou 
non officiels, y compris le trafic de 
presse. Toutefois, au cas ou tous 
autres moyens de communications 
telegraphiques seraient interrom- 
pes et sur notification officielle, 
accompagnee de preuves de cette 
interruption de service, faite au 
Ministere chinois des Communi- 
cations, ces stations pourront 
etre employees provisoirement a 
1' expedition et a la reception de 
messages commerciaux, personnels 
ou non officiels, y compris le trafic 
de presse, jusqu'a ce que le 
Gouvernement chinois ait donne 
avis de la fin de 1' interruption. 

2. Toutes les stations radio- 
telegraphiques exploitees sur le 
territoire de la Chine par un . 
Gouvernement etranger ou ses 
ressortissants, en vertu de traites 
ou de concessions du Gouverne- 
ment chinois, devront limiter 
Pexpedition et la reception des 
messages aux conditions des traites 
et concessions en vertu desquelles 
ces stations sont etablies. 

3. Au cas oil des stations radio- 
telegraphiques seraient entre- 
tenues sur le territoire de la Chine 
par un Gouvernement etranger ou 
ses ressortissants sans la sanction 
du Gouvernement chinois, ces 
stations, ainsi que toute Installa- 
tion, les appareils et le materiel, 
seront transferes au Gouvernement 
chinois pour etre exploitees par 
lui sous la direction du Ministere 
chinois de Communications, apres 
que les proprietaires auront 6te" 
dument et equitablement indem- 
nises de la valeur de l'installation 
et des que le Ministere chinois des 
Communications sera pret a ex- 



374 



DECLARATION CONCERNING RADIO STATIONS. 



operate the same effectively for 
the general public benefit ; 

4. If any questions shall arise 
as to the radio stations in leased 
territories, in the South Man- 
churian Railway Zone or in the 
French Concession at Shanghai, 
they shall be regarded as mat- 
ters for discussion between the 
Chinese Government and the 
Governments concerned. 



5. The owners or managers of 
all radio stations maintained in 
the territory of China by foreign 
powers or citizens or subjects 
thereof shall confer with the 
Chinese Ministry of Communi- 
cations for the purpose of seek- 
ing a common arrHrigehient to 
avoid interference in the use of 
wave lengths by wireless sta- 
tions in China, subject to such 
general arrangements as may be 
made by an international con- 
ference convened for the revi- 
sion of the rules established by 
the International Radio Tele- 
graph Convention signed at 
London, July 5, 1912. 



Adopted by the Conference on 
the Limitation of Armament at 
the Fifth Plenary Session, Feb- 
ruary 1st, 1922. 

DECLARATION CONCERNING THE 
RESOLUTION ON RADIO STATIONS 
IN CHINA OF DECEMBER 7, 1921. 

The Powers other than China 
declare that nothing in para- 
graphs 3 or 4 of the Resolutions 
of 7th December, 1921, is to be 
deemed to be an expression of 



ploiter ces stations effectivement 
dans l'interet public general. 

4. Si des questions sont soule- 
vees en ce qui concerne les stations 
radiotelegraphiques situees sur les 
territoires cedes a bail, dans la 
zone du chemin de fer de la Mand- 
chourie du sud ou dans la con- 
cession francaise de Shanghai, 
elles seront considerees comme 
matiere a debattre entre le Gou- 
vernement chinois et le gouverne- 
ment interesse. 

5. Les proprietaries ou direc- 
teurs de toutes les stations radio- 
telegraphiques entretenues 3ur le 
territoire de la Chine par des Puis- 
sances etrangeres ou par leurs res- 
sortissants devront conferer avec 
le Ministere chinois des Communi- 
cations, dans le but de reehercher 
un arrangement en commun quant 
aux mesures a prendre pour eviter 
les interferences dans l'emploi des 
longueurs d'onde par les stations 
radiotelegraphiques en Chine, sous 
reserve de tous arrangements gene- 
raux qui pourraient dtre pris par 
une Conference Internationale reu- 
nie pour la revision des reglements 
de la Convention Radiotelegra- 
phique Internationale signee a 
Londres le 5 juillet 1912. 

Adoptee par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
cinquieme seance pleniere, le 
l er fevrier 1922. 

DECLARATION CONCERNANT LA 
RESOLUTION RELATIVE AUX STA- 
T I O N S RADIOTELEGRAPHIQUES 
EN CHINE. 

Les Puissances autres que la 
Chine declarent que les para- 
graphes 3 et 4 de la Resolution du 
7 decembre 1921, ne doivent 
etre considered comme constituant 



RAILWAYS IN CHINA. 



375 



opinion by the Conference as to 
whether the stations referred to 
therein are or are not authorized 
by China. 

They further give notice that 
the result of any discussion aris- 
ing under paragraph 4 must, if 
it is not to be subject to objection 
by them, conform with the prin- 
ciples of the Open Door or equal- 
ity of opportunity approved by 
the Conference. 



CHINESE DECLARATION CONCERN- 
ING RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 
7TH REGARDING RADIO STATIONS 
IN CHINA. 

The Chinese Delegation takes 
this occasion formally to declare 
that the Chinese Government 
does not recognize or concede 
the right of any foreign Power 
or of the nationals thereof to 
install or operate, without its 
express consent, radio stations 
in legation grounds, settlements, 
concessions, leased territories, 
railway areas or other similar 
areas. 



NO. 9. RESOLUTION REGARDING 
UNIFICATION OF RAILWAYS 
IN CHINA AND ACCOMPANY- 
ING DECLARATION BY CHINA. 

The Powers represented in this 
Conference record their hope 
that to the utmost degree con- 
sistent with legitimate existing 
rights, the future development 
of railways in China shall be so 
conducted as to enable the Chi- 



de la part de la Conference 1' ex- 
pression d'une opinion quant a la 
question de savoir si les stations 
qui y sont visees sont ou non 
autorisees par la Chine. 

Elles declarent, en outre, que 
les resultats de toute discussion 
ayant trait a 1' application du para- 
graphe 4, doivent pour ne pas etre 
sujettes a des objections de la part 
de ces memes Puissances, §tre en 
harmonie avec les principes de la 
porte ouverte ou de la chance 
egale, tels qu'ils ont ete approuves 
par la Conference. 

DECLARATION DE LA DELEGATION 
CHINOISE CONCERNANT LES STA- 
TIONS RADIOTELEGRAPHIQUES 
EN CHINE. 

La Delegation chinoise saisit 
cette occasion pour declarer for- 
mellement que le Gouvernement 
chinois ne reconnait ni n'accorde 
le droit a aucune Puissance 
etrangere ou aux ressortissants 
d'aucune Puissance Etrangere, 
d'installer ou d' exploiter, sans son 
consentement expres, des stations 
radiotelegraphiques dans les ter- 
rains des legations, dans les colo- 
nies 6trangeres, sur les concessions, 
sur les territoires cedes a bail, dans 
les zones de chemins de fer ou 
autres zones similaires. 

NO. 9. RESOLUTION CONCERNANT 
L'UNIFICATION DES CHEMINS DE 
FER EN CHINE AVEC L'ADJONC- 
TION D'UNE DECLARATION DE 
LA CHINE. 

Les Puissances representees a la 
presente Conference expriment 
l'espoir que, dans toute la mesure 
compatible avec le respect des 
droits legitimement acquis, le 
developpement a venir des che- 
mins de fer en Chine soit effectue" 



376 



DECLARATION ON RAILWAYS. 



nese Government to effect the 
unification of railways into a 
railway system under Chinese 
control, with such foreign finan- 
cial and technical assistance as 
may prove necessary in the in- 
terests of that system. 



Adopted by the Conference on 
the Limitation of Armament at 
the Fifth Plenary Session Feb-, 
ruary 1st, 1922. 

STATEMENT REGARDING CHINESE 
RAILWAYS MADE ON JANUARY 
19, 1922, BY THE CHINESE DELE- 
GATION. 

The Chinese Delegation notes 
with sympathetic appreciation 
the expression of the hope of 
the Powers^ that the existing 
and future railways of China 
may be unified under the con- 
trol and operation of the 
Chinese Government with such 
foreign financial and technical 
assistance as may be needed. 
It is our intention as speedily 
as possible to bring about this 
result. It is our purpose to de- 
velop existing and future rail- 
ways in accordance with a gen- 
eral programme that will meet 
the economic, industrial and 
commercial requirements of 
China. It will be our policy to 
obtain such foreign financial 
and technical assistance as may 
be needed from the Powers in 
accordance with the principles 
of the Open Door or equal op- 
portunity ; and the friendly sup- 
port of these Powers will be 
asked for the effort of the 
Chinese Government to bring all 



de maniere a permettre au Gou- 
vernement chinois de realiser 
l'unification des chemins de fer 
par la voie d'un systeme national 
des chemins de fer sous 1' adminis- 
tration et le controle de la Chine, 
avec telle assistance financiere ou 
technique etrangere qui serait 
necessaire dans l'interet de son 
bon fonctionnement 

Adoptee par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
cinquieme seance pleniere, le l er 
fevrier 1922. 

DECLARATION DE LA DELEGATION 
CHINOISE CONCERNANT LES CHE- 
MINS DE FER CHINOIS. 

La Delegation chinoise accueille 
avec sympathie le voeu exprime 
par les Puissances, a 1'effet que les 
chemins de fer actuels et futurs 
de la Chine soient reunis sous 
la direction et 1' exploitation du 
Gouvernement chinois, avec l'as, 
sistance etrangere, soit financiere- 
soit technique, qui peut §tre 
reconnue necessaire. C'est notre 
intention d'obtenir ce resultat 
aussi rapidement que possible. 
C'est notre dessein de developper 
les chemins de fer actuels et futurs 
selon un programme general qui 
repondra aux besoins econo- 
miques, industriels et commer- 
ciaux de la Chine. Ce sera notre 
politique d'obtenir des Puissances 
l'assistance etrangere, soit finan- 
ciere, soit technique, necessaire, 
en conformite avec les principes de 
la porte ouverte et de l'opportunite 
egale; et le Gouvernement chinois 
demandera aux Puissances de lui 
preter leur aide amicale dans son 
effort pour faire passer tous les 
chemins de fer actuels et futurs de 



REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES. 



377 



the railways of China, now ex- 
isting or to be built, under its 
effective and unified control 
and operation. 

NO. 10. RESOLUTION REGARDING 
THE REDUCTION OF CHINESE 
MILITARY FORCES. 

Whereas the Powers attend- 
ing this Conference have been 
deeply impressed with the se- 
vere drain on the public revenue 
of China through the mainte- 
nance in various parts of the 
country, of military forces, ex- 
cessive in number and con- 
trolled by the military chiefs of 
the provinces without coordi- 
nation, 

And whereas the continued 
maintenance of these forces ap- 
pears to be mainly responsible 
for China's present unsettled 
political conditions, 

And whereas it is felt that 
large and prompt reductions of 
these forces will not only ad- 
vance the cause of China's po- 
litical unity and economic de- 
velopment but will hasten her 
financial rehabilitation ; 

Therefore, without any inten- 
tion to interfere in the internal 
problems of China, but. ani- 
mated by the sincere desire to 
see China develop and maintain 
for herself an effective and 
stable government alike in her 
own interest and in the general 
interest of trade; 

And being inspired by the 
spirit of this Conference whose 
aim is to reduce, through the 
limitation of armament, the 
enormous disbursements which 



la Chine sous sa direction et son 
exploitation effectives et unifiees. 



NO. 10. RESOLUTION CONCERNANT 
LA REDUCTION DES FORCES 
MDLITAIRES CHINOISES. 

Attendu que les Puissances par- 
ticipant a la presente Conference 
ont ete profondement impres- 
sionnees par la constatation que les 
revenus publics de la Chine sont 
epuises au fur et a mesure par l'en- 
tretien en differentes parties de ce 
pays de forces militaires trop nom- 
breuses et qui sont sans coordina- 
tion entre las mains des chefs 
militaires des Provinces; 

Attendu que le maintien de ces 
forces sous les amies semble etre 
la source principale de l'instabilite 
politique actuelle de la Chine; 

Attendu qu ' elles estiment qu ' une 
large et prompte reduction de ces 
forces militaires, non seulement 
fera progresser la cause de 1' unite 
politique et du developpement 
economique de la Chine, mais 
encore accelerera sa restauration 
fmanciere; 

Sans aucune intention d 'inter ve- 
nir dans les affaires interieures de 
la Chine, mais dans le desir sincere 
de voir la Chine developper et 
maintenir pour elle-meme un 
Gouvernement stable et effectif, 
aussi bien dans son propre interet 
que dans l'inter§t general du com- 
merce; 

S'inspirant de 1' esprit de la 
Conference qui vise a reduire, au 
moyen de la limitation des arme- 
ments, les enormes depenses qui 
manifestement constituent le plus 



25882 — 23- 



-25 



378 



EXISTING COMMITMENTS. 



manifestly constitute the 
greater part of the encumbrance 
upon enteprise and national 
prosperity ; 

It is resolved : That this Con- 
ference express to China the 
earnest hope that immediate 
and effective steps may be taken 
by the Chinese Government to 
reduce the aforesaid military 
forces and expenditures. 

Adopted by the Conference on 
the Limitation of Armament at 
the Fifth Plenary Session, Feb- 
ruary 1st, 1922. 

NO. 11. RESOLUTION REGARDING 
EXISTING COMMITMENTS OF 
CHINA OR WITH RESPECT TO 
CHINA. 

The Powers represented in 
this Conference, considering it 
desirable that there should 
hereafter be full publicity with 
respect to all matters affecting 
the political and other inter- 
national obligations of China 
and of the several Powers in 
relation to China, are agreed as 
follows : 

I. The several Powers other 
than China will at their earliest 
convenience file with the Secre- 
tariat General of the Confer- 
ence for transmission to the 
participating Powers, a list of 
all treaties, conventions, ex- 
change of notes, or other inter- 
national agreements which they 
may have with China, or with 
any other Power or Powers in 
relation to China, which they 
deem to be still in force and 
upon which they may desire to 
rely. In each case, citations 
will be given to any official or 
other publication in which an 
authoritative text of the docu- 



grand obstacle aux entreprises et 
a la prosperite nationale; 



II est decide: Que la Conference 
ex prime a la Chine son vif desir de 
voir prendre par le Gouvernement 
chinois des mesures effectives 
pour reduire lesdites forces mili- 
taires et par la meme les depenses 
qui en resultent. 

Adoptee par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
cinquieme seance pleniere, le l eT 
fevrier 1922. 

NO. 11. RESOLUTION CONCERNANT 
LES ENGAGEMENTS EXISTANT 
DE LA CHINE OU AU SUJET DE 
LA CHINE. 

Les Puissances representees a la 
presente Conference, considerant 
qu'il est desirable de donner 
dorenavant publicite entiere a 
toutes questions affectant les obli- 
gations politiques ainsi qu'a tous 
engagements internationaux con- 
tractus par la Chine ou par les 
differentes Puissances avec la 
Chine, ont decide ce qui suit: 

I. Les differentes Puissances 
autres que la Chine, deposeront le 
plus tot possible, au Secretariat 
General de la Conference, pour 
etre transmise aux Puissances par- 
ticipates, une liste de tous traites, 
conventions, echanges de notes 
ou autres accords internationaux 
qu'elles peuvent avoir avec la 
Chine ou avec une ou plusieurs 
autres Puissances au sujet de la 
Chine, et qu'elles considerent 
comme etant encore en vigueur ou 
sur les quelselles pourraient desi- 
rer s'appuyer. Dans chaque cas, 
il sera donne 1 'indication des ou- 
vrages officiels ou autres dans 
lesquels se trouverait un texte 



LIST OF CONTRACTS. 



379 



inents may be found. In any 
case in which the document may 
not have been published, a copy 
of the text (in its original lan- 
guage or languages) will be 
filed with the Secretariat Gen- 
eral of the Conference. 

Every Treaty or other inter- 
national agreement of the char- 
acter described which may be 
concluded hereafter shall be 
notified by the Governments 
concerned within sixty (60) 
days of its conclusion to the 
Powers who are signatories of 
or adherents to this agreement. 

II. The several Powers other 
than China will file with the 
Secretariat General of the 
Conference at their earliest 
convenience for transmission to 
the participating Powers a list, 
as nearly complete as may be 
possible, of all those contracts 
between their nationals, of the 
one part, and the Chinese Gov- 
ernment or any of its adminis- 
trative subdivisions or local 
authorities, of the other part, 
which involve any concession, 
franchise, option or preference 
with respect to railway con- 
struction, mining, forestry, navi- 
gation, river conservancy, har- 
bor works, reclamation, elec- 
trical communications, or other 
public works or public services, 
or for the sale of arms or am- 
munition, or which involve a 
lien upon any of the public 
revenues or properties of the 
Chinese Government or of any 
of its administrative subdivi- 
sions. There shall be, in the 
.case of each document so listed, 



autorise de ces documents. Dans 
les cas ou le document n'aurait pas 
ete publie, une copie (dans sa ou 
ses langues originates) sera deposee 
au Secretariat General de la Con- 
ference. 

Tout traite ou arrangement in- 
ternational ayant le caractere ci- 
dessus vise, conclu par la suite, 
sera porte par les gouvernements 
interesses, dans les soixante (60) 
jours qui suivront la date de son 
entree en vigueur, a la connais- 
sance des Puissances qui auront 
signe le present accord ou qui y 
auront adhere. 

II. Les diverses Puissances au- 
tres que la Chine, deposeront, 
aussitot que faire se pourra, au 
Secretariat General de la Confe- 
rence, une liste aussi complete que 
possible, pour etre transmise aux 
Puissances participantes, de tous 
les contrats existants entre leurs 
ressortissants d'une part, et le 
Gouvernement chinois ou l'une de 
ses subdivisions administratives ou 
autorites locales d 'autre part, lors- 
qu'ils entrainent une concession, 
franchise, option ou preference 
quelconque touchant la cons- 
truction de chemins de fer, 1' ex- 
ploitation des mines et des forets, 
la navigation, l'amenagement des 
voies d'eau, les travaux maritimes, 
la recuperation des terrains, les 
communications electriques et au- 
tres travaux publics ou services 
publics, ou la vente d'armes et 
munitions, ou qui impliquent une 
emprise sur n'importe quel des 
revenus ou biens publics du Gou- 
vernement chinois ou des diverses 
Provinces. Pour chaque docu- 
ment vise dans la liste fournie, il 



380 



FUTURE COMMITMENTS. 



either a citation to a published 
text, or a copy of the text 
itself. 

Every contract of the public 
character described which may 
be concluded hereafter shall be 
notified by the Governments 
concerned within sixty (60) 
days after the receipt of infor- 
mation of its conclusion to the 
Powers who are signatories of 
or adherents to this agreement. 

III. The Chinese Government 
agrees to notify in the condi- 
tions laid down in this agree- 
ment every treaty agreement or 
contract of the character indi- 
cated herein which has been or 
may hereafter be concluded by 
that Government or by any 
local authority in China with 
any foreign Power or the na- 
tionals of any foreign Power 
whether party to this agree- 
ment or not, so far as the in- 
formation is in its possession. 

IV. The Governments of 
Powers having treaty relations 
with China, which are not rep- 
resented at the present Con- 
ference, shall be invited to ad- 
here to this agreement. 

The United States Govern- 
ment, as convenor of the Con- 
ference, undertakes to communi- 
cate this agreement to the Gov- 
ernments of the said Powers, 
with a view to obtaining their 
adherence thereto as soon as 
possible. 

Adopted by the Conference on 
the Limitation of Armament at 
the Fifth Plenary Session Feb- 
ruary 1st, 1922. 



devra y avoir une reference a un 
texte deja publie, soit une copie 
conforme. 

Tout contrat ayant le caractere 
public ci-dessus vise, conclu par 
la suite, sera communique par 
chaque Gouvernement interesse 
dans les soixante (60) jours qui 
suivront la date oil il aura eu con- 
naissance de son entree en vigueur, 
aux Puissances qui auront signe 
le present accord ou qui y auront 
adhere. 

III. Le Gouvernement chinois 
s'engage a notifer, dans les con- 
ditions prescrites au present accord 
et en tant qu'il sera en possession 
de ces reseignements, tout traite, 
accord ou contrat de la nature 
ci-dessus decrite, deja conclu ou 
qui serait conclu a l'avenir soit 
par lui-meme soit par des autorites 
locales chinoises, avec une Puis- 
sance etrangere ou ses ressortis- 
sants, qu'elle soit ou non partie 
au present accord. 

IV. Les Gouvernements des 
Puissances ayant des relations par 
traites avec la Chine, qui ne sont 
pas representes a la presente Con- 
ference, seront invites a adherer 
au present accord. 

Le Gouvernement des Etats- 
Unis, en tant qu'il a pris 1 'initia- 
tive de la presente Conference, 
sera charge de communiquer aux 
gouvernements des dites Puis- 
sances le present accord aux fins 
d'adhesion dans le plus bref delai. 

Adoptee par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
cinquieme seance pl^niere le l er 
fevrier 1922. 



CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY. 



381 



NO. 12. RESOLUTION REGARDING 
THE CHINESE EASTERN RAIL- 
WAY, APPROVED BY ALL THE 
POWERS INCLUDING CHINA. 



Resolved, that the preserva- 
tion of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway for those in interest 
requires that better protection 
be given to the railway and the 
persons engaged in its opera- 
tion and use, a more careful 
selection of personnel to secure 
efficiency of service, and a more 
economical use of funds to pre- 
vent waste of the property. 

That the subject should im- 
mediately be dealt with through 
the proper Diplomatic channels. 

Adopted by the Conference on 
the Limitation of Armament at 
the Sixth Plenary Session Feb- 
ruary 4th, 1922. 

NO. 13. RESOLUTION REGARDING 
THE CHINESE EASTERN RAIL- 
WAY, APPROVED BY ALL THE 
POWERS OTHER THAN CHINA. 

The Powers other than China 
in agreeing to the resolution 
regarding the Chinese Eastern 
Railway, reserve the right to 
insist hereafter upon the re- 
sponsibility of China for per- 
formance or non-performance of 
the obligations towards the for- 
eign stockholders, bondholders 
and creditors of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway Company 
which the Powers deem to re- 
sult from the contracts under 
which the railroad was built 
and the action of China there- 
under and the obligations which 



NO. 12. RESOLUTION CONCERNANT 
LE CHEMIN DE FER DE L'EST 
CHINOIS APPROUVEE PAR LES 
PUISSANCES Y COMPRIS LA 
CHINE. 

II est convenu: Que, dans le but 
de preserver les droits de tous les 
interesses dans le Chemin de Fer 
de l'Est Chinois, il est necessaire 
d'assurer une meilleure protection 
dudit chemin de fer et des per- 
sonnes qui y sont employees ou qui 
en font usage; de choisir plus 
soigneusement le personnel afin 
d'obtenir un meilleur rendement 
du service; d'assurer un emploi 
plus economique des fonds pour 
prevenir le gaspillage; 

Que cette question devrait etre 
traitee sans retard par la voie diplo- 
matique appropriee. 

Adoptee par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
cinquieme seance pleniere le l f " 
fevrier 1922. 

NO. 13. RESOLUTION CONCERNANT 
LE CHEMIN DE FER DE L'EST 
CHINOIS APPROUVEE PAR LES 
PUISSANCES AUTRES QUE LA 
CHINE. 

Les Puissances autres que la 
Chine, en adoptant la Resolution 
relative au Chemin de Fer de 
l'Est Chinois, se reservent le droit 
d'insister ulterieurement sur la 
responsabilite de la Chine en ce 
qui touche 1' execution ou la non- 
execution des obligations envers 
les actionnaires, porteurs de titres 
et autres ereanciers etrangers de la 
Societe du Chemin de Fer de l'Est 
Chinois, obligations que les Fuis- 
sances estiment resulter des con- 
trats sous lesquels le chemin de fer 
a ete construit, ainsi que des actes 
de la Chine qui en sont resultes et 



382 



CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY. 



they deem to be in the nature of 
a trust resulting from the exer- 
cise of power by the Chinese 
Government over the possession 
and administration of the rail- 
road. 

Adopted by the Conference 
on the Limitation of Armament 
at the Sixth Plenary Session, 
February 4th, 1922. 



que lesdites Puissances considerent 
comme ayant le caractere d'une 
garde morale resultant de la main- 
mise par le Gouvernement cliinois 
sur la possession et l'administra- 
tion dudit chemin de fer. 

Adoptee par la Conference de la 
Limitation des Armements a la 
quatrieme seance pleniere le 4 
fevrier 1922. 



INDEX. 



A. 
Aircraft : 

limitation of construction and use — 

discussion by — Page. 

Balfour (Great Britain) 225,227 

Hughes (United States) . 202,223,227 

Kato (Japan) 226 

Sarraut (France) 226 

Schanzer (Italy) 223,227,230 

Underwood (United States) 225 

report of committee on aircraft 203—219 

report toi the President by American delegation 284 

use in warfare — 

discussion by — ' 

de Bon (France) ! 71, 230, 232 

Borden (Canada) 220, 232 

Hughes (United States) 168,169,228 

Lee (Great Britain) 231 

Root (United States) 231 

Schanzer (Italy) 231 

Aircraft carriers : 

limitation of construction — 
discussion by — 

Acton. (Italy) 159 

de Bon (France) 161,230,232 

Hughes (United States) 158,163-165 

Kato (Japan) 161 

Lee (Great Britain) , 160 

proposals accepted by committee 162 

limitation of tonnage and guns — 
discussion by — 

Hughes (United States) 118, 158 

Lee (Great Britain) 119 

proposal accepted by committee 162 

Airplane carriers, see Aircraft carriers. 
Armament, Land : 

limitation discussed by — 

Balfour (Great Britain) 19,23 

Borden (Canada) 27 

Briand (France) 21,23,27 

Hughes (United States) 25, 27 

Root (United States) 26 

Schanzer (Italy) 20,22 

report to the President by American delegation 257 

see also Aircraft — Gas in war — War, Laws of. 

383 



384 INDEX. 

Armament, Naval : 

limitation of — Page. 

American proposal 7 

report to the President by American delegation 261 

caliber of warship guns, British proposal 119 

discussion by — 

de Bon (France) 41,44 

Hughes (United States) 41 

future conference discussed by — 

Balfour (Great Britain) 45 

Hughes (United Statesi) 41 

Lee (Great Britain) 45 

Schanzer (Italy) 45 

Hughes-Briand correspondence 36 

naval tonnage subcommittee appointed 97 

provisional agreement of United States, Great Britain, and 

Japan 38 

report to the President by American delegation 260 

subcommittee proceedings reviewed 32 

technical subcommittee 16, 29 

treaty ___i 291 

approval by committee 238 

report to the President by American delegation 210 

see also Aircraft carriers — Auxiliary craft — Submarines. 
Armies, see Armament, Land. 
Australia : 

submarine warfare resolutions (Pearce) 154,183,184 

Auxiliary craft : 

limitation of construction — 

American proposal 10, 12 

demand of French delegation 102 

report to the President by American delegation 269 

limitation of tonnage and guns — 

resolution j 106 

resolution discussed by — 

Acton (Italy) 114,156 

de Bon (France) .113 

Hanihara (Japan) 114 

Hughes (United States) . 114,155,156 

Kato (Japan) 155 

Lee (Great Britain) 113,114 

B. 
Belgium : 

invitation, to conference 3 

C. 
Canada : 

aircraft in warfare (Borden) 220,232 

laws of war commission (Borden) 232 

limitation of land armament (Borden) 27 

submarine warfare resolutions (Borden) 122 

Capital ships : 

American construction 7,261,264 

British construction , 8, 262, 264 

• French construction , 39,41,43,101 

Japanese construction 8, 263, 264 

ratio ,_ , 7, 33, 264 



INDEX. 



385 



Castex, Capt. : 

articles on submarine — Page. 

discussed by Jusserand (France) 239,244 

discussed by Lee (Great Britain) 181,, 240, 244 

discussed by Sarraut (France) 181 

quoted by Lee (Great Britain) 148 

repudiated by de Bon (France) 150 

repudiated by Sarraut (France) 152 

Central Europe, Italy's relation to States of 28 

Chemical warfare, see Gas in war. 
China : 

invitation to conference 2 

neutral rights respected — ■ 

proposal embodied in treaty , 349 

open door resolution — 

as embodied in treaty 346 

principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning 
China — 

treaty 342 

resolution in connection with treaty 364 

No. 8 embodied in treaty, Article VI 349 

railways — 

embodied in treaty 348 

resolution regarding unification ' 375 

statement of Chinese delegation 376 

Root resolution — 

as embodied in treaty 346 

treaties of foreign powers affecting China — 

resolution regarding limitations embodied in treaty 346 

resolution regarding publicity as adopted 378 

Chinese Eastern Railway : 

resolutions 381 

Commission of jurists, sec War, Laws of. 
Committee on Limitation of Armament : 

aircraft carrier proposals accepted 162 

aircraft, poison gas, and law of nations subcommittees au- 
thorized 28 

aircraft subcommittee report 203 

caliber of warship guns proposal accepted 119 

gas in war resolution adopted 202 

gas in war subcommittee, memorandum 190 

laws of war commission limiting resolution adopted 254 

laws of war commission resolution adopted 236 

naval tonnage subcommittee 99 

procedure 16, 46, 164, 222 

publicity of work of subcommittee 17 

record of proceedings, form , 16 

statements for the press 29, 63, 79, 100 

subcommittee for drafting resolution regarding submarines — 

appointment of members 144 

report presented 166 

Root resolutions referred to 139 

submarine resolutions adopted 171, 180, 190 

technical committee 16, 30 



386 INDEX. 

Conference on Limitation of Armament : Page. 

invitation to Belgium, Netherlands, and Portugal 3 

invitation to China 2 

invitation . to Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan 1 

report to the President by American delegation 257 

limitation of land armament 257 

limitation of naval armament 260 

American plan 261 

capital ship ratio 264 

fortifications in the Pacific 265 

case of the Mutsu 267 

France and Italy 268 

auxiliary craft 269 

naval treaty , 276 

rules for control of new agencies of warfare 278 

commission to revise rules of war 283 

aircraft 284 

treaties and resolutions approved and adopted 291 

F. 

Fortifications in the Pacific : 

report to the President by American delegation 265 

treaty provisions 301 

Four power treaty, see Pacific islands treaty. 
France : 

aircraft carrier construction (de Bon) 161 

aircraft construction and use (Sarraut) 226 

aircraft in warfare (de Bon) 230,232 

gas in. war resolution (Sarraut) 199 

invitation to conference--, 1 

limitation of auxiliary craft (de Bon) 113 

limitation of land armament (Briand) 21,23,27 

limitation of naval armament — 

French demands (de Bon) 41,44 

Hughes-Briand correspondence . 36 

submarine articles by Capt. Castex — 

discussed by Jusserand (France) 239,244 

discussed by Lee (Great Britain) 181,240,244 

discussed by Sarraut (France) 181 

quoted by Lee (Great Britain) 148 

repudiated: by de Bon (France) 150 

repudiated by Sarraut (France) 152 

submarine construction (de Bon) v. 71,95 

submarine construction (Sarraut) 101, 107 

submarine warfare resolutions (de Bon) 121, 150, 174 

submarine warfare resolutions (Sarraut) 117,136,152,172 

submarines in warfare (de Bon) 64, 78 

submarines in warfare (Sarraut) 54,80,88 

see also Treaties. 

Gas in war : 

laws of war commission not to consider question — , 

resolution 254 

resolution adopted 254 

memorandum of subcommittee 190 

report of Advisory Committee of American Delegation 191 

report of General Board of United States Navy 193 

resolution prohibiting 195, 198 

adopted by committee 202 



INDEX. 



387 



Gas in war — Continued. 

laws of war commission not to consider question — Continued. 

discussion by — Page. 

Balfour (Great Britain) 199 

Kato (Japan) 202 

Root (United States) 195,196 

Sarraut (France) 199 

Schanzer (Italy) 196 

treaty prohibiting 248, 327 

discussion by — 

Balfour (Great Britain) 250 

Hughes (United States) 252,253 

Root (United States) : 250 

Salmond (New Zealand) 252,253 

Schanzer (Italy) 251,253 

report to the President by American delegation 280 

General Board of United States Navy, report on gas warfare 193 

Great Britain : 

aircraft carrier construction (Lee) 160 

aircraft carrier limitations (Lee) 119 

aircraft construction and use (Balfour) 225 

aircraft in warfare (Lee) 168,369,220 

Castex submarine articles (Lee) 148,181,240,244 

future conference on armament (Balfour) 1 45 

future conference on armament (Lee) * ! 45 

gas in war resolution (Balfour) 199 

invitation to conference 1 

laws of war (Balfour) 220 

laws of war commission (Balfour) _. 220,221 

limitation of auxiliary craft (Lee) 113,114 

limitation of auxiliary craft resolution amended (Lee) 113 

limitation of land armament (Balfour) 19,23 

limitation of naval armament — 

caliber of warship guns (Lee) 119 

provisional agreement 32 

submarine construction (Balfour) 104,110 

submarine warfare resolutions — 

Balfour 117, 121, 134, 141, 178 

Geddes 176 

Lee 146, 168, 175 

submarines and noxious gases treaty (Balfour) 251 

submarines in warfare — 

Balfour 73, 84, 104 

Lee . 48,53 

record of views of British Empire delegation 49, 93 

see also Australia — Canada — New Zealand — Treaties. 

I. 

Insular possessions, see Pacific islands treaty. 

International law, conference to establish rules 127 

see also War, Laws of. 

Island of Yap, see Yap, Island of. 

Italy : 

aircraft carrier construction (Acton) 159 

aircraft construction and use (Schanzer) 224 

aircraft in warfare (Schanzer) 230 

future conference on armament (Schanzer) '. 45 

gas in war resolution (Schanzer) 196 

invitation to conference 1 

laws of war (Schanzer)__, 220 



388 INDEX. 

Italy — Continued. Page. 

limitation of auxiliary craft (Acton) 114 

limitation of auxiliary craft resolution accepted (Acton) 136 

limitation of land armament (Schanzer) 20,22 

relation to States of central Europe (Schanzer) 28 

submarine construction (Schanzer) 96 

submarine warfare resolutions (Schanzer)- 117,